The European Union (EU) is facing a democratic deficit, which scholars have argued political parties could help resolve. However, few have asked what model of party (system) is suitable for achieving this. To assume that the models of party politics used in the nation‐state context can simply be transposed to the European level would be mistaken. A new model is needed that theorises parties as genuine multilevel actors whose behaviour at the European level can only be understood by also appreciating national‐level dynamics, and vice versa. I argue that organisational field theory can help innovate the way we think about party democracy in the EU, introducing the European Multilevel Party Field. It is based on the understanding that European politics is ‘everything everywhere all at once’, with actors operating in permanent interdependence with others across levels and borders. This model helps capture more accurately the complex reality of European politics.
{"title":"Everything Everywhere All at Once? Introducing a Field‐Theoretic Model for Party Politics in the European Union","authors":"Gilles Pittoors","doi":"10.1111/jcms.13662","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13662","url":null,"abstract":"The European Union (EU) is facing a democratic deficit, which scholars have argued political parties could help resolve. However, few have asked what model of party (system) is suitable for achieving this. To assume that the models of party politics used in the nation‐state context can simply be transposed to the European level would be mistaken. A new model is needed that theorises parties as genuine multilevel actors whose behaviour at the European level can only be understood by also appreciating national‐level dynamics, and vice versa. I argue that organisational field theory can help innovate the way we think about party democracy in the EU, introducing the European Multilevel Party Field. It is based on the understanding that European politics is ‘everything everywhere all at once’, with actors operating in permanent interdependence with others across levels and borders. This model helps capture more accurately the complex reality of European politics.","PeriodicalId":51369,"journal":{"name":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","volume":"41 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142176412","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>A. Burcu Bayram, University of Arkansas</p><p>Abdullah Al Mamun, National University of Malaysia</p><p>Abraham Newman, Georgetown University</p><p>Achim Hurrelmann, Carleton University</p><p>Adam Chalmers, King's College London</p><p>Adam Luedtke, City University of New York (CUNY)</p><p>Adina Akbik, Leiden University</p><p>Adria Rivera Escartin, Barcelona Institute of International Studies (IBEI)</p><p>Adriaan Schout, Clingendael Institute</p><p>Adrian Favell, University College Cork</p><p>Adrian Favero, University of Groningen</p><p>Adrienne Heritier, European University Institute</p><p>Agnes Batory, Central European University</p><p>Agnieszka Cianciara, Polska Akademia Nauk Instytut Studiow Politycznych</p><p>Akitaka Matsuo, University of Essex</p><p>Akshaya Kamalnath, Australian National University</p><p>Alan Greer, UWE Bristol</p><p>Alan Matthews, Trinity College Dublin</p><p>Alan Swinbank, University of Reading</p><p>Alasdair Young, Georgia Institute of Technology</p><p>Albert Weale, University College London</p><p>Albrecht Sonntag, ESSCA School of Management</p><p>Aleksandra Čavoški, University of Birmingham</p><p>Aleksandra Maatsch, University of Wrocław</p><p>Aleksandra Sojka, University Carlos III of Madrid</p><p>Alena Vieira, University of Minho</p><p>Alessandro Del Ponte, University of Alabama</p><p>Alessandro Pellegata, University of Milan</p><p>Alex MacKenzie, University of Liverpool</p><p>Alexander Bürgin, Izmir University of Economics</p><p>Alexander Kustov, University of North Carolina at Charlotte</p><p>Alexandra Hennessy, University of Essex</p><p>Alexandros Kontonikas, University of Essex</p><p>Alexia Katsanidou, GESIS Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences</p><p>Alfredo Arahuetes, Comillas Pontifical University</p><p>Alice Pirlot, Geneva Graduate Institute</p><p>Alison Johnston, Oregon State University</p><p>Alper Kaliber, Altinbas University</p><p>Amandine Crespy, Université Libre de Bruxelles</p><p>Amie Kreppel, University of Florida</p><p>Amy Verdun, University of Victoria</p><p>Ana E. Juncos, University of Bristol</p><p>Ana Paula Brandão, CICP-University of Minho</p><p>Anastasia Ershova, Queen's University Belfast</p><p>Anders Esmark, University of Copenhagen</p><p>André Barrinha, University of Bath</p><p>Andrea Aldrich, Yale University</p><p>Andrea Appolloni, University of Rome Tor Vergata</p><p>Andrea Colli, Bocconi University</p><p>Andrea Filippetti, National Research Council of Italy/Birbeck University of London</p><p>Andrea Lenschow, Osnabrück University</p><p>Andrea Ott, Maastricht University</p><p>Andrea Pedrazzani, University of Milan</p><p>Andrea Pritoni, University of Turin</p><p>Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro</p><p>Andrea Sangiovanni, King's College London</p><p>Andrea Schlenker, University of Lucerne</p><p>Andrea L. P. Pirro, University of Bologna</p><p>Andreas Bieler, University of Nottingham</p><p>Andreas Dür, University of Salzburg</p><p>Andreas Fagerholm, Åb
A. Burcu Bayram，阿肯萨斯大学abdullah Al Mamun，马来西亚国立大学abraham Newman，乔治敦大学achim Hurrelmann，卡尔顿大学adam Chalmers，伦敦国王学院adam Luedtke，纽约城市大学Adina Akbik，莱顿大学adria Rivera Escartin，巴塞罗那国际问题研究所（IBEI）Adriaan Schout， Clingendael研究所adrian Favell，科克大学学院adrian Favero，格罗宁根大学adrienne Heritier，欧洲大学研究所agnes Batory中欧大学agnieszka Cianciara波兰科学院Nauk研究所studiopolityczychakitaka Matsuo埃塞克斯大学akshaya Kamalnath澳大利亚国立大学alan Greer UWE BristolAlan Matthews都柏林三一学院alan Swinbank雷丁大学alasdair Young佐治亚理工学院albert Weale伦敦大学albrecht Sonntag埃塞克斯管理学院aleksandra Čavoški伯明翰大学alexandra Maatsch， WrocławAleksandra Sojka大学，马德里卡洛斯三世大学alena Vieira，米霍大学alessandro Del Ponte，阿拉巴马大学alessandro Pellegata，米兰大学analex MacKenzie，利物浦大学alexander b<e:1> rgin，伊兹密尔经济大学alexander Kustov，北卡罗来纳大学夏洛特分校alexandra Hennessy，埃塞克斯大学alexandros Kontonikas，埃塞克斯大学alexia Katsanidou，GESIS莱布尼茨社会科学研究所alfredo Arahuetes， Comillas Pontifical大学alice Pirlot，日内瓦研究生院alison Johnston，俄勒冈州立大学alper Kaliber， Altinbas大学amandine Crespy，布鲁塞尔自由大学amie Kreppel，佛罗里达大学amy Verdun，维多利亚大学ana E. Juncos， bristol大学ana Paula brand<e:1> o, ccicp - minhouniversity anastasia Ershova，贝尔法斯特女王大学anders Esmark，哥本哈根大学andrea Barrinha，巴斯大学andrea Aldrich，耶鲁大学andrea apolloni，罗马大学VergataAndrea Colli，博科尼大学andrea Filippetti，意大利国家研究委员会/伦敦伯贝克大学andrea Lenschow，奥斯纳布尔克大学andrea Ott，马斯特里赫特大学andrea Pedrazzani，米兰大学andrea Pritoni，都灵大学andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann，罗马天主教大学de bbbbde de janeio andrea Sangiovanni，伦敦国王学院andrea Schlenker，卢塞恩大学andrea L. P. Pirro，博洛尼亚大学andreas Bieler，诺丁汉大学andreas d<e:2> r，萨尔茨堡大学andreas Fagerholm， Åbo学术大学andreas Hofmann，莱顿大学andreas litseg<e:2> rd，哥德堡大学andrei V 梅杰斯，内梅亨大学，maurizio Ferrera，米兰大学，maurizio Ferri, ASL PescaraMax Heermann，康斯坦大学，马克西米利安·康拉德，冰岛大学，马克辛·大卫，莱顿大学，梅希尔德罗斯，奥格斯堡大学，meera Sabaratnam，牛津大学，melina Breitegger，斯泰伦博斯大学，melissa mouthan，剑桥大学，eltem Muftuler-Bac，萨班齐大学，menelaos Markakis，鹿特丹Erasmus大学，周孟贤，南洋理工大学merijn Chamon，自由大学布鲁塞尔mert Kartal，圣劳伦斯大学meryl Kenny，爱丁堡大学michael Blauberger，巴黎萨尔茨堡大学michael Lodron Breen，都柏林城市大学michael Harsch，国防大学michael Higgins，斯特拉思克莱德大学michael Hoelscher，德国行政科学大学SpeyerMichael Keating，阿伯丁大学michael Kellermann，美国海军学院michael Kenny，剑桥大学迈克尔·刘易斯-贝克，爱荷华大学迈克尔·梅林，麻省理工学院迈克尔·波利特，剑桥大学迈克尔·史密斯，阿伯丁大学迈克尔·斯特朗，Malmö大学迈克尔·塔瑟姆，伯根大学迈克尔·温特尔，阿姆斯特丹大学迈克尔·z<e:1> rn， WZB柏林社会科学中心迈克尔·h·Böheim，奥地利经济研究所迈克尔·w·鲍尔，德国行政科学大学施佩尔，迈克尔·纳托斯基，马斯特里赫特大学/联合国大学michael Ovádek，伦敦大学学院michela Ceccorulli，博洛尼亚大学michele Chang，欧洲学院michela ichenle Knodt，达姆施塔特工业大学michelle Cini，布里斯托尔大学michelle Egan，美国大学michelle Pace，罗斯基勒大学mike Verloo， Radboud大学miguel Otero-Iglesias，埃尔卡诺皇家学院/IE大学mihail Chiru，牛津大学mikael Wigell，芬兰国际事务研究所麦克·史密斯、沃里克大学迈克·威尔金森、伦敦政治经济学院、米克尔·梅兰、哥本哈根大学、米拉达·瓦丘多瓦、北卡罗来纳大学教堂山分校、米兰·巴比奇、罗斯基勒大学、米尔斯·索科、威尔茨商学院、明道加斯·布特库斯、维尔纽斯大学Šiauliai米拉·斯科尔滕学院、乌得勒支大学、米利亚姆·哈特拉普、柏林自由大学、米贾·科瓦奇、卢布尔雅那大学、莫根斯·佩尔特、哥本哈根大学mohammad Shamsuddoha，吉大港大学monica Ferrin，卡洛·阿尔伯塔学院onika Bauhr，哥德堡大学monika Glavina，鹿特丹Erasmus大学monika Mühlböck，维也纳大学onika Sus， Hertie学校/波兰科学院moritz osnabrgge，达勒姆大学morten Egeberg，奥斯勒大学mohammad Ali Nasir，利兹大学uireann O'Dwyer，圣安德鲁大学smwita Chacha，伯明翰大学myriam Dunn Cavelty，苏黎世联邦理工学院，naoum T
{"title":"Thank you to Reviewers list July 2019–July 2023","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/jcms.13683","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jcms.13683","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A. Burcu Bayram, University of Arkansas</p><p>Abdullah Al Mamun, National University of Malaysia</p><p>Abraham Newman, Georgetown University</p><p>Achim Hurrelmann, Carleton University</p><p>Adam Chalmers, King's College London</p><p>Adam Luedtke, City University of New York (CUNY)</p><p>Adina Akbik, Leiden University</p><p>Adria Rivera Escartin, Barcelona Institute of International Studies (IBEI)</p><p>Adriaan Schout, Clingendael Institute</p><p>Adrian Favell, University College Cork</p><p>Adrian Favero, University of Groningen</p><p>Adrienne Heritier, European University Institute</p><p>Agnes Batory, Central European University</p><p>Agnieszka Cianciara, Polska Akademia Nauk Instytut Studiow Politycznych</p><p>Akitaka Matsuo, University of Essex</p><p>Akshaya Kamalnath, Australian National University</p><p>Alan Greer, UWE Bristol</p><p>Alan Matthews, Trinity College Dublin</p><p>Alan Swinbank, University of Reading</p><p>Alasdair Young, Georgia Institute of Technology</p><p>Albert Weale, University College London</p><p>Albrecht Sonntag, ESSCA School of Management</p><p>Aleksandra Čavoški, University of Birmingham</p><p>Aleksandra Maatsch, University of Wrocław</p><p>Aleksandra Sojka, University Carlos III of Madrid</p><p>Alena Vieira, University of Minho</p><p>Alessandro Del Ponte, University of Alabama</p><p>Alessandro Pellegata, University of Milan</p><p>Alex MacKenzie, University of Liverpool</p><p>Alexander Bürgin, Izmir University of Economics</p><p>Alexander Kustov, University of North Carolina at Charlotte</p><p>Alexandra Hennessy, University of Essex</p><p>Alexandros Kontonikas, University of Essex</p><p>Alexia Katsanidou, GESIS Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences</p><p>Alfredo Arahuetes, Comillas Pontifical University</p><p>Alice Pirlot, Geneva Graduate Institute</p><p>Alison Johnston, Oregon State University</p><p>Alper Kaliber, Altinbas University</p><p>Amandine Crespy, Université Libre de Bruxelles</p><p>Amie Kreppel, University of Florida</p><p>Amy Verdun, University of Victoria</p><p>Ana E. Juncos, University of Bristol</p><p>Ana Paula Brandão, CICP-University of Minho</p><p>Anastasia Ershova, Queen's University Belfast</p><p>Anders Esmark, University of Copenhagen</p><p>André Barrinha, University of Bath</p><p>Andrea Aldrich, Yale University</p><p>Andrea Appolloni, University of Rome Tor Vergata</p><p>Andrea Colli, Bocconi University</p><p>Andrea Filippetti, National Research Council of Italy/Birbeck University of London</p><p>Andrea Lenschow, Osnabrück University</p><p>Andrea Ott, Maastricht University</p><p>Andrea Pedrazzani, University of Milan</p><p>Andrea Pritoni, University of Turin</p><p>Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro</p><p>Andrea Sangiovanni, King's College London</p><p>Andrea Schlenker, University of Lucerne</p><p>Andrea L. P. Pirro, University of Bologna</p><p>Andreas Bieler, University of Nottingham</p><p>Andreas Dür, University of Salzburg</p><p>Andreas Fagerholm, Åb","PeriodicalId":51369,"journal":{"name":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","volume":"62 6","pages":"1769-1797"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jcms.13683","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142176413","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article discusses the proposal for an EU emissions trading system for transport and buildings (the ETS2), again with the EU as an international pioneer. How did this controversial proposal come to be adopted in 2023? This study links up to recent EU studies highlighting co‐ordination and interaction between the EU institutions. The Commission helped bring about the ETS2 by strategically using different types of issue linking, both positively and more coercively. In the Parliament, senior members of the European Parliament managed to increase support for the ETS2 by inter‐institutional networking and achieving concessions as to flexible mechanisms. Amongst the member states, heavyweight ETS2 proponents had help from the Commission in bringing sceptical countries on board. Hence, several types of synergistic interaction can be noted, facilitated also by trilogues as the more intimate arena for final compromises. Not least, the increasing role of policy packaging highlights the need for further research on changing inter‐institutional dynamics.
{"title":"EU Emissions Trading for Transport and Buildings: Saved by Synergistic Institutional Interaction?","authors":"Jørgen Wettestad","doi":"10.1111/jcms.13671","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13671","url":null,"abstract":"This article discusses the proposal for an EU emissions trading system for transport and buildings (the ETS2), again with the EU as an international pioneer. How did this controversial proposal come to be adopted in 2023? This study links up to recent EU studies highlighting co‐ordination and interaction between the EU institutions. The Commission helped bring about the ETS2 by strategically using different types of issue linking, both positively and more coercively. In the Parliament, senior members of the European Parliament managed to increase support for the ETS2 by inter‐institutional networking and achieving concessions as to flexible mechanisms. Amongst the member states, heavyweight ETS2 proponents had help from the Commission in bringing sceptical countries on board. Hence, several types of synergistic interaction can be noted, facilitated also by trilogues as the more intimate arena for final compromises. Not least, the increasing role of policy packaging highlights the need for further research on changing inter‐institutional dynamics.","PeriodicalId":51369,"journal":{"name":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","volume":"41 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142176414","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>The 2023 elections in Greece and Spain showed that Southern Europe could still surprise. Greece experienced significant change, with the unexpected collapse of the official opposition presaging the emergence of a predominant party system. However, predictions that Spain would become the next European country with far-right government participation were not fulfilled. These elections took place a decade and a half the start of the European debt crisis which sorely tried these countries' political health. They signalled a new phase in the evolution of the post-crisis party systems.</p><p>Both countries transitioned to democracy in the mid-1970s and subsequently established patterns of two-party dominant party competition and single-party governments, though Spain's party system was more fragmented and its minority governments often relied on regionally based non-statewide parties (NSWPs) to govern. The post-2008 crisis era was marked by greater fragmentation, more complex governance and polarisation. In both cases, the political fallout from major economic recessions, European Union (EU)/International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailouts and harsh austerity triggered dramatic party system transformation.</p><p>This included a dive in popular support for the social democratic and conservative parties that had previously alternated in government: PASOK (Πανελληνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα, Panhellenic Socialist Movement) and New Democracy (Νέα Δημοκρατία, ND) in Greece, and the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE) and Popular Party (PP) in Spain. The challenger parties that benefitted in Greece included the radical left SYRIZA (Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς, Coalition of the Radical Left), which replaced the socialists as the main force on the left and led two governments in 2015–2019. Greece also witnessed a rise of the far right, notably the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn (Χρυσή Αυγή), one of the most extreme parties in Europe. In Spain, the radical left <i>Podemos</i> (We Can) and centrist <i>Ciudadanos</i> (Citizens, Cs) surged first, then later, the radical right <i>Vox</i> (Voice) took off in 2019 in part as a response to the 2017 Catalan independence push and corruption scandals engulfing the PP. In Greece in 2012 and Spain in 2015–2016, repeat elections were required before a government could be formed.</p><p>The 2019 elections marked milestones in both countries. In Greece, four successive coalitions governed in 2011–2019, two of them including a (different) radical right party. In contrast, the 2019 election was hailed as a ‘return to normal’ (Rori, <span>2020</span>), resulting in a single-party ND government and the disappearance from parliament of most of the crisis-era challenger parties, including Golden Dawn. However, it did not restore the pre-crisis status quo, as SYRIZA became the official opposition whilst PASOK's vote remained in single figures. Meanwhile, as in 2015–16, Spain once again needed two elections to form a gove
2023年希腊和西班牙的选举表明，南欧仍有可能出人意料。希腊经历了重大变化，官方反对派的意外崩溃预示着一个主导政党制度的出现。然而，有关西班牙将成为下一个极右翼政府参与的欧洲国家的预测并没有实现。这些选举是在欧债危机爆发15年后举行的，这场危机严重考验了这些国家的政治健康。它们标志着后危机时期政党制度的演变进入了一个新阶段。这两个国家都在20世纪70年代中期过渡到民主，随后建立了两党主导的政党竞争和一党政府的模式，尽管西班牙的政党制度更加分散，其少数党政府往往依赖于以地区为基础的非州政党（NSWPs）来执政。2008年后危机时代的特点是更大的分裂、更复杂的治理和两极分化。在这两种情况下，重大经济衰退、欧盟(EU)/国际货币基金组织（IMF）的救助和严厉的紧缩政策带来的政治后果引发了戏剧性的政党制度转型。这包括之前交替执政的社会民主党和保守政党的支持率大幅下降：希腊的泛希腊社会主义运动党（Πανελληνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα，泛希腊社会主义运动党）和新民主党（Νέα Δημοκρατία，新民主党），以及西班牙的社会党（Partido Socialista Obrero Español， PSOE）和人民党（PP）。在希腊受益的挑战者政党包括激进左翼联盟（Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς，激进左翼联盟），它取代社会主义者成为左翼的主要力量，并在2015-2019年领导了两届政府。希腊也见证了极右势力的崛起，尤其是欧洲最极端的政党之一新纳粹金色黎明党（Χρυσή Αυγή）。在西班牙，激进左翼政党“我们可以”（Podemos）和中间派政党“公民党”（Ciudadanos）首先崛起，随后，激进右翼政党“声音党”（Vox）在2019年崛起，这在一定程度上是对2017年加泰罗尼亚独立运动和人民党卷入腐败丑闻的回应。在2012年的希腊和2015年至2016年的西班牙，在组建政府之前都需要进行重复选举。2019年的选举是两国的里程碑。在希腊，2011-2019年连续四个联合政府执政，其中两个包括一个（不同的）激进右翼政党。相比之下，2019年的选举被誉为“回归正常”（Rori, 2020），结果是一党执政的民族民主联盟政府和大多数危机时期的挑战者政党从议会中消失，包括金色黎明党。然而，它并没有恢复到危机前的状态，因为激进左翼联盟成为了官方的反对党，而泛希社运党的选票仍然是个位数。与此同时，与2015-16年一样，西班牙再次需要两次选举才能在2019年组建政府。这是其民主转型以来的第一个执政联盟，将联合左翼和我们可以（Unidas Podemos, United We Can）组成的激进左翼联盟与工人党结成伙伴关系。Vox成为第三大党。本文展示了接下来发生的事情，分析了2023年希腊和西班牙选举的结果，并强调了关键的相似点和不同点。在得出结论之前，本文探讨了选举活动、结果及其对国内和欧洲的影响。与2019年不同的是，这一次希腊举行了重复的议会选举，而西班牙只需要一次选举。在希腊，6月的选举尤其以高弃权和抗议投票为特征，而在西班牙，选民大量回归两个主要政党。两国的选举结果都带来了连续性：希腊巩固了一党多数统治的回归，西班牙则重复了联合政府的实验。在这两个国家，选举都导致了亲欧盟政府的延续，而欧洲怀疑论者的激进右翼仍然局限于反对派。希腊和西班牙于2023年举行大选之前，发生了震惊世界的新冠肺炎疫情和俄罗斯入侵乌克兰。这两个问题在竞选活动中都不重要。由于他们的救助计划早已过去，欧洲一体化也不再是一个关键问题。相反，两场选举都聚焦于国内治理。虽然这不是欧债危机结束后的首次全国议会选举，但这次选举是在经济增长和失业率下降的时代进行的。选举使两国的政府得以延续。因此，他们的欧盟伙伴继续在欧洲理事会、米佐塔基斯和Sánchez同同样的对话者打交道。对着镜子看希腊和西班牙的选举，我们发现了重要的差异。 举几个例子，西班牙的选举竞争非常激烈，人民党和社会主义工人党以及左翼和右翼集团都获得了类似的支持，而希腊的选举则是一边倾侧，民族民主党主导了选举格局。这两届政府截然不同，希腊的民主民主党在议会中占绝对多数，而西班牙的少数派联盟需要与众多不同的议会政党进行谈判，并面临一个动员起来、强大而愤怒的反对派。在希腊，主要的挑战是一个软弱而分裂的反对党，它对政府实施真正制约的可能性有限。尽管如此，也有相似之处。第一个担忧是由于债务危机而出现的主要挑战者政党的作用减弱。西班牙的主要受益者——“我们可以”党和“公民党”——已不再是过去的自己。公民党已经完全从国家政治中消失，而“我们可以党”的影响力微乎其微，它作为社会主义工人党政府合作伙伴的地位已被新成立的人民党取代。在希腊，激进左翼联盟的得票率降至2015年高点的一半左右，尽管仍远高于危机前5%的峰值。然而，它已经失去了在政党体系中的核心地位，似乎不再是另一个候任政府。虽然金色黎明党的领导干部试图卷土重来，但在选举中取得了惊人的成功，但如果斯巴达阵线党如预期的那样被驱逐出议会，这很可能是短暂的。另一个相似之处涉及保守派的选举成功，这在欧洲的背景下是不寻常的（Bale和Rovira Kaltwasser， 2021），希腊民族民主党和西班牙人民党是欧洲最强大的保守派政党之一。与此同时，在激进右翼的选举相关性方面，西班牙和希腊现在与许多其他欧洲国家相似，大约八分之一的希腊和西班牙选民在2023年选择了激进右翼。虽然在希腊，这一政治领域是分裂的，但在西班牙，它有一个强有力的代表。这次的选举结果阻止了Vox在西班牙执政。关于未来，在希腊，最大的变化是明显走向一个主导的政党制度，这可能会带来民主挑战，而西班牙继续面对极端好斗的政党关系，现任政府面临迄今为止最困难的议会谈判局面。
{"title":"The 2023 Elections in Greece and Spain: Evolving Party Systems in Post-Crisis Southern Europe","authors":"Susannah Verney, Bonnie N. Field","doi":"10.1111/jcms.13658","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jcms.13658","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The 2023 elections in Greece and Spain showed that Southern Europe could still surprise. Greece experienced significant change, with the unexpected collapse of the official opposition presaging the emergence of a predominant party system. However, predictions that Spain would become the next European country with far-right government participation were not fulfilled. These elections took place a decade and a half the start of the European debt crisis which sorely tried these countries' political health. They signalled a new phase in the evolution of the post-crisis party systems.</p><p>Both countries transitioned to democracy in the mid-1970s and subsequently established patterns of two-party dominant party competition and single-party governments, though Spain's party system was more fragmented and its minority governments often relied on regionally based non-statewide parties (NSWPs) to govern. The post-2008 crisis era was marked by greater fragmentation, more complex governance and polarisation. In both cases, the political fallout from major economic recessions, European Union (EU)/International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailouts and harsh austerity triggered dramatic party system transformation.</p><p>This included a dive in popular support for the social democratic and conservative parties that had previously alternated in government: PASOK (Πανελληνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα, Panhellenic Socialist Movement) and New Democracy (Νέα Δημοκρατία, ND) in Greece, and the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE) and Popular Party (PP) in Spain. The challenger parties that benefitted in Greece included the radical left SYRIZA (Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς, Coalition of the Radical Left), which replaced the socialists as the main force on the left and led two governments in 2015–2019. Greece also witnessed a rise of the far right, notably the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn (Χρυσή Αυγή), one of the most extreme parties in Europe. In Spain, the radical left <i>Podemos</i> (We Can) and centrist <i>Ciudadanos</i> (Citizens, Cs) surged first, then later, the radical right <i>Vox</i> (Voice) took off in 2019 in part as a response to the 2017 Catalan independence push and corruption scandals engulfing the PP. In Greece in 2012 and Spain in 2015–2016, repeat elections were required before a government could be formed.</p><p>The 2019 elections marked milestones in both countries. In Greece, four successive coalitions governed in 2011–2019, two of them including a (different) radical right party. In contrast, the 2019 election was hailed as a ‘return to normal’ (Rori, <span>2020</span>), resulting in a single-party ND government and the disappearance from parliament of most of the crisis-era challenger parties, including Golden Dawn. However, it did not restore the pre-crisis status quo, as SYRIZA became the official opposition whilst PASOK's vote remained in single figures. Meanwhile, as in 2015–16, Spain once again needed two elections to form a gove","PeriodicalId":51369,"journal":{"name":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","volume":"62 S1","pages":"217-233"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jcms.13658","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142176416","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>This Annual Review (AR) of the European Union (EU) focuses on the events and developments of 2023. However, our editorial was crafted shortly after a critical turning point, that is, the institutional and political renewal process that began on 6–9 June 2024. During this period, nearly 400 million European citizens were entitled to elect the 720 Members of the 10th European Parliament (EP) Legislature. In the following weeks, crucial decisions were made regarding the EU's top leadership positions. Whilst this pivotal moment will be explored in detail in the next AR, dedicated to 2024, it serves as the backdrop for our reflection on the main developments and dynamics in European governance during 2023. Therefore, after outlining our editorial vision, we briefly reconstruct what can be seen as a choice point at which significant options shape the trajectory of the European project. The following section provides an overview of the AR before making some concluding remarks.</p><p>This editorial marks the inaugural effort of a newly appointed team of co-editors. It serves a symbolic purpose by presenting the vision that guided our work. The title of this section aims to encapsulate the pivotal moment in the aftermath of the 2024 EP elections. At the same time, it aptly reflects the essence of our project and serves as a fitting motto. We are firmly committed to maintaining the AR's tradition of high-quality articles, a standard impeccably upheld by the colleagues who preceded us in this job. Concurrently, we aim to introduce specific innovations to enhance the publication's structure and scope. Building on the excellent work of our predecessors and in agreement with the staff of the University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES), we have decided to embed the traditional AR's Annual Lecture within the UACES Annual Conference (Trento, 1–4 September 2024). This move aims to enhance the visibility of the AR within the scholarly community, fostering greater engagement amongst its members. Like in past editions, the AR opens with the traditional Annual Lecture, held this year by Alina Mungiu-Pippidi (<span>2024</span>). In addition, we have introduced a division into three thematic sections, supplemented by a ‘Critical Dialogue’ section on a book that we consider particularly relevant for understanding the EU project and, more generally, Europe's current state of affairs. The three thematic sections encompass (1) the roles of pivotal actors and institutions in shaping European integration, (2) the main policy developments concerning domestic and foreign domains in the year of reference and (3) the main electoral developments in the year under review. In the third section, we also introduced a sub-section called ‘Elections in the Mirror’, which deals with comparative evaluations of elections in geographically close EU member states, often facing similar challenges. This addition aims to provide a more fine-grained analysis, illustrating
本欧盟年度回顾（AR）重点关注2023年的事件和发展。然而，我们的社论是在2024年6月6日至9日开始的体制和政治更新进程的关键转折点之后不久编写的。在此期间，近4亿欧洲公民有权选举第10届欧洲议会（EP）立法机构的720名成员。在接下来的几周里，有关欧盟最高领导人职位的关键决定做出了。虽然这一关键时刻将在下一个AR中详细探讨，致力于2024年，但它可以作为我们反思2023年欧洲治理的主要发展和动态的背景。因此，在概述了我们的编辑愿景之后，我们简要地重建了可以被视为一个选择点的地方，在这个选择点上，重要的选择塑造了欧洲项目的轨迹。在作结束语之前，以下部分提供AR的概述。这篇社论标志着新任命的联合编辑团队的首次努力。通过展示指导我们工作的愿景，它起到了象征性的作用。本节的标题旨在概括2024年欧洲议会选举后的关键时刻。同时，它恰当地反映了我们项目的本质，并作为一个合适的座右铭。我们坚定地致力于保持AR的高质量文章的传统，这是在我们之前从事这项工作的同事们无可挑剔地坚持的标准。同时，我们的目标是引入具体的创新，以提高出版物的结构和范围。基于我们前辈的出色工作，并与当代欧洲研究大学协会（UACES）的工作人员达成协议，我们决定将传统的AR年度讲座嵌入UACES年会（特伦托，2024年9月1日至4日）。此举旨在提高AR在学术界的知名度，促进其成员之间的更多参与。与过去的版本一样，AR以传统的年度讲座开始，今年由Alina Mungiu-Pippidi（2024）举办。此外，我们还将本书分为三个主题部分，并辅以本书中的“关键对话”部分，我们认为这与理解欧盟项目以及更广泛地说，欧洲当前的事务状况特别相关。三个主题部分包括(1)关键行为者和机构在形成欧洲一体化方面的作用，(2)参考年度有关国内外领域的主要政策发展，以及(3)审查年度的主要选举发展。在第三部分中，我们还介绍了一个名为“镜子中的选举”的小节，该小节涉及对地理位置相近的欧盟成员国选举的比较评估，这些国家经常面临类似的挑战。这一补充旨在提供更细致的分析，说明成员国之间的共同点和差异，从而对欧洲的政治动态和选举格局提供更深刻的见解。最后，新的关键对话部分旨在促进基于AR所涵盖年份出版的一本书的讨论（Bartels, 2023），涉及两名评论者和作者的回复，以激发公众辩论和加强学术交流。因此，不同的部分汇聚在一起，为读者提供了一种了解欧洲政治的综合方法，揭示了多层次治理与欧盟政治框架之间错综复杂的相互作用。这种有凝聚力的结构旨在提供对各种政治，制度和政策因素如何在更广泛的欧洲背景下相互作用的全面理解。在编辑路线的变化和连续性之间实现这种微妙的整合，我们已经认识到需要强调包容性。这一版包括19位女性和14位男性的贡献。我们的努力也旨在让高级和初级学者参与，并在联合研究课题上加强国际学术合作。与《共同市场研究期刊》（JCMS）的目标一致，我们努力通过吸引来自世界各地的作者来扩大《共同市场研究期刊》的全球推广范围，我们将在未来的版本中进一步追求这一任务，并通过吸纳从业者和增强《共同市场研究期刊》的多学科元素。欧洲公民在一个以复杂和错综复杂的国际动态为特征的全球背景下为2024年欧洲选举投票。这包括两场战争：一场是俄罗斯侵略乌克兰战争的第三年，这是二战以来欧洲最重大的国际战争；另一场是自2023年10月以来以色列-哈马斯战争的升级，这场战争导致了中东危机，并对成员国的团结构成了挑战。 在此背景下，中欧关系日益紧张，唐纳德·特朗普可能再次当选美国总统的前景可能会带来更多的不确定性每五年一次的欧洲议会选举是欧盟的关键时刻，标志着一个新的政治和制度周期的开始。新演员随着EP的续订和委员团的加入而加入。人事变动可能涉及所有领导职位：欧盟委员会主席、欧洲议会和欧洲理事会主席（EUCO）以及欧盟外交和安全政策高级代表/欧盟委员会副主席（HR/VP）。同样，欧盟政治议程中也设定了新的优先事项，由国家元首和政府首脑（HOSG）在其“2024-29年战略议程”中确定，并由委员会主席在新的“2024-29年政治指南”中确定。在这方面，2024年的更新过程是不寻常的，因为它涉及更多的政治连续性而不是变化，其明确目标是在挑战激增的情况下确保欧洲项目的生存。从这个意义上说，它可以被视为一个不寻常的（保守）过渡阶段，通过明确投资于领导人和档案的连续性，成功地防止了欧盟轨迹演变中的激进变化。我们可以确定欧盟公民对制度更新挑战的反应程度和类型（例如，投票率和选举结果）和结果（例如，团体形成，领导职位和议程设置）至少有五个主要的连续性。首先，欧洲选举的投票率（51.05%）与5年前（50.66%）相比仅略有改善，因此引发了批评，认为这种参与水平“太小，不能让我们说对冯德莱恩政权投了实质性的信任票”（Ludlow, 2024，第4页）。其次，与前两次欧洲议会选举（2014年和2019年）一样，几个国家的竞选活动的特点是对各种民粹主义和欧洲怀疑主义激进右翼政党崛起的恐惧(Beaudonnet and Gomez, 2024；Bergmann et al., 2021；布劳恩和卡特尼，2024；Mudde, 2024)。尽管这些政党表现良好，获得了超过四分之一的席位，但它们的整体影响力连续第三次受到限制。这种限制主要是由于他们分裂成不同的政治团体，在某些情况下，他们作为非附属成员被孤立。第三，尽管右翼分裂加剧意味着第十届议会也更加分裂（八个政治团体，比即将卸任的议会多一个），但三个主要的亲欧团体——欧洲人民党（EPP）、社会党和民主党（S&；D）以及更新欧洲的自由主义者——已经获得了多数席位，最终由被削弱的绿党/欧洲自由联盟集团加强了席位。第四，在主要角色及其政治家族方面，欧洲议会主席梅索拉（Roberta Metsola）和欧盟委员会主席冯德莱恩（Ursula von der Leyen）被确认连任，2承认欧洲议会在欧盟政治中发挥的主导作用，自2004年以来，欧洲议会一直成功地担任欧盟委员会主席。欧洲议会选举后的谈判也为欧盟高层职位带来了新的人选，如葡萄牙前总理António Costa将担任欧盟理事会主席，现任爱沙尼亚总理Kaja Kallas将担任人力资源/副总裁职位。这些决定并非一致通过。匈牙利总理维克多Orbán支持科斯塔的提名，但对冯德莱恩投了反对票，对卡拉斯投了弃权票，而意大利总理乔治娅·梅洛尼对冯德莱恩投了弃权票，但对其他两位投了反对票（Ludlow, 2024, p. 14）。第五，优先事项的连续性也占上风，议程的重点是增强欧洲经济、加强欧洲安全和防务以及保护欧洲价值观。在欧洲议会的政治团体形成之前，密集的政治活动强调了议会的中心地位，确认了议会团体在欧盟政治体系中的重要性，影响了任命、发言时间、资源和决策过程(Ahrens et al., 2022；Bressanelli and Chelotti, 2020)。尽管获得了新成员，欧洲保守党和改革派（ECR）很快就被一个新成立的团体所取代。这个名为“欧洲爱国者”的新组织包括西班牙的Vox和意大利的Lega等主要右翼政党，以84个欧洲议会席位超过欧洲共产党。与此同时，一个较小的组织“主权国家欧洲”成立了，由来自8
{"title":"Navigating Complexity: Continuity and Change in European Governance, 2023/2024","authors":"Gianfranco Baldini, Elena Baracani, Sorina Soare","doi":"10.1111/jcms.13682","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jcms.13682","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This Annual Review (AR) of the European Union (EU) focuses on the events and developments of 2023. However, our editorial was crafted shortly after a critical turning point, that is, the institutional and political renewal process that began on 6–9 June 2024. During this period, nearly 400 million European citizens were entitled to elect the 720 Members of the 10th European Parliament (EP) Legislature. In the following weeks, crucial decisions were made regarding the EU's top leadership positions. Whilst this pivotal moment will be explored in detail in the next AR, dedicated to 2024, it serves as the backdrop for our reflection on the main developments and dynamics in European governance during 2023. Therefore, after outlining our editorial vision, we briefly reconstruct what can be seen as a choice point at which significant options shape the trajectory of the European project. The following section provides an overview of the AR before making some concluding remarks.</p><p>This editorial marks the inaugural effort of a newly appointed team of co-editors. It serves a symbolic purpose by presenting the vision that guided our work. The title of this section aims to encapsulate the pivotal moment in the aftermath of the 2024 EP elections. At the same time, it aptly reflects the essence of our project and serves as a fitting motto. We are firmly committed to maintaining the AR's tradition of high-quality articles, a standard impeccably upheld by the colleagues who preceded us in this job. Concurrently, we aim to introduce specific innovations to enhance the publication's structure and scope. Building on the excellent work of our predecessors and in agreement with the staff of the University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES), we have decided to embed the traditional AR's Annual Lecture within the UACES Annual Conference (Trento, 1–4 September 2024). This move aims to enhance the visibility of the AR within the scholarly community, fostering greater engagement amongst its members. Like in past editions, the AR opens with the traditional Annual Lecture, held this year by Alina Mungiu-Pippidi (<span>2024</span>). In addition, we have introduced a division into three thematic sections, supplemented by a ‘Critical Dialogue’ section on a book that we consider particularly relevant for understanding the EU project and, more generally, Europe's current state of affairs. The three thematic sections encompass (1) the roles of pivotal actors and institutions in shaping European integration, (2) the main policy developments concerning domestic and foreign domains in the year of reference and (3) the main electoral developments in the year under review. In the third section, we also introduced a sub-section called ‘Elections in the Mirror’, which deals with comparative evaluations of elections in geographically close EU member states, often facing similar challenges. This addition aims to provide a more fine-grained analysis, illustrating ","PeriodicalId":51369,"journal":{"name":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","volume":"62 S1","pages":"5-16"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jcms.13682","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142176415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>2023 and 2024 developments in the field of migration governance have been marked by a shift towards the acceptance of systematic illiberal migration practices in the European Union (EU). This illiberal turn is not only a backlash against liberalism ‘in all its varied scripts – political, economic, cultural, geopolitical, civilizational – often in the name of democratic principles and thanks to them (by winning the popular vote)’ but also an ethno-nationalist turn against globalisation (Laruelle, <span>2022</span>, p. 304). Today, these illiberal practices, symbolised by the adoption of the Pact and the latest migration and asylum developments, are ‘majoritarian, nation-centric or sovereigntist, favouring traditional hierarchies and cultural’ and encouraged by ‘state structures’ (Laruelle, <span>2022</span>, p. 314) involving ‘anti-migrants legislation and practices such as detention camps, that have put states at odds with their own human rights declarations’. This shift has not happened overnight and is the result of several years of restrictions, pushbacks and criminalisation of NGOs rescuing migrants at sea that have become widespread in Europe. What has happened is that incidental illiberal practices have become more mainstreamed and accepted. This is at odds with the so-called post-Westphalian normative stand of the EU, which has traditionally declared to be the beacon of human rights and refugee rights against restrictive and sovereigntist member states. Global refugee norms adopted after the World War II and embraced by the EU as a liberal ambition to harmonise and create similar conditions for refugees and asylum seekers across EU member states have indeed been at the heart of the liberal international order (Lavenex, <span>2024</span>, p. 1).</p><p>Ideological illiberalism within the field of migration is not new, however (Kauth and King, <span>2020</span>). A ‘liberal paradox’ has always been present in immigration policies, notably after the 1970s, when Western nations decided to halt guest worker programmes (Hollifield, <span>2004</span>). Since the 1990s, policies of non-admission, collaborative and delegated policies of non-arrival have been increasingly at the heart of immigration policies in Europe, such as with the adoption of visa policies or safe country rules under the Dublin Convention (Lavenex, <span>2024</span>, p. 7). At the external level, readmission and return policies have been negotiated with third countries in addition to the delegation of policies of non-arrival (Lavenex, <span>2024</span>). The New Pact on Migration adopted in 2024 is the last occurence of a general strengthening of ‘organized hypocrisy’ around (European) states' obligations to assist refugees by multiplying the deterrence practices and barriers such as carrier sanctions, ‘buffer zones, refugee camps’, which are at odds with their claims to be liberal democracies (Kauth and King, <span>2020</span>, p. 383). This has been seen as not only a subve
这就是为什么本文首先回顾极右翼反移民思想的兴起，以及欧盟机构和欧盟成员国的结盟，以实现欧洲公众舆论眼中可信的改革。其次，我认为，鉴于不确定的地缘政治背景，欧盟与威权政权的交易性移民协议的增加正在导致欧盟根深蒂固的非自由主义。最后，我详细阐述了该协定的未来实施，以及学者在重新思考欧洲这些不自由的事态发展中所扮演的角色。以下部分回顾了欧盟机构在2024年欧洲选举前进行可信改革的意愿如何促成了《公约》谈判，但也反映了整个欧洲极右翼思想的主流化。关于新协议的讨论揭示了移民和庇护的“地缘政治化”，不稳定和外国影响日益影响欧盟制定其移民战略和政策的方式，预测第三国工具化的风险，以及移民可以被用作“大规模移民武器”的想法（格林希尔，2016）。这也给欧洲带来了一个明显的转变，即越来越多地将寻求庇护者视为我们社会的风险，从而加速了一些不自由的做法的引入。卢卡申科政权在白俄罗斯和波兰之间以及与波罗的海国家之间的边境上有组织地让中东难民和移民过境，这让欧盟成员国意识到，难民可以被不自由的政权用作勒索和破坏欧盟稳定的“武器”。这导致了工具化一揽子计划的直接采用，这为欧盟成员国在实施欧盟法律方面提供了更多的余地和自由裁量权。然而，欧盟移民外交并不新鲜，最初是通过欧盟与第三国的移民和边境政策的外部化来实现的，这使得欧盟能够组织不入境的授权政策，也可以外包不离境的政策，在第三国建立安全区。自2004年以来，欧盟以重新接纳协议、流动伙伴关系、免签证对话和签证自由化的形式与第三国签订了多项双边协议。这些文书大多由总司谈判，以部门方式处理，有时与国家文书竞争（Cassarino和Marin， 2022年）。欧盟成员国也诉诸于与第三国的双边条约和协议来合作打击移民，例如2008年卡扎菲统治下的《友好、伙伴关系和合作条约》（TFPC），或者意大利和利比亚在2018年与民族团结政府签署的最新谅解备忘录（Cusumano and Riddervold, 2023, pp. 3024-3025）。这些类型的协议涉及防止非正常移民和意大利和欧盟对利比亚海岸警卫队和海军的强化培训（Cusumano和Riddervold， 2023年）。然而，在2023年发生的变化是，这些移民协议明显增多，非自由主义现在正更明确地嵌入欧盟的外交工具和战略中。更具体地说，欧盟机构和成员国之间通过“欧洲团队”的品牌进行协调。它确实不再是像2023年11月意大利-阿尔巴尼亚协议那样由欧盟成员国主导的生意，而是现在越来越多地成为一种公共品牌推广活动，欧盟委员会主席与荷兰首相吕特一起与突尼斯独裁者凯斯·赛义德握手。继2023年7月与突尼斯达成协议后，毛里塔尼亚在西班牙轮值主席国的影响下，于2024年1月与欧盟签署了一项协议，并于2024年3月与埃及、2024年5月与黎巴嫩分别签署了协议。事实上，哈马斯-以色列战争导致更多的叙利亚人从黎巴嫩越境前往塞浦路斯，早在2023年全年就有4500名叙利亚人从黎巴嫩前往塞浦路斯（美联社新闻，2024年）。叙利亚长达13年的内战，黎巴嫩收容难民的压力和严重的经济危机导致了这些人的离开，并引起了塞浦路斯当局越来越多的担忧，塞浦路斯当局一直在与奥地利和丹麦一起推动达成一项新协议（Stamouli, 2024）。这些交易为第三国带来了实实在在的外交利益。例如，在突尼斯，谅解备忘录包括五大支柱：宏观经济稳定；贸易和投资；绿色能源转型；民间交往;还有移民和流动性。通过“欧洲团队”，我们看到在欧盟委员会的领导下，欧盟成员国和欧盟机构之间进行了重要的协调，以提出在公众舆论眼中可见且容易烙印的解决方案。 这些交易大多涉及动用各种外交手段，通过大笔投资为突尼斯、埃及和黎巴嫩带来稳定和经济支持。然而，在这些协议中，劳动力移民并不是那么重要，而欧盟发起的人才合作计划，与欧盟面临的人口挑战相比，显得过于温和。移民协议的加速是在2018年通过的《难民和移民全球契约》的更广泛背景下发生的，该契约旨在实现“安全、有序和正常的移民”，该契约在全球层面重申，移民管理是国家的事务，根本上是一个与主权有关的问题（米金斯基和列斐伏尔，2024年）。因此，毫不奇怪，英国的卢旺达案件，以及Sunak政府愿意将卢旺达列为安全国家，以便合法地将难民和寻求庇护者送回第三国，显然是规避国际法和日内瓦公约不驱回原则的做法之一。虽然从历史上看，丹麦是1986年第一个通过安全国家计划的欧盟国家之一（菲茨杰拉德，2019），现在是12个欧盟成员国的情况，但它也是第一个决定通过关于庇护处理的域外化法律的欧盟国家，就像英国一样，并受到联合国禁止酷刑委员会的批评（联合国人权，2023）。这种与欧盟第三国外交协议激增的趋势值得怀疑。关于欧盟-突尼斯协议，联合国专家对“据称对撒哈拉以南移民的歧视性待遇”、“集体驱逐”、“驱逐移民”（人权高专办，2023年）以及与第三国达成协议，实施不自由的移民治理，在某种程度上颠覆了自由规范和国际法表示担忧。以前与利比亚的合作也曾受到质疑。Cusumano和Riddervold正确地质疑为什么欧盟机构及其成员国与利比亚军队合作，这“除了与欧盟自己的承诺相矛盾，在道德上存在问题，并面临欧洲人权委员会司法审查的风险之外，由于利比亚政治局势的波动和GNA的弱点，外化也可能无效，GNA几乎不能作为双边移民治理的有效伙伴”（Cusumano和Riddervold， 2023）。3025)。2023年另一个有趣的发展是，英吉利海峡的海上过境仍在继续，而支持英国退欧的人士所流行的“夺回控制权”的口号并没有成为现实。2023年，共有29437个过境点，比2022年全年创纪录的45774个过境点低36% （BBC, 2024）。尽管法英两国已经开展了20年的双边海上和边境合作，并在2003年签署了《图凯协定》（Touquet agreement）， 2018年签署了《桑德赫斯特条约》（Sandhurst Treaty），但两国在2023年3月的法英峰会上承诺，英国将在3年内提供5亿多欧元，用于改善边境巡逻和阻止走私者。总体而言，根据议会的一份报告，英国在2014年至2022/2023财政年度结束期间承诺了略高于2.32亿英镑的资金——额外支付的金额略低于8700万英镑，其中至少有一部分似乎已经支付给了法国政府（众议院，2023年）。随着英国脱欧，英国无法确保与欧盟的任何合作，而且由于英国现在已经退出了《都柏林公约》（Dublin Convention），它也无法找到遣返寻求庇护者的方法。最终滞留在加莱和敦刻尔克的难民没有安全的途径前往英国，这对无人陪伴的儿童来说尤其令人担忧。根据安全通道2010年至2020年的一份报告，安全通道（2023年）表示，“在英国获得庇护的无人陪伴儿童中，只有6%是通过安全途径抵达的，这还不包括无人陪伴儿童。”总体而言，在截至2023年6月的12个月里，通过安全途径抵达的难民比去年减少了83%。然而，很少有人想到加来港的双边合作和缺乏合法渠道是如何参与海上过境和“小船”的情况的。关于欧盟的交易说明了不自由行为的概念，因为欧洲议会通常不参与他们的谈判，因此将民主审查边缘化，将（法律）审查交给监察员和法院。 就像2016年的欧盟-土耳其协议一样，欧洲议会没有
{"title":"The New Pact on Migration: Embedded Illiberalism?","authors":"Sarah Wolff","doi":"10.1111/jcms.13669","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jcms.13669","url":null,"abstract":"<p>2023 and 2024 developments in the field of migration governance have been marked by a shift towards the acceptance of systematic illiberal migration practices in the European Union (EU). This illiberal turn is not only a backlash against liberalism ‘in all its varied scripts – political, economic, cultural, geopolitical, civilizational – often in the name of democratic principles and thanks to them (by winning the popular vote)’ but also an ethno-nationalist turn against globalisation (Laruelle, <span>2022</span>, p. 304). Today, these illiberal practices, symbolised by the adoption of the Pact and the latest migration and asylum developments, are ‘majoritarian, nation-centric or sovereigntist, favouring traditional hierarchies and cultural’ and encouraged by ‘state structures’ (Laruelle, <span>2022</span>, p. 314) involving ‘anti-migrants legislation and practices such as detention camps, that have put states at odds with their own human rights declarations’. This shift has not happened overnight and is the result of several years of restrictions, pushbacks and criminalisation of NGOs rescuing migrants at sea that have become widespread in Europe. What has happened is that incidental illiberal practices have become more mainstreamed and accepted. This is at odds with the so-called post-Westphalian normative stand of the EU, which has traditionally declared to be the beacon of human rights and refugee rights against restrictive and sovereigntist member states. Global refugee norms adopted after the World War II and embraced by the EU as a liberal ambition to harmonise and create similar conditions for refugees and asylum seekers across EU member states have indeed been at the heart of the liberal international order (Lavenex, <span>2024</span>, p. 1).</p><p>Ideological illiberalism within the field of migration is not new, however (Kauth and King, <span>2020</span>). A ‘liberal paradox’ has always been present in immigration policies, notably after the 1970s, when Western nations decided to halt guest worker programmes (Hollifield, <span>2004</span>). Since the 1990s, policies of non-admission, collaborative and delegated policies of non-arrival have been increasingly at the heart of immigration policies in Europe, such as with the adoption of visa policies or safe country rules under the Dublin Convention (Lavenex, <span>2024</span>, p. 7). At the external level, readmission and return policies have been negotiated with third countries in addition to the delegation of policies of non-arrival (Lavenex, <span>2024</span>). The New Pact on Migration adopted in 2024 is the last occurence of a general strengthening of ‘organized hypocrisy’ around (European) states' obligations to assist refugees by multiplying the deterrence practices and barriers such as carrier sanctions, ‘buffer zones, refugee camps’, which are at odds with their claims to be liberal democracies (Kauth and King, <span>2020</span>, p. 383). This has been seen as not only a subve","PeriodicalId":51369,"journal":{"name":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","volume":"62 S1","pages":"113-123"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jcms.13669","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142176417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>The beginning of the 2020s has been marked by a near global polycrisis (Lawrence et al., <span>2024</span>). In addition to the global climate crisis brewing in the background, in 2020, the first global pandemic erupted, which pressured governments to take unprecedented measures and divided societies over social distancing measures and vaccination and disrupted global production and logistics chains and caused turbulence in demand and supply. In 2022, Russia launched full-scale war in Ukraine, which sent millions seeking refuge elsewhere in Europe, prompted unprecedented international economic sanctions on Russia and enhanced the military preparedness in most European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states. This also resulted in the rapid rise of energy prices and the danger of energy deficit, rise of inflation and interest rates.</p><p>Hence, the general elections in Estonia in March 2023 and Finland in April 2023 took place in a situation of heightened international, economic and societal tensions and the outgoing governments having mainly dealt with crisis governance rather than focusing on fulfilling their electoral promises. In addition, both election campaigns also bore marks of bloc politics, where an otherwise multi-party system becomes aligned in two major camps and the campaign becomes a referendum on the proposed policies of these two camps.</p><p>Whilst polarization – both affective and political – is very well documented in the United States, it is also making headways into European politics. Political campaign cultures and government–opposition relations are changing even in countries like Finland and Estonia, which have usually been characterized by notably low levels of polarization (Bettarelli et al., <span>2023</span>; Nord et al., <span>2024</span>). Previous research has suggested that after a crisis, voters are particularly attracted to the political rhetoric of the (extreme) right. For instance, after a financial crisis, extreme right-wing parties increase their vote share by 30 percent (Funke et al., <span>2016</span>). Moreover, as Lisinska (<span>2022</span>) has noted, in times of crisis, when taking substantial measures is of particular importance, continued polarization often leads to democracy fatigue. Whilst Estonia and Finland have not faced democracy fatigue, it seems clear that following the turbulent times of the last decade have led both countries to unforeseen levels of polarization and emergence of populist right wing. Especially Finland has a long tradition of multiparty collaboration, having a history of coalitions including from left to right, but the consensus-oriented society has lately reformed towards bloc politics with strong divisions between political camps. This shift towards bloc politics has resulted in more pronounced ideological divides and a rise in populist rhetoric. The political landscape in both Estonia and Finland now reflects a growing fragmentation, where th
本世纪20年代初的特点是一场近乎全球性的多重危机（Lawrence et al., 2024）。除了正在酝酿的全球气候危机之外，2020年爆发了第一次全球大流行，迫使各国政府采取前所未有的措施，并在社会疏远措施和疫苗接种方面造成社会分裂，扰乱了全球生产和物流链，造成了供需动荡。2022年，俄罗斯在乌克兰发动全面战争，导致数百万人在欧洲其他地方避难，促使国际社会对俄罗斯实施前所未有的经济制裁，并加强了大多数欧盟和北大西洋公约组织（北约）成员国的军事准备。这也导致了能源价格的快速上涨以及能源短缺、通货膨胀和利率上升的危险。因此，2023年3月的爱沙尼亚大选和2023年4月的芬兰大选是在国际、经济和社会紧张局势加剧的情况下举行的，即将卸任的政府主要处理危机治理，而不是专注于履行其选举承诺。此外，这两次竞选活动也带有集团政治的痕迹，即多党制在两个主要阵营中结盟，竞选活动成为对这两个阵营提出的政策的全民公决。虽然两极分化——无论是情感上的还是政治上的——在美国是有据可查的，但它也在欧洲政治中取得了进展。即使在芬兰和爱沙尼亚这样的国家，政治竞选文化和政府-反对派关系也在发生变化，这些国家通常以两极分化程度明显较低为特征(Bettarelli et al., 2023；Nord et al., 2024)。先前的研究表明，危机过后，选民特别容易被（极端）右翼的政治言论所吸引。例如，在金融危机之后，极右翼政党的投票份额增加了30% （Funke et al., 2016）。此外，正如Lisinska（2022）所指出的，在危机时期，当采取实质性措施尤为重要时，持续的两极分化往往会导致民主疲劳。虽然爱沙尼亚和芬兰没有面临民主疲劳，但很明显，在过去十年的动荡时期之后，这两个国家的两极分化和民粹主义右翼的出现都达到了不可预见的程度。尤其是芬兰，有着悠久的多党合作传统，从左翼到右翼都有过联盟的历史，但这个以共识为导向的社会最近向政治阵营之间存在强烈分歧的集团政治转变。这种向集团政治的转变导致了更明显的意识形态分歧和民粹主义言论的兴起。爱沙尼亚和芬兰的政治格局现在都反映出日益分化，右翼民粹主义的出现标志着与历史上共识驱动的政治文化的重大背离。爱沙尼亚和芬兰是两个传统上政治地位和历史不同的邻国。冷战期间，爱沙尼亚仍在铁幕后面，而芬兰是一个中立国。爱沙尼亚在1991年重新获得独立后，开始了与西方的（重新）融合，2004年成为欧盟成员国（芬兰于1995年加入欧盟），并于同年加入北约，而芬兰则保持中立。社会经济上，芬兰是一个北欧福利国家，而爱沙尼亚自独立以来一直是一个自由福利国家。尽管存在差异，但芬兰和爱沙尼亚有着深厚的文化渊源（两国都说芬兰-乌戈尔语，这使它们与斯堪的纳维亚和波罗的海国家区别开来），并保持着非常友好的关系。这两个国家都有议会政治制度，政府是根据议会选举的结果组成的（尽管芬兰在20世纪90年代之前使用半总统制，并且与爱沙尼亚不同，芬兰仍然直接选举总统）。爱沙尼亚议会Riigikogu有101个席位，芬兰议会Eduskunta有200个席位。两国都采用比例投票制度，将国家划分为选区（爱沙尼亚为12个选区，芬兰为13个选区）。在爱沙尼亚和芬兰，选票直接投给候选人，间接投给政党（或选举名单）。芬兰也允许选举联盟在选举中竞争，这对小党派来说是一个有吸引力的解决方案，而爱沙尼亚只允许政党和单一候选人竞争。在爱沙尼亚，选举门槛是5%。在芬兰，使用d'Hondt方法将授权分配到每个选区。 在爱沙尼亚，席位分三轮分配：首先，个人授权分配给在选区中超过配额（所有选票除以授权数目）的候选人。这也是单一候选人进入国会的唯一机会。在第二轮选举中，各党按配额分配选区，而各党则按每位候选人得票的比例重新排序。在第三轮中，使用封闭的国家名单和改进的德洪特方法分配薪酬授权。两种选举制度都对大党略微有利。在下文中，我们将概述两国的选举事件，包括核心竞选主题和选举结果以及对国内、国际和欧盟层面的影响。我们表明，虽然全球多元危机在爱沙尼亚和芬兰引发了类似的问题，但它们的表现却截然不同，即使在新兴的两极分化和集团政治的共同趋势中也是如此。此外，本文还展示了多重危机时期是如何在选举期间做出重要的政治决策的，而不是在竞选期间进行辩论。在坚持了几十年的中立原则之后，芬兰迅速加入北约（NATO）就是一个很好的例子。虽然爱沙尼亚和芬兰的选举是在国际动荡时期举行的，但它们并没有发挥重大的变革作用，而是巩固了现状。在联合政府协议中，两国政府同意继续支持欧洲-大西洋一体化，包括加入欧盟和北约（Government Office, 2023a）。根据Petteri Orpo的政府计划，欧盟是芬兰最重要的政治和经济框架和价值共同体。为了解决执政联盟成员之间对欧盟的分歧（芬兰人党采取了温和的疑欧立场），政府计划强调，将欧盟发展成一个更好、更有效的联盟符合芬兰的利益。然而，联合政府的计划并没有详细说明欧盟是否应该改变，或者如何改变。芬兰外交和安全政策的主要目标是维护芬兰的独立和领土完整，防止其卷入军事冲突，并确保其公民的安全和福祉。欧盟和北约构成了芬兰外交政策的合作核心。在执政期间，芬兰人党对欧盟的立场有所软化。芬兰人党在其欧洲议会选举纲领中不再寻求芬兰退出欧盟，尽管该党仍在其2019年欧洲议会选举计划中表示，其长期目标是退出欧盟，无论是独立还是作为欧盟关键国家更广泛联盟的一部分。这与他们在2019-2023年属于id组后，于2023年重返欧洲议会ECR组的决定一致。在过去的几十年里，芬兰的外交政策发生了翻天覆地的变化。自二战以来，芬兰将自己定位为西方和苏联之间的中立西方国家。冷战结束，俄罗斯开放后，芬兰继续与俄罗斯保持传统的友好关系，同时将自己定位为一个军事不结盟的欧洲国家。然而，政治领导层对加入北约的选择敞开了大门，而大多数芬兰人并不愿意加入。在2022年2月和俄罗斯对乌克兰的敌对行动之后，芬兰的公众舆论发生了迅速变化，芬兰与瑞典一起开始了加入北约的竞赛。芬兰于2022年5月18日，即大选前10个月，申请加入北约，并于大选后2天，即2023年4月4日成为北约成员国，并得到了即将离任和即将上任的政府的支持。虽然芬兰与北约和美国的关系之前已经很密切，而且成为北约成员国的步骤并不大，但外交政策共识的迅速变化令人震惊。自2004年成为欧盟和北约的正式成员国后，爱沙尼亚继续其欧洲-大西洋一体化进程，即使在中党-埃克-祖国党执政期间，这一进程也基本保持不变。然而，选举在一定程度上是对政府慷慨支持乌克兰政策的公投，因为爱沙尼亚已经向乌克兰捐赠了超过1%的GDP的军事援助，并承诺在选举后增加对乌克兰的支持（政府办公室，2023b）。这也可以看作是对Kaja Kallas积极的公共外交的公投，她一直在谈判欧盟的联合回应中发挥着显著的积极作用（欧洲议会，2022年）。 卡拉斯一直主张没收俄罗斯在欧盟成员国的冻结资产，以资助乌克兰的胜利（Bloomberg, 2023），该倡议于2024年被批准为国家和欧盟层面的一项措施。此外，改革党的部长们鼓励北约成员国增加国防开支，并将其GDP的0.25%捐给乌克兰，以赢得对俄罗斯的战争（BBC, 2024）。2023年成立的新政府联合政府将国防和
{"title":"In the Shadow of Global Polycrisis: Consensus and Polarization in the 2023 Estonian and Finnish Parliamentary Elections","authors":"Mari-Liis Jakobson, Johanna Peltoniemi","doi":"10.1111/jcms.13668","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jcms.13668","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The beginning of the 2020s has been marked by a near global polycrisis (Lawrence et al., <span>2024</span>). In addition to the global climate crisis brewing in the background, in 2020, the first global pandemic erupted, which pressured governments to take unprecedented measures and divided societies over social distancing measures and vaccination and disrupted global production and logistics chains and caused turbulence in demand and supply. In 2022, Russia launched full-scale war in Ukraine, which sent millions seeking refuge elsewhere in Europe, prompted unprecedented international economic sanctions on Russia and enhanced the military preparedness in most European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states. This also resulted in the rapid rise of energy prices and the danger of energy deficit, rise of inflation and interest rates.</p><p>Hence, the general elections in Estonia in March 2023 and Finland in April 2023 took place in a situation of heightened international, economic and societal tensions and the outgoing governments having mainly dealt with crisis governance rather than focusing on fulfilling their electoral promises. In addition, both election campaigns also bore marks of bloc politics, where an otherwise multi-party system becomes aligned in two major camps and the campaign becomes a referendum on the proposed policies of these two camps.</p><p>Whilst polarization – both affective and political – is very well documented in the United States, it is also making headways into European politics. Political campaign cultures and government–opposition relations are changing even in countries like Finland and Estonia, which have usually been characterized by notably low levels of polarization (Bettarelli et al., <span>2023</span>; Nord et al., <span>2024</span>). Previous research has suggested that after a crisis, voters are particularly attracted to the political rhetoric of the (extreme) right. For instance, after a financial crisis, extreme right-wing parties increase their vote share by 30 percent (Funke et al., <span>2016</span>). Moreover, as Lisinska (<span>2022</span>) has noted, in times of crisis, when taking substantial measures is of particular importance, continued polarization often leads to democracy fatigue. Whilst Estonia and Finland have not faced democracy fatigue, it seems clear that following the turbulent times of the last decade have led both countries to unforeseen levels of polarization and emergence of populist right wing. Especially Finland has a long tradition of multiparty collaboration, having a history of coalitions including from left to right, but the consensus-oriented society has lately reformed towards bloc politics with strong divisions between political camps. This shift towards bloc politics has resulted in more pronounced ideological divides and a rise in populist rhetoric. The political landscape in both Estonia and Finland now reflects a growing fragmentation, where th","PeriodicalId":51369,"journal":{"name":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","volume":"62 S1","pages":"201-216"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jcms.13668","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142176418","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"European Union Enlargement and Geopolitical Power in the Face of War","authors":"Nadiia Koval, Milada Anna Vachudova","doi":"10.1111/jcms.13677","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jcms.13677","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51369,"journal":{"name":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","volume":"62 S1","pages":"135-146"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142176419","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>The inception of the European Union's (EU's) ‘Green Deal’ – a flagship project of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen launched to much acclaim in December 2019 – contrasts with its adoption in the final years of the Commission's term in office in 2023–2024.</p><p>In 2019, unprecedented climate protests and mobilisations across Europe and the world – from the ‘Fridays for Future’ school strikes to climate marches and to more radical actions by groups like the Extinction Rebellion (XR) – pushed climate change and the energy transition to the top of the EU's political agenda. In this context, the 2019 European elections saw unprecedented successes for Green Parties across the continent, boosting the Greens/European Free Alliance (EFA) parliamentary group to a record 72 members (Pearson and Rüdig, <span>2020</span>). With the main centre-left and centre-right groups together failing to command a majority in Parliament, the Greens were able to pressure Ursula von der Leyen to commit to ambitious policies. The EU ‘Green Deal’ stemmed directly from this context marked by ‘enabling politicisation’ of the climate issue (Dupont et al., <span>2024</span>). The EU climate law (Regulation EU 2021/1119, <span>2021</span>), formally adopted in July 2021, committed the block to reaching net-zero emissions by 2050 and reducing net emissions by 55% by 2030, whilst a large legislative package explicitly called ‘Fit for 55’ was proposed by the Commission that same month to achieve the headline targets. Although the Green Deal has been developed in times of crisis, the Commission and EU have held steady in their commitments (Eckert, <span>2021</span>; Von Homeyer et al., <span>2022</span>). Yet, the finalisation of the legislative proposals aimed at turning lofty goals into action in 2023–2024 – before the Commission's end of term and EU Parliament elections – has taken place in a starkly different context. Energy and cost of living crises, initially triggered by post-COVID-19 supply chain disruptions and dramatically heightened by the war in Ukraine leading to energy supply disruptions and commodity price hikes across Europe, have increasingly fuelled concerns about the costs of climate and energy transitions (Goldthau and Youngs, <span>2023</span>; Kuzemko et al., <span>2022</span>). Although energy prices have fallen since the end of 2023, cost of living and energy security issues have remained salient.</p><p>Politically, this context has been instrumentalised by populist and radical right parties to mobilise against the climate and energy transitions (Yazar and Haarstad, <span>2023</span>), whilst the centre has also become increasingly cautious, especially the centre right. At the European level, this is most evident for the European People's Party (EPP), which has increasingly contested Green Deal legislation, most notably the Nature Restoration Law (Regulation EU 2024/1991, <span>2024</span>) (Tosun, <span>2023</span>). This shift is in part
欧盟“绿色协议”是欧盟委员会主席乌尔苏拉·冯德莱恩于2019年12月启动的旗舰项目，受到了广泛赞誉，与欧盟委员会任期最后几年（2023-2024年）的实施形成了鲜明对比。2019年，欧洲和世界各地前所未有的气候抗议和动员——从“周五为未来”的学校罢工到气候游行，再到“灭绝叛乱”（XR）等组织采取的更激进的行动——将气候变化和能源转型推到了欧盟政治议程的首位。在这种背景下，2019年的欧洲选举见证了整个欧洲大陆绿党前所未有的成功，将绿党/欧洲自由联盟（EFA）议会集团的成员人数提高到创纪录的72人（Pearson and r<e:1> dig, 2020）。由于主要的中左翼和中右翼团体未能在议会中占据多数席位，绿党得以向乌苏拉·冯·德莱恩施压，要求她承诺实施雄心勃勃的政策。欧盟的“绿色协议”直接源于气候问题“政治化”的背景（Dupont et al., 2024）。欧盟气候法（Regulation EU 2021/1119, 2021）于2021年7月正式通过，承诺到2050年实现净零排放，到2030年将净排放量减少55%，而欧盟委员会在同月提出了一项明确称为“适合55年”的大型立法方案，以实现总体目标。尽管绿色协议是在危机时期制定的，但欧盟委员会和欧盟一直坚持其承诺(Eckert, 2021；Von Homeyer et al., 2022)。然而，旨在在2023-2024年（在欧盟委员会任期结束和欧盟议会选举之前）将崇高目标转化为行动的立法提案的最终敲定，却是在一个截然不同的背景下进行的。能源和生活成本危机最初是由covid -19后的供应链中断引发的，并因乌克兰战争导致整个欧洲的能源供应中断和大宗商品价格上涨而急剧加剧，日益加剧了人们对气候和能源转型成本的担忧(Goldthau and young, 2023；Kuzemko et al., 2022)。尽管自2023年底以来能源价格有所下降，但生活成本和能源安全问题仍然突出。在政治上，民粹主义和激进右翼政党利用这一背景动员起来反对气候和能源转型（Yazar和Haarstad， 2023），而中间派也变得越来越谨慎，尤其是中右翼。在欧洲层面，这一点在欧洲人民党（EPP）身上表现得最为明显，该党越来越多地反对绿色协议立法，最著名的是《自然恢复法》（欧盟条例2024/1991,2024）（Tosun, 2023）。这种转变在一定程度上是对整个非洲大陆对能源和气候立法的抗议和争论的回应，特别是从2023年底开始并持续到2024年春季的高度报道的农民抗议活动(Politico, 2024；路透社,2023)。2024年6月的欧洲议会选举反映了这种新的背景，极右翼团体的崛起，而绿党和自由派一起成为主要的输家（Hix等人，2024年）。在气候政策“限制性政治化”的背景下（杜邦等人，2024年），本文提出2023-2024年是否代表欧盟对气候和能源转型承诺的转折点。随着新一届欧盟委员会和议会的成立，现在是评估欧盟“绿色协议”进展和挑战的好时机。它是否一直步履蹒跚？它的实施前景如何，欧盟的绿色雄心又会如何？我认为，总体而言，气候行动和能源系统脱碳议程已被证明具有很强的弹性。欧盟机构和成员国仍然致力于在冯德莱恩委员会任期结束前实现绿色协议议程的气候和能源层面，而且大部分都做到了。然而，对成本的担忧、抗议以及右翼民粹主义者对它们的政治利用，也给实施带来了问题，可能会抑制未来的雄心。本文首先回顾了绿色协议立法的进展，以及欧盟是否实现了其雄心壮志，特别是在能源和气候变化方面。然后，它评估了气候行动似乎正在减弱的势头和最近的“绿色反弹”。最后，从过去的危机及其对欧盟环境和气候政策的影响中吸取教训，反思了《绿色协议》实施和更新的前景。报告的结论是，虽然能源和气候转型议程可能具有弹性，但在国内气候和能源转型政治化以及全球地缘政治竞争的背景下，其框架和重点可能会发生变化。 欧盟委员会（2019年）在启动“绿色协议”的初步沟通中，提出了一项广泛的战略，旨在“到2050年使欧洲成为第一个气候中和的大陆”，保护生物多样性，创造循环经济，遏制污染，为绿色转型调动资金，同时提高欧洲工业的竞争力，确保受影响地区和工人的公正过渡。这一战略的实施导致从气候和能源到农业、运输和环境等不同部门提出并随后通过了一系列广泛的一揽子政策和个别法律。自从作为“地缘政治委员会”的核心优先事项启动以来，在其演变过程中，绿色协议作为政治目标的轮廓仍然不明确。这在一定程度上是因为它是一项跨领域战略，反映了气候危机的多部门、复杂和不断演变的性质，这需要在所有领域整合气候政策（Dupont等人，2024）。这也是政治上深思熟虑的：重新构建和整合新的和相关的倡议，作为一个无所不包、有目的和受欢迎的叙事的一部分。欧盟为了在第9届欧洲议会和第一届冯德莱恩委员会任期结束的2024年6月欧盟选举之前完成剩余绿色协议文件的谈判和通过，在2023年全年和2024年上半年都在加紧工作。当欧盟委员会副主席兼“绿色协议”负责人弗兰斯·蒂默曼斯（Frans Timmermans）辞职参加荷兰选举并领导一个左翼绿色联盟时，不确定性出现了。蒂默曼斯是一位重量级的熟练谈判代表和“绿色协议”的直言不讳的支持者。接替他的是欧盟委员会副主席marosh Šefčovič和新任命的有争议的荷兰人Wopke Hoekstra，后者因过去在壳牌的工作和在气候问题上的黯淡记录而受到批评（Taylor, 2023a）。然而，这并没有影响最终确定绿色协议的工作，总体而言，该协议是成功的，大多数文件被通过，少数文件因延误或棘手的分歧而受阻或撤回。1具体来看“适合55年”一揽子计划，该计划实施了主要的减排目标和能源转型目标，最初由13项立法提案组成，后来扩大到19.2项。截至2024年7月，除一项提案外，所有提案都被联合立法委员通过。部分法例更新及加强原有法例，同时亦引入新政策。其中重要的一步是对欧盟排放交易体系（EU ETS）的改革，该体系于2023年4月通过，同时还出台了一系列相关法律。加快降低能源密集型行业和电力行业排放限额；逐步取消免费津贴；逐步将航运纳入排放交易体系；通过逐步取消国内航班的免费配额，并对欧洲以外的航班实施国际航空碳抵消和减少计划（CORSIA），加强航空排放规则；修正旨在维持稳定有效碳价的市场稳定储备。改革的目标是到2030年，与2005年相比，覆盖行业的排放量减少62%，这一减少幅度略高于委员会最初提出的目标。此外，从2027年起适用于燃料分销商的建筑、公路运输和其他被认为难以脱碳的行业，将引入一种新的、独特的碳排放交易体系。一个新的社会气候基金，主要由新的碳排放交易体系的收入提供，旨在帮助脆弱的家庭、小公司和运输用户应对相关成本。这是对这一新计划的具体影响和司法影响的认可，也是为了分散争议，以避免长期反对的重演，例如2018-2020年因燃油税增加而震惊法国的“黄背心”抗议活动。碳边界调整机制（CBAM）是一项创新且在国际上备受争议的立法，该机制对碳密集型产业的进口产品征收碳税。CBAM将从2026年开始逐步实施，以配合碳排放交易体系内的免费配额逐步取消，旨在使欧盟和第三国的工业处于公平竞争的环境中，避免碳泄漏—
{"title":"Climate and Energy Transitions in Times of Environmental Backlash? The European Union ‘Green Deal’ From Adoption to Implementation","authors":"Pierre Bocquillon","doi":"10.1111/jcms.13675","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jcms.13675","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The inception of the European Union's (EU's) ‘Green Deal’ – a flagship project of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen launched to much acclaim in December 2019 – contrasts with its adoption in the final years of the Commission's term in office in 2023–2024.</p><p>In 2019, unprecedented climate protests and mobilisations across Europe and the world – from the ‘Fridays for Future’ school strikes to climate marches and to more radical actions by groups like the Extinction Rebellion (XR) – pushed climate change and the energy transition to the top of the EU's political agenda. In this context, the 2019 European elections saw unprecedented successes for Green Parties across the continent, boosting the Greens/European Free Alliance (EFA) parliamentary group to a record 72 members (Pearson and Rüdig, <span>2020</span>). With the main centre-left and centre-right groups together failing to command a majority in Parliament, the Greens were able to pressure Ursula von der Leyen to commit to ambitious policies. The EU ‘Green Deal’ stemmed directly from this context marked by ‘enabling politicisation’ of the climate issue (Dupont et al., <span>2024</span>). The EU climate law (Regulation EU 2021/1119, <span>2021</span>), formally adopted in July 2021, committed the block to reaching net-zero emissions by 2050 and reducing net emissions by 55% by 2030, whilst a large legislative package explicitly called ‘Fit for 55’ was proposed by the Commission that same month to achieve the headline targets. Although the Green Deal has been developed in times of crisis, the Commission and EU have held steady in their commitments (Eckert, <span>2021</span>; Von Homeyer et al., <span>2022</span>). Yet, the finalisation of the legislative proposals aimed at turning lofty goals into action in 2023–2024 – before the Commission's end of term and EU Parliament elections – has taken place in a starkly different context. Energy and cost of living crises, initially triggered by post-COVID-19 supply chain disruptions and dramatically heightened by the war in Ukraine leading to energy supply disruptions and commodity price hikes across Europe, have increasingly fuelled concerns about the costs of climate and energy transitions (Goldthau and Youngs, <span>2023</span>; Kuzemko et al., <span>2022</span>). Although energy prices have fallen since the end of 2023, cost of living and energy security issues have remained salient.</p><p>Politically, this context has been instrumentalised by populist and radical right parties to mobilise against the climate and energy transitions (Yazar and Haarstad, <span>2023</span>), whilst the centre has also become increasingly cautious, especially the centre right. At the European level, this is most evident for the European People's Party (EPP), which has increasingly contested Green Deal legislation, most notably the Nature Restoration Law (Regulation EU 2024/1991, <span>2024</span>) (Tosun, <span>2023</span>). This shift is in part ","PeriodicalId":51369,"journal":{"name":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","volume":"62 S1","pages":"124-134"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jcms.13675","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142176420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>When, in November 2019, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen declared that hers would be a ‘geopolitical Commission’ (<span>2019b</span>), she was not only seeking to differentiate her incoming administration from that of her predecessor. She was also making a bold gambit. Without the powerful mandate associated with the election through the <i>Spitzenkandidaten</i> process, voted into office by a slender majority, and with no substantial experience at the European Union (EU) level, the 13th and first female President was taking a risk. Beyond the question marks against the authority of the incoming Commission President, foreign policy, defence and security are areas where the Commission's powers have been limited and often indirect and where, with few resources, it is reliant on other actors inside and outside the EU.</p><p>Seen from its term end, however, the von der Leyen Commission has been very successful at extending the Commission's influence and expanding EU competence in security, defence and the protection of the EU's economic interests. The concept of the ‘geopolitical Commission’ (Baracani, <span>2023</span>) and its associated policy agenda also grew between the presentation of her Political Guidelines (<span>2019a</span>) as candidate for Commission President and the record of achievements posted by her administration at its close (Commission, <span>2024a</span>). Taking stock of these developments, this article reflects on the origins and evolution of the ‘geopolitical Commission’. It discusses the Commission President's personal style and entrepreneurship, the contingency that allowed for the concept's expansion and the institutional conditions that were propitious to von der Leyen's success. It concludes with a reflection on possible future developments.</p><p>The article makes three main arguments. The first is that although the preceding Commission was styled as a ‘political Commission’, with mainly domestic policy priorities, the Juncker Commission took important steps that anticipated and laid the foundations for the ‘geopolitical Commission’. The second argument is that the von der Leyen Commission built on her predecessor's legacy, but also added new geopolitical elements, such as the reorientation of EU development policy through the ‘Global Gateway’ (Heldt, <span>2023</span>), a ‘Global Human Rights Sanctions regime’ and working for peace and justice in the Middle East. The third argument is that the Commission's success can be attributed to a combination of the experience and the energetic personal style of the President herself (Kassim, <span>2021</span>, <span>2023a</span>, <span>2023b</span>), a series of external challenges that put the EU into permanent crisis mode from early 2020 and the readiness of other key figures and institutions to allow the Commission President to assume a leadership role.</p><p>The discussion below is organised into four sections. The first reviews the ‘geopolitical’ measures adopte
2019年11月，欧盟委员会主席乌苏拉·冯德莱恩（Ursula von der Leyen）宣布她的政府将是一个“地缘政治委员会”（2019b），她不仅试图将她的新政府与她的前任政府区分开来。她还采取了一个大胆的策略。由于没有通过斯皮岑候选人程序获得与选举相关的强大授权，以微弱多数投票当选，并且没有在欧盟（EU）层面的丰富经验，这位第13任也是第一位女总统是在冒险。除了质疑即将上任的欧盟委员会主席的权威之外，外交政策、国防和安全是欧盟委员会权力有限的领域，而且往往是间接的，在这些领域，由于资源很少，它依赖于欧盟内外的其他参与者。然而，从任期结束来看，冯德莱恩委员会在扩大委员会的影响力和扩大欧盟在安全、防务和保护欧盟经济利益方面的能力方面非常成功。“地缘政治委员会”的概念（Baracani, 2023）及其相关的政策议程也在她作为委员会主席候选人提出的政治指导方针（2019a）和她的政府在结束时公布的成就记录（Commission, 2024a）之间得到了发展。总结这些发展，本文反思了“地缘政治委员会”的起源和演变。它讨论了委员会主席的个人风格和企业家精神，使这一概念得以扩展的偶然性，以及有利于冯德莱恩成功的体制条件。最后对未来可能的发展进行了思考。这篇文章提出了三个主要论点。首先，尽管之前的委员会被称为“政治委员会”，主要负责国内政策，但容克委员会采取了重要步骤，为“地缘政治委员会”的成立奠定了基础。第二个论点是，冯德莱恩委员会建立在她前任的遗产之上，但也增加了新的地缘政治因素，例如通过“全球门户”（Heldt, 2023）重新定位欧盟发展政策，“全球人权制裁制度”以及为中东的和平与正义而努力。第三种观点认为，欧盟委员会的成功可以归因于主席本人的经验和充满活力的个人风格（Kassim, 2021, 2023a, 2023b），一系列外部挑战使欧盟从2020年初开始进入永久性危机模式，以及其他关键人物和机构愿意让欧盟委员会主席发挥领导作用。下面的讨论分为四个部分。第一篇文章回顾了容克委员会采取的“地缘政治”措施。第二部分则探讨了冯德莱恩如何从一个毫无希望的开始，成长为一位卓有成效的领导人。第三部分考察了“地缘政治委员会”的概念及其运作如何在冯德莱恩的任期内急剧扩大，特别是在俄罗斯侵略乌克兰战争之后。第四部分反映了使“地缘政治委员会”成为可能的因素，包括机构间和组织内的因素。尽管在学术文献中经常被忽视，但容克委员会在扩大欧盟在国防和安全方面的能力方面发挥了重要作用，为欧盟对东欧的做法增添了地缘政治因素，并保护了欧盟在贸易和其他领域的经济利益。容克委员会在俄罗斯吞并克里米亚（2014年3月）8个月后上任，继续对莫斯科采取限制性措施，并向乌克兰提供支持（见Kassim和Tholoniat， 2021）。容克在其《政治指南》（2014年）中强调了这一主题，并继续认为欧盟应该能够自卫（2016年、2017年）。2016年英国脱欧公投和特朗普当选总统只是强化了他的观点。面对来自东方和南方的共同威胁，容克委员会加强了欧盟与北大西洋公约组织（北约）的合作（Hoeffler and Hofmann, 2024）。2016年，欧盟和北约发表联合声明，随后提出了包括反恐、和平与安全、军事机动性、网络安全和国防、国防能力、国防工业和应对混合威胁在内的共同建议。该宣言在两年后更新，是国防和安全政策的三个关键战略要素之一。 其他是2016年6月由高级代表/副主席（HR/VP）费代丽卡·莫盖里尼（Federica Mogherini）提交的欧盟外交和安全政策全球战略，以及委员会2016年12月的欧洲防务行动计划，该计划旨在鼓励成员国在新的欧洲防务基金（EDF）的支持下合作防御能力（Haroche， 2020年，2023年）。在他呼吁到2025年建立“一个成熟的欧洲防务联盟”三个月后，容克对欧洲理事会（EUCO）决定根据《里斯本条约》建立安全与防务永久性结构性合作（PESCO）表示欢迎。PESCO允许成员国发展联合军事能力并投资于共享项目。更广泛地说，在2015年1月巴黎查理周刊办公室枪击事件之后，委员会发布了“欧洲安全议程”，其中制定了欧洲共同的反恐方法（Kassim和Tholoniat， 2021）。欧盟委员会成立了一个新的“安全工作组”，提出了限制枪支获取、提高成员国信息系统互操作性、打击洗钱和加强网络安全的举措。次年，委员会和人力资源/副总裁通过了一项关于打击混合威胁的联合框架。容克委员会在另外三个领域采取的行动也值得注意。首先，根据欧盟委员会捍卫自由贸易和多边体系的传统，在特朗普政府对欧盟进口钢铁和铝征收关税后，容克试图避免与美国爆发贸易战。除了与美国总统达成协议，努力实现“零”关税、壁垒和补贴外，他还加强了对多边贸易体系和自由公平贸易的捍卫，同时呼吁改革世界贸易组织，并加强了欧盟对倾销和补贴的防御。其次，英国脱欧、特朗普以及容克所认为的中国的不公平做法，促使欧盟委员会更广泛地反思欧盟保护其在世界上地位的必要性（容克，2017,2018）。在地缘经济转向中，经济成为“地缘政治竞争的战场”（Matthijs和Meunier， 2023），欧盟委员会开始制定一种更具战略性的贸易方法，旨在保护供应链，减少欧盟对敌对国家的依赖。它建议对关键领域（包括国防工业、技术和港口等资产）的外国投资采取更为谨慎的态度。欧盟委员会与人力资源/副总裁的联合文件将中国描述为“同时”的“合作伙伴”、“谈判伙伴”、“经济竞争对手”和“系统性竞争对手”（欧盟委员会和欧洲经济区，2019年）。英国脱欧促使欧盟委员会确定了需要维护自身利益的领域，包括迅速完成贸易协议和重振对资本市场的兴趣。第三个行动是组织性的。委员会于2018年在总秘书处设立了对外关系司，为委员会的国际工作提供核心战略和监督。当乌苏拉·冯德莱恩（Ursula von der Leyen）作为总统候选人宣布“在世界上建立一个更强大的欧洲”为目标时，她提出的行动建议是继续而不是改变，包括维护基于规则的国际秩序、自由公平的贸易、加强与邻国的关系和防务联盟（von der Leyen, 2019a）。然而，她强调“欧洲也必须学习权力的语言”，因为“软实力已经不够了”。除了在安全等欧盟习惯于依赖他人的领域发展自身能力外，欧盟还需要学习如何“在涉及欧洲利益的领域以更有针对性的方式运用其现有力量”（《世界报》，2019年）。虽然委员会的地缘政治政策议程在她担任主席期间有所扩大，但对委员会主席权力的关切在新主席就职后不久就得到缓和。冯德莱恩的上任之路表明，他的任务很脆弱。虽然她曾担任过部长职位，但她没有担任过高级职位，也缺乏欧盟经验。然而，容克引入的主席领导模式（由委员会主席确定机构的政策重点，并决定学院的结构和运作）很快就变得制度化了（Kassim, 2021, 2023a, 2023b）。和她的前任一样，冯德莱恩用特派团信函来说明她下一任期的目标、委员会准成员的个人责任和委员会的运作。 在组织方面，冯德莱恩首先采取行动，通过创建一个外部协调小组，加强委员会工作外部方面的协调，该小组每周为学院验证委员会对国际政策的立场，从而确保就外部问题传达信息的一致性，并使委员会工作的内部和外部层面保持一致
{"title":"The ‘Geopolitical Commission’: An End of Term Review","authors":"Elena Baracani, Hussein Kassim","doi":"10.1111/jcms.13673","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jcms.13673","url":null,"abstract":"<p>When, in November 2019, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen declared that hers would be a ‘geopolitical Commission’ (<span>2019b</span>), she was not only seeking to differentiate her incoming administration from that of her predecessor. She was also making a bold gambit. Without the powerful mandate associated with the election through the <i>Spitzenkandidaten</i> process, voted into office by a slender majority, and with no substantial experience at the European Union (EU) level, the 13th and first female President was taking a risk. Beyond the question marks against the authority of the incoming Commission President, foreign policy, defence and security are areas where the Commission's powers have been limited and often indirect and where, with few resources, it is reliant on other actors inside and outside the EU.</p><p>Seen from its term end, however, the von der Leyen Commission has been very successful at extending the Commission's influence and expanding EU competence in security, defence and the protection of the EU's economic interests. The concept of the ‘geopolitical Commission’ (Baracani, <span>2023</span>) and its associated policy agenda also grew between the presentation of her Political Guidelines (<span>2019a</span>) as candidate for Commission President and the record of achievements posted by her administration at its close (Commission, <span>2024a</span>). Taking stock of these developments, this article reflects on the origins and evolution of the ‘geopolitical Commission’. It discusses the Commission President's personal style and entrepreneurship, the contingency that allowed for the concept's expansion and the institutional conditions that were propitious to von der Leyen's success. It concludes with a reflection on possible future developments.</p><p>The article makes three main arguments. The first is that although the preceding Commission was styled as a ‘political Commission’, with mainly domestic policy priorities, the Juncker Commission took important steps that anticipated and laid the foundations for the ‘geopolitical Commission’. The second argument is that the von der Leyen Commission built on her predecessor's legacy, but also added new geopolitical elements, such as the reorientation of EU development policy through the ‘Global Gateway’ (Heldt, <span>2023</span>), a ‘Global Human Rights Sanctions regime’ and working for peace and justice in the Middle East. The third argument is that the Commission's success can be attributed to a combination of the experience and the energetic personal style of the President herself (Kassim, <span>2021</span>, <span>2023a</span>, <span>2023b</span>), a series of external challenges that put the EU into permanent crisis mode from early 2020 and the readiness of other key figures and institutions to allow the Commission President to assume a leadership role.</p><p>The discussion below is organised into four sections. The first reviews the ‘geopolitical’ measures adopte","PeriodicalId":51369,"journal":{"name":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","volume":"62 S1","pages":"41-51"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jcms.13673","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142176421","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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