This submission examines the impact of the European Union (EU) policy efforts to construct a European Heritage and a sense of belonging within the wider European population on Heritage policy. The article explores how the EU has selected and wielded instruments that frame particular values that (1) respond to specific policy problems and impact European heritage(s) and (2) build political myths articulating particular visions of what the EU represents and how the population should engage with European integration. Through analysis of four case studies (European Heritage Label, the EU Horizon 2020, European Cultural Routes and the EU Energy Efficiency Directive) in a policy instrument typology, we reveal that the frames embedded in the EU policy instruments carry a range of different values and priorities that often compete, leading to policy outcomes that are fragmented in their effect.
{"title":"Framing European Heritage and Identity: Cultural Policy Instruments of the European Union","authors":"Anthony R. Zito, Susannah Eckersley","doi":"10.1111/jcms.13767","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13767","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This submission examines the impact of the European Union (EU) policy efforts to construct a European Heritage and a sense of belonging within the wider European population on Heritage policy. The article explores how the EU has selected and wielded instruments that frame particular values that (1) respond to specific policy problems and impact European heritage(s) and (2) build political myths articulating particular visions of what the EU represents and how the population should engage with European integration. Through analysis of four case studies (European Heritage Label, the EU Horizon 2020, European Cultural Routes and the EU Energy Efficiency Directive) in a policy instrument typology, we reveal that the frames embedded in the EU policy instruments carry a range of different values and priorities that often compete, leading to policy outcomes that are fragmented in their effect.</p>","PeriodicalId":51369,"journal":{"name":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","volume":"64 2","pages":"859-880"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jcms.13767","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146148121","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study examines who the media holds responsible for economic issues in a multi-level setting, particularly during the 2009 economic crisis. Despite the burgeoning research on responsibility attribution and the likely effect of the media in giving credit and blame, little attention has been paid to this role of the media. To address this gap, our objectives are to assess (1) the extent to which the media attributes responsibility to national governments and the EU for the economy, (2) how responsibility was assigned during the 2009 crisis and (3) underlying differences across political actors and countries. We examine media coverage of economic issues in Ireland, Portugal and Spain between 2002 and 2016, corresponding to a total of 672 news stories. Results show a pattern of greater responsibility attributed to the European level compared to the domestic level, which decreases with the crisis and is more accentuated in Ireland.
{"title":"Who Is Responsible for the State of the Economy? Media Narratives on Responsibility Attribution During the Eurozone Crisis in Ireland, Portugal and Spain","authors":"Susana Rogeiro Nina, Ana Maria Belchior","doi":"10.1111/jcms.13740","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13740","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study examines who the media holds responsible for economic issues in a multi-level setting, particularly during the 2009 economic crisis. Despite the burgeoning research on responsibility attribution and the likely effect of the media in giving credit and blame, little attention has been paid to this role of the media. To address this gap, our objectives are to assess (1) the extent to which the media attributes responsibility to national governments and the EU for the economy, (2) how responsibility was assigned during the 2009 crisis and (3) underlying differences across political actors and countries. We examine media coverage of economic issues in Ireland, Portugal and Spain between 2002 and 2016, corresponding to a total of 672 news stories. Results show a pattern of greater responsibility attributed to the European level compared to the domestic level, which decreases with the crisis and is more accentuated in Ireland.</p>","PeriodicalId":51369,"journal":{"name":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","volume":"64 1","pages":"293-311"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145652470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In response to a more contentious and geopolitically fractious international environment, the European Union's (EU) approach to international economic policies has in recent years undergone a significant shift, often referred to as the EU's ‘geoeconomic turn’. Whilst valuable academic and policy work has explored this ongoing shift, there is a general tendency to see geoeconomics as either required and beneficial or a sad imposition on a reluctant EU in a changing global economic landscape. However, as geoeconomics is likely here to stay, we argue that it is high time for EU studies to engage more critically with this geoeconomic turn. This entails a deeper examination of the geoeconomic turn's broader implications for social inequalities, exploitation, power disparities and changing hierarchies within the EU and internationally. More concretely, we put forward four perspectives that could inform future critical research on the geoeconomic turn. Drawing on work in other disciplines and at the EU studies' fringes, we first argue for critically historicising the geoeconomic turn's supposed newness and for recentring human development in thinking about the EU's geoeconomic turn. We then explore the changing modalities of business power entailed by the geoeconomic turn and the importance of studying its social purpose. By addressing these underexplored questions, we aim to provide a first, non-exhaustive step for future research towards a more critical understanding of the complexities and potential power consequences of the EU's evolving economic strategy.
{"title":"An Evermore Geoeconomic European Union? Exploring Critical Perspectives for Future Research","authors":"Sjorre Couvreur, Jaša Veselinovič","doi":"10.1111/jcms.13741","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13741","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In response to a more contentious and geopolitically fractious international environment, the European Union's (EU) approach to international economic policies has in recent years undergone a significant shift, often referred to as the EU's ‘geoeconomic turn’. Whilst valuable academic and policy work has explored this ongoing shift, there is a general tendency to see geoeconomics as either required and beneficial or a sad imposition on a reluctant EU in a changing global economic landscape. However, as geoeconomics is likely here to stay, we argue that it is high time for EU studies to engage more critically with this geoeconomic turn. This entails a deeper examination of the geoeconomic turn's broader implications for social inequalities, exploitation, power disparities and changing hierarchies within the EU and internationally. More concretely, we put forward four perspectives that could inform future critical research on the geoeconomic turn. Drawing on work in other disciplines and at the EU studies' fringes, we first argue for critically historicising the geoeconomic turn's supposed newness and for recentring human development in thinking about the EU's geoeconomic turn. We then explore the changing modalities of business power entailed by the geoeconomic turn and the importance of studying its social purpose. By addressing these underexplored questions, we aim to provide a first, non-exhaustive step for future research towards a more critical understanding of the complexities and potential power consequences of the EU's evolving economic strategy.</p>","PeriodicalId":51369,"journal":{"name":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","volume":"64 1","pages":"431-448"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jcms.13741","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145652471","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article engages the European Union's (EU) implementation of counterterrorism clauses as part of its development aid regulations in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT). The point of departure for the research is the shift in the EU's policy for aid regulations in the OPT in 2019, when the EU began to gradually implement counterterrorism clauses in its grant contracts, a measure that sparked widespread protests amongst Palestinian non-governmental organisations (NGOs), who critiqued the clauses as an explicit attempt to further pacify civil society. Situated within the realms of postcolonial theory and critical security studies, the article draws on semi-structured interviews with staff and representatives of Palestinian NGOs in the OPT in order to unpack perspectives of civil society actors who interpret the policy as an illegitimate interference with their political self-determination, in particular the internationally recognised right to resist colonial subjugation. The conceptual framework of pacification – as an inconspicuous, diffuse form of violence within liberal governance aimed at suppressing resistance to the prevailing order – aligns closely with both perspectives on the ground and postcolonial thought. As such, the article elucidates tensions between an expanding European counterterrorism regime, increasingly permeating the sphere of development aid, and perspectives of Palestinian civil society actors who discern these policies as deeply rooted in colonial paradigms. Whilst exploring these tensions, the intricate relationship between postcolonial research and allyship lingers as an underlying notion. This premise assumes heightened relevance within the contemporary academic landscape in Europe, wherein scholarly investigations, which refuse simplistic vilifications of Palestinian resistance and instead seek a deeper engagement with local perspectives, are increasingly marginalised.
{"title":"Aid as Pacification: The Encroachment of Counterterrorism Clauses into the Aid Regime of the European Union in the Occupied Palestinian Territories","authors":"Mariam Salameh-Puvogel","doi":"10.1111/jcms.13762","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13762","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The article engages the European Union's (EU) implementation of counterterrorism clauses as part of its development aid regulations in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT). The point of departure for the research is the shift in the EU's policy for aid regulations in the OPT in 2019, when the EU began to gradually implement counterterrorism clauses in its grant contracts, a measure that sparked widespread protests amongst Palestinian non-governmental organisations (NGOs), who critiqued the clauses as an explicit attempt to further pacify civil society. Situated within the realms of postcolonial theory and critical security studies, the article draws on semi-structured interviews with staff and representatives of Palestinian NGOs in the OPT in order to unpack perspectives of civil society actors who interpret the policy as an illegitimate interference with their political self-determination, in particular the internationally recognised right to resist colonial subjugation. The conceptual framework of pacification – as an inconspicuous, diffuse form of violence within liberal governance aimed at suppressing resistance to the prevailing order – aligns closely with both perspectives on the ground and postcolonial thought. As such, the article elucidates tensions between an expanding European counterterrorism regime, increasingly permeating the sphere of development aid, and perspectives of Palestinian civil society actors who discern these policies as deeply rooted in colonial paradigms. Whilst exploring these tensions, the intricate relationship between postcolonial research and allyship lingers as an underlying notion. This premise assumes heightened relevance within the contemporary academic landscape in Europe, wherein scholarly investigations, which refuse simplistic vilifications of Palestinian resistance and instead seek a deeper engagement with local perspectives, are increasingly marginalised.</p>","PeriodicalId":51369,"journal":{"name":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","volume":"63 5","pages":"1615-1637"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jcms.13762","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144897332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>By the beginning of the 2000s, integration theory had fallen out of favour as scholars turned to comparative politics and new governance to understand the European Union (EU) as a polity (Hix, <span>1998</span>, <span>1994</span>). This period was, in retrospect, one of relative confidence in the European project. A string of ‘no’ votes in referendums on EU policies and treaties, the rise of Eurosceptic challenger parties and the euro crisis shattered this confidence. As the Union's problems mounted, EU scholars were drawn once more to integration theory, with its concern for the EU's ontology and capacity for forward momentum. New intergovernmentalism was part of this new wave of theorising, along with post-functionalism and the core state powers approach (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, <span>2014</span>; Hooghe and Marks, <span>2009</span>).</p><p>In its original form, post-functionalism posited that public disquiet over the European project was discouraging EU policy-makers from taking major integrationist steps (Hooghe and Marks, <span>2009</span>). The core state powers approach sees such constraints as being overstated; mass publics in many member states do want the EU to play a greater role in defence, macroeconomic policy and public administration, it points out, even though these policies touch upon the primary responsibilities of states (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, <span>2018</span>). New intergovernmentalism sees the EU as pursuing deeper integration despite not because of public opinion (Bickerton et al., <span>2015b</span>). By avoiding the delegation of new powers to the European Commission, member states have sought to reduce the scope for a backlash from voters and Eurosceptics, but only partially so. The EU's principled opponents, thus, have been growing stronger rather than weaker, new intergovernmentalism contends.</p><p>Like all attempts at theory building, new intergovernmentalism faced its fair share of criticisms at first (Schimmelfennig, <span>2015</span>). Over time, however, a growing number of scholars responded to its call for further research on the changing dynamics of post-Maastricht integration. New intergovernmentalism has been applied to a wide range of policies, including asylum policy (Smeets and Zaun, <span>2021</span>), foreign and security policy (Morillas, <span>2020</span>), sanctions policy (Szép, <span>2020</span>), energy (Bocquillon and Maltby, <span>2020</span>), environmental policy (Catuti, <span>2022</span>) and competition policy (Bora and Schramm, <span>2024</span>), the legislative process (Bressanelli and Chelotti, <span>2016</span>) and the EU's rule of law crisis (Pavone, <span>2024</span>). New intergovernmentalism has been identified by Verdun (<span>2020</span>) as one of the three strands of intergovernmentalism and by Schmidt (<span>2024</span>) as driving a distinctive phase of integration theory.</p><p>This article takes stock of new intergovernmentalism 10 years after this approach was
到21世纪初,随着学者们转向比较政治学和新治理来理解作为政体的欧盟(EU),整合理论已经失宠(Hix, 1998,1994)。回想起来,这段时期是人们对欧洲计划相对有信心的时期。在针对欧盟政策和条约的公投中,一连串的“不”票、欧洲怀疑主义挑战者政党的崛起以及欧元危机粉碎了这种信心。随着欧盟问题的增加,欧盟学者再次被一体化理论所吸引,一体化理论关注欧盟的本体论和前进动力的能力。新政府间主义是新一波理论化的一部分,与后功能主义和核心国家权力方法一起(Genschel和Jachtenfuchs, 2014; Hooghe和Marks, 2009)。在其最初的形式中,后功能主义假设公众对欧洲项目的不安使欧盟政策制定者不愿意采取重大的一体化措施(Hooghe和Marks, 2009)。核心国家权力的观点认为这些限制被夸大了;报告指出,许多成员国的公众确实希望欧盟在国防、宏观经济政策和公共管理方面发挥更大的作用,尽管这些政策涉及国家的主要责任(Genschel和Jachtenfuchs, 2018)。新政府间主义认为欧盟正在追求更深层次的一体化,尽管不是因为公众舆论(Bickerton et al., 2015b)。通过避免将新的权力下放给欧盟委员会(European Commission),成员国试图减少选民和欧洲怀疑论者的反弹空间,但这只是部分原因。因此,新的政府间主义主张,欧盟的主要反对者变得越来越强大,而不是越来越弱。像所有理论建设的尝试一样,新的政府间主义一开始面临着相当多的批评(Schimmelfennig, 2015)。然而,随着时间的推移,越来越多的学者响应其呼吁,进一步研究后马斯特里赫特一体化的动态变化。新政府间主义被广泛应用于各种政策,包括庇护政策(Smeets and Zaun, 2021)、外交和安全政策(Morillas, 2020)、制裁政策(szacimp, 2020)、能源(Bocquillon and Maltby, 2020)、环境政策(Catuti, 2022)和竞争政策(Bora and Schramm, 2024)、立法程序(Bressanelli and Chelotti, 2016)和欧盟的法治危机(Pavone, 2024)。Verdun(2020)将新政府间主义确定为政府间主义的三个分支之一,Schmidt(2024)将其确定为推动整合理论的一个独特阶段。本文回顾了这种方法提出10年后的新政府间主义。在这段时间里,欧盟发生了很多事情,包括百年一遇的流行病、英国脱欧和俄罗斯对乌克兰的全面战争。我们认为,这些变化和其他变化与新政府间主义理论所提出的整合主义动力和制度政治相一致,在某些情况下还被放大了。新政府间主义的核心是整合悖论。虽然欧盟精英对共同应对当代重大政策挑战的需求正在上升,但与《马斯特里赫特条约》之前的时期相比,这些人对赋予超国家机构权力的偏好有所减弱。正如悖论的概念所暗示的那样,这种选择带来了难以解决的紧张关系。十年过去了,这些紧张关系依然存在。新冠肺炎疫情、气候变化和绿色转型、移民流动以及乌克兰战争,都促使人们重新寻求扩大欧盟的政策活动。成员国政府和欧盟机构的回应不是将重要的新权力下放给欧盟委员会,而是通过动员共识和行使“集体权力”(Laffan, 2024)。过去10年发生的变化是,欧盟政策领域的相互联系日益紧密,这一现象表明,欧盟执行机构开始像政府一样行事。尽管欧元危机管理只专注于宏观经济稳定,但事后看来,这一经历表明,欧盟作为一个政治体系的稳定在多大程度上取决于其动员金融资源的能力。复苏和韧性基金(RRF)不仅使金融市场相信,在2019冠状病毒病大流行期间,欧元危机不会重演;它还为绿色转型、数字化提供了近7000亿欧元的欧盟资金,并通过条件限制机制用于打击民主和法治倒退以及其他政策努力。气候行动,特别是2019-2024年欧洲绿色协议一揽子计划,重新启动了欧盟的监管议程,同时几乎涵盖了欧盟所有的政策部门。 这种模式在欧盟对俄罗斯2022年入侵乌克兰的回应中得到了重复,从为数百万流离失所的人提供临时保护,到重塑欧盟的能源结构,再到向乌克兰提供军事支持。这些政策反应融合了欧盟政策制定的传统和新领域,并在某些情况下为欧盟委员会提供了突出的作用。然而,显赫地位不应与权力混为一谈。国家元首或政府首脑仍然牢牢掌握着决定权。对新政府间主义的最初描述对欧盟政策制定的传统领域和新领域之间的关系持谨慎态度。当时欧洲一体化动态变化的最明显证据与新的后马斯特里赫特欧盟活动领域有关,特别是经济、社会和就业、外交和安全,以及司法和内政政策(Bickerton等人,2015d; Fabbrini和Puetter, 2016)。例如,对欧洲理事会兴起的具体研究表明,欧盟活动的新领域主导了国家元首和政府首脑的议程(Puetter, 2014, p. 92)。十年过去了,新的政府间主义动态涵盖了政策制定的新旧领域。对新政府间主义的最初描述也不愿在核心国家权力和市场一体化之间划出明确的界限(Genschel和Jachtenfuchs, 2018)。相反,新政府间主义认为,高级和低级政治之间的差异已经变得模糊(Bickerton等人,2015)。我们以类似的方式看待能力建设与规则制定的逻辑。虽然Genschel和Jachtenfuchs(2025)对令人担忧的政府间能力建设政治提供了有价值的见解,但规则制定既不能免受国内反对,也不能完全成为超国家领域。从英国首相戴维•卡梅伦(David Cameron)在寻求与欧盟达成新的解决方案时试图取消四大自由,到农民对欧盟环境监管的抗议,无论欧盟是否试图建立能力,它都发现自己处于火线上,将责任推给成员国政府,而不是超国家机构,以寻找前进的道路。在过去的十年里,欧盟的执行机构变得越来越像政府。他们的决定对国内政治和国民经济有着深远的影响。他们决定着应对重大社会挑战的总体政策方向,他们越来越关注战争与和平的问题。例如,2019-2024年一揽子绿色协议包括一系列重要的监管和负担分担决定,这些决定对当代人和子孙后代具有重大的再分配影响,是激烈政治冲突的主题。通过建立欧洲稳定机制和RRF以及正在进行的关于欧洲防务联合基金的讨论(Tamma et al., 2024),欧盟已经成为一个资源分配者,没有它,成员国政府越来越难以实现关键政策目标。我们认为,欧盟的制度政治已经以符合新的政府间主义预测的方式适应了这些变化。对于批评者来说,新的政府间主义淡化了欧盟委员会的权力,他们认为欧盟委员会是欧元危机的“意外赢家”(Bauer和Becker, 2014)。事后看来,声称欧盟委员会通过“六包”、“两包”和“财政契约”等改革赢得了重大新权力的说法有些言过其实。在这段动荡时期,欧盟出台了同样难以执行的财政规则,而且同样依赖于成员国政府整顿内部秩序的意愿。宏观经济失衡程序和欧洲学期确保了对各国经济政策的更细致的分析,但它们并没有从根本上改变各国政府与欧盟委员会之间的权力平衡。2024年3月实施的欧盟经济治理改革在这方面几乎没有起到什么作用。欧盟制度政治的一个关键特征是,行政权被三个机构——欧洲理事会(European Council)、欧盟理事会(Counc
{"title":"The New Intergovernmentalism 10 Years On","authors":"Dermot Hodson, Uwe Puetter","doi":"10.1111/jcms.13754","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13754","url":null,"abstract":"<p>By the beginning of the 2000s, integration theory had fallen out of favour as scholars turned to comparative politics and new governance to understand the European Union (EU) as a polity (Hix, <span>1998</span>, <span>1994</span>). This period was, in retrospect, one of relative confidence in the European project. A string of ‘no’ votes in referendums on EU policies and treaties, the rise of Eurosceptic challenger parties and the euro crisis shattered this confidence. As the Union's problems mounted, EU scholars were drawn once more to integration theory, with its concern for the EU's ontology and capacity for forward momentum. New intergovernmentalism was part of this new wave of theorising, along with post-functionalism and the core state powers approach (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, <span>2014</span>; Hooghe and Marks, <span>2009</span>).</p><p>In its original form, post-functionalism posited that public disquiet over the European project was discouraging EU policy-makers from taking major integrationist steps (Hooghe and Marks, <span>2009</span>). The core state powers approach sees such constraints as being overstated; mass publics in many member states do want the EU to play a greater role in defence, macroeconomic policy and public administration, it points out, even though these policies touch upon the primary responsibilities of states (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, <span>2018</span>). New intergovernmentalism sees the EU as pursuing deeper integration despite not because of public opinion (Bickerton et al., <span>2015b</span>). By avoiding the delegation of new powers to the European Commission, member states have sought to reduce the scope for a backlash from voters and Eurosceptics, but only partially so. The EU's principled opponents, thus, have been growing stronger rather than weaker, new intergovernmentalism contends.</p><p>Like all attempts at theory building, new intergovernmentalism faced its fair share of criticisms at first (Schimmelfennig, <span>2015</span>). Over time, however, a growing number of scholars responded to its call for further research on the changing dynamics of post-Maastricht integration. New intergovernmentalism has been applied to a wide range of policies, including asylum policy (Smeets and Zaun, <span>2021</span>), foreign and security policy (Morillas, <span>2020</span>), sanctions policy (Szép, <span>2020</span>), energy (Bocquillon and Maltby, <span>2020</span>), environmental policy (Catuti, <span>2022</span>) and competition policy (Bora and Schramm, <span>2024</span>), the legislative process (Bressanelli and Chelotti, <span>2016</span>) and the EU's rule of law crisis (Pavone, <span>2024</span>). New intergovernmentalism has been identified by Verdun (<span>2020</span>) as one of the three strands of intergovernmentalism and by Schmidt (<span>2024</span>) as driving a distinctive phase of integration theory.</p><p>This article takes stock of new intergovernmentalism 10 years after this approach was ","PeriodicalId":51369,"journal":{"name":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","volume":"63 S1","pages":"39-51"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jcms.13754","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145375146","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article reflects on the EU's thought and practice of democracy promotion in its Southern neighbourhood through a critical approach to allyship. This approach centres the demos', or Arab publics', yearnings for emancipation and their aspirations to dignified lives. The article proposes the notion of ‘liminal allyship’, neither taken for granted nor stable, but shaped by inequalities of power and resources within (post)colonial settings such as Tunisia. (Mis)matches between values and practices impact allyship even vis-à-vis a shared, declared goal like democratisation. To illustrate the argument empirically, the article will draw on interviews with Tunisian civil society activists and primary data from online and social media. The exploratory case study gauges Tunisian assessments of EU democracy promotion in times of a ‘democratic degeneration’ in Tunisia and of a geopolitical crisis between Europe and the Arab world triggered by the war in Gaza. Findings point to a possible turning point in this relationship of ‘liminal allyship’, which faces scepticism that is unprecedented since Tunisian democratisation took off in 2011.
{"title":"Towards a Critical Democracy Promotion Agenda? Liminal Allyship in EU–Tunisian Relations","authors":"Larbi Sadiki, Layla Saleh","doi":"10.1111/jcms.13756","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13756","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article reflects on the EU's thought and practice of democracy promotion in its Southern neighbourhood through a critical approach to allyship. This approach centres the demos', or Arab publics', yearnings for emancipation and their aspirations to dignified lives. The article proposes the notion of ‘liminal allyship’, neither taken for granted nor stable, but shaped by inequalities of power and resources within (post)colonial settings such as Tunisia. (Mis)matches between values and practices impact allyship even vis-à-vis a shared, declared goal like democratisation. To illustrate the argument empirically, the article will draw on interviews with Tunisian civil society activists and primary data from online and social media. The exploratory case study gauges Tunisian assessments of EU democracy promotion in times of a ‘democratic degeneration’ in Tunisia and of a geopolitical crisis between Europe and the Arab world triggered by the war in Gaza. Findings point to a possible turning point in this relationship of ‘liminal allyship’, which faces scepticism that is unprecedented since Tunisian democratisation took off in 2011.</p>","PeriodicalId":51369,"journal":{"name":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","volume":"63 5","pages":"1552-1570"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144897304","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article examines the role of ordoliberal ideas in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) reforms adopted during the Euro crisis. Drawing on discursive institutionalism and morphological analysis, the study employs process-tracing and discourse analysis to reconstruct the reform process. The analysis primarily focuses on the public discourses of German leaders and the documents of the Van Rompuy Task Force. The article argues that ordoliberal ideas played a crucial role in the formation of the German government's preferences regarding the EMU reforms. Their impact was more limited in the reform process, where other actors were involved and Germany had to accept compromises. As a result, the reforms were more flexible than Germany would have preferred. However, to the extent that the reforms align with Germany's approach based on fiscal discipline and national responsibility, they reflect an ordoliberal rationality. In this sense, the reforms contributed to the incorporation and strengthening (albeit partial and incomplete) of the ordoliberal principles of fiscal discipline, national responsibility, competitiveness and Ordnungspolitik within the EMU rules during the crisis. These are the constitutive principles of competitive federalism, a model of European integration in which the role of supranational institutions is to enforce a regulatory framework that, by reducing their discretion in fiscal and monetary policy, exposes member states to market pressure and prompts them to adopt neoliberal policies to remain competitive with each other.
{"title":"The Reforms of the Economic and Monetary Union During the Euro Crisis: The Ordoliberalisation of the European Economic Governance?","authors":"Federico Bruno","doi":"10.1111/jcms.13752","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13752","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article examines the role of ordoliberal ideas in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) reforms adopted during the Euro crisis. Drawing on discursive institutionalism and morphological analysis, the study employs process-tracing and discourse analysis to reconstruct the reform process. The analysis primarily focuses on the public discourses of German leaders and the documents of the Van Rompuy Task Force. The article argues that ordoliberal ideas played a crucial role in the formation of the German government's preferences regarding the EMU reforms. Their impact was more limited in the reform process, where other actors were involved and Germany had to accept compromises. As a result, the reforms were more flexible than Germany would have preferred. However, to the extent that the reforms align with Germany's approach based on fiscal discipline and national responsibility, they reflect an ordoliberal rationality. In this sense, the reforms contributed to the incorporation and strengthening (albeit partial and incomplete) of the ordoliberal principles of fiscal discipline, national responsibility, competitiveness and <i>Ordnungspolitik</i> within the EMU rules during the crisis. These are the constitutive principles of competitive federalism, a model of European integration in which the role of supranational institutions is to enforce a regulatory framework that, by reducing their discretion in fiscal and monetary policy, exposes member states to market pressure and prompts them to adopt neoliberal policies to remain competitive with each other.</p>","PeriodicalId":51369,"journal":{"name":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","volume":"64 1","pages":"171-193"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jcms.13752","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145652829","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study investigates under what conditions Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) emphasised relevant policy issues—economy, climate/environment and immigration—during the 2019 European Parliament election campaign. Building on research on issue salience in EP elections and based on the content published on X/Twitter by MEPs in the weeks preceding the election, the study identifies key drivers of issue attention. It shows that issue relevance in the domestic public agenda and individual issue expertise increase MEPs' attention to the three policy issues, whereas parties' stance on the sociocultural dimension only affects attention to climate/environment. The study contributes to research on issue salience in EP election campaigns and MEPs' communication on social media, highlighting the importance of adopting a cross-issue approach when studying European elections.
{"title":"Issue Salience in the European Parliament Election: An Analysis of Economic, Environmental and Immigration Issues on Social Media","authors":"Nuria Font","doi":"10.1111/jcms.13722","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13722","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study investigates under what conditions Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) emphasised relevant policy issues—economy, climate/environment and immigration—during the 2019 European Parliament election campaign. Building on research on issue salience in EP elections and based on the content published on X/Twitter by MEPs in the weeks preceding the election, the study identifies key drivers of issue attention. It shows that issue relevance in the domestic public agenda and individual issue expertise increase MEPs' attention to the three policy issues, whereas parties' stance on the sociocultural dimension only affects attention to climate/environment. The study contributes to research on issue salience in EP election campaigns and MEPs' communication on social media, highlighting the importance of adopting a cross-issue approach when studying European elections.</p>","PeriodicalId":51369,"journal":{"name":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","volume":"63 6","pages":"1931-1948"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jcms.13722","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145375145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The preservation of origin through the geographical indication (GI) scheme has evolved from an EU policy tool for high-quality agrifood products to an instrument of international governance, green transition and property rights competition. The new 2024 EU Law of GIs aims to strengthen the historical value of such a scheme and support its role in indirectly generating socio-economic spillovers at the territorial level. This article analyses the effects of GI EU policy on innovation in the agrifood technological fields at the municipality level over the 1991–2020 period in Italy. Whilst the EU scheme is preserving the essence of tradition, it may impede the adoption of innovative practices, which, according to the EU Green Deal, are considered crucial for bolstering competitiveness, sustainability and resilience. However, the linkage between products and the region of origin triggers a virtuous circle of informal inter-organisational collaborations and shared values that may spur innovations. Using propensity score matching and difference-in-differences models, we analyse how the acknowledgement of GIs impacts the agrifood innovation performance of Italian municipalities. The results show that GIs, thanks to their territorially sensitive nature, do not limit the innovation performance of territories, though there is no significant positive effect on it either. This helps avoid excessive scaremongering about the impact of tradition-oriented quality schemes on innovation. The place-based nature of policies can create favourable conditions that do not hinder innovation, despite their primary focus, even if more direct policy actions are needed.
{"title":"Spirit of Innovation or Historical Tradition? The Complex Dilemma of EU Policy for Renowned Products","authors":"Cristina Vaquero-Piñeiro, Eleonora Pierucci","doi":"10.1111/jcms.13739","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13739","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The preservation of origin through the geographical indication (GI) scheme has evolved from an EU policy tool for high-quality agrifood products to an instrument of international governance, green transition and property rights competition. The new 2024 EU Law of GIs aims to strengthen the historical value of such a scheme and support its role in indirectly generating socio-economic spillovers at the territorial level. This article analyses the effects of GI EU policy on innovation in the agrifood technological fields at the municipality level over the 1991–2020 period in Italy. Whilst the EU scheme is preserving the essence of tradition, it may impede the adoption of innovative practices, which, according to the EU Green Deal, are considered crucial for bolstering competitiveness, sustainability and resilience. However, the linkage between products and the region of origin triggers a virtuous circle of informal inter-organisational collaborations and shared values that may spur innovations. Using propensity score matching and difference-in-differences models, we analyse how the acknowledgement of GIs impacts the agrifood innovation performance of Italian municipalities. The results show that GIs, thanks to their territorially sensitive nature, do not limit the innovation performance of territories, though there is no significant positive effect on it either. This helps avoid excessive scaremongering about the impact of tradition-oriented quality schemes on innovation. The place-based nature of policies can create favourable conditions that do not hinder innovation, despite their primary focus, even if more direct policy actions are needed.</p>","PeriodicalId":51369,"journal":{"name":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","volume":"64 1","pages":"214-247"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145652508","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article examines the EU's current geopolitical turn: the push to have the EU embrace power politics and develop a ‘strategic autonomy’, both vis-à-vis global powers and its own ‘neighbourhood’. This turn is significant since it marks a shift away from what is said to be the post-cold war EU's liberal approach to world affairs. By openly embracing ‘hard power’, Brussels is also severing the continuity between the present rhetoric and its founding narrative about the EU as an anti-geopolitical peace project. In the first part, I argue that whilst the geopolitical turn has introduced a different rhetoric, this should not confuse analysts into believing that the post-cold war EU was short of a geopolitical agenda. In the second part, I discuss the EU's current geopolitical turn in the context of the colonial policy it pursued in the 1950s, when large parts of colonial Africa were annexed to the European Economic Community (EEC). Here, I argue that the obliviousness that impedes the knowledge of the EU's colonial origins helps explain why the geopolitical turn today is seen as novel and poles apart from the EU's approach to geopolitics in the 1950s. What appears to be a break with the past, then, is in fact a reunion with the past, in the sense that the current EU leaders' open embrace of geopolitics follows in the footsteps of the EU founders. In the conclusion, I relate this to a theoretical discussion concerning the EU's quest for ‘strategic autonomy’, which, arguably, constitutes the most defining aspect of the geopolitical turn.
{"title":"The Return of the Repressed: The Colonial History of the EU's Geopolitical Turn","authors":"Peo Hansen","doi":"10.1111/jcms.13757","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13757","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article examines the EU's current geopolitical turn: the push to have the EU embrace power politics and develop a ‘strategic autonomy’, both vis-à-vis global powers and its own ‘neighbourhood’. This turn is significant since it marks a shift away from what is said to be the post-cold war EU's liberal approach to world affairs. By openly embracing ‘hard power’, Brussels is also severing the continuity between the present rhetoric and its founding narrative about the EU as an anti-geopolitical peace project. In the first part, I argue that whilst the geopolitical turn has introduced a different rhetoric, this should not confuse analysts into believing that the post-cold war EU was short of a geopolitical agenda. In the second part, I discuss the EU's current geopolitical turn in the context of the colonial policy it pursued in the 1950s, when large parts of colonial Africa were annexed to the European Economic Community (EEC). Here, I argue that the obliviousness that impedes the knowledge of the EU's colonial origins helps explain why the geopolitical turn today is seen as novel and poles apart from the EU's approach to geopolitics in the 1950s. What appears to be a break with the past, then, is in fact a reunion with the past, in the sense that the current EU leaders' open embrace of geopolitics follows in the footsteps of the EU founders. In the conclusion, I relate this to a theoretical discussion concerning the EU's quest for ‘strategic autonomy’, which, arguably, constitutes the most defining aspect of the geopolitical turn.</p>","PeriodicalId":51369,"journal":{"name":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","volume":"63 5","pages":"1420-1437"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jcms.13757","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144897348","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}