Monika Brusenbauch Meislová, Julie Elizabeth Smith, Ed Turner
This policy commentary explores the puzzling stalemate over a proposed Youth Mobility Scheme between the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK), offering a deep analysis of its emergence as a site of post-Brexit contestation. Despite appearing as a low-stakes, mutually advantageous initiative, youth mobility became mired in mutual misperceptions, political caution and institutional rigidity. Drawing on the conceptual triad of bounded rationality, path dependence and bilateralism, the policy commentary traces how misaligned expectations, historical baggage and diverging preferences for multilateral versus bilateral approaches have locked both sides into intransigent positions. Rather than reflecting irreconcilable interests, the impasse reveals how these constraints continue to shape – and distort – the initial stages of policy co-operation. As such, understanding this stalemate not only sheds light on missed opportunities for young people on both sides of the Channel but also offers critical lessons for the future architecture of UK–EU engagement.
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<p>As a member of the Trio Presidency with Spain and Hungary, Belgium took over the post of the rotating presidency for the 13th time in the first half of 2024, followed by Hungary for the second time since its EU accession in 2004. The legislative agendas and operational flexibility of both presidencies were heavily influenced by the 2024 elections to the European Parliament (EP) scheduled between 6 and 9 June. Notably, the Belgian presidency concluded with the elections, whilst the Hungarian presidency began amid the institutional transition following the elections.</p><p>As members of the same Trio Presidency, Belgium, Hungary and Spain had committed to a few overarching thematic priorities. Their joint programme pledged to deepen the single market to increase competitiveness, to strengthen the area of freedom, security and justice internally and externally, to build a climate-neutral, green, fair and social Europe, to promote Europe's interest in the world (e.g., by continued support to Ukraine, strengthening the EU's defence and security capacities and promoting enlargement) and, finally, to adopt and implement the EU's Strategic Agenda for 2024–2029 (General Secretariat of the Council, <span>2023</span>). However, despite these commitments and the significance of the upcoming EP elections for both, the two presidencies could not have been more different: whilst the Belgian presidency acted as a model honest broker and facilitator of European interests, the Hungarian presidency became a constant irritant and a dogmatic disruptor of common EU policies.</p><p>This article outlines the political contexts as well as the self-ascribed roles and priorities of both presidencies and assesses their respective achievements and failures. It argues that the Hungarian presidency represents a new type of presidency: for the first time in EU history, the position was filled by a hard Eurosceptic and radical right-wing populist government, which had been challenging the EU's legal and political foundations for years and continued to do so whilst serving as the rotating presidency. In comparison with the Belgian presidency, which was committed to the European agenda and acted as an honest broker, the Hungarian government leveraged the presidency to challenge the EU and its policies and to promote its domestic foreign policy objectives. Content-wise, the Belgian presidency focused on the finalisation of EU legislation and measures that addressed current challenges to the EU (such as those related to the single market, green transition or support to Ukraine), whereas the Hungarian presidency's thematic priorities, especially the focus on countering illiberal migration and demographic challenges, reflected the government's domestic political agenda.</p><p>The Treaty of Lisbon has significantly changed the rotating presidency's role and responsibilities. First, the establishment of a permanent President of the European Council has reduced the rotating presidency
政府可以作为诚实的中间人,抛开国家偏好,致力于为欧盟的集体利益做出贡献。或者他们可以充当“以自我为中心的总统”,即使在没有正式权力的情况下,也可以推进自己的优先事项,包括外交政策(Mehlhausen和karolowski, 2014, 14ff)。从理论上讲,我们可以预期,亲欧政府更倾向于充当诚实的中间人,而疑欧政府可能将自己视为以自我为中心的总统。然而,文献表明有两个关键因素可以减轻欧洲怀疑论政府的影响。首先是里斯本条约之后,欧洲理事会主席的职位与欧盟理事会主席的职位分离,这减少了各国政府利用这一职位进行国内定性的动机。因此,总统职位与国内政治之间的这种弱化联系可能导致总统职位的非政治化(Leconte, 2012, 142f)。其次,“布鲁塞尔模式”,即在布鲁塞尔社交的公务员和外交官的关键作用,可以抵消欧洲怀疑主义政府的影响(科曼,2020)。最后,轮值主席国的表现还取决于成员国及其政府的政治信誉和声誉(Quaglia和Moxon-Browne, 2006,第362页)。与以对抗著称的政府相比,一个以促进妥协解决方案而闻名的政府作为一个诚实的中间人更可信。比利时作为欧盟前身的创始成员国,曾多次担任欧盟轮值主席国,最近一次是在2010年《里斯本条约》生效后不久。这使得比利时成为第一个在重新配置的制度体系中服务的国家之一,其中总统的角色发生了相当大的变化(见Drieskens, 2011; van de Voorde, 2012)。2024年,在亚历山大·德·克罗(Alexander De Croo)总理的领导下,比利时政府“在一个分水岭时刻”接管了欧盟(2024年比利时常驻欧盟代表),就在欧洲议会选举和随后的机构过渡之前。此外,联邦选举也定于2024年6月举行。因此,总统任期恰逢现任政府结束和国内竞选活动。虽然全国竞选活动没有影响到主席职位(de browwer, 2024),但欧盟立法周期的结束和预期中的匈牙利总统职位对其行动产生了重大影响。首先,不确定的是,右翼势力可能得到加强的新欧洲议会是否会继续处理悬而未决的立法文件,尤其是欧盟绿色协议等有争议的立法文件。此外,即将到来的匈牙利总统任期,由一个以阻碍和反欧盟立场而臭名昭著的政府领导,预计将使决策过程复杂化并阻碍决策。因此,比利时主席将自己定位为未完成的立法工作的促进者,支持饱受战争蹂躏的乌克兰,以及即将到来的围绕欧盟关键职位(委员会主席、欧洲议会主席和欧洲理事会主席)的谈判。因此,德克罗总理的“目标是”在6月之前尽可能多地提交并完成150份公开的立法文件(比利时常驻欧盟代表,2024年),从而限制匈牙利总统阻碍欧盟决定的机会。与此相一致,比利时主席将其角色确定为一个诚实的中间人。De Croo宣布“在他们的总统任期内采取冷静的态度,专注于寻找解决方案和消除障碍”,总统一直强调比利时的妥协文化,扎根于该国的语言和领土多样性,使比利时成为完美的调解人(Griera, 2025)。总统的“保护、加强、准备”计划反映了这一雄心壮志,主要涉及在六个优先领域完成立法:(1)捍卫法治、民主和团结;(2)增强竞争力;(三)坚持绿色转型、公正转型;(4)加强欧盟的社会和卫生议程;(五)保护人民和边境;(6)促进一个全球化的欧洲(比利时担任欧盟理事会主席,2024年)。从主题上看,这些议题与三国主席会议的目标密切相关。最终,轮值主席国达成了74项协议,达成了57项理事会谈判授权(比利时担任欧盟理事会轮值主席国,2024年),成功兑现了承诺。其中许多协议涉及的问题已经在理事会搁置多年,通常是由于法国、德国或意大利的抵制(例如,《企业可持续发展尽职调查指令》或《关于改善平台工作条件的指令》)。 在第一个优先领域,欧盟主席最终批准了两项旨在保护欧盟媒体和新闻自由的法案:《欧洲媒体自由法案》(EMFA),该法案为国家媒体系统建立了约束性法规;以及《反对公众参与的战略诉讼指令》(反slapp指令),旨在加强对记者的保护,使其免受政府等强大行为者发起的滥用法庭诉讼(Priebus, 2025, 7f.)。此外,根据国际理念(International IDEA, 2024)的一份报告,主席国组织了一场关于如何加强成员国和候选国法治和民主的讨论。在波兰新政府于2024年2月向理事会提交了《恢复法治行动计划》之后,欧委会主席还于6月组织了针对匈牙利的现行第7(1)条程序听证会,并于5月促进了针对波兰的第7条程序的终止。主席会议强调了保护民主和法治免受内外威胁的重要性,通过了安理会关于“民主复原力:保护选举进程不受外国干涉”的结论和安理会关于加强和保护自由、公开和知情的民主辩论的结论。在竞争力领域,总统与议会达成了一项协议,改革《稳定与增长公约》,使其预防部门具有更大的灵活性。此外,它还获得了旨在支持欧盟清洁技术的《净零工业法》的批准,以及有关循环经济的立法,特别是《修理权指令》和《建筑产品条例》。为了应对与数字化相关的挑战,比利时轮值主席国成功地通过了《人工智能法案》的妥协文本,这是全球第一本关于人工智能的规则手册(欧盟理事会,2023年)。此外,主席国还与议会就《网络团结法》达成共识,旨在提高欧盟应对网络威胁的能力。最后,主席会议结束了与完成资本市场联盟有关的几个文件。在绿色和公正过渡领域,由于匈牙利的退出,总统在2月份失去了理事会的支持后,设法确保了《自然恢复法》(Cagney, 2024)。它还就单一欧洲天空立法的改革和跨欧洲运输网络(TEN-T)达成了协议。与其第四个优先事项,即社会和健康议程有关,达成了一项关于改善平台工作工作条件的指令的协议,该指令改善了平台工作人员(例如食品配送服务人员)的工作条件。在西班牙的妥协被拒绝后,比利时不得不重新开始谈判(Bourgery-Gonse, 2024)。同样,双方达成了《企业可持续发展尽职调查指令》(CSDDD)协议,要求员工超过1000人、营业额超过4.5亿欧元的公司对其对环境、劳工权利和侵犯人权的负面影响负责。至于其第五个优先事项——保护人民和边界,有争议的《庇护和移民公约》(见沃尔夫,2024年)和《申根边境法典》(允许重新引入边境管制)的通过值得一提。最后,在促进全球欧洲方面,新的西巴尔干改革和增长基金最终确定,旨在为该地区有关法治和民主的改革提供财政支持,这与主席强调加强欧盟成员国和候选国之间的民主和法治相一致。支持乌克兰也是轮值主席国的一项高度优先事项,特别是因为预计匈牙利轮值主席国将阻挠有关乌克兰的决定。2023年12月,匈牙利政府否决了价值500亿欧元的乌克兰基金,随后继续反对支持乌克兰。今年1月,在欧盟领导人说服匈牙利总理Orbán撤回否决权后,比利时获得了理事会的部分谈判授权,随后与议会就该基金达成了协议(Brzozowski, 2024)。此外,比利时主席通过了安理会的谈判框架,并于6月25日与乌克兰组织了第一次政府间会议,从而促进了乌克兰的加入进程。此外,主席团通过了摩尔多瓦的谈判框架,随后与该国建立了第一个政府间委员会。除了这些政策成就之外,主席任期还推动了欧洲理事会关于欧盟三个主要立场和欧盟2024 - 2029年战略议程的谈判(de browwer, 2024)。 然而,一些文件仍
{"title":"The 2024 Belgian and Hungarian Presidencies of the Council of the EU in Comparison: From an Honest Broker to a Dogmatic Disruptor","authors":"Sonja Priebus","doi":"10.1111/jcms.70014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.70014","url":null,"abstract":"<p>As a member of the Trio Presidency with Spain and Hungary, Belgium took over the post of the rotating presidency for the 13th time in the first half of 2024, followed by Hungary for the second time since its EU accession in 2004. The legislative agendas and operational flexibility of both presidencies were heavily influenced by the 2024 elections to the European Parliament (EP) scheduled between 6 and 9 June. Notably, the Belgian presidency concluded with the elections, whilst the Hungarian presidency began amid the institutional transition following the elections.</p><p>As members of the same Trio Presidency, Belgium, Hungary and Spain had committed to a few overarching thematic priorities. Their joint programme pledged to deepen the single market to increase competitiveness, to strengthen the area of freedom, security and justice internally and externally, to build a climate-neutral, green, fair and social Europe, to promote Europe's interest in the world (e.g., by continued support to Ukraine, strengthening the EU's defence and security capacities and promoting enlargement) and, finally, to adopt and implement the EU's Strategic Agenda for 2024–2029 (General Secretariat of the Council, <span>2023</span>). However, despite these commitments and the significance of the upcoming EP elections for both, the two presidencies could not have been more different: whilst the Belgian presidency acted as a model honest broker and facilitator of European interests, the Hungarian presidency became a constant irritant and a dogmatic disruptor of common EU policies.</p><p>This article outlines the political contexts as well as the self-ascribed roles and priorities of both presidencies and assesses their respective achievements and failures. It argues that the Hungarian presidency represents a new type of presidency: for the first time in EU history, the position was filled by a hard Eurosceptic and radical right-wing populist government, which had been challenging the EU's legal and political foundations for years and continued to do so whilst serving as the rotating presidency. In comparison with the Belgian presidency, which was committed to the European agenda and acted as an honest broker, the Hungarian government leveraged the presidency to challenge the EU and its policies and to promote its domestic foreign policy objectives. Content-wise, the Belgian presidency focused on the finalisation of EU legislation and measures that addressed current challenges to the EU (such as those related to the single market, green transition or support to Ukraine), whereas the Hungarian presidency's thematic priorities, especially the focus on countering illiberal migration and demographic challenges, reflected the government's domestic political agenda.</p><p>The Treaty of Lisbon has significantly changed the rotating presidency's role and responsibilities. First, the establishment of a permanent President of the European Council has reduced the rotating presidency","PeriodicalId":51369,"journal":{"name":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","volume":"63 S1","pages":"105-119"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jcms.70014","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145375272","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>No one was taken by surprise when Putin was re-elected as president of the Russian Federation in March 2024. Everything had been put in place to guarantee an overwhelming victory in the most rigged and unfree Russian elections since the demise of the Soviet Union. The elections took place amidst the ravaging war in Ukraine, giving them an additional dimension. They were not simply set up as a plebiscite for the president, but also as an endorsement of Russia's war against Ukraine and a proof of unity in this crisis context.</p><p>Elections in an authoritarian context could easily be mistaken for an annoying inevitability for a regime that wants to keep up democratic appearances. The opposite is true. The elections were an opportunity for the regime to celebrate Russia's ‘democracy’. This article seeks to understand why this is the case. It starts by sketching the context in which the elections took place and how they were manipulated. In the next section, the elections are put into the wider context of radicalising repression, symbolised by the death of main oppositionist Navalny in captivity 1 month before the ballot. This prepares the ground for taking a bird's eye view of the autocratic evolution of Russia's regime and the role elections play within this authoritarian context. Finally, the question is raised how the war against Ukraine mattered for the elections. The analysis draws on studies on authoritarianism and on both the conceptual framework and the data of the V-Dem Institute (V-Dem Dataset, <span>2025</span>; V-Dem Institute, <span>2024</span>).</p><p>Russia's 1993 constitution provided for a limitation of a president's rule to two consecutive terms. This was the reason why Putin stepped aside as President from 2008 to 2012, when he became Prime Minister, switching roles with Dmitry Medvedev. To prevent that Putin's presidential rule would come to an end in 2024 (after two more terms of 6 years each), constitutional amendments were adopted in 2020 that maintained the restriction of presidential rule to two terms but set the counter back to zero for former presidents (Pomeranz, <span>2021</span>, p. 17). This makes it possible for Putin to stay in power until 2036.</p><p>The 2020 constitutional amendments were part of a broader attempt at consolidating the regime and reinforcing the power vertical, making the super-presidential system ‘even more concentrated’ (Pomeranz, <span>2021</span>, p. 25) and further restricting civil rights. Pomerantz assesses the significance of the changes: ‘the sanctity and democratic promise of the 1993 constitution has now been violated on numerous fronts. The division of powers, political turnover, the elevation of international law within the Russian legal system, the independent judiciary—all these founding principles have now been shattered and/or severely compromised by the amendments. … Putin has now tried to limit the public arena where open political discussion can take place. The constitutional
当普京在2024年3月再次当选俄罗斯联邦总统时,没有人感到意外。一切都已准备就绪,以确保在自苏联解体以来最受操纵、最不自由的俄罗斯选举中取得压倒性胜利。这次选举是在乌克兰战争肆虐的情况下举行的,这给选举增加了一个额外的维度。它们的设立不仅是为了支持总统,也是对俄罗斯对乌克兰战争的支持,也是在这场危机背景下团结一致的证明。对于一个想要保持民主表象的政权来说,威权主义背景下的选举很容易被误认为是一种恼人的必然性。事实恰恰相反。选举是政权庆祝俄罗斯“民主”的机会。本文试图理解为什么会出现这种情况。它首先概述了选举发生的背景以及选举是如何被操纵的。在下一节,选举被置于激进镇压的更大背景下,主要反对派纳瓦尔尼在投票前一个月被囚禁而死,这是选举的象征。这为鸟瞰俄罗斯政权的专制演变以及选举在这种专制背景下所扮演的角色奠定了基础。最后,有人提出了一个问题:对乌克兰的战争对选举有何影响?该分析借鉴了对威权主义的研究以及V-Dem研究所的概念框架和数据(V-Dem Dataset, 2025; V-Dem Institute, 2024)。俄罗斯1993年的宪法规定,总统只能连任两届。这就是为什么普京从2008年到2012年辞去总统一职,并与德米特里•梅德韦杰夫(Dmitry Medvedev)互换角色,成为总理。为了防止普京的总统统治在2024年结束(在每届任期6年之后),2020年通过了宪法修正案,将总统统治限制为两届,但将前总统的反制权设置为零(Pomeranz, 2021, p. 17)。这使得普京有可能执政到2036年。2020年的宪法修正案是巩固政权和加强权力纵向的更广泛尝试的一部分,使超级总统制“更加集中”(Pomeranz, 2021, p. 25),并进一步限制公民权利。波梅兰茨评价了这些变化的意义:“1993年宪法的神圣和民主承诺现在在许多方面遭到了侵犯。权力分工、政治更替、国际法在俄罗斯法律体系中的地位提升、司法独立——所有这些基本原则现在都被修正案粉碎或严重损害。普京现在试图限制可以进行公开政治讨论的公共领域。宪法修正案之后,又迅速出台了新的限制会议、非政府组织和外国代理人的法律(Pomeranz, 2021, pp. 25-26)。第二套措施与“选举工程”和操纵选举过程有关2024年3月的总统选举是自苏联解体以来最受操纵的选举(Fischer, 2024; Galeotti, 2024)。这种操纵既发生在选举之前,也发生在选举过程中。首先,可以控制谁可以参加选举。没有参加在杜马中代表的政党竞选的候选人需要收集10万个签名,其中来自一个地区的签名不得超过2500个(Fischer, 2024,第2页)。独立候选人的障碍甚至更高(500名公众人物的支持和30万个签名)。虽然有几位候选人向中央选举委员会提交了所需的签名,但他们仍然因行政“错误”而被排除在外。最著名的例子是鲍里斯·纳杰日金,他收集了两倍于要求的签名。这减少了竞选普京的候选人数量,并从15名候选人中选出了3名形式候选人。三位“另类”候选人都没有真正的反对议程。他们中没有一个人公开反对战争。其中一位候选人Nikolay Kharitonov(来自俄罗斯联邦共产党)甚至公开表示他不会批评普京(TASS, 2023)。这次选举持续了3天(2024年3月15日至17日),为干预留出了更多时间。有很多关于强迫投票的报道。乌克兰被占领土上的人们被迫投票,甚至是由武装人员投票(关于这一点,参见舍甫琴科,例如,2024年)。俄罗斯选举监督组织Golos,在俄罗斯被禁止,报告了使用地理定位软件来控制国家部门的人们是否会有效投票(Grigoryev, 2024)。 此外,难以控制的电子投票也大大扩大了。没有国际组织或独立的公民社会团体监督选举。此外,选举是在后共产主义时代的俄罗斯在最不自由的氛围下举行的。下面将详细说明,这些事件是在严重镇压的情况下发生的,在这种情况下,公民自由受到限制,主要反对派不是被拘留就是被杀害。没有独立的媒体,没有广泛的审查、宣传和媒体控制。例如,泄露的文件揭示了“清洗计划”如何旨在识别和消除社交媒体上的反对材料(Grigoryev, 2024)。早在选举之前,就有消息透露,总统选举的目标是投票率达到70%,其中80%-85%的选票支持普京(参见Pertsev, 2024)。最终,根据官方数据,普京以77%的投票率和创纪录的87%的投票率赢得了选举——远远超过了目标(见表1)。总之,与前共产主义时代的俄罗斯之前的选举相比,这是最不自由的选举。尽管之前的选举为一些“竞争利基”留下了空间(Fischer, 2024,第6页),但这些选举在恐惧和压抑的气氛中反映出几乎完全的控制。虽然在过去,当选举过程中的竞争因素得以保留时,人们对如何给俄罗斯政权贴上标签存在很多分歧,但今天,人们对其专制性质和日益个性化达成了相当广泛的共识(Burkhardt, 2021; Gel’man, 2021; Klimovich, 2023等)。格尔曼谈到了“个人统治下的选举威权主义”(格尔曼,2021年,第71页)。Burkhardt提到了“加速的政权个性化”和“具有宪法不受约束的总统的高度个性化的专制政权”(Burkhardt, 2021, p. 50)。这种权力的个人化与制度的侵蚀密切相关(Klimovich, 2023; McFaul, 2018)。Golosov更进一步,他看到了“从对行政权力行使具有相对强大(尽管大多是非正式的)约束的选举威权主义到成熟的个人独裁的阶段性转变”(Golosov, 2023,第390页)。V-Dem研究所将政体分为四种类型:自由民主制、选举民主制、选举专制制和封闭专制制。俄罗斯被归类为“选举专制”(V-Dem Institute, 2024,第12页),它被定义为一种举行选举的制度,但“言论和结社自由、自由和公平选举等基本必要条件水平不足”(V-Dem Institute, 2024,第12页)。在该研究所的自由民主指数(LDI)中,俄罗斯在179个国家中排名第159位,得分为0.06 (V-Dem institute, 2024,第63页)。从时间上看,2000年以来LDI呈持续下降趋势(V-Dem Dataset, 2025)这表明,俄罗斯的独裁并不是由2020年的宪法改革或乌克兰战争突然推动的,而是一种长期趋势。V-Dem研究所将俄罗斯作为“后苏联时期独裁政权巩固”的一个例子(V-Dem研究所,2024年,第10页)。然而,需要添加一些细微差别。在多年的逐渐退化之后,我们确实看到了一个更突然的变化,那就是与公民自由和媒体自由相关的指数(V-Dem Dataset, 2025)。媒体自由指数显示,2019年之后政府审查急剧增加,2021年之后媒体偏见急剧增加。在入侵乌克兰前夕和战争期间,激进的宣传和政府控制无疑是这一过程中的关键因素。随着入侵,虚假信息的程度达到了前所未有的水平,克里姆林宫的宣传反映了“未经证实的指控或完全虚构的说法”,其规模允许政权“捏造”战争(johnson - nogu<s:1>和Şimanschi, 2023, p. 2016)。这得到了旨在通过重写历史教科书或在娱乐部
{"title":"Russia's 2024 Presidential Elections in a Context of War: A New Step in the Autocratisation of the Regime","authors":"Tom Casier","doi":"10.1111/jcms.70008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.70008","url":null,"abstract":"<p>No one was taken by surprise when Putin was re-elected as president of the Russian Federation in March 2024. Everything had been put in place to guarantee an overwhelming victory in the most rigged and unfree Russian elections since the demise of the Soviet Union. The elections took place amidst the ravaging war in Ukraine, giving them an additional dimension. They were not simply set up as a plebiscite for the president, but also as an endorsement of Russia's war against Ukraine and a proof of unity in this crisis context.</p><p>Elections in an authoritarian context could easily be mistaken for an annoying inevitability for a regime that wants to keep up democratic appearances. The opposite is true. The elections were an opportunity for the regime to celebrate Russia's ‘democracy’. This article seeks to understand why this is the case. It starts by sketching the context in which the elections took place and how they were manipulated. In the next section, the elections are put into the wider context of radicalising repression, symbolised by the death of main oppositionist Navalny in captivity 1 month before the ballot. This prepares the ground for taking a bird's eye view of the autocratic evolution of Russia's regime and the role elections play within this authoritarian context. Finally, the question is raised how the war against Ukraine mattered for the elections. The analysis draws on studies on authoritarianism and on both the conceptual framework and the data of the V-Dem Institute (V-Dem Dataset, <span>2025</span>; V-Dem Institute, <span>2024</span>).</p><p>Russia's 1993 constitution provided for a limitation of a president's rule to two consecutive terms. This was the reason why Putin stepped aside as President from 2008 to 2012, when he became Prime Minister, switching roles with Dmitry Medvedev. To prevent that Putin's presidential rule would come to an end in 2024 (after two more terms of 6 years each), constitutional amendments were adopted in 2020 that maintained the restriction of presidential rule to two terms but set the counter back to zero for former presidents (Pomeranz, <span>2021</span>, p. 17). This makes it possible for Putin to stay in power until 2036.</p><p>The 2020 constitutional amendments were part of a broader attempt at consolidating the regime and reinforcing the power vertical, making the super-presidential system ‘even more concentrated’ (Pomeranz, <span>2021</span>, p. 25) and further restricting civil rights. Pomerantz assesses the significance of the changes: ‘the sanctity and democratic promise of the 1993 constitution has now been violated on numerous fronts. The division of powers, political turnover, the elevation of international law within the Russian legal system, the independent judiciary—all these founding principles have now been shattered and/or severely compromised by the amendments. … Putin has now tried to limit the public arena where open political discussion can take place. The constitutional","PeriodicalId":51369,"journal":{"name":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","volume":"63 S1","pages":"268-276"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jcms.70008","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145375348","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>In 2024, two major official reports on the European economy were published, both authored by former Italian Prime Ministers.</p><p>One report had been commissioned by the President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen from Mario Draghi. Its title was ‘The future of European competitiveness’ (Draghi, <span>2024</span>).</p><p>The other report had been commissioned by the European Council, with support from the government of Belgium. Its title betrays an ambition to go beyond the strictly economic: ‘Much more than a market’ (Letta, <span>2024</span>).</p><p>The Draghi and Letta reports were not the only official reports to appear in 2024. The Commission had also asked a former Finnish President Niinistö for a report on how the Union should prepare for conflict (Niinistö, <span>2024</span>). Moreover, French President Macron had asked an expert group under the former governor of the French central bank, Noyer, to reflect on strategic autonomy (Tresor, <span>2024</span>). The resulting report focused on financial issues. These two latter reports received only limited attention.</p><p>The main audience of the Letta report is the member states, whereas the Draghi report seems to address its recommendations more to the Commission (for which it was written). This is reflected in the fact that the Letta report is available on the website of the Council, whereas the Draghi report is published on the website of the Commission.</p><p>The Draghi report received the most public attention. By early 2025, it was referred to over 200 times in the most important European newspaper, <i>The Financial Times</i>, whereas Letta's report featured only 50 times.</p><p>Both reports are difficult to summarize because they are long (hundreds of pages each) and because they discuss many different issues. The Draghi report alone contains hundreds of detailed policy recommendations, including on trade, innovation, competition, fiscal policy and so forth.</p><p>In this respect, both reports are very different from the reports that, more than almost 40 years ago, foreshadowed major steps towards integration: the Cockfield single market report (Cockfield, <span>1985</span>) and the Delors report on EMU (Delors, <span>1989</span>).</p><p>Both of these foundational reports were based on one single idea and had only one aim.</p><p>The 1985 White Paper prepared by Lord Cockfield was based on the idea that eliminating the remaining border controls would boost competition and growth. This idea inspired the list of 300 directives that were later to create the single market. To facilitate the adoption of all these measures, member states agreed to allow for qualified majority voting through the Single European Act.</p><p>The report on Economic and Monetary Union prepared by the group presided over by Jacques Delors, comprising the then 12 central bank governors of the European Community, also had one underlying idea, namely, that price stability was a precondition for growth and th
{"title":"The Draghi and Letta Reports: Overloaded Messages and Limited Impact","authors":"Daniel Gros","doi":"10.1111/jcms.70012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.70012","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In 2024, two major official reports on the European economy were published, both authored by former Italian Prime Ministers.</p><p>One report had been commissioned by the President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen from Mario Draghi. Its title was ‘The future of European competitiveness’ (Draghi, <span>2024</span>).</p><p>The other report had been commissioned by the European Council, with support from the government of Belgium. Its title betrays an ambition to go beyond the strictly economic: ‘Much more than a market’ (Letta, <span>2024</span>).</p><p>The Draghi and Letta reports were not the only official reports to appear in 2024. The Commission had also asked a former Finnish President Niinistö for a report on how the Union should prepare for conflict (Niinistö, <span>2024</span>). Moreover, French President Macron had asked an expert group under the former governor of the French central bank, Noyer, to reflect on strategic autonomy (Tresor, <span>2024</span>). The resulting report focused on financial issues. These two latter reports received only limited attention.</p><p>The main audience of the Letta report is the member states, whereas the Draghi report seems to address its recommendations more to the Commission (for which it was written). This is reflected in the fact that the Letta report is available on the website of the Council, whereas the Draghi report is published on the website of the Commission.</p><p>The Draghi report received the most public attention. By early 2025, it was referred to over 200 times in the most important European newspaper, <i>The Financial Times</i>, whereas Letta's report featured only 50 times.</p><p>Both reports are difficult to summarize because they are long (hundreds of pages each) and because they discuss many different issues. The Draghi report alone contains hundreds of detailed policy recommendations, including on trade, innovation, competition, fiscal policy and so forth.</p><p>In this respect, both reports are very different from the reports that, more than almost 40 years ago, foreshadowed major steps towards integration: the Cockfield single market report (Cockfield, <span>1985</span>) and the Delors report on EMU (Delors, <span>1989</span>).</p><p>Both of these foundational reports were based on one single idea and had only one aim.</p><p>The 1985 White Paper prepared by Lord Cockfield was based on the idea that eliminating the remaining border controls would boost competition and growth. This idea inspired the list of 300 directives that were later to create the single market. To facilitate the adoption of all these measures, member states agreed to allow for qualified majority voting through the Single European Act.</p><p>The report on Economic and Monetary Union prepared by the group presided over by Jacques Delors, comprising the then 12 central bank governors of the European Community, also had one underlying idea, namely, that price stability was a precondition for growth and th","PeriodicalId":51369,"journal":{"name":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","volume":"63 S1","pages":"138-145"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jcms.70012","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145375349","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Research has solidly established that the presidency of the Council of the European Union can significantly influence the Council's activity. However, it has not yet explained whether, why and how Council actors anticipate the different national executives scheduled to lead them. I explore this gap through an extreme case: the Hungarian presidency (second semester 2024) and rule-of-law (RoL) enforcement. Findings reveal that anticipation exists, although it manifests informally, and is triggered by repeated consensus breaches. Trio arrangements, agenda shaping and issue linkage can help address topic exclusion but remain constrained by the presidency's decision-making power and co-ordination limits. Empirically, I trace anticipation using evidence from elite interviews with key actors. This work contributes to the RoL crisis literature by shifting the focus to how EU institutions anticipate, not react to, illiberal challenges, with implications for institutional resilience, mutual trust and the neutrality of the presidency.
{"title":"Expect the Best, Prepare for the Worst? EU Council Anticipation of rule of law Challenges During the Hungarian Presidency","authors":"Gisela Hernández","doi":"10.1111/jcms.70009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.70009","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Research has solidly established that the presidency of the Council of the European Union can significantly influence the Council's activity. However, it has not yet explained whether, why and how Council actors anticipate the different national executives scheduled to lead them. I explore this gap through an extreme case: the Hungarian presidency (second semester 2024) and rule-of-law (RoL) enforcement. Findings reveal that anticipation exists, although it manifests informally, and is triggered by repeated consensus breaches. Trio arrangements, agenda shaping and issue linkage can help address topic exclusion but remain constrained by the presidency's decision-making power and co-ordination limits. Empirically, I trace anticipation using evidence from elite interviews with key actors. This work contributes to the RoL crisis literature by shifting the focus to how EU institutions anticipate, not react to, illiberal challenges, with implications for institutional resilience, mutual trust and the neutrality of the presidency.</p>","PeriodicalId":51369,"journal":{"name":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","volume":"64 2","pages":"669-692"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jcms.70009","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146148120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The EU's efforts to integrate sustainability into its trade policy have met with mixed reactions, particularly from developing countries. Previously, the EU has sought to promote relevant autonomous measures and the Trade and Sustainable Development chapters in its trade agreements by offering support for implementation and compliance. However, further alignment of trade and development co-operation, known as external policy coherence, faces growing challenges as the second von der Leyen Commission has made Europe's economic security a top priority. Although this new agenda has yet to translate into tangible (trade) policy actions beyond recently adopted initial measures, the shift in focus is driving increased investment in competitiveness and securing access to critical raw materials – efforts that, at times, appear fragmented rather than co-ordinated. Whilst the EU acknowledges that partnerships, including those with countries from the Global South, are essential to strengthen its position in the growing geopolitical competition with other major economies, the increasingly complex global and regional context, coupled with shifting internal priorities, challenges the Commission's ability to balance the EU's trade and development ambitions. This commentary explores new directions for a coherent EU trade and development policy in the dynamic geopolitical landscape of 2025 and beyond.
欧盟将可持续性纳入其贸易政策的努力遇到了不同的反应,尤其是来自发展中国家的反应。此前,欧盟一直寻求通过为执行和遵守提供支持来促进相关的自主措施以及其贸易协定中的贸易和可持续发展章节。然而,随着第二届冯德莱恩委员会(von der Leyen Commission)将欧洲经济安全列为首要任务,贸易和发展合作的进一步协调(即对外政策的一致性)面临越来越大的挑战。尽管除了最近采取的初步措施外,这一新议程尚未转化为切实的(贸易)政策行动,但重心的转移正在推动增加对竞争力的投资,并确保获得关键原材料的渠道——这些努力有时似乎是分散的,而不是协调一致的。尽管欧盟承认,在与其他主要经济体日益激烈的地缘政治竞争中,包括与全球南方国家的伙伴关系对于加强其地位至关重要,但日益复杂的全球和地区背景,加上内部优先事项的变化,对欧盟委员会平衡欧盟贸易和发展雄心的能力提出了挑战。这篇评论探讨了在2025年及以后的动态地缘政治格局中,连贯的欧盟贸易和发展政策的新方向。
{"title":"Policy Coherence in the Time of Economic Insecurity: Balancing the Sustainable Trade and Development Playbook of the New European Commission","authors":"Frederik Stender, Tim Vogel, Niels Keijzer","doi":"10.1111/jcms.70001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.70001","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The EU's efforts to integrate sustainability into its trade policy have met with mixed reactions, particularly from developing countries. Previously, the EU has sought to promote relevant autonomous measures and the Trade and Sustainable Development chapters in its trade agreements by offering support for implementation and compliance. However, further alignment of trade and development co-operation, known as external policy coherence, faces growing challenges as the second von der Leyen Commission has made Europe's economic security a top priority. Although this new agenda has yet to translate into tangible (trade) policy actions beyond recently adopted initial measures, the shift in focus is driving increased investment in competitiveness and securing access to critical raw materials – efforts that, at times, appear fragmented rather than co-ordinated. Whilst the EU acknowledges that partnerships, including those with countries from the Global South, are essential to strengthen its position in the growing geopolitical competition with other major economies, the increasingly complex global and regional context, coupled with shifting internal priorities, challenges the Commission's ability to balance the EU's trade and development ambitions. This commentary explores new directions for a coherent EU trade and development policy in the dynamic geopolitical landscape of 2025 and beyond.</p>","PeriodicalId":51369,"journal":{"name":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","volume":"63 6","pages":"1984-1993"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jcms.70001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145375121","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article critically assesses how the European Union (EU) constructs the identities of ‘EU-Europe’ and ‘the rest of the world’ to legitimise the formation of a ‘geopolitical Europe’. It draws on poststructuralist and postcolonial perspectives within the spirit of scholarly allyship, deconstructing texts produced by key EU officials – Ursula von der Leyen, Charles Michel and Josep Borrell – between 2019 and 2023. The article manifests how civilisational binaries are employed to justify the EU's transition from normative power to power politics. It problematises the ‘EU versus the rest of the world’ framing and, particularly, Borrell's ‘garden–jungle’ analogy, exposing their neocolonial underpinnings. Through an intertextual second reading, it shows how depicting the EU as a peaceful and civilised ‘garden’ and the rest of the world as a conflictual and disorderly ‘jungle’ reinforces civilisational hierarchies. The article argues that these binaries not only legitimise the EU's increasingly securitised foreign policy but also reproduce colonial-era tropes of the mission civilisatrice, perpetuating a Eurocentric worldview.
{"title":"‘Europe and the Rest’ in Official EU Discourse: Legitimising ‘Geopolitical Europe’ Through the ‘Jungle’ Analogy and Beyond","authors":"Münevver Cebeci","doi":"10.1111/jcms.13770","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13770","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article critically assesses how the European Union (EU) constructs the identities of ‘EU-Europe’ and ‘the rest of the world’ to legitimise the formation of a ‘geopolitical Europe’. It draws on poststructuralist and postcolonial perspectives within the spirit of scholarly allyship, deconstructing texts produced by key EU officials – Ursula von der Leyen, Charles Michel and Josep Borrell – between 2019 and 2023. The article manifests how civilisational binaries are employed to justify the EU's transition from normative power to power politics. It problematises the ‘EU versus the rest of the world’ framing and, particularly, Borrell's ‘garden–jungle’ analogy, exposing their neocolonial underpinnings. Through an intertextual second reading, it shows how depicting the EU as a peaceful and civilised ‘garden’ and the rest of the world as a conflictual and disorderly ‘jungle’ reinforces civilisational hierarchies. The article argues that these binaries not only legitimise the EU's increasingly securitised foreign policy but also reproduce colonial-era tropes of the <i>mission civilisatrice</i>, perpetuating a Eurocentric worldview.</p>","PeriodicalId":51369,"journal":{"name":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","volume":"63 5","pages":"1438-1459"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jcms.13770","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144897218","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>In the first two decades of the 21st century, Germany experienced a level of government continuity unparalleled in the European Union (Helms, <span>2025</span>; Hutter and Kriesi, <span>2019</span>). Still, the 16-year chancellorship of Angela Merkel (2005–2021) not only overshadowed but also contributed to the critical state of German politics, shaped by widespread insecurity over economic and cultural change in times of global crises (Decker, <span>2024</span>; Grotz and Schroeder, <span>2021</span>; Kneip et al., <span>2020</span>; Nachtwey, <span>2018</span>; Schmidt, <span>2023</span>). Already during Merkel's tenure, many Germans were ‘idle democrats’, convinced of the normative value of political participation but doubtful of their capacity to make an impact (Weisskircher and Hutter, <span>2019</span>). In many policy areas, limited responsiveness on fiscal matters has been a key challenge (Elsässer and Haffert, <span>2022</span>). Consequently, Merkel's successor Olaf Scholz and his ‘traffic light’ coalition of social democrats, greens and liberals promised ‘new beginnings’ (Faas and Klingelhöfer, <span>2022</span>). However, the fate of this coalition turned out to be more familiar to observers of contemporary European politics than Merkel's long reign: after only one legislative period, cut short by snap elections, the parties of Scholz's government coalition suffered heavy defeat.</p><p>Four years after the end of Merkel's last government, then, Germany's conservatives returned to power, or at least to government. In February 2025, CDU/CSU 1 won the federal election, even though electoral support (28.5%) fell short of expectations. CDU leader Friedrich Merz became the new chancellor, forming a coalition with the SPD, now at a record-breaking electoral low (16.4%). The 2025 campaign and subsequent government negotiations were shaped by a collective uncertainty not only about how but whether major contemporary challenges – in particular, a lack of economic growth, Russia's war against Ukraine and immigration – can be effectively responded to at all. This was further exacerbated by the inauguration of the new Trump administration in the United States and ongoing geopolitical turmoil. At the time of government formation, some polls saw the electoral winner CDU/CSU already trailing behind the far-right AfD, which was endorsed by none other than Elon Musk – the richest person on the planet and a key advisor to Trump.</p><p>Germany's new chancellor Merz, born in 1955, earned more modest wealth through his own business activities. Five years in the European Parliament (1989–1994) and 15 years in the German Bundestag (1994–2009), he was sidelined in the early 2000s after losing the power struggle against his key intra-party rival, Merkel, for CDU leadership. In 2008, he published the book <i>Daring More Capitalism</i>. Entering the private sector, the educated lawyer became a multi-millionaire, amongst other roles as board member of Deutsche
{"title":"German Politics in Times of Crises: The Success of the Post-Merkel Conservatives in the 2025 Federal Election","authors":"Manès Weisskircher","doi":"10.1111/jcms.70002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.70002","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In the first two decades of the 21st century, Germany experienced a level of government continuity unparalleled in the European Union (Helms, <span>2025</span>; Hutter and Kriesi, <span>2019</span>). Still, the 16-year chancellorship of Angela Merkel (2005–2021) not only overshadowed but also contributed to the critical state of German politics, shaped by widespread insecurity over economic and cultural change in times of global crises (Decker, <span>2024</span>; Grotz and Schroeder, <span>2021</span>; Kneip et al., <span>2020</span>; Nachtwey, <span>2018</span>; Schmidt, <span>2023</span>). Already during Merkel's tenure, many Germans were ‘idle democrats’, convinced of the normative value of political participation but doubtful of their capacity to make an impact (Weisskircher and Hutter, <span>2019</span>). In many policy areas, limited responsiveness on fiscal matters has been a key challenge (Elsässer and Haffert, <span>2022</span>). Consequently, Merkel's successor Olaf Scholz and his ‘traffic light’ coalition of social democrats, greens and liberals promised ‘new beginnings’ (Faas and Klingelhöfer, <span>2022</span>). However, the fate of this coalition turned out to be more familiar to observers of contemporary European politics than Merkel's long reign: after only one legislative period, cut short by snap elections, the parties of Scholz's government coalition suffered heavy defeat.</p><p>Four years after the end of Merkel's last government, then, Germany's conservatives returned to power, or at least to government. In February 2025, CDU/CSU\u00001 won the federal election, even though electoral support (28.5%) fell short of expectations. CDU leader Friedrich Merz became the new chancellor, forming a coalition with the SPD, now at a record-breaking electoral low (16.4%). The 2025 campaign and subsequent government negotiations were shaped by a collective uncertainty not only about how but whether major contemporary challenges – in particular, a lack of economic growth, Russia's war against Ukraine and immigration – can be effectively responded to at all. This was further exacerbated by the inauguration of the new Trump administration in the United States and ongoing geopolitical turmoil. At the time of government formation, some polls saw the electoral winner CDU/CSU already trailing behind the far-right AfD, which was endorsed by none other than Elon Musk – the richest person on the planet and a key advisor to Trump.</p><p>Germany's new chancellor Merz, born in 1955, earned more modest wealth through his own business activities. Five years in the European Parliament (1989–1994) and 15 years in the German Bundestag (1994–2009), he was sidelined in the early 2000s after losing the power struggle against his key intra-party rival, Merkel, for CDU leadership. In 2008, he published the book <i>Daring More Capitalism</i>. Entering the private sector, the educated lawyer became a multi-millionaire, amongst other roles as board member of Deutsche","PeriodicalId":51369,"journal":{"name":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","volume":"63 S1","pages":"224-236"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jcms.70002","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145375215","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>On 22 May 2024, the UK Conservative Prime Minister (PM) Rishi Sunak surprisingly announced that a snap general election was going to take place on 4 July, around 6 months ahead of the expected end of the parliamentary term. Since Sunak's entry in Downing Street in October 2022, opinion polls had consistently put the Labour party 15 to 20 points ahead of the Conservatives. Rumour has it that the vote was anticipated by the PM after he was advised about the dire economic forecasts for the autumn. The attempt to avoid a large defeat, however, was unsuccessful, and the Conservatives ended up with the worst electoral crash ever (losing more than 200 seats – from 326 to 121 – compared to the previous election in December 2019). Though Labour won big in terms of seats, this was due to a record-high level of disproportionality of the plurality electoral system, which magnified a rather modest victory (33.7, with an increase of less than two percentage points over 2019), translating it into a comfortable margin of majority of over 170 seats.</p><p>Seen in the context of the recent tensions and changes in UK politics, the electoral result was not very surprising, for at least three reasons. First, the Conservatives had governed since 2010. Like in the previous two long electoral cycles (Conservative with Thatcher-Major in 1979–1997; Labour with Blair and Brown, 1997–2010), voters clearly manifested an appetite for change, in what has been defined as a ‘valence vote’, in which the incumbent party lost ‘competence, leadership, and capacity to deliver’ (Surridge, <span>2024</span>).</p><p>Second, the political conditions were very different from the ones of the 2019 election (cf. Prosser, <span>2024</span>). Back then, Boris Johnson won big, capitalizing, amongst other things, on the pledge to ‘get Brexit done’, in a process that, starting with the June 2016 EU Membership referendum, eventually led to the country's exit from the European Union in 2020. The electoral campaign, as well as the vote, also grafted onto a ‘geography of discontent’ (McCann, <span>2019</span>), where many ‘left behind areas’ turned to the Conservative party, buying into its promise to ‘level up the country’ and address persisting socio-economic inequalities that drove also the support for Brexit (Rodríguez-Pose, <span>2018</span>). Most prominent amongst them were the Midlands and North of England constituencies, making up the so-called ‘Red Wall’. Ending a prolonged period of uncertainty, in 2019, Johnson won the necessary majority to achieve his goals also thanks to Nigel Farage's ‘informal alliance’, as his Brexit party did not contest candidates in seats with an incumbent Conservative Member of Parliament (MP). Yet, whilst Brexit was ‘done’, as it will be discussed later, its negative socio-economic effects have persisted, giving rise to further discontent across large swathes of the country. In the end, most constituencies that switched to the Conservatives in 2019 went back
在9年中,举行了四次大选(2015年,2017年,2019年,2024年;最后三次都是临时投票,而2024年的投票是唯一一次英国脱欧没有正式发挥作用的投票)。在苏纳克之前,有四位不同的保守党首相(戴维·卡梅伦、特蕾莎·梅、鲍里斯·约翰逊和利兹·特拉斯)执政。2022年,特拉斯在唐宁街只待了7周,就创下了英国历史上任期最短的首相的不令人羡慕的记录。在保守党执政期间(2010-2024),英国的选举行为变得更加不稳定。即使在英国这样的两党制国家,在连续选举中支持同一个政党的忠诚选民也越来越少。这一趋势也给通常可预测的威斯敏斯特两党格局带来了不确定性,苏格兰民族党(Scottish National Party)的崛起(在2011年苏格兰大选中导致了2014年苏格兰独立公投)、英国独立党(UKIP)在2015年大选中的崛起,以及次年的英国退欧公投,已经动摇了这一格局。这些事件在20年前还被认为是“不可预测的选举冲击”(Fieldhouse et al., 2021)。到2019年,随着“红墙”的倒塌,保守党成功地进入了英格兰中部和北部传统的工人阶级据点。因此,两党博弈似乎恢复了,尽管两个主要政党的选民的选举地理和社会人口状况发生了深刻的变化。然而,到2024年,投票率降至59.7(接近2001年登记的最低点59.1),两个主要政党努力保住2019年的选民。对于保守党来说尤其如此,只保留了略多于一半的选票(53%),同时在改革方面损失了多达25%(而工党在2019年的投票中保留了71%)。自由民主党——传统上是第三大得票最多的政党——在议会中的席位大幅增加(从11个增加到72个),从11.5%小幅增加到12.2%。就像2015年英国脱欧公投前的最后一次选举一样,他们被法拉奇的政党(当时的英国独立党,现在的改革党)超越(YouGov, 2024)。所有这些导致了英国民主历史上最分散和不成比例的选举(Pattie和Cutts, 2024)。虽然工党在议会中的多数席位看起来很稳固,但也不乏潜在的紧张来源。经过几次尝试,法拉奇最终以改革议员的身份进入威斯敏斯特。改革党的得票率为14%,与许多欧洲国家类似的民粹主义极右翼政党多年来获得的平均得票率相差不远。如果与获得的选票相比,改革的代表人数仍然非常少(只有五个席位),那么进入议会为英国退欧的主要建筑师之一提供了一个新的制度平台(仅次于欧洲议会)(Baldini et al., 2022)。即使是在政府的左翼,一个组织也已经形成,这可能会给斯塔默带来困难。除了在2024年大选前夕被驱逐出工党的前工党领袖杰里米·科尔宾(Jeremy Corbyn)之外,另外四名亲巴勒斯坦的议员也以独立议员的身份赢得了席位,他们正在加强与四名绿党议员的合作。如果这些数字与其他欧洲议会相比非常低,并且与威斯敏斯特的关系不大,那么它们就会加强在上一届议会中已经出现的分裂趋势(参见表1)。2025年初,新当选的保守党领袖凯米·巴德诺克(Kemi Badenoch)似乎在努力重振该党的命运。尽管斯塔默也被证明相当不受欢迎,在上任的头几个月没有享受到蜜月期,但两大主要政党在民意调查中的差距缩小与奈杰尔•法拉奇(Nigel Farage)及其领导的改革英国(Reform UK)的崛起相吻合,后者越来越被视为工党在选举中面临的主要威胁。从选民的角度来看,有人强调,“2024年对改革的支持在脱欧路线上比2015年公投前对英国独立党的支持略微两极分化,这表明改革在更多支持脱欧的地区增加了基础”(Heath等人,2025年,第7页)。这些地区也是该国经济最贫困的地区之一,可能再次成为关键的选举战场。如前所述,斯塔默的政党带着一个明确的雄心壮志进入政府,即从保守党政府时代“翻开新的一页”。在其宣言中,该党承诺为“复兴十年”铺平道路,奠定“良好政府的基础”(第12页)。为了实现这一目标,在国内层面,新政府采取了“使命驱动”的方式。 从一开始,工党的首要任务和首要任务就是“启动经济增长,确保七国集团中最高的持续增长——在全国各地创造良好的就业机会和生产率增长,使每个人,而不仅仅是少数人,变得更好”,这并非巧合(第13页,斜体添加)。斯塔默和他的内阁非常清楚,扭转经济停滞是“重建英国”、恢复公共服务以及公民对国家及其机构的信心的关键。然而,从进入公职的那一刻起,工党就不得不面对一系列物质和意识形态方面的挑战,这些挑战一直阻碍着它快速实现变革的雄心。第一次是在投票后几天出现的,当时英格兰北部绍斯波特的三名年轻女孩被谋杀后,全国各地爆发了一系列骚乱。一些政治和媒体评论员匆忙地将这些事件标记为极端主义运动利用的激进右翼情绪的表达-尤其是在移民作为公众舆论的关键问题持续突出之后(YouGov, 2025)。然而,这只是部分解释。正如Whiteley(2024)所指出的那样,像骚乱这样的破坏性和暴力事件可能源于一种深刻的不满情绪,这种情绪经常出现在遭受剥夺的地区-即所谓的“落后地区”(Pike et al., 2024)。事实上,根据政府的剥夺指数,许多暴力冲突最严重的地区(如米德尔斯堡、布莱克浦、利物浦、哈特尔浦、赫尔和布莱克本)都在最贫困地区的前十名之列,而其他许多地区仍高于全国平均水平。英国是经合组织中最不平等的地区国家之一(McCann, 2019; Raikes et al., 2019)。长期存在的社会经济地区差异不仅持续存在,而且在过去几十年里继续扩大。例如,伦敦和英格兰北部之间已经存在的巨大生活水平差距在2019年至2024年间几乎翻了一番,这使得很大一部分人口基本上被困在了“落后地区”。这种情况正在扩大现有的领土鸿沟——南北之间、大都市与农村或沿海地区之间,以及区域内部和跨区域之间——形成社会经济衰退、“落后”感和政治不满的恶性循环(Pike et al., 2024)。可以肯定的是,近年来,经济落后的地区经常把自己的不满诉诸于投票箱,比如英国退欧公投,投票脱离欧盟;同时,随着“红墙”的倒塌,选举也出现了高度波动,就像2019年大选中发生的那样。然而,尽管承诺“提高国家水平”,上届保守党政府在解决“落后地区”的经济衰退方面做得很少(Tomaney等人,2025年;Webb等人,2022年)。这些地区也受到英国脱欧的负面经济影响的打击更大,而移民仍被视为一个非常突出的问题(Goes, 2025; Prosser, 2024)。其结果是,民众的不满情绪非但没有平息,反而在不断增加。这有助于解释为什么骚乱不应被视为由激进右翼团体煽动的孤立的暴力爆发,而应被视为“无关紧要的地方的复仇”的最新表现(Rodríguez-Pose, 2018)。这对新政府是一个严重的警告——尤其是因为,到目前为止,除了在骚乱发生后立即寻求重建公共秩序之外,斯塔默政府还没有采取任何明确的步骤来理解或解决骚乱的根本原因。关键是,工党在“红墙”选区的胜利尤其脆弱。此外,改革在许多席位中排名第二的事实表明,在这些地区,一种深刻的不满情绪正在挥之不去,忠诚可能会再次迅速转变工党的胜利可能更多地归因于保守党支持率的急剧下降和右翼选票的分裂,这往往是由于改革的好处,而不是斯塔默的政党得到了坚定的支持。这表明,要想继续执政,新一届工党政府必
{"title":"‘Turning the Page’? The 2024 UK General Elections and First Implications of Labour's Landslide Victory","authors":"Gianfranco Baldini, Edoardo Bressanelli, Arianna Giovannini","doi":"10.1111/jcms.70011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.70011","url":null,"abstract":"<p>On 22 May 2024, the UK Conservative Prime Minister (PM) Rishi Sunak surprisingly announced that a snap general election was going to take place on 4 July, around 6 months ahead of the expected end of the parliamentary term. Since Sunak's entry in Downing Street in October 2022, opinion polls had consistently put the Labour party 15 to 20 points ahead of the Conservatives. Rumour has it that the vote was anticipated by the PM after he was advised about the dire economic forecasts for the autumn. The attempt to avoid a large defeat, however, was unsuccessful, and the Conservatives ended up with the worst electoral crash ever (losing more than 200 seats – from 326 to 121 – compared to the previous election in December 2019). Though Labour won big in terms of seats, this was due to a record-high level of disproportionality of the plurality electoral system, which magnified a rather modest victory (33.7, with an increase of less than two percentage points over 2019), translating it into a comfortable margin of majority of over 170 seats.</p><p>Seen in the context of the recent tensions and changes in UK politics, the electoral result was not very surprising, for at least three reasons. First, the Conservatives had governed since 2010. Like in the previous two long electoral cycles (Conservative with Thatcher-Major in 1979–1997; Labour with Blair and Brown, 1997–2010), voters clearly manifested an appetite for change, in what has been defined as a ‘valence vote’, in which the incumbent party lost ‘competence, leadership, and capacity to deliver’ (Surridge, <span>2024</span>).</p><p>Second, the political conditions were very different from the ones of the 2019 election (cf. Prosser, <span>2024</span>). Back then, Boris Johnson won big, capitalizing, amongst other things, on the pledge to ‘get Brexit done’, in a process that, starting with the June 2016 EU Membership referendum, eventually led to the country's exit from the European Union in 2020. The electoral campaign, as well as the vote, also grafted onto a ‘geography of discontent’ (McCann, <span>2019</span>), where many ‘left behind areas’ turned to the Conservative party, buying into its promise to ‘level up the country’ and address persisting socio-economic inequalities that drove also the support for Brexit (Rodríguez-Pose, <span>2018</span>). Most prominent amongst them were the Midlands and North of England constituencies, making up the so-called ‘Red Wall’. Ending a prolonged period of uncertainty, in 2019, Johnson won the necessary majority to achieve his goals also thanks to Nigel Farage's ‘informal alliance’, as his Brexit party did not contest candidates in seats with an incumbent Conservative Member of Parliament (MP). Yet, whilst Brexit was ‘done’, as it will be discussed later, its negative socio-economic effects have persisted, giving rise to further discontent across large swathes of the country. In the end, most constituencies that switched to the Conservatives in 2019 went back ","PeriodicalId":51369,"journal":{"name":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","volume":"63 S1","pages":"255-267"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jcms.70011","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145375120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Scholars who have examined European integration from a neo-Polanyian perspective have long been sceptical about the opportunities for a ‘countermovement’ against the EU's market-making bias. However, as part of a broader ‘social turn’, recent years have seen the adoption of EU legislation to promote fair and decent working conditions. Based on a contextual analysis of four key labour-law directives, I argue that these amount to a meaningful ‘re-embedding’ of liberalised labour markets. Conventional theories of organised interests or public opinion explain little about this move to market-correcting integration. Returning to Polanyi, I argue that this (re-)emergence of EU labour regulation has been the corollary of a ‘double countermovement’, that is, an attempt to restore the Union's social legitimacy in response to (perceived) popular discontent with market-making integration that surfaced during the 2000s and reached its height during the Eurozone crisis in the early 2010s.
{"title":"Re-Embedding European Market Society? EU Labour Regulation and the ‘Double Countermovement’ to Market-Making Integration","authors":"Sven Schreurs","doi":"10.1111/jcms.70006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.70006","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Scholars who have examined European integration from a neo-Polanyian perspective have long been sceptical about the opportunities for a ‘countermovement’ against the EU's market-making bias. However, as part of a broader ‘social turn’, recent years have seen the adoption of EU legislation to promote fair and decent working conditions. Based on a contextual analysis of four key labour-law directives, I argue that these amount to a meaningful ‘re-embedding’ of liberalised labour markets. Conventional theories of organised interests or public opinion explain little about this move to market-correcting integration. Returning to Polanyi, I argue that this (re-)emergence of EU labour regulation has been the corollary of a ‘double countermovement’, that is, an attempt to restore the Union's social legitimacy in response to (perceived) popular discontent with market-making integration that surfaced during the 2000s and reached its height during the Eurozone crisis in the early 2010s.</p>","PeriodicalId":51369,"journal":{"name":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","volume":"64 2","pages":"881-901"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jcms.70006","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146139594","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}