European Journal of Political Economy最新文献

英文中文

Recovering history: Using the Nobel lectures to identify hidden women in economic thought 恢复历史：利用诺贝尔奖讲座找出隐藏在经济思想中的女性

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-06-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102703

Darwyyn Deyo

Women's historical contributions to the development of economic thought are often hidden or overlooked, demonstrating an example of the Matilda Effect. One way to identify more of these women is by identifying their work through the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences prize lectures. In this study, I identify citations in the prize lectures from 1969 to 2009, the year when Elinor Ostrom won the prize. These lectures represent a novel data source to identify a substantial sample of women in the history of economic thought. I identified 125 women as authors in 165 citations and 29 women as editors in 34 citations. In total, 163 unique women are acknowledged in 198 unique citations. I provide a descriptive analysis of scholars and citations, including publication type, longevity, and field. I also classify types of contributions within the discipline, from authorship, editorship, and manuscript support. I find that the Nobel lectures provide an important resource for identifying more women who made significant contributions to the development of economic thought, and I provide a public database that supports research on a credit attribution gap in the literature.

女性对经济思想发展的历史贡献往往被隐藏或忽视，这是“玛蒂尔达效应”的一个例子。了解更多女性的一个方法是通过瑞典央行经济科学奖的讲座来了解她们的工作。在这项研究中，我确定了1969年至2009年（埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆获奖的那一年）获奖演讲中的引文。这些讲座代表了一种新的数据来源，可以识别经济思想史上大量的女性样本。我发现165篇引文中有125名女性作者，34篇引文中有29名女性编辑。总共有163名独特的女性在198次独特的引用中得到认可。我提供了学者和引文的描述性分析，包括出版物类型，寿命和领域。我还对学科内的贡献类型进行分类，从作者、编辑和手稿支持。我发现，诺贝尔奖讲座为识别更多对经济思想发展做出重大贡献的女性提供了重要资源，我还提供了一个公共数据库，支持对文献中信用归属差距的研究。

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引用次数: 0

Make it burn? Wildfires, disaster aid and presidential approval 让它燃烧？野火、灾难援助和总统批准

IF 2.4 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-08-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102738

Michael Berlemann , Marina Eurich , Timur Eckmann

For governments, the occurrence of natural disasters creates the opportunity to demonstrate their willingness and competence in providing prompt and efficient disaster aid. A number of studies has investigated the political consequences of providing disaster aid by analyzing the effects of such aid on subsequent election results. However, the findings of these studies have not yielded a coherent picture. This paper makes a contribution to the existing literature by employing high-frequency (daily) survey data on presidential approval. The combination of this data with wildfire data and information on Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) aid approvals and denials reveals that Barack Obama gained in support among survey respondents for whom FEMA aid was approved by the president, while he was not punished for denials of FEMA assistance. We show that this effect is exclusively driven by respondents without party affiliation and that the effect is temporary.

对于政府来说，自然灾害的发生为他们提供了一个机会，可以展示他们提供及时有效的灾害援助的意愿和能力。一些研究通过分析这种援助对随后选举结果的影响，调查了提供灾害援助的政治后果。然而，这些研究的发现并没有产生一个连贯的画面。本文利用高频（每日）的总统支持率调查数据，对现有文献做出了贡献。这些数据与野火数据以及联邦紧急事务管理局（FEMA）批准和拒绝援助的信息相结合，显示巴拉克•奥巴马（Barack Obama）在联邦紧急事务管理局（FEMA）批准援助的受访者中获得了支持，同时他没有因为拒绝FEMA援助而受到惩罚。我们表明，这种影响完全是由没有党派关系的受访者驱动的，而且这种影响是暂时的。

引用次数: 0

Inequality, conspiracy theories, and redistribution 不平等、阴谋论和再分配

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-06-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102698

Daiki Kishishita

Despite a rapid increase in inequality, redistribution does not necessarily expand. I address this paradox by emphasizing a novel effect of inequality on the acceptance of conspiracy theories. For this purpose, I develop an electoral competition model in which voters are divided into rich and poor. Each voter weighs the desire to maintain their self-image against the need for accurate beliefs, leading to varied endorsements of conspiracy theories. In the model, greater inequality leads the poor to believe more strongly in conspiracy theories. As a result, poor voters can seek more reforms to defeat conspiracies and lower income taxation. I show that greater inequality paradoxically reduces income taxation when the initial inequality is high and the distortion of taxation is large. In the shadow of prevalent conspiracy theories, democracy may fail to act as a protector against rising inequality.

尽管不平等迅速加剧，但再分配并不一定会扩大。我通过强调不平等对阴谋论接受度的新影响来解决这个悖论。为此，我开发了一个选举竞争模型，其中选民分为富人和穷人。每位选民都在维护自我形象的愿望与对准确信念的需求之间进行权衡，导致对阴谋论的不同支持。在该模型中，更大的不平等导致穷人更强烈地相信阴谋论。因此，贫穷的选民可以寻求更多的改革来击败阴谋和降低所得税。我表明，当最初的不平等程度很高，税收扭曲程度很大时，更大的不平等矛盾地减少了所得税。在阴谋论盛行的阴影下，民主可能无法抵御日益加剧的不平等。

引用次数: 0

Strategic interdependence in sovereign lending 主权贷款中的战略相互依赖

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-07-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102715

Jonas B. Bunte , Brandon J. Kinne

Government-to-government loans are powerful instruments of influence, but how do creditor governments decide whom to lend to? We argue that these decisions are shaped by the lending behavior of third-party creditors, as governments strategically allocate loans to maximize their geopolitical influence. Specifically, creditors observe and respond to third-party lending patterns, using these signals to guide their own choices. Crucially, the identity of these third-party creditors matters: rather than engaging directly with rivals, creditors tend to specialize and cooperate within their partnerships. We introduce and empirically test network effects in sovereign lending, showing that lending follows a pattern of conditional preferential attachment. Creditors are more likely to extend loans to recipients supported by their political partners than to recipients supported by adversaries. Consequently, although lending competition is not easily visible in aggregate data, lending patterns reveal a fragmentation into politically aligned creditor blocs. Our inferential network models provide strong evidence of this dynamic, demonstrating that governments’ perceptions of a recipient’s strategic value are shaped by the actions of other lenders. By incorporating this strategic interdependence, our analysis significantly improves the prediction of which governments receive loans and from whom.

政府间贷款是强大的影响力工具，但债权国政府如何决定向谁放贷？我们认为，这些决策是由第三方债权人的贷款行为塑造的，因为政府战略性地分配贷款以最大化其地缘政治影响力。具体来说，债权人观察并回应第三方借贷模式，利用这些信号来指导自己的选择。至关重要的是，这些第三方债权人的身份很重要：与其直接与竞争对手打交道，债权人倾向于专业化，并在合作伙伴关系中进行合作。我们引入并实证检验了主权贷款中的网络效应，表明贷款遵循有条件的优先依附模式。债权人更有可能向其政治伙伴支持的接受国提供贷款，而不是向对手支持的接受国提供贷款。因此，尽管贷款竞争不容易从总体数据中看到，但贷款模式显示出政治上结盟的债权人集团的分裂。我们的推理网络模型为这一动态提供了强有力的证据，表明政府对接受国战略价值的看法是由其他贷款人的行为所塑造的。通过纳入这种战略上的相互依存关系，我们的分析大大改善了对哪些政府获得贷款以及从谁那里获得贷款的预测。

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引用次数: 0

Kicking the can down the road? A real-time data analysis of delayed fiscal consolidation 把问题拖到以后再说？延迟财政整顿的实时数据分析

IF 2.4 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-08-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102736

Bram Gootjes

Why do some countries act swiftly when confronted with fiscal unsustainability, while others delay action? This study investigates the inertia in correcting unsound fiscal policy within the European Union (EU) from 2002 to 2019, using real-time data drawn from annual policy reports of the European Commission (EC). The results show that, on average, EU countries take three years to formulate adjustment plans after their fiscal policies are marked as unsustainable by the EC. Key drivers of the timing of fiscal consolidation plans include the domestic output gap, elections, cabinet size, and the activation of an Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP). The analysis provides new evidence that the functioning of the EDP is heavily politicized: its influence tends to diminish during European election years, in countries with long-standing fiscal risks, in smaller EU countries, and where national governments lean more to the right relative to the European Parliament. Additional findings highlight that neglecting the need for fiscal consolidation may overlook key factors driving delays in such policies, potentially leading to misleading policy guidance.

为什么一些国家在面临财政不可持续性时迅速采取行动，而另一些国家却迟迟不行动？本研究使用欧盟委员会年度政策报告中的实时数据，调查了2002年至2019年欧盟（EU）内部纠正不健全财政政策的惯性。结果表明，欧盟国家在其财政政策被欧共体标记为不可持续后，平均需要三年时间来制定调整计划。财政整顿计划时机的关键驱动因素包括国内产出缺口、选举、内阁规模和过度赤字程序（EDP）的启动。该分析提供了新的证据，证明欧洲经济政策的运作严重政治化：在欧洲大选年，在存在长期财政风险的国家，在较小的欧盟国家，以及相对于欧洲议会，国家政府更倾向于右倾的国家，其影响力往往会减弱。其他研究结果强调，忽视财政整顿的必要性可能会忽视导致此类政策延迟的关键因素，从而可能导致误导性的政策指导。

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引用次数: 0

Short-term rental bans and the hotel industry: Evidence from New York city 短期租赁禁令和酒店业：来自纽约市的证据

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-07-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102725

Sebastian C. Anastasi , Alexander Marsella , Vitor Melo , E. Frank Stephenson , Gary A. Wagner

We examine the gains and involvement of the hotel industry in New York City’s short-term rental ban. Building on capture theory, we document that the hotel industry was better positioned to overcome collective action problems associated with lobbying and spent an order of magnitude more than home-sharing platforms like Airbnb in political contributions, particularly prior to the ban. We find that hotels’ average daily rates increased by $14 to 19 per night, depending on specification, and revenue increased by roughly $2.1 to 2.9 billion over the first eighteen months following the ban. By contrast, the effect on room nights is small and imprecisely estimated, so the revenue increase was mostly due to the increase in room rates.

我们研究了酒店业在纽约市短期租赁禁令中的收益和参与。基于捕获理论，我们证明酒店业更有能力克服与游说相关的集体行动问题，并且在政治捐款方面的花费比Airbnb等房屋共享平台高出一个数量级，尤其是在禁令出台之前。我们发现，在禁令实施后的前18个月里，酒店的平均每日房价每晚增加了14至19美元，具体取决于具体规格，收入增加了大约21至29亿美元。相比之下，对客房夜数的影响较小，估计也不准确，因此收入的增长主要是由于房价的上涨。

引用次数: 0

The effect of increased women's legislative representation on women's well-being 增加妇女立法代表对妇女福利的影响

IF 2.4 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-08-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102735

Robin Grier , Kevin Grier , Florence Muhoza

We analyze the causal effects of large and sustained increases in female legislative representation on several measures of women's well-being. Across all our outcome variables, we find no significant results. These null results continue to hold when we use different criteria for defining a significant increase or allow for differences in treatment effects based on the country's political regime. We conclude that, at least on average, this increased representation does not significantly increase measures of women's well-being.

我们分析了女性立法代表的大量持续增加对妇女福祉的若干措施的因果影响。在我们所有的结果变量中，我们没有发现显著的结果。当我们使用不同的标准来定义显著增加或考虑到基于国家政治制度的治疗效果差异时，这些无效结果继续成立。我们的结论是，至少在平均水平上，这种增加的代表性并没有显著提高妇女福祉的衡量标准。

引用次数: 0

In the grip of Whitehall? The effects of party control on local fiscal policy in England 在白厅的控制下？政党控制对英格兰地方财政政策的影响

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-06-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102697

Benjamin Lockwood , Francesco Porcelli , James Rockey

This paper uses an instrumental variable approach based on close elections to evaluate the effects of political parties on local fiscal policy in England from 1998 to 2015. Our main finding is that when we condition on the central government grant, political control of the council by Labour or Conservative parties has no effect on total service expenditure, the composition of that expenditure, and the property tax rate (council tax per band D property). We find the same null results for capital expenditure, debt, and authorized debt limits. Using data on the distribution of income within local authorities, we find no evidence that this null result is being driven by homogeneous electorates rather than fiscal constraints. Thus, our results confirm the widely expressed belief that centrally imposed constraints on local government fiscal policy (rate-capping, and more recently, compulsory referenda, and the Prudential Code for borrowing) hold local government fiscal policy in a tight grip.

本文采用基于相近选举的工具变量方法评估了1998 - 2015年英国政党对地方财政政策的影响。我们的主要发现是，当我们以中央政府拨款为条件时，工党或保守党对市政委员会的政治控制对总服务支出、支出构成和房产税率（每D级房产的市政税）没有影响。对于资本支出、债务和授权债务限额，我们发现相同的无效结果。利用地方政府内部收入分配的数据，我们发现没有证据表明这一无效结果是由同质选民而不是财政约束驱动的。因此，我们的研究结果证实了一种广泛表达的观点，即中央对地方政府财政政策施加的限制（利率上限，以及最近的强制性全民公决和审慎借贷准则）使地方政府财政政策受到严格控制。

引用次数: 0

Do appointing institutions influence monetary policy? Evidence from voting patterns in the Polish Monetary Policy Council 任命机构会影响货币政策吗？来自波兰货币政策委员会投票模式的证据

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-07-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102721

Jan Fałkowski, Jacek Lewkowicz, Łukasz Hardt, Bartosz Słysz

The main aim of the study is to analyse the extent to which the monetary-policy views of the Monetary Policy Council (MPC) members vary along institutional channels of appointment. To this end, we investigate the voting records of the Polish MPC over the period 1998–2022, taking advantage of the fact that in Poland all MPC members, except the chairman, are appointed in equal numbers by the President and the two houses of parliament (the Sejm and the Senate). We document that members appointed by the same institution are more likely to vote in the same way, than those appointed by different institutions. This pattern indicates that the appointing institution plays a role in shaping voting behaviour. In line with this, our results suggest that having separate appointing institutions promotes a diversity of views regarding the optimal level of interest rates. Appointees of the Sejm emerge as the most dovish and relatively often contribute to the winning coalition in close vote tallies.

这项研究的主要目的是分析货币政策委员会（MPC）成员的货币政策观点在多大程度上随着任命的制度渠道而变化。为此，我们调查了波兰货币政策委员会在1998年至2022年期间的投票记录，利用了波兰所有货币政策委员会成员（主席除外）由总统和议会两院（众议院和参议院）任命的事实。我们记录了由同一机构任命的成员比由不同机构任命的成员更有可能以相同的方式投票。这种模式表明，任命机构在塑造投票行为方面发挥了作用。与此相一致的是，我们的研究结果表明，单独的任命机构促进了对最佳利率水平的不同看法。被任命的众议院议员是最温和的，在票数接近的情况下，他们往往会为获胜的联盟做出贡献。

引用次数: 0

Approval vs. participation quorums 批准与参与法定人数

IF 2.4 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-08-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102747

Dmitriy Vorobyev , Azamat Valei , Andrei Matveenko

Using a pivotal costly voting model, we analyze how participation and approval quorum requirements, applied separately or jointly, affect turnout, election outcomes, and welfare. To characterize an optimal quorum rule, we first show that equally strict participation and approval quorums often yield similar outcomes, unless the two settings result in equilibria that differ in terms of whether voters can coordinate on participation. Second, any combination of quorum types can be replaced by either an approval or participation quorum alone, with negligible or no impact on equilibrium. Using these results, we suggest that to maximize turnout, no quorum is optimal unless low status quo support is expected, in which case a strict approval quorum is preferred. To increase the status quo’s chances of winning, a strict approval quorum or no quorum works best. From a voter welfare perspective, an approval quorum near half the electorate or no quorum at all are reasonable choices. These results hold whether we use Bayesian Nash equilibrium or quantal response equilibrium as the solution concept.

使用关键的昂贵投票模型，我们分析了参与和批准法定人数要求（分别或联合应用）如何影响投票率、选举结果和福利。为了描述最优法定人数规则，我们首先表明，同等严格的参与和批准法定人数通常会产生相似的结果，除非这两种设置导致在选民是否可以协调参与方面不同的均衡。其次，任何仲裁类型的组合都可以被单独的批准或参与仲裁所取代，对平衡的影响可以忽略不计或没有影响。利用这些结果，我们建议，为了使投票率最大化，没有法定人数是最优的，除非预期的低现状支持，在这种情况下，严格的批准法定人数是首选。为了增加维持现状获胜的机会，严格的批准法定人数或没有法定人数是最好的办法。从选民福利的角度来看，投票法定人数接近一半或根本没有法定人数都是合理的选择。这些结果无论我们使用贝叶斯纳什均衡还是量子响应均衡作为解决概念都是成立的。

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全部 ACS Publications Elsevier ieeexplore Springer The Royal Society of Chemistry Wiley

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