<p>Approaching the May 2023 Turkish presidential and assembly elections seemed to promise a challenging situation for the incumbent Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (<i>Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi</i>, AKP). The significant influx of refugees since the onset of the Syrian civil war introduced a reactive public agenda marked by occasional violent clashes in neighbourhoods with high refugee populations. This eventually spilled over to the national political agenda. A new political party, the Victory Party (Zafer Partisi, ZP), emerged with an anti-Syrian sentiment platform, gaining traction amongst young voters and expanding its electoral appeal. After the 2018 elections, the opposition parties united under the Nation Alliance (<i>Millet İttifakı</i>, MI), bringing together social democrats, liberals, nationalists and pro-Islamist conservatives to broaden the opposition's appeal and resistance to the ruling AKP. Additionally, the Erdoğan government's policy performance was also deteriorating. The economy deteriorated due to the President's reliance on strict monetary controls and disregard for market dynamics, leading to a depreciating national currency. The opposition's control of the largest cities since 2019 limited the cabinet's ability to regulate projects and manage clientelist networks. The resulting insecurity and vulnerability tarnished the government's image as a stability and good governance provider. The twin earthquakes on 6 February, 3 months before the elections, exacerbated the administration's failure to respond effectively to the disaster. The affected southeastern provinces, home to nearly 10% of the population, suffered extensive loss of life and infrastructure damage.</p><p>The AKP's 21-year rule seemed to be ending due to poor performance in economics and democratic governance, leading to a potential electoral defeat. However, Erdoğan won the presidency in the second round, and his People's Alliance (Cumhur İttifakı, CI) secured a comfortable margin for controlling the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, TBMM).1 The question remains: what factors contributed to Erdoğan's remarkable survival against all odds? Who were Erdoğan's supporters, and on what issue bases did they cast their votes for him?2</p><p>I examine the factors contributing to Erdoğan's re-election using individual-level post-election data and I argue that his success was primarily based on his performance in various policy areas, such as protecting moral values and easing the use of turban in public spaces, as well as his handling of security and foreign policy. However, his performance in other areas, such as resolving the Kurdish problem, reducing inflation, providing economic welfare and addressing the LGBTQ community's demands, was perceived as relatively low. This duality in his performance allowed him to strategically shift the agenda in favour of more advantageous issue areas, which were favoured by lar
{"title":"The Unlikely Survival of Erdoğan in Turkey's May 2023 Elections","authors":"Ali Çarkoğlu","doi":"10.1111/jcms.13655","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jcms.13655","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Approaching the May 2023 Turkish presidential and assembly elections seemed to promise a challenging situation for the incumbent Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (<i>Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi</i>, AKP). The significant influx of refugees since the onset of the Syrian civil war introduced a reactive public agenda marked by occasional violent clashes in neighbourhoods with high refugee populations. This eventually spilled over to the national political agenda. A new political party, the Victory Party (Zafer Partisi, ZP), emerged with an anti-Syrian sentiment platform, gaining traction amongst young voters and expanding its electoral appeal. After the 2018 elections, the opposition parties united under the Nation Alliance (<i>Millet İttifakı</i>, MI), bringing together social democrats, liberals, nationalists and pro-Islamist conservatives to broaden the opposition's appeal and resistance to the ruling AKP. Additionally, the Erdoğan government's policy performance was also deteriorating. The economy deteriorated due to the President's reliance on strict monetary controls and disregard for market dynamics, leading to a depreciating national currency. The opposition's control of the largest cities since 2019 limited the cabinet's ability to regulate projects and manage clientelist networks. The resulting insecurity and vulnerability tarnished the government's image as a stability and good governance provider. The twin earthquakes on 6 February, 3 months before the elections, exacerbated the administration's failure to respond effectively to the disaster. The affected southeastern provinces, home to nearly 10% of the population, suffered extensive loss of life and infrastructure damage.</p><p>The AKP's 21-year rule seemed to be ending due to poor performance in economics and democratic governance, leading to a potential electoral defeat. However, Erdoğan won the presidency in the second round, and his People's Alliance (Cumhur İttifakı, CI) secured a comfortable margin for controlling the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, TBMM).\u00001 The question remains: what factors contributed to Erdoğan's remarkable survival against all odds? Who were Erdoğan's supporters, and on what issue bases did they cast their votes for him?\u00002</p><p>I examine the factors contributing to Erdoğan's re-election using individual-level post-election data and I argue that his success was primarily based on his performance in various policy areas, such as protecting moral values and easing the use of turban in public spaces, as well as his handling of security and foreign policy. However, his performance in other areas, such as resolving the Kurdish problem, reducing inflation, providing economic welfare and addressing the LGBTQ community's demands, was perceived as relatively low. This duality in his performance allowed him to strategically shift the agenda in favour of more advantageous issue areas, which were favoured by lar","PeriodicalId":51369,"journal":{"name":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","volume":"62 S1","pages":"162-173"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jcms.13655","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141862647","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>Like other conflict-affected states, the history of presidential elections in the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) is characterized by significant political tension centred around the Cyprus problem. The 1960 Constitution and London–Zurich agreements led to a dysfunctional and ‘quasi-state’ state (Constantinou, <span>2006</span>), and the period from 1960 to 1963 exemplified the state's weaknesses and the negative impact of the Constitution (Emilianides, <span>2003</span>, p. 175). Following the Greek junta coup in July 1974, Turkey invaded the island and continues to occupy 37% of its territory, resulting in a de facto division that remains to this day. Other pivotal events, such as the 1983 unilateral declaration of independence by Turkish Cypriots, resulting in the formation of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC), which remains unrecognized except by Turkey, further complicate the theoretical pursuit of a settlement based on a Bizonal Bicommunal Federation (BBF). Negotiations, despite their challenges, were always aiming for a commonly accepted BBF settlement. However, the situation deteriorated following the collapse of the Crans Montana talks in 2017 and was further worsened with Ersin Tatar's 2020 election, as the Turkish Cypriot narrative shifted towards a two-state solution and recognition of the ‘TRNC’, driven by Turkey's militarized foreign policy (Adamides, <span>2022a</span>).</p><p>In 2003, the opening of the crossing points allowed for bicommunal interaction for the first time since 1974, and in 2004, Cyprus entered the European Union (EU), albeit divided and with the EU <i>acquis</i> only applying to the RoC government-controlled areas. In this historical context, it is worth noting the RoC's uniqueness in the EU as the only member state with a presidential system, whereby the President serves as both head of state and head of government. This dual role, particularly in the absence of a Turkish-Cypriot Vice President, limits the checks and balances, thereby granting the Cypriot President considerable power over domestic political affairs, surpassing that of any other EU leader (Ker-Lindsay, <span>2006</span>).</p><p>Inevitably, the Cypriot political landscape, especially the presidential elections, has been dominated by the Cyprus problem (Adamides, <span>2020</span>). Until the late 2000s, electoral decisions were influenced by the parties' stance on the Cyprus conflict, making it almost certain that only one of their candidates would become President, thus containing the emergence of independent candidates. However, over the past decade, culminating in the 2023 elections, voting behaviour shifted, with issues such as migration and the economy gaining importance and even surpassing the prominence of the Cyprus problem. This allowed for party competition on multiple issues where the traditional parties, burdened by corruption scandals and economic and societal challenges, are not necessarily able to prevail. New parties eme
{"title":"The 2023 Cypriot Presidential Elections: Shifts in Domestic and Regional Dynamics","authors":"Constantinos Adamides","doi":"10.1111/jcms.13667","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jcms.13667","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Like other conflict-affected states, the history of presidential elections in the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) is characterized by significant political tension centred around the Cyprus problem. The 1960 Constitution and London–Zurich agreements led to a dysfunctional and ‘quasi-state’ state (Constantinou, <span>2006</span>), and the period from 1960 to 1963 exemplified the state's weaknesses and the negative impact of the Constitution (Emilianides, <span>2003</span>, p. 175). Following the Greek junta coup in July 1974, Turkey invaded the island and continues to occupy 37% of its territory, resulting in a de facto division that remains to this day. Other pivotal events, such as the 1983 unilateral declaration of independence by Turkish Cypriots, resulting in the formation of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC), which remains unrecognized except by Turkey, further complicate the theoretical pursuit of a settlement based on a Bizonal Bicommunal Federation (BBF). Negotiations, despite their challenges, were always aiming for a commonly accepted BBF settlement. However, the situation deteriorated following the collapse of the Crans Montana talks in 2017 and was further worsened with Ersin Tatar's 2020 election, as the Turkish Cypriot narrative shifted towards a two-state solution and recognition of the ‘TRNC’, driven by Turkey's militarized foreign policy (Adamides, <span>2022a</span>).</p><p>In 2003, the opening of the crossing points allowed for bicommunal interaction for the first time since 1974, and in 2004, Cyprus entered the European Union (EU), albeit divided and with the EU <i>acquis</i> only applying to the RoC government-controlled areas. In this historical context, it is worth noting the RoC's uniqueness in the EU as the only member state with a presidential system, whereby the President serves as both head of state and head of government. This dual role, particularly in the absence of a Turkish-Cypriot Vice President, limits the checks and balances, thereby granting the Cypriot President considerable power over domestic political affairs, surpassing that of any other EU leader (Ker-Lindsay, <span>2006</span>).</p><p>Inevitably, the Cypriot political landscape, especially the presidential elections, has been dominated by the Cyprus problem (Adamides, <span>2020</span>). Until the late 2000s, electoral decisions were influenced by the parties' stance on the Cyprus conflict, making it almost certain that only one of their candidates would become President, thus containing the emergence of independent candidates. However, over the past decade, culminating in the 2023 elections, voting behaviour shifted, with issues such as migration and the economy gaining importance and even surpassing the prominence of the Cyprus problem. This allowed for party competition on multiple issues where the traditional parties, burdened by corruption scandals and economic and societal challenges, are not necessarily able to prevail. New parties eme","PeriodicalId":51369,"journal":{"name":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","volume":"62 S1","pages":"174-185"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jcms.13667","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141862645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Industrial policy has been enjoying a significant comeback. In the European Union (EU), ‘important projects of common European interest’ (IPCEIs) have become a template for a new, value chain‐oriented EU industrial policy. But what does this mean for convergence between ‘peripheral’ and ‘core’ member states? Based on the understanding that convergent development requires opportunities for ‘learning in production’ to accumulate the technological capabilities that are necessary for economic upgrading within value chains, this article advances an in‐depth analysis of the implementation of this EU industrial policy template. It argues that IPCEIs have so far offered peripheral countries and their firms few opportunities for learning in production within value chains. In this light, there is a risk that IPCEIs might have limited or even detrimental effects on the prospects for convergence within the EU. The article concludes by considering how this template could be made more conducive to convergent development.
{"title":"EU Industrial Policy and Convergent Development in EU Peripheries: An Assessment of the ‘Important Project of Common European Interest’ (IPCEI) Template","authors":"Henrique Lopes‐Valença","doi":"10.1111/jcms.13664","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13664","url":null,"abstract":"Industrial policy has been enjoying a significant comeback. In the European Union (EU), ‘important projects of common European interest’ (IPCEIs) have become a template for a new, value chain‐oriented EU industrial policy. But what does this mean for convergence between ‘peripheral’ and ‘core’ member states? Based on the understanding that convergent development requires opportunities for ‘learning in production’ to accumulate the technological capabilities that are necessary for economic upgrading within value chains, this article advances an in‐depth analysis of the implementation of this EU industrial policy template. It argues that IPCEIs have so far offered peripheral countries and their firms few opportunities for learning in production within value chains. In this light, there is a risk that IPCEIs might have limited or even detrimental effects on the prospects for convergence within the EU. The article concludes by considering how this template could be made more conducive to convergent development.","PeriodicalId":51369,"journal":{"name":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141862651","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>In December 2022, the European Parliament (EP) was confronted with the biggest corruption scandal in its history. The Belgian police carried out a series of searches, during which they seized more than €1.5 million in cash and arrested several members of the EP (MEPs), former MEPs and members of their entourage.1 It soon became apparent that all these actors, sheltered in part by bogus non-governmental organizations (NGOs), had sold their influence to third countries – for example, Qatar and Morocco (Fernández-Molina and Khakee, <span>2024</span>). The EP, which usually has little audience in the media, was suddenly exposed at length on the front page. This unprecedented crisis has confirmed the concerns of some MEPs, scholars and think tankers, who have long been calling for tighter control over the behaviour of MEPs, the presence of interest groups in the EP and the influence of foreign countries (Alemanno, <span>2017</span>; Chalmers, <span>2019</span>; Costa, <span>2019</span>).</p><p>The Qatargate scandal has been an opportunity to put three issues back on the European Union (EU) agenda. The first is that the EP is lagging behind in the regulation of the behaviour of its members and of the interest groups active in its premises, which must be constantly adapted to the increasing powers and influence of the institution. The second is the difficulty encountered by the EU institutions in agreeing on instruments and procedures to improve transparency and probity, even though the issue has been on the agenda of the von der Leyen Commission since its investiture. The third is the growing pressure exerted by certain third countries on the Union's institutions, which carries the risk not only of disrupting the way they operate and influencing their decisions but also of undermining their legitimacy in the eyes of the public.</p><p>Brussels is the second place in the world – after Washington, D.C. – for both lobbying and diplomatic activities (Coen and Richardson, <span>2009</span>). The recent annual report from the German-based NGO LobbyControl (<span>2024</span>) establishes that corporate lobbyists alone have spent some €1.3bn in 2023 to influence EU-based decision-making. According to the report, 80% of the lobbyists that met with Commission president Ursula von der Leyen came from the business sector. The challenges in terms of influence, transparency and probity are immense. This is particularly true when it comes to lobbying by third countries, which is currently poorly regulated and which involves players that are not very sensitive to the sanctions that lobbying firms or large companies could face if they were to break the rules. There is a tension here between the operation of democratic bodies, which demand transparency and probity, and diplomatic practices, which require confidentiality. Regulation becomes very complex when third-party states act in the grey area that exists between lobbying and diplomacy and play both sides (Sánchez
2022年12月，欧洲议会（EP）面临其历史上最大的腐败丑闻。比利时警方进行了一系列搜查，缴获了150多万欧元现金，并逮捕了几名欧洲议会议员、前欧洲议会议员及其随行人员很快就发现，所有这些行为者在某种程度上受到伪非政府组织（ngo）的庇护，把自己的影响力卖给了第三国——例如卡塔尔和摩洛哥（Fernández-Molina and Khakee, 2024）。通常在媒体上很少有观众的EP突然在头版上被详细曝光。这场前所未有的危机证实了一些欧洲议会议员、学者和智库的担忧，他们长期以来一直呼吁对欧洲议会议员的行为、欧洲议会中利益集团的存在和外国的影响进行更严格的控制(Alemanno, 2017；查尔默斯,2019;哥,2019)。卡塔尔门事件是将三个问题重新提上欧盟议程的机会。首先，欧洲议会在规范其成员和活跃在其内部的利益集团的行为方面落后，这些行为必须不断适应该机构日益增长的权力和影响。第二个问题是欧盟各机构在就提高透明度和诚信的工具和程序达成一致时遇到的困难，尽管这个问题自冯德莱恩委员会成立以来一直在其议程上。第三，某些第三国对欧盟机构施加的压力越来越大，这不仅有可能扰乱它们的运作方式和影响它们的决定，而且有可能破坏它们在公众眼中的合法性。布鲁塞尔是世界上第二大游说和外交活动的地方，仅次于华盛顿特区（科恩和理查森，2009）。总部位于德国的非政府组织“游说控制”（2024）最近的年度报告显示，仅企业游说者在2023年就花费了约13亿欧元来影响欧盟的决策。报告显示，与欧盟委员会主席乌苏拉·冯德莱恩会面的游说者中，80%来自商界。在影响力、透明度和廉洁方面的挑战是巨大的。在涉及第三国游说时尤其如此。目前，第三国游说监管不力，而且涉及的参与者对游说公司或大公司违反规则可能面临的制裁不太敏感。要求透明和廉洁的民主机构的运作与要求保密的外交惯例之间存在紧张关系。当第三方国家在游说和外交之间的灰色地带采取行动并发挥双方作用时，监管变得非常复杂（Sánchez et al., 2017）。认为在这个问题上没有采取任何行动是错误的：自20世纪90年代初以来，欧洲议会议员就经常讨论这个问题。随着欧盟发展新的能力，欧洲议会更多地参与决策（Costa和Brack， 2013），压力程度机械地增加。同样重要的是，卡塔尔门涉及非欧盟国家，这些国家越来越多地受到欧盟决策的影响——无论是在国家的公共形象、地区冲突，还是在人口流动、促进人权、能源或贸易协定等具体政策方面。在本文中，我们将首先回顾欧洲议会在历史上是如何解决利益代表和欧洲议会议员行为问题的。其次，我们将看到这场辩论在2019年欧洲选举后是如何重新启动的，以及卡塔尔门是如何推动改革的。我们将详细介绍欧洲议会采取的举措，以及最近创建的一个负责道德的新欧盟机构的方式。最后，我们将看到，情况远未结束，尽管提出了雄心勃勃的改革，但许多专家和行动者认为这些改革不足以应对挑战。自20世纪90年代初以来，欧洲议会权力的上升伴随着对其内部利益代表及其成员行为的监管的日益关注（Lehmann, 2009）。在一个纯粹的咨询机构中意义不大的事情，在一个参与决策过程的机构中变得至关重要（Schmidt, 2013）。对于欧洲议会来说，这首先是一个原则问题：确保其审议不受外部干涉的干扰。但这也是一个在-à-vis公民、国家领导人和其他机构面前的可信度问题。因此，欧洲议会逐渐规范了其内部的游说活动，并对欧洲议会议员施加了行为规则(Costa, 2009；格林伍德,2017)。加勒报告是欧洲议会管制游说团体活动的第一次尝试（1992年3月16日），但没有采取后续行动。 经过几年的激烈辩论，欧洲议会通过了福特和诺德曼报告（1996年7月16日），该报告强制要求所有欧洲议会议员披露其专业和有偿活动的细节，他们在工作人员或设备方面获得的财政支持以及捐助者的身份（Costa, 2009）。1996年，《议事规则》的附件还规定了访客（特别是游说者）获得永久通行证的程序和议会助理必须履行的义务。其目的是防止游说集团在他们的工资之外支付他们的工资，甚至不让那些不那么尽职的欧洲议会议员免费获得他们的工资。这一最初的监管框架在本世纪头十年得到了充实，每次丑闻发生后，规则都会收紧。2008年4月1日，欧洲议会通过了斯塔布报告，建立了一个登记册，以确保利益代表的资金和赞助人的透明度，并为他们制定了行为准则。委员会在自愿的基础上接受了共同登记册的原则。这些工具已经被修改了几次，变得更有约束力，并收集更详细的数据。自2021年起，欧洲议会、欧盟委员会和理事会共同使用该登记册。2016年，欧洲议会启动了新的议事规则改革。Corbett报告（2016年11月22日）建议禁止欧洲议会议员在其职权范围内开展游说活动，要求更详细地申报经济利益，并规定他们只能与注册的游说者会面，并将这些会面公开。报告建议，如果欧洲议会议员在任期结束后从事游说工作，应通知欧洲议会。他们还必须说明使用一般费用津贴的理由，并以书面承诺遵守行为守则。欧洲议会议员的活动也逐渐受到负责促进欧洲机构道德的各种机构的审查：OLAF（欧洲反欺诈办公室）、欧洲监察员、审计法院、欧洲法院，以及自2021年以来的欧洲检察官办公室（EPPO）。围绕欧洲议会议员行为监管和游说监管的讨论从来都不容易(Costa, 2009；Crespy and Parks, 2019)。随着时间的推移，这种进步是真实的，但它与各种游说团体对欧盟机构参与者施加的压力的发展不相称。这是因为欧洲议会促进道德的努力遇到了四个反复出现的困难——除了任何人都不愿将令人不快的规则强加于自己之外。首先，在代表性、合法性和正直性的国家概念之间存在着强烈的对比（Kergueno, 2024）。其次，组成欧洲议会的政治团体之间也存在类似的分歧：左翼团体一直强烈反对私人利益在欧洲议会中的代表，而半衰期右侧的成员则倾向于认为这是多元社会中的正常活动（Marshall, 2015）。第三，欧盟各机构之间的分歧阻碍了欧洲议会的努力。最后，欧洲议会议员一直在努力调和两个相互矛盾的要求：与社会期望保持一致的需要，以及独立决策和保护自己不受利益集团影响的需要。在2019年欧洲议会选举之后，欧洲议会重新开始在两个方面反思欧洲议会议员的透明度、廉洁性和独立性问题：建立一个负责道德的机构和外国干涉问题。在被欧洲议会选举之前，欧盟委员会主席乌苏拉·冯德莱恩承诺成立一个负责道德的新机构。为了权衡这一过程，欧洲议会委托进行了两项详细的研究。第一篇（Demmke et al., 2020）分析了成员国内部关于高层政治任命利益冲突的相关规则、政策和实践的有效性，并给出了一些政策建议。第二项研究（Frischhut, 2020）概述了当前欧盟环境中的透明度和诚信相关因素，并建议创建一个“独立的道德机构”。2021年9月16日，欧洲议会呼吁建立这样一个机构报告员Daniel Freund（绿党/欧洲自由联盟，德国）认为，现有的自我管制制度已经失败，需要一项新的倡议来赢回公民的信任。 在其决议（Kalniete, 2023）中，欧洲议会呼吁建立一个机构，该机构能够(1)根据第三方（记者、非政府组织、举报人和欧洲监察员）提供的信息，对可能存在
{"title":"The European Parliament and the Qatargate","authors":"Olivier Costa","doi":"10.1111/jcms.13666","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jcms.13666","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In December 2022, the European Parliament (EP) was confronted with the biggest corruption scandal in its history. The Belgian police carried out a series of searches, during which they seized more than €1.5 million in cash and arrested several members of the EP (MEPs), former MEPs and members of their entourage.\u00001 It soon became apparent that all these actors, sheltered in part by bogus non-governmental organizations (NGOs), had sold their influence to third countries – for example, Qatar and Morocco (Fernández-Molina and Khakee, <span>2024</span>). The EP, which usually has little audience in the media, was suddenly exposed at length on the front page. This unprecedented crisis has confirmed the concerns of some MEPs, scholars and think tankers, who have long been calling for tighter control over the behaviour of MEPs, the presence of interest groups in the EP and the influence of foreign countries (Alemanno, <span>2017</span>; Chalmers, <span>2019</span>; Costa, <span>2019</span>).</p><p>The Qatargate scandal has been an opportunity to put three issues back on the European Union (EU) agenda. The first is that the EP is lagging behind in the regulation of the behaviour of its members and of the interest groups active in its premises, which must be constantly adapted to the increasing powers and influence of the institution. The second is the difficulty encountered by the EU institutions in agreeing on instruments and procedures to improve transparency and probity, even though the issue has been on the agenda of the von der Leyen Commission since its investiture. The third is the growing pressure exerted by certain third countries on the Union's institutions, which carries the risk not only of disrupting the way they operate and influencing their decisions but also of undermining their legitimacy in the eyes of the public.</p><p>Brussels is the second place in the world – after Washington, D.C. – for both lobbying and diplomatic activities (Coen and Richardson, <span>2009</span>). The recent annual report from the German-based NGO LobbyControl (<span>2024</span>) establishes that corporate lobbyists alone have spent some €1.3bn in 2023 to influence EU-based decision-making. According to the report, 80% of the lobbyists that met with Commission president Ursula von der Leyen came from the business sector. The challenges in terms of influence, transparency and probity are immense. This is particularly true when it comes to lobbying by third countries, which is currently poorly regulated and which involves players that are not very sensitive to the sanctions that lobbying firms or large companies could face if they were to break the rules. There is a tension here between the operation of democratic bodies, which demand transparency and probity, and diplomatic practices, which require confidentiality. Regulation becomes very complex when third-party states act in the grey area that exists between lobbying and diplomacy and play both sides (Sánchez","PeriodicalId":51369,"journal":{"name":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","volume":"62 S1","pages":"76-87"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jcms.13666","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141862648","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>Over a decade of successive crises has transformed how major policy reforms are dealt with in the European Union (EU), with a more European Council (EUCO)-centred system of governance as a result (Kassim et al., <span>2017</span>; Smeets and Beach, <span>2022</span>). Whilst the EUCO's formal role is merely to ‘provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and define the general political directions and priorities thereof’ [Article 15 Treaty on the European Union (TEU)], the crises have created the expectation that the EUCO should be much more closely involved in policy discussions on major dossiers. Yet the governance arrangements that were developed out of the need to manage these crises appear to have more lasting impacts post-crisis, as expected by work on ‘crisisification’ and ‘emergency politics’ (Kreuder-Sonnen and White, <span>2022</span>; Puetter and Terranova, <span>2023</span>; Rhinard, <span>2019</span>). This literature provides us with important indicators for how this system works post-crisis. Apart from the crisis-induced speed and urgency, they point to a new, grand narrative of an EU system that is dealing with major, horizontal policy challenges that require a comprehensive (‘packaged’) policy response and that favour a centralized set of political and institutional actors (Rhinard, <span>2019</span>, p. 617; White, <span>2015</span>, p. 300). However, this literature does not specify what effects these features might have. Therefore, this article tackles the question of what happens when the EUCO-centred crisis management system is deployed in a post-crisis environment.</p><p>The year 2023, arguably, was the first moment in a long time that the EU was not in the midst of a severe crisis. There was still plenty of ‘crisis’ in its environment, first and foremost the Russian aggression in Ukraine. However, this became less a crisis <i>of</i> the EU system. The EUCO summit of 15 December 2022 represented a turning point in this regard. Two days earlier, energy ministers had managed to agree on a second package of measures to deal with the energy crisis, including a long-awaited Market Correction Mechanism (price cap) on gas (Smeets, <span>2023</span>). Three days later, the Council and European Parliament closed a deal on the central elements of the fit-for-55 package – the Emission Trading Scheme, Social Climate Fund and Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism – thereby locking in the main targets for the green transition. There was a sense of optimism amongst the leaders. For once, the Union appeared to be on track instead of in the depths of a crisis.</p><p>However, major medium- to long-term challenges to the EU remained, the most prominent at the time being the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), the massive US subsidy scheme to support investments in clean industry and renewable energy that was adopted in August 2022. Whilst the IRA did not trigger an immediate crisis, it was undoubtedly <i>Chefsache</i>, meaning
基于对这一过程因果动态的实证追踪，我们发现，如果没有危机的速度和紧迫性，EUCO系统引导重大政策发展的能力将更加有限。本节旨在评估零风险理论框架在后危机环境中的适用性。零风险理论基于对欧元区、移民、英国脱欧、新冠肺炎和能源危机的一系列深入实证案例研究。虽然这些危机改革过程在每种情况下都有独特的因素，但NIL框架试图综合因果动态的共同因素，即以欧盟为中心的系统如何将对危机的认识与承认需要某种形式的改革来解决危机（原因）与正在采取的重大政策改革（结果）联系起来。NIL详细说明了不同机构参与者在不同层面管理这些过程中所起的因果作用(Beach和Smeets, 2020；Smeets and Beach, 2022)。分析的重点是欧共体、欧盟委员会和部长理事会的机构三角关系。关于决策层面，NIL引入了控制室和机房之间的关键区别（或“差距”），控制室由EUCO本身和委员会和理事会内的政治层面组成，机房由委员会和理事会秘书处内的技术/行政层面和指定的成员国代表（Sherpa， Coreper大使）组成，代表领导人构建和管理决策过程。由于欧委会不能通过立法建议，也没有资源独自谈判政府间协定，因此必须向机房提供某种形式的授权。然而，控制室与机房在形式上是分开的，这给EUCO维持某种形式的控制带来了挑战，并为机房的进程注入了紧迫感。NIL展示了EUCO在危机中的驱动作用如何矛盾地导致了来自委员会、理事会秘书处和EUCO主席内阁的机构行为者非正式网络（PEC）的无形官僚手中的自主权和自由裁量权的增加，将控制和机房程序联系起来并管理机房谈判。NIL一词指的是机构行为体在以欧盟为中心的危机谈判中对进程的更大影响。NIL将典型危机改革谈判过程的因果动态分解为五个连续步骤，如图1所示。这一进程通常始于一个或多个机构行为者（委员会、临时经济委员会内阁和理事会秘书处）开始制定解决危机的可能办法。这个步骤可以在任务（步骤2）发生之前或之后发生。在某些情况下，欧共体正式责成委员会在欧共体结论中制定解决办法，而在其他情况下，机构行动者甚至在被要求之前就开始制定可能的解决办法。此外，该活动通常在整个流程中重复出现。潜在的解决方案通常以一揽子建议的形式提出，这些建议为手头的横向政策挑战提供了全面和雄心勃勃的答案（另见Puetter和Terranova， 2023）。下一步是由欧共体向机构行为者授予某种形式的授权。如果没有授权，机构提出的重大改革建议通常会在机房一级立即被拒绝。然而，在每次危机中，这项任务的具体形式和时间都是不同的。欧盟组织的任务是一个政治信号，表明国家元首和政府首脑对解决危机相关问题的重视。然后，这个信号可以被机房中的机构参与者用来保护谈判，并帮助他们弥合机构分歧。在危机期间，有必要通过在较小的关键行为体群体之间使用更非正式的决策模式来保护谈判。屏蔽降低了死锁、延迟和通常困扰高度突出问题的最小公分母动态的风险。其次，危机中的速度和紧迫性有助于弥合机构分歧，特别是政府间（欧盟组织、理事会）和超国家（欧盟委员会）之间的分歧。利用欧盟委员会提供的授权，委员会可以提供具体的政策建议，并利用来自最高层的政治信号，利用诸如“首脑们希望这样做”之类的论据，推动机房内的谈判。考虑到对速度的需求和问题的高度突出性（Chefsache），有必要让EUCO了解情况，并与机房流程密切相关。 欧盟委员会主席乌苏拉·冯德莱恩（Ursula von der Leyen, 2022a）在2022年9月的国情咨文演讲中自主地提出了设立主权基金的想法，之后她的工作是确定这一基金的规模、目的和模式。然而，在2022年12月欧盟峰会前夕，冯德莱恩（2022b）决定搁置这一想法，建议将其作为欧盟委员会计划于2023年夏季提交的多年度财政框架（MFF）中期审查的一部分提出。欧盟委员会（2020）已于2020年7月明确表示：“不应对多边框架进行中期审查”（附件6）。尽管如此，欧盟委员会仍在继续筹备中期审查。尽管冯·德莱恩直接警告说，没有一个成员国热衷于进行中期审查，但她还是让她最信任的两位副手——办公厅主任Björn Seibert和预算总司司长st<s:1>芬妮·里索——来完成这项工作。欧共体，特别是欧洲经济委员会主席查尔斯·米歇尔，正朝着相反的方向前进。欧盟委员会已责成委员会在2023年2月提出动员所有相关欧盟和国家工具的建议，而不是等到6月。特别委员会在其2023年1月23日关于欧盟组织的结论草案中提醒委员会注意这些要求。这些结论草案要求在几个问题上紧急开展工作：更多的国家援助空间，更灵活地使用现有的欧盟基金，相当于SURE（紧急情况下减轻失业风险的支持）计划，但最重要的是，“欧盟委员会关于欧洲主权基金的快速提案”（EUCO, 2023a, p. 2 - d）。这些结论已经在大使一级被抛弃了。荷兰大使罗伯特·德·格鲁特（Robert de Groot）使用了“服用类固醇的马克思”这一短语，但在幕后，德国大使也同样持批评态度（Politico, 2023）。不需要新的资金，因为第一个NGEU基金还有很多钱。在选举委员会撤退的同时，委员会主席先发制人地决定减少损失。欧洲主权基金的提议被简化为欧洲战略技术平台（STEP），这主要是对现有基金和工具的重新定位和重新标签（Commission, 2023b）。STEP提案仍然作为MFF中期审查的一部分提出（委员会，2023c）。由于STEP被刻意设计成一个空壳，几乎没有必要进行广泛的谈判。相反，谈判的重点是乌克兰基金和处理NGEU贷款利息支付大幅增加的级联机制。最后，领导人进一步简化了STEP一揽子计划，直到只剩下15亿欧元用于欧洲国防基金（EUCO, 2023e，第12页）。在这种危机后的环境中，委员会能够相当自主地制定主权基金和中期审查的轨道。然而，由于这项工作没有得到欧盟组织的强有力授权，因此没有取得多少成果。对于爱尔兰共和军的回应，情况正好相反。欧盟委员会不断敦促欧盟委员会提出各种评估和建议，但欧盟委员会仍然犹豫不决。欧盟委员会于2023年6月29日至30日正式邀请（即委托）“委员会……评估爱尔兰共和制对投资的影响以及欧盟采取应对措施的有效性”（第19页）。在10月26日至27日欧共体首脑会议前夕，委员会（2023年）有些不情愿地提出了这项初步影响评估。各方一致认为，这份来文缺乏实质内容(作者采访，2023年11月；2024年2月)。在筹备会议的讨论中，塞伯特敦促各国大使保持克制。毕竟，绿色投资是一件好事，而中国的保护主义则是一个更大的问题。与此同时，美国代表敦促欧盟也这么做（Euractiv, 2023）。事实上，欧盟委员会的代表们已经开始将现有的NGEU基金（其37%的绿色投资和20%的数字投资）作为欧洲的IRA。在10月24日的通讯中，委员会（2023年）已经从敲响警钟变成称赞爱尔兰共和军是“一个受欢迎的发展”（第14页）。欧盟也有点不情愿地照办了。它邀请欧盟委员会“继续研究全球行为体关税和补贴的扭曲效应”，并“集中努力减轻美国《减少通货膨胀法》的问题和歧视性影响”（EUCO， 2023年，第22e页）。然而，这并不能掩盖这样一个事实，即欧盟组织体系对爱尔兰共和军的答案/等效性的追求基本
{"title":"The European Union Response to the Inflation Reduction Act: An Assessment of the European Council System Beyond Crisis","authors":"Sandrino Smeets, Derek Beach","doi":"10.1111/jcms.13653","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jcms.13653","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Over a decade of successive crises has transformed how major policy reforms are dealt with in the European Union (EU), with a more European Council (EUCO)-centred system of governance as a result (Kassim et al., <span>2017</span>; Smeets and Beach, <span>2022</span>). Whilst the EUCO's formal role is merely to ‘provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and define the general political directions and priorities thereof’ [Article 15 Treaty on the European Union (TEU)], the crises have created the expectation that the EUCO should be much more closely involved in policy discussions on major dossiers. Yet the governance arrangements that were developed out of the need to manage these crises appear to have more lasting impacts post-crisis, as expected by work on ‘crisisification’ and ‘emergency politics’ (Kreuder-Sonnen and White, <span>2022</span>; Puetter and Terranova, <span>2023</span>; Rhinard, <span>2019</span>). This literature provides us with important indicators for how this system works post-crisis. Apart from the crisis-induced speed and urgency, they point to a new, grand narrative of an EU system that is dealing with major, horizontal policy challenges that require a comprehensive (‘packaged’) policy response and that favour a centralized set of political and institutional actors (Rhinard, <span>2019</span>, p. 617; White, <span>2015</span>, p. 300). However, this literature does not specify what effects these features might have. Therefore, this article tackles the question of what happens when the EUCO-centred crisis management system is deployed in a post-crisis environment.</p><p>The year 2023, arguably, was the first moment in a long time that the EU was not in the midst of a severe crisis. There was still plenty of ‘crisis’ in its environment, first and foremost the Russian aggression in Ukraine. However, this became less a crisis <i>of</i> the EU system. The EUCO summit of 15 December 2022 represented a turning point in this regard. Two days earlier, energy ministers had managed to agree on a second package of measures to deal with the energy crisis, including a long-awaited Market Correction Mechanism (price cap) on gas (Smeets, <span>2023</span>). Three days later, the Council and European Parliament closed a deal on the central elements of the fit-for-55 package – the Emission Trading Scheme, Social Climate Fund and Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism – thereby locking in the main targets for the green transition. There was a sense of optimism amongst the leaders. For once, the Union appeared to be on track instead of in the depths of a crisis.</p><p>However, major medium- to long-term challenges to the EU remained, the most prominent at the time being the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), the massive US subsidy scheme to support investments in clean industry and renewable energy that was adopted in August 2022. Whilst the IRA did not trigger an immediate crisis, it was undoubtedly <i>Chefsache</i>, meaning","PeriodicalId":51369,"journal":{"name":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","volume":"62 S1","pages":"88-98"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jcms.13653","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141862650","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Tim Haughton, Karolina Pomorska, Darina Malová, Kevin Deegan-Krause
<p>Elections provide signals. They signal the state of public opinion, the robustness of a democracy and the direction of democratic travel. Poland and Slovakia went to the polls in the autumn of 2023 in parliamentary elections. In both cases, they were change elections marked by the electorate's reaction to the acts and performance of governing parties propelled into power at previous elections in the context of significant social and political disruption caused by the pandemic and Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. But they also marked the return to power of prominent politicians whose domestic political careers had appeared to be over. Moreover, responding to the direction of travel their countries had been taking in previous years, the old–new politicians at the helm of their respective countries sought to chart a different course. This change of direction had significant ramifications for the state of democracy, the European Union (EU) and wider international politics. Furthermore, whilst the Slovak case offers additional insights into the causes and course of democratic backsliding that has been a prominent feature of Central European politics in recent times (e.g., Bakker and Sitter, <span>2022</span>; Bernhard, <span>2021</span>; Guasti and Bustikova, <span>2023</span>; Vachudova, <span>2020</span>), the Polish case provides pointers to the necessary ingredients for democratic resilience. In addition, both cases underscore the arguments about swerves and careening in the processes of democratization or autocratization (Cianetti and Hanley, <span>2021</span>). Indeed, Poland and Slovakia not only illuminate that the path towards or away from democracy is rarely linear, involving many contingencies along the way, but also illuminate that journeys may involve many changes of direction depending on whose hands are on the steering wheel, particularly when the fate of democracy itself becomes central to political contestation.</p><p>Three-time Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico had looked a broken man in 2020. In 2018, the murder of a journalist and his fiancée, who had been investigating the murky links between politicians, organized crime and organs of the state, provoked an outcry and large-scale demonstrations. Fico stepped down as premier, although he remained as head of his party, Direction – Social Democracy (Smer – sociálna demokracia, Smer-SD). In the subsequent parliamentary elections in 2020, Fico was swept from power. Thanks in no small part to anti-corruption appeals, Igor Matovič's Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (Obyčajní ľudia a nezávislé osobnosti, OĽaNO) hoovered up a quarter of the vote and was able to form a four-party coalition with a constitutional majority (Haughton et al., <span>2022</span>). Moreover, in the aftermath of the election, several of Fico's closest lieutenants broke away to form a new party, Voice – Social Democracy (Hlas – sociálna demokracia, Hlas-SD), luring away many Smer-SD voters. Bu
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Katharine A. M. Wright, Ruth McAreavey, Rebecca Donaldson
The impact of Brexit on Northern Ireland (NI) is now well established; however, less attention has been given to the impact on women, despite the applicability of the Women, Peace and Security agenda. In this policy commentary, we detail the impact Brexit has had on the issue of violence against women in NI. This is timely, given that the NI Executive Office has developed an Ending Violence against Women and Girls (VAWG) Strategic Framework, of which the adoption was identified as a priority on the resumption of the NI Assembly in February 2024. In addition to the repercussions of ‘Brexit politics’ resulting in the suspension of Stormont, which stymied the adoption of the strategy, we examine what has been lost in terms of funding, data collection, benchmarking and legal protections, all of which contribute to addressing VAWG in NI. We conclude with policy points to address the issues arising.
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<p>The European Union (EU)'s cybersecurity policy has, over the past two decades, undergone dramatic changes that have positioned it not only at the forefront of the EU's security policy landscape but also as one of the most influential policies across the EU policy spectrum (Carrapico and Farrand, <span>2020</span>; Christou, <span>2015</span>; Dunn Cavelty, <span>2013</span>; Obendiek and Seidl, <span>2023</span>). Over the years, the EU has become particularly aware of its increasing reliance on digital infrastructure and services, namely, how sectors such as transport, trade, finance, health, energy and education rely on accessing secure information and communication technology infrastructure. This dependency has been understood as highlighting the EU's vulnerability to the exponential growth in cyberthreats online (Carrapico and Farrand, <span>2021</span>). Having developed mainly in a reactive fashion to these perceived vulnerabilities, the EU's cybersecurity strategy was officially introduced in 2013 as an umbrella for a set of pre-existing, albeit scattered, initiatives (European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, <span>2013</span>). Since then, it has transitioned from a set of foundational measures to a mature, comprehensive and strategic policy focused on resilience, co-operation and technological advancement. It is composed of four main sub-policy areas: cybercrime and law enforcement; critical information infrastructure protection; cyber-defence; and cyber-diplomacy. Although distinct in their focus, these areas all work together towards the protection of the EU's digital infrastructure and residents.</p><p>The evolution of the EU cybersecurity policy can be characterised as having three distinct phases: the first was the genesis phase (1985–2003), during which the different sub-fields of cybersecurity developed separately (in particular in the context of the former EU First and Third Pillars), and the EU gradually positioned itself as a co-ordinating actor capable of addressing cross-border cybersecurity threats. This phase saw the initial recognition of the need for a co-ordinated approach to cybersecurity within a European framework. The second was the institutionalisation phase (2004–2018), where the EU pushed towards a more consistent policy framework by advocating for coherence and dialogue between the different sub-fields. This push involved the introduction and expansion of the number of EU cybersecurity co-ordinating bodies and adopting resilience as a strategy to protect businesses, public bodies and citizens. The third phase can be classified as the regulatory phase (2019–present), which has been marked by a significant attempt by the EU to gain control of cybersecurity governance. This has been achieved through a discursive framing of cybersecurity as a matter of European sovereignty (Farrand and Carrapico, <span>2022</span>), the translation of this discourse
， 2022，第348页)。从这个意义上说，监管重商主义将政策形成确定为应对地缘政治关切的国家建设手段，本文旨在对其进行剖析。它采用了监管重商主义的三个特征，并将它们应用于2023年网络安全政策的发展。第一部分强调了欧盟作为政策驱动因素的地缘政治不安全感和脆弱性日益增强；第二部分更深入地探讨了这些政策，确定了欧盟正在寻求在这一政策领域施加的越来越多的监管控制；第三是通过网络外交进行规范输出的尝试。欧盟2023年在网络安全领域的行动最好与欧盟更广泛的政策议程和倡议联系起来理解。随着冯德莱恩委员会的成立，“数字主权”的话语成为欧盟技术治理行动的核心（Bellanova et al., 2022）。欧盟的数字主权话语表达了加强控制的愿望，作为对非欧盟国家和可能与欧盟价值观或利益不一致的私营部门行为者所构成的外部威胁的脆弱感的回应（Carrapico和Farrand， 2020）。塑造欧洲的数字未来，委员会关于其2019-2024年工作计划的“数字支柱”的政策议程在发展欧盟能力和减少外部依赖方面构建了这一主权雄心（欧盟委员会，2020b，第3页）。它与战略自治的概念密切相关（Broeders等人，2023）。《2023年国情咨文》强调，这种欧洲主权是“维护欧洲在关键技术和新兴技术上的优势所必需的经济和国家安全”（von der Leyen， 2023年，第7页），强化了欧盟安全取决于其独立于外部约束或压力采取行动的能力这一概念。这些限制包括，即缺乏对外部持有或运营的基础设施、服务和内容提供商的控制（Madiega, 2020），这对欧盟保护公民数据和安全的能力产生了影响(Celeste, 2021；参见Chander and Sun， 2023)；对生产网络安全所需技术所需的其他国家拥有或加工的关键自然资源的依赖（DeCarlo和Goodman， 2022）；以及对日益增加的网络威胁的脆弱性，无论是以虚假信息、勒索软件攻击、拒绝服务攻击还是数据泄露的形式（Moerel和Timmers， 2021）。这些已确定的数字脆弱性与欧盟对自身地缘政治脆弱性的更广泛认识密切相关。这通常隐含在对自由国际秩序的挑战所表达的担忧中，即对全球化的拒绝（Braw, 2024），对国际组织和规范的日益漠视（Stephan, 2023），以及大国之间“大国”政治的回归（Weiß， 2023）。在这些地缘政治变化的背景下，“网络”和“物质”安全的界限变得模糊，欧盟在2016年讨论了对“混合”威胁的担忧（欧盟委员会和外交事务和安全政策联盟高级代表，2016年），网络安全是敌对行为者破坏欧盟稳定的一种手段。无论是通过传播虚假信息还是攻击关键信息基础设施（欧盟委员会和外交事务和安全政策联盟高级代表，2016年，第10页）。继2016年的这份文件之后，2018年又发布了一份关于提高弹性和增强应对混合威胁能力的文件，其中指出“网络安全对我们的繁荣和安全都至关重要。随着我们的日常生活和经济越来越依赖于数字技术，我们变得越来越暴露”（欧盟委员会和外交事务和安全政策联盟高级代表，2018年，第7页）。2023年，俄罗斯对乌克兰的战争突显了由于更广泛的地缘政治不稳定而导致的欧盟感知到的网络脆弱性，CERT-EU2监测了俄罗斯扩大针对欧盟机构的网络行动的可能性。CERT-EU 2023年2月报告的主要发现之一是，“与俄罗斯对乌克兰的战争有关的网络行动并不局限于交战方。”自俄罗斯入侵以来，乌克兰的盟友，如欧盟国家，面临着几种类型的网络攻击（CERT-EU, 2023，第3页）。新技术也被归类为威胁，生成人工智能（AI）在《2023年国情咨文》和CERT-EU制作的一份报告中都有体现。 在《国情咨文》中，人工智能被明确定义为一种安全威胁，冯德莱恩援引专家的话说，防止人工智能导致人类灭绝应该像防止核战争一样被优先考虑，并指出人工智能“是一种通用技术，易于获取，功能强大，适用于民用和军事等广泛用途。”它的发展速度甚至超过了开发者的预期。因此，我们指导这项新技术的机会窗口越来越窄”（von der Leyen, 2023，第9页）。同样，CERT-EU表示，虽然生成式人工智能可能具有潜在的网络防御能力，但他们对其潜在的网络攻击表示严重担忧，其用途包括复杂的社会工程攻击，更有效的网络钓鱼形式和网络安全漏洞识别的自动化，允许发现以前未知的攻击媒介（CERT-EU, 2023，第4页）。鉴于对人工智能使用增加的安全影响的担忧，欧盟委员会已明确表示希望通过《人工智能法案》等机制在内部规范该技术的使用，并寻求指导国际层面规则的制定。通过人工智能法案作为世界其他地区的蓝图，并通过指导创新和实施安全和道德使用的最低标准（von der Leyen, 2023，第9-10页）。2023年是欧盟网络安全监管工作特别活跃的一年。虽然在2022年底达成一致，但关于整个联盟高水平网络安全措施的指令（指令2022/2555），也称为NIS2指令，于2023年1月生效。该指令废除了原来的NIS指令，并表明了欧盟方面对网络安全监管的一种“国家制定”形式。在其面向公众的常见问题解答文件中，委员会解释了其废除原指令并制定新立法的决定，其基础是应对不断扩大的威胁形势，并需要解决“在欧盟运营的企业的网络弹性水平不足；各会员国和部门的复原力不一致；对各会员国面临的主要威胁和挑战缺乏共识；（以及）缺乏共同的危机应对措施”（欧盟委员会，2023a）。该指令的提案明确表示希望加强对这一领域的控制，并指出该提案是旨在“加强欧盟的战略自主权，以提高其弹性和集体反应能力”的一揽子计划的一部分（欧盟委员会，2020a，第1页）。有趣的是，在该指令的最后文本中，将脆弱性作为干预基础的联系见序言37。其中指出，“2019冠状病毒病大流行期间加剧的网络攻击表明了日益相互依存的社会的脆弱性”（第2022/2555号指令）。除了更新NIS1（指令2016/1148）下已有的要求外，NIS2还提供了更强有力的监督和执法，以保证抵御网络攻击的能力（Vandezande, 2024）。第12条规定了成员国（MSs）之间的协调漏洞披露，以及由欧盟网络安全机构（ENISA）维护的漏洞数据库的创建。第13条规定了成员国之间在国家层面上的合作，第14条建立了一个合作小组，“以支持和促进成员国之间的战略合作和信息交流”，其成员包括成员国、欧盟委员会和欧洲空间局的代表，欧洲对外行动署作为观察员。2023年，根据加强监督和监管等级制度的监管重商主义框架，网络安全监管也在深化，从设定私营部门义务的狭窄范围扩展到建立一个无所不包的网络安全框架。首先，委员会提议修改2019年通过的《网络安全法》（第2019/881号条例），以扩大其认证计划，将托管安全服务纳入其中。欧盟委员会将此作为提高欧盟整体网络安全水平的手段，这将促进可信网络安全服务提供商的出现，并将其作为“欧盟在网络安全领域的产业政策”的优先事项（欧盟委员会，2023e，第1页）。基于欧洲标准建立欧洲认证体系是《网络安全法》基本原理的核心（Kohler, 2020）。随着这一制度的扩大，以涵盖更多的部门行为者，代表着这种监管方法的深化。 该提案已经在欧洲议会进行了第一次阅读，正在等待
{"title":"Cybersecurity Trends in the European Union: Regulatory Mercantilism and the Digitalisation of Geopolitics","authors":"Helena Carrapico, Benjamin Farrand","doi":"10.1111/jcms.13654","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jcms.13654","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The European Union (EU)'s cybersecurity policy has, over the past two decades, undergone dramatic changes that have positioned it not only at the forefront of the EU's security policy landscape but also as one of the most influential policies across the EU policy spectrum (Carrapico and Farrand, <span>2020</span>; Christou, <span>2015</span>; Dunn Cavelty, <span>2013</span>; Obendiek and Seidl, <span>2023</span>). Over the years, the EU has become particularly aware of its increasing reliance on digital infrastructure and services, namely, how sectors such as transport, trade, finance, health, energy and education rely on accessing secure information and communication technology infrastructure. This dependency has been understood as highlighting the EU's vulnerability to the exponential growth in cyberthreats online (Carrapico and Farrand, <span>2021</span>). Having developed mainly in a reactive fashion to these perceived vulnerabilities, the EU's cybersecurity strategy was officially introduced in 2013 as an umbrella for a set of pre-existing, albeit scattered, initiatives (European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, <span>2013</span>). Since then, it has transitioned from a set of foundational measures to a mature, comprehensive and strategic policy focused on resilience, co-operation and technological advancement. It is composed of four main sub-policy areas: cybercrime and law enforcement; critical information infrastructure protection; cyber-defence; and cyber-diplomacy. Although distinct in their focus, these areas all work together towards the protection of the EU's digital infrastructure and residents.</p><p>The evolution of the EU cybersecurity policy can be characterised as having three distinct phases: the first was the genesis phase (1985–2003), during which the different sub-fields of cybersecurity developed separately (in particular in the context of the former EU First and Third Pillars), and the EU gradually positioned itself as a co-ordinating actor capable of addressing cross-border cybersecurity threats. This phase saw the initial recognition of the need for a co-ordinated approach to cybersecurity within a European framework. The second was the institutionalisation phase (2004–2018), where the EU pushed towards a more consistent policy framework by advocating for coherence and dialogue between the different sub-fields. This push involved the introduction and expansion of the number of EU cybersecurity co-ordinating bodies and adopting resilience as a strategy to protect businesses, public bodies and citizens. The third phase can be classified as the regulatory phase (2019–present), which has been marked by a significant attempt by the EU to gain control of cybersecurity governance. This has been achieved through a discursive framing of cybersecurity as a matter of European sovereignty (Farrand and Carrapico, <span>2022</span>), the translation of this discourse","PeriodicalId":51369,"journal":{"name":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","volume":"62 S1","pages":"147-158"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jcms.13654","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141773954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Between Cooperation and Rivalry: The Leadership of Charles Michel as President of the European Council","authors":"Henriette Müller, Ingeborg Tömmel","doi":"10.1111/jcms.13660","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jcms.13660","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51369,"journal":{"name":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","volume":"62 S1","pages":"52-63"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141773952","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The European Union's Response to the Rule of Law Crisis and the Making of the New Conditionality Regime","authors":"Ramona Coman, Aron Buzogány","doi":"10.1111/jcms.13661","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jcms.13661","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51369,"journal":{"name":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","volume":"62 S1","pages":"102-112"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141773956","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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