Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies最新文献

European Union (EU) agencies' relations with interest groups have received scarce research attention despite their relevance to bureaucratic autonomy and functioning. Such relations may be organised via advisory committees, which are durable organisational structures for regularised contact between an agency and those societal actors given membership by the agency. Advisory committees may be imposed by the legislator to control an agency or harnessed by the latter to build autonomy. The EU legislator leaves significant discretion to EU agencies regarding advisory committees. However, EU agencies' late emergence in already densely populated regulatory fields begs the question of whether the use of agency discretion is fully autonomous. A case in point is the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), whose establishment and design of three European Stakeholder Committees are examined here. Advisory committees were needed by, but also imposed on, ACER, reflecting agency preferences to improve task performance as much as prior institutionalisation within the organisational field. Hence, factors beyond legal requirements can constrain agency discretion on how to organise the organisation of agency–interest group relations.

This study revisits the salience of the Brexit negotiations using an advanced Decision-Making in the European Union (EU) methodology to assess the relative importance of 20 key issues amongst the EU27 member states, the European Commission and the UK. Unlike earlier studies that suggest more uniform salience levels, except for the UK, our analysis identifies eight clusters of actors influenced by their political, economic and geographical contexts. These differences in salience levels have been conducive to logrolling, which likely supported a unified EU stance and a successful agreement with the UK. Additionally, our research quantitatively confirms the UK's distinct salience position, highlighting its isolation and reducing its ability to use divisive negotiation tactics. These findings offer insights into both the dynamics of past Brexit negotiations and ongoing EU–UK policy developments. They contribute to the analysis of Brexit and international negotiations in general by systematically exploring salience in high-level diplomatic negotiations.

This article explores the struggle for ‘digital sovereignty’ in the European Union (EU). A seeming contradiction – the internet, after all, spans the globe – digital sovereignty is portrayed as the winning geoeconomic formula to keep the EU secure, competitive and democratic in the digital future. Approaching digital sovereignty as a discursive claim and analysing it through a case study of the European cloud project Gaia-X, we show that there is no singular understanding of digital sovereignty in the EU. Instead, we identify six different conceptions across the domains of security, economy and rights. This article outlines three scenarios for how the digital sovereignty agenda may develop and thus shape the EU's digital policy and its relations with the rest of the world: constitutional tolerance (where the conceptions co-exist), hegemony (where one conception dominates) or collapse (where the agenda falls apart due to inbuilt conceptual contradictions).

Rule of law spending conditionality marks a turn in the EU’s strategy in the 2020s. The entry of this value into the budgetary sphere represents an economization process, creating room for the development of a transactional approach to rule of law compliance. This article defines this conceptual framework and examines the extent of its application through the case study of three budgetary instruments used during the 2021–2027 cycle: the Recovery and Resilience Facility, the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation and the horizontal enabling condition of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Contributing to the recent Europeanization literature, it also emphasizes the change in European governance and in the EU–Member State relationship triggered by the new conditionality culture following the succession of European crises, moving from a traditional politico-legal enforcement model to a transactional one.

This article investigates whether populism affects the foreign policy of European Union (EU) member states towards China and, if so, through what mechanisms. In order to answer this question, we examine the cases of Italy and Czechia, both of which went through turbulent relations with China in the recent decade whilst also experiencing several government changes between populist and non-populist parties. Our analysis reveals that whilst populist-led governments appeared to be more China-friendly than non-populist governments, the impact of populism is not direct but mediated through other variables, namely, thick ideology, economic pragmatism and international positioning. We propose this model as a hypothesis for testing in future research. In addition, our findings suggest a need to rethink the relationship between thin–thick ideologies in the study of populism and to emphasise the role of ‘economic pragmatism’ as a mediating variable, which has been largely missing from the literature on populist foreign policy.

During the Eurozone's sovereign debt crisis, the ideational consensus that shaped the foundation of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was destabilized by disagreement on unconventional monetary policies (UMPs), specifically government bond purchases. In the ECB's 2021 strategy review, however, UMPs were confirmed as standard elements of the European Central Bank's (ECB) toolbox. What happened? One argument frequently presented to question the legitimacy of UMPs is that they undermine the prior objective of the EMU of avoiding moral hazard. We analyse the politics of UMPs by focusing upon how top officials in four major Eurozone central banks have discursively constructed the relationship between the ECB's purchase of sovereign debt and moral hazard. We find that top central bank officials aligned to a large degree on the non-necessary causal relationship between government bond purchases and moral hazard, which reinforced its legitimacy and eventual acceptance as ‘conventional’.

The European Union's (EU's) ‘geoeconomic turn’ denotes the growing integration of international security considerations into EU economic policies. This article introduces the concept of ‘geoeconomic power Europe’ to show how this development has the potential to renew debates on the nature of EU power. Most existing conceptualisations of EU power – whether characterised as civilian, normative, market based, regulatory or liberal – tend to focus on the EU's endogenous characteristics. However, the added value of the concept of geoeconomic power is that it redirects attention to the ‘co-constitution’ loop between global power competition and the evolution of EU power. In this article, I present an analytical framework that highlights the drivers of EU geoeconomic power and distinguishes between systemic pressures, the intra-EU policy process and the impact on EU power. I conclude that the concept of geoeconomic power Europe can help to bridge theories of international security and economic interdependence, particularly neorealism and neofunctionalism.

Trading actors like the European Union (EU) are increasingly seen as geopoliticising trade policy, but such assertions may not capture the extent to which the Directorate General for Trade (DG Trade) uses this policy to achieve security objectives. This article investigates changes over time in justifications for trade policy by differentiating between how the EU and DG Trade use frames – articulated in four EU trade strategies with two DG Trade strategic plans and 10 annual management plans – to propose solutions in response to the geoeconomic turn. This article finds that, whilst DG Trade's discourse continues to reflect the dominant market liberal frame, geopoliticising pressures are encouraging the emergence of an EU counter-frame linking trade to non-trade issues and a reframing of the counter-frame that increasingly links trade and security policy. As a result, the EU's framing of trade policy resembles deep geopoliticisation, whilst DG Trade's framing resembles reluctant geopoliticisation.

This article explores the European Union's (EU's) assistance to Ukraine through the lens of critical geopolitics with a view to ascertaining whether the EU has become more geopolitical in its thinking and actions towards Eastern Europe. Our findings point to a mixed picture. Whilst the EU ‘mindscape’ appears to have shifted in relation to Eastern Europe, Ukraine and itself as an actor in the region, it is less apparent that the EU's foreign and security policy action has become geopoliticised. The 2022 Russian invasion has certainly seen a step change from the hesitant and self-conscious approach that characterised the EU's engagement with Eastern Europe prior to 2022. However, declarations such as that by the High Representative and Vice President of the European Commission (HRVP) around the ‘birth of geopolitical Europe’ appear to be somewhat premature, as there is limited evidence at this stage that the EU is willing to provide leadership on the geospatial (re)ordering of the region.

The nature of global economic interactions is undergoing profound changes. Rising concerns over the security and strategic implications of economic interdependence are leading to what is often defined as a ‘geoeconomic world order’. In framing this Special Issue, this article sets a common conceptual ground to assess whether, how and why the single European market is experiencing such a geoeconomic turn and how EU responses are shaping other international actors in the process. It develops a research agenda to examine (i) the systemic pressures pushing towards geoeconomic responses, (ii) the internal drivers and processes determining the nature of the EU's geoeconomic turn (what we term ‘shades of geopoliticisation’) and (iii) the external consequences of the EU's embrace of geoeconomics. The analytical discussion is complemented by an overview of empirical trends, drawing examples from the various fields of market integration and European policy-making covered in the contributions to this Special Issue.