Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies最新文献

The idea that the German public continues to suffer from the collective trauma of the experiences of hyperinflation in 1923 remains a prominent theme in Germany's public discourse. As such, it is often invoked when explaining the country's peculiar stability culture – its aversion to inflation and preference for stability-oriented monetary and fiscal policy. Whilst a number of studies have pointed to deliberate appeals to hyperinflation by policy-makers, this article presents the first systemic investigation into the strategic use of references to an allegedly persistent inflation trauma in fiscal policy debates. Specifically, it examines whether, when and how Bundestag members narratively utilised the powerful idea of trauma as a discursive tool to assert restrictive fiscal measures. Employing qualitative content analysis of the plenary speeches from 1949 to 2022, two key findings come to light: first, a conservative bias in the use of these narrative appeals can be observed, occurring mainly in speeches of the CDU/CSU and FDP; second, the trauma narrative surfaced above all during two formative periods of European monetary integration – the inception of EMU and the Eurozone crisis. These results affirm a close discursive connection between the collective memory of hyperinflation and the conservative efforts to preserve, transpose and rejuvenate German stability culture within the Eurozone, thereby reconciling domestic demands for monetary stability with monetary integration and its defence.

Recent research on party-based Euroscepticism increasingly ascribes ‘hard Euroscepticism’ only to parties pursuing exit from the EU. I argue that such interpretation, besides deviating from Taggart and Szczerbiak's original work, conceals the actual extent of ‘principled opposition’ to European integration. This contribution reconsiders and redefines hard Euroscepticism, restoring consistency with Szczerbiak and Taggart's reasoning whilst anchoring the category in the substantive core of European integration: an integrated common market, the legitimacy of a supranational layer, the possibility of further expansion of competences and EU core values. Compared to the understanding centred on exit, this (re)definition brings several advantages. Above all, it prevents the reduction of hard Euroscepticism to a merely strategic–tactical variable exclusively reserved for opposition parties. Moreover, it avoids the conflation of ‘strange bedfellows’ in the adjacent category of soft Euroscepticism. These arguments should stoke debate on the relationship between interpretations of European integration and Euroscepticism, hard and soft.

Do norms impact state action, or are they purely instrumental and subordinate to material interests? I approach this long-standing debate by analysing the European Union's (EU) enlargement terms. When the prospect of enlargement arises, the EU faces the dilemma of minimising resulting financial implications while fulfilling normative obligations to support new members. Historically, the EU responded both by discriminating new members from benefits or by exempting them from obligations. I claim that understanding the determinants of enlargement requires bridging theoretical divides in European Studies. I argue that states' material interests and norms are equally influential, resulting in enlargement terms being painstakingly negotiated compromises balancing both. The analysis focuses on the German Democratic Republic's (GDR) integration into the European Community (EC), where the EU's dilemma between material and normative principles was particularly pronounced. The mixed-methods analysis reveals nuanced enlargement terms with unprecedented exemptions, albeit of short duration.

Securitization scholarship concentrates on the discursive association between undocumented migration, terrorism and crime. Our textual and visual analysis of Italian, Spanish and Maltese newspapers between 2013 and 2020 demonstrates that the discourses securitizing irregular mobility as a health risk became more salient than those linking migration to terrorism already since the 2014 Ebola epidemic. After the COVID-19 outbreak, associations between migration and infectious diseases also dwarfed discourses linking migration to crime. The pervasiveness of health securitization discourses in both conservative and progressive Southern European newspapers shows that narratives of people on the move as both ‘a risk’ and ‘at risk’ are not solely coexisting but mutually reinforcing, framing migrants as carriers of diseases precisely because of their vulnerability. Our visual analysis also highlights that, once portrayed by media, the systematic use of biohazard clothing in European Union (EU) border enforcement missions becomes itself discourse, securitizing irregular migration no less than written texts.

Recent decades have seen a significant rise in return and readmission frameworks. Scholars note a trend towards informalization, incentivization and Europeanization. Yet, no study has thoroughly evaluated with advanced regression techniques how the resulting frameworks impact migrant return and whether different types of frameworks affect migrant return differentially. In this study, we use Cassarino's inventory of return and readmission frameworks, data from the European Migration Network and Eurostat return data. We employ fixed-effects Poisson regression techniques to examine how various types of return and readmission frameworks influence the enforced return rates (2008–2021). Our findings hold significant implications for academic research and policy-making. Whilst bilateral return and readmission frameworks and EU Return and Readmission Agreements (EURAs) linked to visa facilitation arrangements show limited positive effects on enforced migrant return rates, non-binding EU-wide frameworks appear to reduce such rates. These findings are interpreted from the perspectives of rational choice and sociological institutionalism.

Populism has become a defining feature of global politics. As populists become part of elected governments, an increasingly rich literature has been investigating their influence on a country's foreign policy. Nonetheless, such scholarly endeavours have neglected one specific element: the interplay between elective officials and the bureaucracy, notably the diplomatic corps. Through this article, we aim at filling such gap. We address the research question by means of a comparative case study of two populist governments in EU member states: the Orbán Second and Third governments in Hungary (2010–2014 and 2014–2018) and the Conte First government (2018–2019) in Italy. Such cases have been selected for the differences in the case outcomes, the nature of the governing party coalition configuration and the role of the bureaucracy and its capacity to provide policy continuity. We adopt as main theoretical lenses Barr's politico-strategic approach and Peters' politics of bureaucracy theory. Our findings demonstrate that, following Hermann's categorisation of foreign policy change, the Conte I government underwent adjustment changes, whilst the Orbán executives launched an international orientation change of Hungary's foreign policy. Two factors are key in shaping the outcome of foreign policy change: (i) the governing coalition dynamics and (ii) the extent to which the diplomatic corps conceives of its role as guarantor and guardian of continuity in foreign policy. Length of stay in power plays a key role in shaping the dynamic interactions of these factors and ultimately foreign policy change.

In December 2023, the European Parliament and the Council reached an agreement to revise the Solvency II Directive, aiming to unlock €100 billion in private investment through a series of deregulatory measures. This marks a significant departure from the stringent insurance supervision framework that has shaped European policy since the financial crisis. Through detailed process tracing, this article examines the drivers behind this unexpected outcome and its broader implications for EU economic governance. Whilst this shift could be seen as part of the EU's growing prioritization of growth over stability, we argue that it is, above all, the result of France's sustained influence. Our findings suggest that the fragmented insurance industry played a limited role in the negotiations. Although the Commission actively promoted the Capital Markets Union and investment in the green transition, it largely acted as a reactive and pragmatic policy-maker. Instead, we show that the reregulation of the European insurance sector was primarily driven by the sustained efforts of the French Treasury. However, rather than pushing for wholesale deregulation, French policy-makers leveraged the Solvency II review to advance a cohesive asset-led growth strategy at home – motivated by a desire for greater economic sovereignty through the inflow of liquidity into national companies. Taken together, these findings shed new light on EU financial regulation in the post-Covid era, the evolving tension between the EU's interventionist shift and the rise of state activism and France's role in shaping European economic governance.

Queer scholarship highlights and analyses how international politics are produced through sexuality and gender norms. Doing so, queer perspectives question and unpack binaries and the assumptions underlying dominant concepts in international politics such as sovereignty. Although there is some vibrant research on the European Union (EU) and the promotion of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer/questioning, intersex and asexual (LGBTQIA+) human and citizenship rights, a systematic framework that adopts a queer perspective on the EU's role as a global actor and its foreign and security policy is lacking. To start tackling this gap, we study the EU's implementation of the United Nations Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda through a queer lens. We suggest that the focus on WPS allows us to open up a broader queer research agenda to study the EU's foreign and security policy by unpacking the dominant invisibilities, heteronormativity and binaries.

National energy and climate plans (NECPs) are a cornerstone of European Union (EU) climate policy. As ‘hard’ soft governance instruments, NECPs allow comparison of member state policies and monitoring of whether they reach EU aims. My argument is that NECPs can be analysed as regulatory talk, with both member states and the Commission using reputational strategies—performative, technical, procedural and moral—to lend authority to their policy descriptions and projections. I show that the technical rhetoric of draft NECPs varies according to domestic capacities. Commission comments are uniform, emphasising performance. Member states do not adapt their final NECPs to the regulatory talk of the Commission. They use the same reputational mix as in the draft NECPs. In sum, the NECPs portray an output-oriented legitimation strategy, emphasising performance and technical proficiency. The actor bases of the found national variation of regulatory talk and its effects are questions for further research.