Pub Date : 2025-08-04DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102726
Xiangyu Shi
In this paper, I argue that national leaders and institutions jointly determine cross-country income differences. I document two novel cross-country stylized facts: (1) national leaders in democracies have more pre-tenure work experience, a novel measure of leaders’ capabilities, than those in non-democracies, and (2) leaders with more diverse work experience lead to better economic performance in democracies and to higher regime stability in non-democracies. I establish robustness by several instrumental variable approaches, a regression discontinuity design based on close elections, and (quasi-)random leadership transitions. I build an endogenous growth model with political selection and institutional transitions to rationalize these facts. Quantitative exercises based on this model suggest that the differences in the channel of political selection and in the role of leaders can explain the persistent income gap between democracies and non-democracies.
{"title":"Leaders and institutions as joint determinants of economic growth","authors":"Xiangyu Shi","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102726","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102726","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In this paper, I argue that national leaders and institutions jointly determine cross-country income differences. I document two novel cross-country stylized facts: (1) national leaders in democracies have more pre-tenure work experience, a novel measure of leaders’ capabilities, than those in non-democracies, and (2) leaders with more diverse work experience lead to better economic performance in democracies and to higher regime stability in non-democracies. I establish robustness by several instrumental variable approaches, a regression discontinuity design based on close elections, and (quasi-)random leadership transitions. I build an endogenous growth model with political selection and institutional transitions to rationalize these facts. Quantitative exercises based on this model suggest that the differences in the channel of political selection and in the role of leaders can explain the persistent income gap between democracies and non-democracies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102726"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144766673","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-07-22DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102728
Hoyong Jung
This study examines the relationship between fiscal rules, populist leadership, and central bank independence. It posits that populist leaders, driven by the desire to stimulate economic activity and gain public approval through short-term expansionary policies, are more inclined to undermine central bank independence when they are constrained by fiscal rules. The findings reveal that fiscal constraints significantly increase the likelihood of weakened central bank independence under populist leadership, a result that remains robust across various model specifications. These effects are particularly pronounced in political contexts where populist leaders exert greater authority and encounter stronger incentives to prioritize monetary policy over fiscal measures. Moreover, the adverse impact on central bank independence is exacerbated when fiscal rules impose stricter constraints on short-term expenditures, with reduced independence primarily reflected in shifts in central bank policies. These results highlight the importance of political dynamics in fiscal and monetary institutions and emphasize the need for complementary measures to stabilize macroeconomic conditions through coordinated fiscal rules and central bank independence.
{"title":"Central bank independence and fiscal rule under populist leader's regime","authors":"Hoyong Jung","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102728","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102728","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines the relationship between fiscal rules, populist leadership, and central bank independence. It posits that populist leaders, driven by the desire to stimulate economic activity and gain public approval through short-term expansionary policies, are more inclined to undermine central bank independence when they are constrained by fiscal rules. The findings reveal that fiscal constraints significantly increase the likelihood of weakened central bank independence under populist leadership, a result that remains robust across various model specifications. These effects are particularly pronounced in political contexts where populist leaders exert greater authority and encounter stronger incentives to prioritize monetary policy over fiscal measures. Moreover, the adverse impact on central bank independence is exacerbated when fiscal rules impose stricter constraints on short-term expenditures, with reduced independence primarily reflected in shifts in central bank policies. These results highlight the importance of political dynamics in fiscal and monetary institutions and emphasize the need for complementary measures to stabilize macroeconomic conditions through coordinated fiscal rules and central bank independence.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102728"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144680360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-07-21DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102725
Sebastian C. Anastasi , Alexander Marsella , Vitor Melo , E. Frank Stephenson , Gary A. Wagner
We examine the gains and involvement of the hotel industry in New York City’s short-term rental ban. Building on capture theory, we document that the hotel industry was better positioned to overcome collective action problems associated with lobbying and spent an order of magnitude more than home-sharing platforms like Airbnb in political contributions, particularly prior to the ban. We find that hotels’ average daily rates increased by $14 to 19 per night, depending on specification, and revenue increased by roughly $2.1 to 2.9 billion over the first eighteen months following the ban. By contrast, the effect on room nights is small and imprecisely estimated, so the revenue increase was mostly due to the increase in room rates.
{"title":"Short-term rental bans and the hotel industry: Evidence from New York city","authors":"Sebastian C. Anastasi , Alexander Marsella , Vitor Melo , E. Frank Stephenson , Gary A. Wagner","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102725","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102725","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine the gains and involvement of the hotel industry in New York City’s short-term rental ban. Building on capture theory, we document that the hotel industry was better positioned to overcome collective action problems associated with lobbying and spent an order of magnitude more than home-sharing platforms like Airbnb in political contributions, particularly prior to the ban. We find that hotels’ average daily rates increased by $14 to 19 per night, depending on specification, and revenue increased by roughly $2.1 to 2.9 billion over the first eighteen months following the ban. By contrast, the effect on room nights is small and imprecisely estimated, so the revenue increase was mostly due to the increase in room rates.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102725"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144713018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-07-21DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102731
Martin Paldam
The democratic transition is a strong relation in the data, as analyzed elsewhere. This paper deals with the only large exception: The 26 countries in the OPEC/MENA/Arab nexus have no democratic transition. The explanation is complex as it requires (at least) two intertwined theories: The oil theory (for OPEC) and the institutional genes theory (for MENA). More than half of the OPEC and MENA groups overlap, and in addition all but two of the MENA countries are Arab, with similar language, religion, history, and culture, giving spatial effects. The paper is an attempt to untangle and test the theories, and demonstrate that both theories are needed, hence the overlapping countries that are both OPEC and MENA are especially far from democracy.
{"title":"The OPEC/MENA/Arab nexus and the missing democratic transition","authors":"Martin Paldam","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102731","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102731","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The democratic transition is a strong relation in the data, as analyzed elsewhere. This paper deals with the only large exception: The 26 countries in the OPEC/MENA/Arab nexus have no democratic transition. The explanation is complex as it requires (at least) two intertwined theories: The <em>oil theory</em> (for OPEC) and the <em>institutional genes theory</em> (for MENA). More than half of the OPEC and MENA groups overlap, and in addition all but two of the MENA countries are Arab, with similar language, religion, history, and culture, giving spatial effects. The paper is an attempt to untangle and test the theories, and demonstrate that both theories are needed, hence the overlapping countries that are both OPEC and MENA are especially far from democracy.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"90 ","pages":"Article 102731"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145109719","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-07-17DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102724
Yizhaq Minchuk , Ohad Raveh
We study the role of term limits in reducing sabotage in political contests, vis-à-vis negative campaigning in gubernatorial races. A model of political contests, with endogenous sabotage and asymmetries in electoral support and future terms, indicates that the (aggregate) extent of sabotage may decline when incumbents are term-limited (lame-ducks). We validate this using close to 7 million political TV ads from U.S. gubernatorial elections (2000–2020) while leveraging plausibly exogenous variations across space and time in state term-limit regimes. Results show that campaigning is substantially less negative when incumbents are term-limited: having a lame-duck incumbent in the race decreases campaign negativity by approximately one standard deviation. The results shed light on the potential role of term limits in reducing the extent of sabotage in political contests, as well as on hitherto overlooked political externalities of reelection prospects.
{"title":"Can term limits reduce political sabotage? Evidence from negative campaigning in gubernatorial races","authors":"Yizhaq Minchuk , Ohad Raveh","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102724","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102724","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the role of term limits in reducing sabotage in political contests, vis-à-vis negative campaigning in gubernatorial races. A model of political contests, with endogenous sabotage and asymmetries in electoral support and future terms, indicates that the (aggregate) extent of sabotage may decline when incumbents are term-limited (lame-ducks). We validate this using close to 7 million political TV ads from U.S. gubernatorial elections (2000–2020) while leveraging plausibly exogenous variations across space and time in state term-limit regimes. Results show that campaigning is substantially less negative when incumbents are term-limited: having a lame-duck incumbent in the race decreases campaign negativity by approximately one standard deviation. The results shed light on the potential role of term limits in reducing the extent of sabotage in political contests, as well as on hitherto overlooked political externalities of reelection prospects.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102724"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144680361","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-07-11DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102719
David Piazolo
This paper theoretically investigates the strategic implications of varying reliability of bargaining partners under unanimous and non-unanimous voting. In a sequential two-period model, three players (one proposer, two responders) bargain over the distribution of a pie. One responder has private information about his valuation of finding an agreement, implying signaling values that differ substantially between voting rules and are affected by the other responder’s reliability. The other responder is of a non-strategic “robot” type, who is unreliable in the sense that in the first period, he may vote “no” after announcing a “yes”-vote. Under unanimity rule, the responder with private information benefits from voting “no” because this signals that he requires a larger compensation in a future period. In contrast, under majority rule, voting “no” is unattractive due to the fear of being excluded from a future coalition. Under both voting rules, one responder becoming less reliable negatively affects the other responder’s willingness to vote “yes”, making efficient agreements increasingly difficult to achieve. Under majority rule, the presence of unreliable parties can lead to more parties being included in the winning coalition, as demonstrated by an extension of the model. However, some of these insights are contingent on the specific assumptions of the model.
{"title":"The “German Vote” and its consequences: (Un)reliable parties in multilateral bargaining under private information","authors":"David Piazolo","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102719","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102719","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper theoretically investigates the strategic implications of varying <em>reliability</em> of bargaining partners under unanimous and non-unanimous voting. In a sequential two-period model, three players (one proposer, two responders) bargain over the distribution of a pie. One responder has private information about his valuation of finding an agreement, implying signaling values that differ substantially between voting rules and are affected by the other responder’s <em>reliability</em>. The other responder is of a non-strategic “robot” type, who is unreliable in the sense that in the first period, he may vote “no” after announcing a “yes”-vote. Under unanimity rule, the responder with private information benefits from voting “no” because this signals that he requires a larger compensation in a future period. In contrast, under majority rule, voting “no” is unattractive due to the <em>fear of being excluded</em> from a future coalition. Under both voting rules, one responder becoming less reliable negatively affects the other responder’s willingness to vote “yes”, making efficient agreements increasingly difficult to achieve. Under majority rule, the presence of unreliable parties can lead to more parties being included in the winning coalition, as demonstrated by an extension of the model. However, some of these insights are contingent on the specific assumptions of the model.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102719"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144605727","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-07-08DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102704
Armando N.G.L. Martins
This article analyzes the long-term effects of authoritarian repression on democratic engagement (protests and voting) in Chile, focusing on the 2019–2020 Estallido Social protests and the 2020–2023 constitutional plebiscite process. It uses measures such as the location of military bases before 1970 and the number of victims during Pinochet’s regime to capture the intensity of past repression. The study also examines indicators of contemporary political behavior linked to the legacy of this repression, including public demonstrations, NGO activity, memorial sites, and social media engagement. Two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates suggest that exposure to political violence continues to shape civic and electoral behavior even after three decades after the end of the dictatorship. Moreover, municipalities more affected by dictatorship-era violence were more likely to protest but less likely to participate in the constitutional plebiscite. These areas did not consistently oppose incumbent politicians or favor independent candidates. Overall, the findings suggest that historical repression can contribute to greater reaction on the streets to political violence and lower levels of electoral engagement in contemporary democracies.
{"title":"Democratic engagement in the shadow of authoritarian repression: Evidence from Chile (2019–2023)","authors":"Armando N.G.L. Martins","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102704","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102704","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This article analyzes the long-term effects of authoritarian repression on democratic engagement (protests and voting) in Chile, focusing on the 2019–2020 <em>Estallido Social</em> protests and the 2020–2023 constitutional plebiscite process. It uses measures such as the location of military bases before 1970 and the number of victims during Pinochet’s regime to capture the intensity of past repression. The study also examines indicators of contemporary political behavior linked to the legacy of this repression, including public demonstrations, NGO activity, memorial sites, and social media engagement. Two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates suggest that exposure to political violence continues to shape civic and electoral behavior even after three decades after the end of the dictatorship. Moreover, municipalities more affected by dictatorship-era violence were more likely to protest but less likely to participate in the constitutional plebiscite. These areas did not consistently oppose incumbent politicians or favor independent candidates. Overall, the findings suggest that historical repression can contribute to greater reaction on the streets to political violence and lower levels of electoral engagement in contemporary democracies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102704"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144597521","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-07-02DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102715
Jonas B. Bunte , Brandon J. Kinne
Government-to-government loans are powerful instruments of influence, but how do creditor governments decide whom to lend to? We argue that these decisions are shaped by the lending behavior of third-party creditors, as governments strategically allocate loans to maximize their geopolitical influence. Specifically, creditors observe and respond to third-party lending patterns, using these signals to guide their own choices. Crucially, the identity of these third-party creditors matters: rather than engaging directly with rivals, creditors tend to specialize and cooperate within their partnerships. We introduce and empirically test network effects in sovereign lending, showing that lending follows a pattern of conditional preferential attachment. Creditors are more likely to extend loans to recipients supported by their political partners than to recipients supported by adversaries. Consequently, although lending competition is not easily visible in aggregate data, lending patterns reveal a fragmentation into politically aligned creditor blocs. Our inferential network models provide strong evidence of this dynamic, demonstrating that governments’ perceptions of a recipient’s strategic value are shaped by the actions of other lenders. By incorporating this strategic interdependence, our analysis significantly improves the prediction of which governments receive loans and from whom.
{"title":"Strategic interdependence in sovereign lending","authors":"Jonas B. Bunte , Brandon J. Kinne","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102715","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102715","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Government-to-government loans are powerful instruments of influence, but how do creditor governments decide whom to lend to? We argue that these decisions are shaped by the lending behavior of third-party creditors, as governments strategically allocate loans to maximize their geopolitical influence. Specifically, creditors observe and respond to third-party lending patterns, using these signals to guide their own choices. Crucially, the identity of these third-party creditors matters: rather than engaging directly with rivals, creditors tend to specialize and cooperate within their partnerships. We introduce and empirically test network effects in sovereign lending, showing that lending follows a pattern of conditional preferential attachment. Creditors are more likely to extend loans to recipients supported by their political partners than to recipients supported by adversaries. Consequently, although lending competition is not easily visible in aggregate data, lending patterns reveal a fragmentation into politically aligned creditor blocs. Our inferential network models provide strong evidence of this dynamic, demonstrating that governments’ perceptions of a recipient’s strategic value are shaped by the actions of other lenders. By incorporating this strategic interdependence, our analysis significantly improves the prediction of which governments receive loans and from whom.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102715"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144522844","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-07-02DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102721
Jan Fałkowski, Jacek Lewkowicz, Łukasz Hardt, Bartosz Słysz
The main aim of the study is to analyse the extent to which the monetary-policy views of the Monetary Policy Council (MPC) members vary along institutional channels of appointment. To this end, we investigate the voting records of the Polish MPC over the period 1998–2022, taking advantage of the fact that in Poland all MPC members, except the chairman, are appointed in equal numbers by the President and the two houses of parliament (the Sejm and the Senate). We document that members appointed by the same institution are more likely to vote in the same way, than those appointed by different institutions. This pattern indicates that the appointing institution plays a role in shaping voting behaviour. In line with this, our results suggest that having separate appointing institutions promotes a diversity of views regarding the optimal level of interest rates. Appointees of the Sejm emerge as the most dovish and relatively often contribute to the winning coalition in close vote tallies.
{"title":"Do appointing institutions influence monetary policy? Evidence from voting patterns in the Polish Monetary Policy Council","authors":"Jan Fałkowski, Jacek Lewkowicz, Łukasz Hardt, Bartosz Słysz","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102721","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102721","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The main aim of the study is to analyse the extent to which the monetary-policy views of the Monetary Policy Council (MPC) members vary along institutional channels of appointment. To this end, we investigate the voting records of the Polish MPC over the period 1998–2022, taking advantage of the fact that in Poland all MPC members, except the chairman, are appointed in equal numbers by the President and the two houses of parliament (the Sejm and the Senate). We document that members appointed by the same institution are more likely to vote in the same way, than those appointed by different institutions. This pattern indicates that the appointing institution plays a role in shaping voting behaviour. In line with this, our results suggest that having separate appointing institutions promotes a diversity of views regarding the optimal level of interest rates. Appointees of the Sejm emerge as the most dovish and relatively often contribute to the winning coalition in close vote tallies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102721"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144522845","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study examines the effect of COVID-19 vaccination on political support by leveraging Japan’s age-based vaccination rollout, which prioritized people aged 65 and older. Using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, we found that vaccination increased favorable opinions of vaccination progress and infection control measures by 27.4% and 14.7%, respectively. These favorable opinions extended to positive perceptions of other infection control measures, ultimately fostering trust in the government. In addition, the effect of vaccination was heterogeneous: it was more pronounced among individuals with chronic diseases, women, those of lower socioeconomic status, and those with higher levels of interpersonal trust. In contrast, low trusters became more dissatisfied with how the Tokyo Olympics and Paralympics in 2021 were managed, without showing an increase in positive opinions of the government.
{"title":"Public investment on health and voter responses: Evidence from the mass vaccination during COVID-19","authors":"Masaki Takahashi , Reo Takaku , Toyo Ashida , Yoko Ibuka","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102718","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102718","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines the effect of COVID-19 vaccination on political support by leveraging Japan’s age-based vaccination rollout, which prioritized people aged 65 and older. Using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, we found that vaccination increased favorable opinions of vaccination progress and infection control measures by 27.4% and 14.7%, respectively. These favorable opinions extended to positive perceptions of other infection control measures, ultimately fostering trust in the government. In addition, the effect of vaccination was heterogeneous: it was more pronounced among individuals with chronic diseases, women, those of lower socioeconomic status, and those with higher levels of interpersonal trust. In contrast, low trusters became more dissatisfied with how the Tokyo Olympics and Paralympics in 2021 were managed, without showing an increase in positive opinions of the government.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102718"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144571235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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