European Journal of Political Economy最新文献

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Kicking the can down the road? A real-time data analysis of delayed fiscal consolidation 把问题拖到以后再说？延迟财政整顿的实时数据分析

IF 2.4 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-08-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102736

Bram Gootjes

Why do some countries act swiftly when confronted with fiscal unsustainability, while others delay action? This study investigates the inertia in correcting unsound fiscal policy within the European Union (EU) from 2002 to 2019, using real-time data drawn from annual policy reports of the European Commission (EC). The results show that, on average, EU countries take three years to formulate adjustment plans after their fiscal policies are marked as unsustainable by the EC. Key drivers of the timing of fiscal consolidation plans include the domestic output gap, elections, cabinet size, and the activation of an Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP). The analysis provides new evidence that the functioning of the EDP is heavily politicized: its influence tends to diminish during European election years, in countries with long-standing fiscal risks, in smaller EU countries, and where national governments lean more to the right relative to the European Parliament. Additional findings highlight that neglecting the need for fiscal consolidation may overlook key factors driving delays in such policies, potentially leading to misleading policy guidance.

为什么一些国家在面临财政不可持续性时迅速采取行动，而另一些国家却迟迟不行动？本研究使用欧盟委员会年度政策报告中的实时数据，调查了2002年至2019年欧盟（EU）内部纠正不健全财政政策的惯性。结果表明，欧盟国家在其财政政策被欧共体标记为不可持续后，平均需要三年时间来制定调整计划。财政整顿计划时机的关键驱动因素包括国内产出缺口、选举、内阁规模和过度赤字程序（EDP）的启动。该分析提供了新的证据，证明欧洲经济政策的运作严重政治化：在欧洲大选年，在存在长期财政风险的国家，在较小的欧盟国家，以及相对于欧洲议会，国家政府更倾向于右倾的国家，其影响力往往会减弱。其他研究结果强调，忽视财政整顿的必要性可能会忽视导致此类政策延迟的关键因素，从而可能导致误导性的政策指导。

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引用次数: 0

Political connections and participation in global value chains: Evidence from MENA firms 政治关系和参与全球价值链：来自中东和北非地区公司的证据

IF 2.4 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-08-07 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102742

Nora Aboushady , Chahir Zaki

We use new data on political connections from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys to examine the impact of connections on firms' participation in international trade through global value chains (GVCs) for six lower middle income MENA countries and territories (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, the West Bank and Gaza, Jordan, and Lebanon). Our findings add to the literature on “hidden protection” and corruption in the region: trade- and investment policies and regulations are tailored to benefit or protect politically connected firms. Our findings suggest that politically connected firms are more likely to participate in GVCs by 9.8 percentage points and that the intensity of their participation in GVCs increases by 4.1 percentage points. Combining political connections and grand corruption increases firms' participation in GVCs by 13.6 percentage points.

我们利用世界银行《企业调查》中有关政治关系的新数据，研究了中东和北非六个中低收入国家和地区（摩洛哥、突尼斯、埃及、西岸和加沙、约旦和黎巴嫩）的政治关系对企业通过全球价值链参与国际贸易的影响。我们的发现为有关该地区“隐性保护”和腐败的文献提供了补充：贸易和投资政策和法规是为有利于或保护有政治关系的公司而量身定制的。我们的研究结果表明，有政治关系的企业参与全球价值链的可能性增加了9.8个百分点，参与全球价值链的强度增加了4.1个百分点。结合政治关系和大规模腐败，企业参与全球价值链的比例提高了13.6个百分点。

引用次数: 0

Greasing or Grinding? Regulatory context and the productivity effects of corruption: Evidence from Vietnamese SMEs 上油还是研磨？监管环境和腐败对生产率的影响：来自越南中小企业的证据

IF 2.4 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-08-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102727

Chiara Tomasi , Quoc Thai Le , Thi Ngoc Lan Nguyen

This paper investigates the heterogeneous effects of bribery on the productivity of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Vietnam. Using panel data from the Vietnam Small and Medium Enterprise Survey (VSMES) and an instrumental variable approach to address endogeneity, we find that corruption generally reduces firm productivity. However, its impact varies across institutional contexts: the negative effect is stronger in provinces with efficient regulatory environments and weaker where firms face high bureaucratic burdens or identify government inefficiency as a key constraint. These findings support a weak form of the “grease the wheels” hypothesis, suggesting bribery may act as a costly coping strategy in poorly governed settings. The results highlight the importance of regulatory quality in moderating the effects of corruption and point to the need for reforms that address both corruption and bureaucratic inefficiencies.

本文研究了贿赂对越南中小企业生产率的异质性影响。利用越南中小企业调查（VSMES）的面板数据和工具变量方法来解决内生性问题，我们发现腐败通常会降低企业生产率。然而，其影响因制度背景而异：在监管环境有效的省份，负面影响更强，而在企业面临高额官僚负担或将政府效率低下视为关键制约因素的省份，负面影响较弱。这些发现支持了一种弱形式的“润滑车轮”假说，即在治理不善的环境中，贿赂可能是一种代价高昂的应对策略。研究结果强调了监管质量在缓和腐败影响方面的重要性，并指出需要进行改革，以解决腐败和官僚效率低下的问题。

引用次数: 0

The effect of increased women's legislative representation on women's well-being 增加妇女立法代表对妇女福利的影响

IF 2.4 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-08-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102735

Robin Grier , Kevin Grier , Florence Muhoza

We analyze the causal effects of large and sustained increases in female legislative representation on several measures of women's well-being. Across all our outcome variables, we find no significant results. These null results continue to hold when we use different criteria for defining a significant increase or allow for differences in treatment effects based on the country's political regime. We conclude that, at least on average, this increased representation does not significantly increase measures of women's well-being.

我们分析了女性立法代表的大量持续增加对妇女福祉的若干措施的因果影响。在我们所有的结果变量中，我们没有发现显著的结果。当我们使用不同的标准来定义显著增加或考虑到基于国家政治制度的治疗效果差异时，这些无效结果继续成立。我们的结论是，至少在平均水平上，这种增加的代表性并没有显著提高妇女福祉的衡量标准。

引用次数: 0

Leaders and institutions as joint determinants of economic growth 领导人和制度是经济增长的共同决定因素

IF 2.4 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-08-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102726

Xiangyu Shi

In this paper, I argue that national leaders and institutions jointly determine cross-country income differences. I document two novel cross-country stylized facts: (1) national leaders in democracies have more pre-tenure work experience, a novel measure of leaders’ capabilities, than those in non-democracies, and (2) leaders with more diverse work experience lead to better economic performance in democracies and to higher regime stability in non-democracies. I establish robustness by several instrumental variable approaches, a regression discontinuity design based on close elections, and (quasi-)random leadership transitions. I build an endogenous growth model with political selection and institutional transitions to rationalize these facts. Quantitative exercises based on this model suggest that the differences in the channel of political selection and in the role of leaders can explain the persistent income gap between democracies and non-democracies.

在本文中，我认为国家领导人和机构共同决定了跨国收入差异。我记录了两个新的跨国风格化事实：(1)民主国家的国家领导人比非民主国家的领导人有更多的任职前工作经验，这是衡量领导人能力的一种新方法；(2)工作经验更多样化的领导人在民主国家有更好的经济表现，在非民主国家有更高的政权稳定性。我通过几种工具变量方法建立了稳健性，基于接近选举的回归不连续设计，以及（准）随机领导过渡。我建立了一个包含政治选择和制度变迁的内生增长模型来合理化这些事实。基于该模型的定量练习表明，政治选择渠道和领导人角色的差异可以解释民主国家和非民主国家之间持续存在的收入差距。

引用次数: 0

Central bank independence and fiscal rule under populist leader's regime 民粹主义领导人政权下的央行独立性和财政统治

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-07-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102728

Hoyong Jung

This study examines the relationship between fiscal rules, populist leadership, and central bank independence. It posits that populist leaders, driven by the desire to stimulate economic activity and gain public approval through short-term expansionary policies, are more inclined to undermine central bank independence when they are constrained by fiscal rules. The findings reveal that fiscal constraints significantly increase the likelihood of weakened central bank independence under populist leadership, a result that remains robust across various model specifications. These effects are particularly pronounced in political contexts where populist leaders exert greater authority and encounter stronger incentives to prioritize monetary policy over fiscal measures. Moreover, the adverse impact on central bank independence is exacerbated when fiscal rules impose stricter constraints on short-term expenditures, with reduced independence primarily reflected in shifts in central bank policies. These results highlight the importance of political dynamics in fiscal and monetary institutions and emphasize the need for complementary measures to stabilize macroeconomic conditions through coordinated fiscal rules and central bank independence.

本研究考察了财政规则、民粹主义领导和央行独立性之间的关系。它认为，受刺激经济活动、通过短期扩张性政策获得公众认可的愿望驱动的民粹主义领导人，在受到财政规则约束时，更倾向于破坏央行的独立性。研究结果显示，财政约束显著增加了民粹主义领导下央行独立性被削弱的可能性，这一结果在各种模型规格中都保持强劲。这些影响在民粹主义领导人拥有更大权威的政治背景下尤其明显，因为他们有更强的动机将货币政策置于财政措施之上。此外，当财政规则对短期支出施加更严格的限制时，对央行独立性的不利影响就会加剧，独立性的降低主要反映在央行政策的变化上。这些结果突出了财政和货币机构中政治动态的重要性，并强调需要采取补充措施，通过协调财政规则和中央银行独立性来稳定宏观经济状况。

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引用次数: 0

Short-term rental bans and the hotel industry: Evidence from New York city 短期租赁禁令和酒店业：来自纽约市的证据

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-07-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102725

Sebastian C. Anastasi , Alexander Marsella , Vitor Melo , E. Frank Stephenson , Gary A. Wagner

We examine the gains and involvement of the hotel industry in New York City’s short-term rental ban. Building on capture theory, we document that the hotel industry was better positioned to overcome collective action problems associated with lobbying and spent an order of magnitude more than home-sharing platforms like Airbnb in political contributions, particularly prior to the ban. We find that hotels’ average daily rates increased by $14 to 19 per night, depending on specification, and revenue increased by roughly $2.1 to 2.9 billion over the first eighteen months following the ban. By contrast, the effect on room nights is small and imprecisely estimated, so the revenue increase was mostly due to the increase in room rates.

我们研究了酒店业在纽约市短期租赁禁令中的收益和参与。基于捕获理论，我们证明酒店业更有能力克服与游说相关的集体行动问题，并且在政治捐款方面的花费比Airbnb等房屋共享平台高出一个数量级，尤其是在禁令出台之前。我们发现，在禁令实施后的前18个月里，酒店的平均每日房价每晚增加了14至19美元，具体取决于具体规格，收入增加了大约21至29亿美元。相比之下，对客房夜数的影响较小，估计也不准确，因此收入的增长主要是由于房价的上涨。

引用次数: 0

The OPEC/MENA/Arab nexus and the missing democratic transition 欧佩克/中东和北非/阿拉伯的关系和缺失的民主转型

IF 2.4 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-07-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102731

Martin Paldam

The democratic transition is a strong relation in the data, as analyzed elsewhere. This paper deals with the only large exception: The 26 countries in the OPEC/MENA/Arab nexus have no democratic transition. The explanation is complex as it requires (at least) two intertwined theories: The oil theory (for OPEC) and the institutional genes theory (for MENA). More than half of the OPEC and MENA groups overlap, and in addition all but two of the MENA countries are Arab, with similar language, religion, history, and culture, giving spatial effects. The paper is an attempt to untangle and test the theories, and demonstrate that both theories are needed, hence the overlapping countries that are both OPEC and MENA are especially far from democracy.

正如其他地方分析的那样，在数据中，民主转型是一个强有力的关系。本文讨论的是唯一的大例外：欧佩克/中东和北非/阿拉伯关系中的26个国家没有民主转型。解释是复杂的，因为它需要（至少）两个相互交织的理论：石油理论（欧佩克）和制度基因理论（中东和北非）。超过一半的欧佩克和中东和北非国家重叠，此外，除了两个中东和北非国家外，其他国家都是阿拉伯国家，具有相似的语言、宗教、历史和文化，从而产生了空间效应。本文试图理清和检验这两种理论，并证明这两种理论都是必要的，因此，欧佩克和中东和北非地区的重叠国家尤其远离民主。

引用次数: 0

Can term limits reduce political sabotage? Evidence from negative campaigning in gubernatorial races 任期限制能减少政治破坏吗？州长竞选中负面竞选的证据

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-07-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102724

Yizhaq Minchuk , Ohad Raveh

We study the role of term limits in reducing sabotage in political contests, vis-à-vis negative campaigning in gubernatorial races. A model of political contests, with endogenous sabotage and asymmetries in electoral support and future terms, indicates that the (aggregate) extent of sabotage may decline when incumbents are term-limited (lame-ducks). We validate this using close to 7 million political TV ads from U.S. gubernatorial elections (2000–2020) while leveraging plausibly exogenous variations across space and time in state term-limit regimes. Results show that campaigning is substantially less negative when incumbents are term-limited: having a lame-duck incumbent in the race decreases campaign negativity by approximately one standard deviation. The results shed light on the potential role of term limits in reducing the extent of sabotage in political contests, as well as on hitherto overlooked political externalities of reelection prospects.

我们研究任期限制在减少政治竞争中破坏的作用，参见-à-vis州长竞选中的负面竞选。一个具有内生破坏和选举支持和未来任期不对称的政治竞争模型表明，当现任者任期有限（跛脚鸭）时，破坏的（总）程度可能会下降。我们利用美国州长选举（2000-2020年）的近700万条政治电视广告来验证这一点，同时利用州任期限制制度中跨时空的外生变化。结果表明，当现任者任期有限时，竞选活动的负面影响会大大减少：在竞选中有一个跛脚鸭现任者会使竞选活动的负面影响减少大约一个标准差。研究结果揭示了任期限制在减少政治竞争中的破坏程度方面的潜在作用，以及迄今为止被忽视的连任前景的政治外部性。

引用次数: 0

The “German Vote” and its consequences: (Un)reliable parties in multilateral bargaining under private information “德国投票”及其后果：私人信息下多边谈判中不可靠的各方

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-07-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102719

David Piazolo

This paper theoretically investigates the strategic implications of varying reliability of bargaining partners under unanimous and non-unanimous voting. In a sequential two-period model, three players (one proposer, two responders) bargain over the distribution of a pie. One responder has private information about his valuation of finding an agreement, implying signaling values that differ substantially between voting rules and are affected by the other responder’s reliability. The other responder is of a non-strategic “robot” type, who is unreliable in the sense that in the first period, he may vote “no” after announcing a “yes”-vote. Under unanimity rule, the responder with private information benefits from voting “no” because this signals that he requires a larger compensation in a future period. In contrast, under majority rule, voting “no” is unattractive due to the fear of being excluded from a future coalition. Under both voting rules, one responder becoming less reliable negatively affects the other responder’s willingness to vote “yes”, making efficient agreements increasingly difficult to achieve. Under majority rule, the presence of unreliable parties can lead to more parties being included in the winning coalition, as demonstrated by an extension of the model. However, some of these insights are contingent on the specific assumptions of the model.

本文从理论上研究了协商伙伴在一致投票和非一致投票情况下的不同可靠性的战略含义。在连续两期模型中，三个参与者（一个提议者，两个回应者）就馅饼的分配进行讨价还价。一个响应者有关于他找到协议的估值的私人信息，这意味着在投票规则之间的信号值存在很大差异，并受到另一个响应者的可靠性的影响。另一个应答者是一个非战略性的“机器人”类型，他是不可靠的，因为在第一阶段，他可能在宣布“赞成”投票后投“反对”票。在一致同意原则下，拥有私人信息的回答者会从投“不”票中受益，因为这表明他在未来一段时间内需要更大的补偿。相比之下，在多数决定原则下，由于担心被排除在未来的联合政府之外，投反对票是没有吸引力的。在这两种投票规则下，一个应答者变得不那么可靠会对另一个应答者投赞成票的意愿产生负面影响，使有效的协议越来越难以达成。在多数决定原则下，不可靠政党的存在可能导致更多政党被纳入获胜的联盟，正如该模型的扩展所证明的那样。然而，其中一些见解取决于模型的特定假设。

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