Pub Date : 2025-09-29DOI: 10.1177/00220027251386938
{"title":"Bruce Russett Award for Article of the Year in JCR for 2024","authors":"","doi":"10.1177/00220027251386938","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251386938","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145183000","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-19DOI: 10.1177/00220027251374830
Tugba Bozcaga, Fotini Christia
Whether armed or unarmed, Islamist non-state actors have a reputation for winning over citizens’ support and spreading their ideas through service delivery, reflecting a worldwide trend in non-state service provision. While existing research attributes the notable variation in service provision to strategic targeting, we argue that service allocation is also highly dependent on a non-state actor’s ability to marshal resources through local economic elites. Our findings demonstrate that service provision by religious non-state actors is more likely in areas and periods where there is associational involvement among elite supporters at the local level. For our inferences, we examine the spatial and temporal variation in the service delivery of a major Islamist group in Turkey. We use original data on non-state service infrastructure, local business associations, charitable endowments, and economic development, as proxied by average nightlight density, along with data on public service infrastructure and historical state-building institutions.
{"title":"Imams and Patrons: Service Provision by Islamist Non-State Actors","authors":"Tugba Bozcaga, Fotini Christia","doi":"10.1177/00220027251374830","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251374830","url":null,"abstract":"Whether armed or unarmed, Islamist non-state actors have a reputation for winning over citizens’ support and spreading their ideas through service delivery, reflecting a worldwide trend in non-state service provision. While existing research attributes the notable variation in service provision to strategic targeting, we argue that service allocation is also highly dependent on a non-state actor’s ability to marshal resources through local economic elites. Our findings demonstrate that service provision by religious non-state actors is more likely in areas and periods where there is associational involvement among elite supporters at the local level. For our inferences, we examine the spatial and temporal variation in the service delivery of a major Islamist group in Turkey. We use original data on non-state service infrastructure, local business associations, charitable endowments, and economic development, as proxied by average nightlight density, along with data on public service infrastructure and historical state-building institutions.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"44 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145093619","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-08DOI: 10.1177/00220027251375624
Michael J. Soules, Mark Berlin
Why do some rebel groups mobilize around diverse grievances, while others organize around a narrow set of issues? Rebels can widen their recruitment pool by appealing to broader segments of society. However, groups that represent multiple interests are often plagued by infighting and low cohesion, as members disagree about which issues to prioritize. We contend that radical Islamist groups are more likely to recruit with more diverse claims than other rebel organizations. This is because radical Islamist organizations attempt to unite diverse interests through a shared religious identity and use disparate grievances to promote the idea that Islam is under threat. Moreover, the frequent adoption of transnational identities by radical Islamist groups often places them in conflict with local, regional, and international actors, widening the scope of organizational grievances. We find support for these arguments by leveraging novel data on the recruitment practices of 232 rebel movements across the world.
{"title":"A Call to Arms: How Rebel Groups Choose Their Recruitment Appeals","authors":"Michael J. Soules, Mark Berlin","doi":"10.1177/00220027251375624","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251375624","url":null,"abstract":"Why do some rebel groups mobilize around diverse grievances, while others organize around a narrow set of issues? Rebels can widen their recruitment pool by appealing to broader segments of society. However, groups that represent multiple interests are often plagued by infighting and low cohesion, as members disagree about which issues to prioritize. We contend that radical Islamist groups are more likely to recruit with more diverse claims than other rebel organizations. This is because radical Islamist organizations attempt to unite diverse interests through a shared religious identity and use disparate grievances to promote the idea that Islam is under threat. Moreover, the frequent adoption of transnational identities by radical Islamist groups often places them in conflict with local, regional, and international actors, widening the scope of organizational grievances. We find support for these arguments by leveraging novel data on the recruitment practices of 232 rebel movements across the world.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"55 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145017157","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-01DOI: 10.1177/00220027251374195
Eric Keels, J. Michael Greig
While government corruption is often cited as a reason for poor military performance, little empirical attention has been devoted to understanding how governance structures influence corruption’s impact. To address this gap, we introduce a theory of how corruption undermines military efficacy in armed conflicts, arguing that regime type plays a critical role in shaping the impact of corruption on military performance. We focus specifically on public sector theft and embezzlement on fighting effectiveness. This type of corruption brings especially pernicious effects as it stokes morale problems among military personnel and weakens oversight of fighting effectiveness. To test our theory, we examine the outcomes of all lethal military interstate disputes (MIDS) and intrastate armed conflicts through 2014. Bridging the comparative politics and military effectiveness literatures, our results offer greater insight into how autocratic policies hinder armed forces as well as the need for stronger civilian oversight to ensure battlefield efficacy.
{"title":"Paper Tigers: Assessing the Role of Corruption in Shaping Conflict Outcomes","authors":"Eric Keels, J. Michael Greig","doi":"10.1177/00220027251374195","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251374195","url":null,"abstract":"While government corruption is often cited as a reason for poor military performance, little empirical attention has been devoted to understanding how governance structures influence corruption’s impact. To address this gap, we introduce a theory of how corruption undermines military efficacy in armed conflicts, arguing that regime type plays a critical role in shaping the impact of corruption on military performance. We focus specifically on public sector theft and embezzlement on fighting effectiveness. This type of corruption brings especially pernicious effects as it stokes morale problems among military personnel and weakens oversight of fighting effectiveness. To test our theory, we examine the outcomes of all lethal military interstate disputes (MIDS) and intrastate armed conflicts through 2014. Bridging the comparative politics and military effectiveness literatures, our results offer greater insight into how autocratic policies hinder armed forces as well as the need for stronger civilian oversight to ensure battlefield efficacy.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144927829","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-30DOI: 10.1177/00220027251366585
Barış Arı, Luke Abbs, Phillip Nelson
Political militias are active in most civil wars, yet their impact on peace processes is largely overlooked. Building on principal-agent logic, we argue that the incentives to delegate violence to political militias have downstream consequences for the likelihood of peace negotiations. On one hand, battlefield violence by militias can complicate the bargaining. On the other hand, the higher use of civilian victimization by political militias may backfire, eventually bringing international pressure on the unwilling parties to agree to talks. We combine data on peace negotiations between government-rebel dyads with data on militia activities in Africa. We find that militia violence against government and rebel forces is associated with a decrease in the likelihood of negotiations. When militias target civilians, however, mediated peace talks with third-party involvement become more likely. We complement these findings using fine-grained data in a focused case analysis of Sudan and South Sudan.
{"title":"Spoiling the Broth? The Impact of Militia Violence on Peace Negotiations","authors":"Barış Arı, Luke Abbs, Phillip Nelson","doi":"10.1177/00220027251366585","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251366585","url":null,"abstract":"Political militias are active in most civil wars, yet their impact on peace processes is largely overlooked. Building on principal-agent logic, we argue that the incentives to delegate violence to political militias have downstream consequences for the likelihood of peace negotiations. On one hand, battlefield violence by militias can complicate the bargaining. On the other hand, the higher use of civilian victimization by political militias may backfire, eventually bringing international pressure on the unwilling parties to agree to talks. We combine data on peace negotiations between government-rebel dyads with data on militia activities in Africa. We find that militia violence against government and rebel forces is associated with a decrease in the likelihood of negotiations. When militias target civilians, however, mediated peace talks with third-party involvement become more likely. We complement these findings using fine-grained data in a focused case analysis of Sudan and South Sudan.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144919319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-27DOI: 10.1177/00220027251372059
Dongan Tan, Hoan La
Why do some countries recover swiftly after economic sanctions are lifted, while others face prolonged stagnation? Despite extensive research on the initiation and effectiveness of sanctions, their aftermath remains understudied. This study develops a theoretical framework to explain post-sanctions economic recovery, focusing on three key determinants: domestic institutional quality, international investment, and sanctions characteristics. Using duration analysis on data from 1960 to 2023, we find that government effectiveness accelerates long-term recovery, while foreign direct investment drives short-term rebounds. Sanctions characteristics yield mixed results: sanction costs show no significant effect, while success and duration are associated with slower recovery. These findings contribute to a broader understanding of how states rebuild after economic disruption, highlighting the role of institutional resilience and external economic reintegration. By bridging the gap between sanctions and economic resilience research, this study provides insights for policymakers seeking to mitigate long-term economic costs and design more effective recovery strategies.
{"title":"The Determinants of Post-Sanctions Economic Recovery","authors":"Dongan Tan, Hoan La","doi":"10.1177/00220027251372059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251372059","url":null,"abstract":"Why do some countries recover swiftly after economic sanctions are lifted, while others face prolonged stagnation? Despite extensive research on the initiation and effectiveness of sanctions, their aftermath remains understudied. This study develops a theoretical framework to explain post-sanctions economic recovery, focusing on three key determinants: domestic institutional quality, international investment, and sanctions characteristics. Using duration analysis on data from 1960 to 2023, we find that government effectiveness accelerates long-term recovery, while foreign direct investment drives short-term rebounds. Sanctions characteristics yield mixed results: sanction costs show no significant effect, while success and duration are associated with slower recovery. These findings contribute to a broader understanding of how states rebuild after economic disruption, highlighting the role of institutional resilience and external economic reintegration. By bridging the gap between sanctions and economic resilience research, this study provides insights for policymakers seeking to mitigate long-term economic costs and design more effective recovery strategies.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144905759","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-27DOI: 10.1177/00220027251365535
Michael R. Kenwick, Sumin Lee, Burcu Kolcak
Veterans are disproportionately represented among political elites, and the question of whether military experience shapes their behavior is a central puzzle in the study of international relations. Existing theories link military experience with hawkish or dovish foreign policy preferences. Rather than determining their positions on the use of force ex ante, we argue that domain-specific knowledge and their elevated social status will make veterans less likely to change their expressed positions, especially in response to wartime casualties. We test our argument by analyzing Congressional speeches referencing the American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, finding strong support for our expectations. Our core insight is that veteran politicians are partisans first and veterans second, and that military experience may say more about how they update, rather than establish, their political positions.
{"title":"Military Experience and Casualty Sensitivity in Elite Discourse: Evidence From the U.S. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan","authors":"Michael R. Kenwick, Sumin Lee, Burcu Kolcak","doi":"10.1177/00220027251365535","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251365535","url":null,"abstract":"Veterans are disproportionately represented among political elites, and the question of whether military experience shapes their behavior is a central puzzle in the study of international relations. Existing theories link military experience with hawkish or dovish foreign policy preferences. Rather than determining their positions on the use of force ex ante, we argue that domain-specific knowledge and their elevated social status will make veterans less likely to change their expressed positions, especially in response to wartime casualties. We test our argument by analyzing Congressional speeches referencing the American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, finding strong support for our expectations. Our core insight is that veteran politicians are partisans first and veterans second, and that military experience may say more about how they update, rather than establish, their political positions.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"82 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144910691","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-20DOI: 10.1177/00220027251370091
Marco Alcocer
Violence against law enforcement by criminal organizations is pervasive in Latin America yet largely unexplored. What explains why and where law enforcement is violently attacked, who is targeted, and how they are killed? This article contends that conflicts between criminal organizations incentivize warring organizations to attack law enforcement, particularly local officers, with more brazen violence. Two original datasets on killings of law enforcement in Mexico show that killings are overwhelmingly of local officers and most frequently perpetrated through coordinated attacks, not confrontations, executions, or kidnappings. Using data on cartels, I first document a strong association between criminal conflicts and the killing of law enforcement officers, and find that the association is driven by killings of state and municipal officers rather than federal officers enforcing the government crackdown. I further show that criminal conflicts increase brazen killings and killings of officers while off duty.
{"title":"Criminal Conflicts and the Killing of Law Enforcement Officers in Mexico","authors":"Marco Alcocer","doi":"10.1177/00220027251370091","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251370091","url":null,"abstract":"Violence against law enforcement by criminal organizations is pervasive in Latin America yet largely unexplored. What explains why and where law enforcement is violently attacked, who is targeted, and how they are killed? This article contends that conflicts between criminal organizations incentivize warring organizations to attack law enforcement, particularly local officers, with more brazen violence. Two original datasets on killings of law enforcement in Mexico show that killings are overwhelmingly of local officers and most frequently perpetrated through coordinated attacks, not confrontations, executions, or kidnappings. Using data on cartels, I first document a strong association between criminal conflicts and the killing of law enforcement officers, and find that the association is driven by killings of state and municipal officers rather than federal officers enforcing the government crackdown. I further show that criminal conflicts increase brazen killings and killings of officers while off duty.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144898811","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-12DOI: 10.1177/00220027251363229
Lauren Sukin, Stephen Herzog, Alexander Lanoszka
Decades of scholarship hold that great powers shore up global confidence during crises with strong demonstrations of resolve. A much smaller literature critiques these assumptions, suggesting that restraint may strengthen confidence. When and why do restraint or resolve reassure, and for whom? In light of Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, we appraise early U.S. attempts to reassure allies and partners using public opinion surveys in 24 countries on six continents. Our novel data, which cover rarely surveyed publics, illuminates conditions under which restraint or resolve reassure. We introduce theoretical mechanisms that predict individuals’ propensity to be reassured by resolve or restraint: prior beliefs about the use of force and geopolitical positioning. The results challenge dominant scholarly narratives. Respondents worldwide were reassured by restraint. Forgoing direct intervention in the Russo-Ukrainian War strengthened the U.S.-led order, successfully balancing NATO members’ interests with those of U.S. Indo-Pacific and Global South partners.
{"title":"Winning Hearts and Minds? How the United States Reassured During the Russo-Ukrainian War","authors":"Lauren Sukin, Stephen Herzog, Alexander Lanoszka","doi":"10.1177/00220027251363229","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251363229","url":null,"abstract":"Decades of scholarship hold that great powers shore up global confidence during crises with strong demonstrations of resolve. A much smaller literature critiques these assumptions, suggesting that restraint may strengthen confidence. When and why do restraint or resolve reassure, and for whom? In light of Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, we appraise early U.S. attempts to reassure allies and partners using public opinion surveys in 24 countries on six continents. Our novel data, which cover rarely surveyed publics, illuminates conditions under which restraint or resolve reassure. We introduce theoretical mechanisms that predict individuals’ propensity to be reassured by resolve or restraint: prior beliefs about the use of force and geopolitical positioning. The results challenge dominant scholarly narratives. Respondents worldwide were reassured by restraint. Forgoing direct intervention in the Russo-Ukrainian War strengthened the U.S.-led order, successfully balancing NATO members’ interests with those of U.S. Indo-Pacific and Global South partners.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"193 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144898855","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-11DOI: 10.1177/00220027251365162
Edward D. Mansfield, Jon C. W. Pevehouse
Nationalism is on the rise throughout the world. Scholars and practitioners have expressed concern about the effects of rising nationalism on international cooperation, arguing that nationalism poses a risk to the liberal international economic order. Other observers maintain that nationalism need not be associated with trade protectionism. Yet there has been little cross-country research on the effects of nationalism on trade cooperation. We argue that nationalism has led to a reluctance to sign trade agreements in democracies, but that its effects on trade policy in autocracies are ambiguous. Nationalism in the public is associated with antipathy toward trade. Since democratically elected governments must be responsive to their constituents or risk losing office, nationalist governments in democratic countries tend to be protectionist. We find a strong negative relationship between nationalism and signing trade agreements in democracies. These findings shed light on the dynamics of trade and globalization in the current era of nationalism.
{"title":"Nationalism, Regime Type, and Trade Agreements","authors":"Edward D. Mansfield, Jon C. W. Pevehouse","doi":"10.1177/00220027251365162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251365162","url":null,"abstract":"Nationalism is on the rise throughout the world. Scholars and practitioners have expressed concern about the effects of rising nationalism on international cooperation, arguing that nationalism poses a risk to the liberal international economic order. Other observers maintain that nationalism need not be associated with trade protectionism. Yet there has been little cross-country research on the effects of nationalism on trade cooperation. We argue that nationalism has led to a reluctance to sign trade agreements in democracies, but that its effects on trade policy in autocracies are ambiguous. Nationalism in the public is associated with antipathy toward trade. Since democratically elected governments must be responsive to their constituents or risk losing office, nationalist governments in democratic countries tend to be protectionist. We find a strong negative relationship between nationalism and signing trade agreements in democracies. These findings shed light on the dynamics of trade and globalization in the current era of nationalism.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144898857","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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