European Journal of Population-Revue Europeenne De Demographie最新文献

Rising employment uncertainty featured by higher risks of being temporarily employed or unemployed is often seen as the driving force behind delayed and declined partnering in Western countries. However, such an employment-partnering relationship is contextualized by labour market institutions and thus could diverge across countries over time. This paper aims to investigate how country-level variations in labour market regulations moderate individual-level effects of unstable employment on union formation, including the transitions into marriage or cohabitation unions. Using comparative panel data for 26 countries from the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (the years 2010-2019), our multilevel fixed effects models showed that temporary employment and unemployment negatively affected the probability of union formation for single women and men in Europe. Moreover, the negative relationship between unstable employment and union formation was reinforced when labour market reforms were stimulating insider-outsider segregations or decreasing welfare provisions. Specifically, stricter employment protection legislations and higher coverage rates of collective bargaining agreements could reinforce the negative effects of temporary employment and unemployment on union formation, while more generous provisions of unemployment benefits could buffer such negative effects.

The association between economic cycles-typically measured in terms of GDP growth or swings in unemployment-and macro-level fertility trends has received ample attention in the literature. Compared to studies that consider macro-level fertility, individual-based models can address the association between economic cycles and specific stages of family formation (e.g. entry into parenthood) more precisely while allowing for structural factors that contribute to fertility postponement. Using population-wide longitudinal microdata from the Belgian censuses we combine discrete-time hazard models of entry into parenthood for the period 1960 to 2010 with microsimulation models to assess whether economic cycles in tandem with educational expansion can account for year-to-year variation in the proportion of women entering parenthood and variation in the pace of fertility postponement at the macro-level. Results indicate that educational expansion has been a structural driver of fertility postponement, whereas the procyclical effect of economic cycles accounts for accelerations and decelerations of fertility postponement throughout the period considered. Microsimulation of macro-level fertility trends indicates that individual-based models predict the annual proportion of women entering parenthood and the mean age at first birth with average errors of prediction below 1 per cent and 3 months, respectively, while also showing strong correlations between first differences of observed and simulated time-series. Because the extended observation window encompasses several severe recessions, we test whether the association between economic cycles and entry into parenthood has changed over time and how this affected macro-level trends, discussing several mechanisms that may account for such temporal variation.

In this study we examine partnership dynamics among people with different sexual orientations in Germany. More specifically, we explore the process of first partnership formation and first cohabitation among men and women who self-identify as heterosexual, homosexual or bisexual. Given the various discriminations against same-sex lifestyles, and the limited opportunities to meet potential partners, we assume that lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) people form partnerships later in life and less frequently than heterosexuals. We further expect that the constantly improving social and legal climate for sexual minorities will lead to a reduction in differences in partnership behaviour by sexual orientation. We use retrospectively reported partnership biographies from the German Socio-Economic Panel, which was supplemented in 2019 with a boost sample of sexual and gender minority households. Using discrete-time event history models, we analyse nearly 15,000 episodes of being single and nearly 20,000 episodes of living without a partner in the household. Around 4.5% of these episodes are from people who self-identify as LGB. The results clearly show that patterns of partnership and coresidential union formation differ by sexual orientation. People with a homosexual orientation-and to a lesser extent people with a bisexual orientation-are less likely to enter into a first partnership and a first cohabitation than people with a heterosexual orientation. Significant changes occur across cohorts: LGB people from younger birth cohorts enter (cohabiting) partnerships much earlier and more frequently than those from older cohorts. Thus, the union formation patterns of LGB and straight people have converged slightly.

The share of young adults living in married-couple family households in the USA has declined in recent decades. Research on alternative living arrangements focuses on cohabitation among unmarried couples and parent-adult child coresidence. Less is known about trends in non-family living arrangements and the characteristics of young adults living with non-relatives. This study documents trends over time in non-family living arrangements among young adults in the USA and examines the sociodemographic profile of those living with non-relatives. Using pooled US Census and American Community Survey microdata from 1990 to 2019, the authors document age patterns in non-family living arrangements over time and use logistic regression to estimate the likelihood of living with non-family based on individual-level characteristics. Results indicate that non-family living among young adults has increased over time, and that the arrangement is associated with markers of both advantage and disadvantage. Differences across age groups explain some of these mixed results. Trends among younger groups are linked to socioeconomic patterns around family formation. Among older groups, the demographic and labor force characteristics of the foreign born and constraints of their kin availability may be driving trends. The exploratory analysis provides relevant evidence around an increasingly common living arrangement in the USA and also identifies several areas for future research on living arrangements among young adults and the implications of these trends.

We use longitudinal data on religious affiliation in Finland to examine childbearing behavior. All analyses are based on detailed fertility information from the Finnish national register of each person's religious denomination for men and women born in 1956-1975. We identify higher fertility according to parity among members of the Evangelical Lutheran state church and other Protestant churches, and lower fertility among individuals with no religious affiliation. Most other religious groups-Orthodox Christians, Jews, Muslims, and adherents of Eastern religions-have intermediate levels of fertility. We also find that religious converts, that is, those observed with more than one religious denomination over their life course, typically are similar to the non-converts of the group they convert to, though with more distinct deviations from the Finnish population. Women show larger differences by religious affiliation than men. We find the largest differences across religions when we examine the proportion of childless men and women. Overall, differences between religious groups are rather modest, and childbearing patterns are quite similar. Our results provide, to our knowledge, the first examination of religion and fertility using national-level longitudinal data.

Proximate determinants theory considers infertility rates a risk factor for lower fertility rates, but the assumption that people who perceive infertility will have fewer children has not been tested. This study investigates the association of self-perceived infertility with the number of children people have had after 11 years. Infertility implies reduced chances of conception (rather than sterility), but people do not always consistently perceive infertility over time. If people who think they are infertile at one time can later report no infertility, then does self-perceived infertility necessarily lead to having fewer children? We answer this question by analyzing 11 waves of the German family panel (pairfam) data using negative binomial growth curve models for eight core demographic subgroups created by combinations of gender (men/women), parity (0/1+children), and initial age groups (25-27 and 35-37). Those who repeatedly perceived themselves to be infertile (three times or more) had fewer children than those who perceived themselves to be infertile once or twice in only four of eight gender by initial parity by age groups. Only in four groups did people who perceived themselves to be infertile once or twice have fewer children than those who never perceived themselves to be infertile in both the unadjusted and adjusted models. Thus, self-perceived infertility does not necessarily result in fewer children. Rather, the association depends upon life course context and gender.

This paper is the first to examine to what extent ethnicity affects ever migrating and the number of migrations across the lifespan for the case of internal migration in Indonesia. We use all five waves of the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS) to study migration behaviour of respondents belonging to some of the largest ethnic groups in Indonesia. Our logistic regression results show that the Minangkabau, Betawi, Madurese, Balinese, Buginese and Makassarese, and Sasak, Bima and Dompu are less likely to ever migrate than the Javanese. Using only migrants and controlling for the first migration and other characteristics, truncated negative binomial regression results show that, in comparison with the Javanese, the Minangkabau and Banjarese have a higher expected number of migrations while the numbers are lower for the Betawi and Balinese. Thus, ethnicity contributes to ever migrating as well as the number of migrations, but we find that the differences between the ethnic groups diminish for the latter. These results also point out that a higher likelihood of ever migrating does not always correspond with a higher number of migrations, highlighting the importance of studying migration count to complement the study of migration as a one-time event.

We examined the influence of education on fertility decisions in contemporary China, drawing upon theoretical insights that emphasise the role of social institutions, gender relations, and life course dynamics in shaping family behaviour. This led us to propose a set of hypotheses that explain the differential effect of education on each parity. We used information on female cohorts born between 1960 and 1989, coming from the China Family Panel Studies for 2010-2018. We applied event history models with both independent and simultaneous equations models to account for selection and endogeneity effects. The results point to a substantial contribution of the increased educational attainment in the population in the fertility decline and current low levels of fertility, beyond the role of fertility policies. Consistent with our hypotheses, the results show that woman's educational attainment has a strong negative effect on the hazard of bearing a second or third child. Male partner's educational attainment also has a negative effect on the hazard of transition to a second or third birth, yet with a weaker intensity. We also found that the negative effect of education on second birth rates significantly declines across birth cohorts. The results show little educational differentials in the probability of bearing a first child, while the better educated postpone first births. Moreover, the effect of fertility policies, measured at the individual level, gradually increases with the level of education.

Spatial assimilation theory asserts that immigrants' socioeconomic progress leads to residential adaptation and integration. This association has proven robust in USA and European urban areas through much of the twentieth century, but drastic change of ethnic and class compositions yet persistent (neighbourhood) inequality in the urban landscape urge us to reconsider the dynamic interaction between stability and change. In this study, we investigate to what extent education shapes residential mobility differently for young adults with varying ethnic and social origins. Focussing on Brussels, we use multinomial logistic regressions on linked longitudinal population-based censuses from 1991 and 2001 and register data for the period 2001-2006. Analyses show that dispersal away from poor inner-city neighbourhoods appears least likely for the offspring of poor low-educated non-Western households, regardless of their own educational attainment. While our approach roughly confirms traditional arguments of socio-spatial integration, it also reveals how educational success generates opportunities to escape poor neighbourhoods for some but not for others. With this, it points at the subtle ways in which factors and mechanisms in traditional spatial assimilation theory affect residential behaviour of young adults over their life course, at the intersection of specific locales, ethnic groups, social classes and generations.

Following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, many countries faced short-term fertility declines in 2020-2021, a development which did not materialize in the majority of German-speaking and Nordic countries. However, more recent birth statistics show a steep fertility decline in 2022. We aim to provide empirical evidence on the unexpected birth decline in 2022 in Germany and Sweden. We rely on monthly birth statistics and present seasonally adjusted monthly Total Fertility Rates (TFR) for Germany and Sweden. We relate the nine-month lagged fertility rates to contextual developments regarding COVID-19. The seasonally adjusted monthly TFR of Germany dropped from 1.5-1.6 in 2021 to 1.4 in early 2022 and again in autumn 2022, a decline of about 10% in several months. In Sweden, the corresponding TFR dropped from about 1.7 in 2021 to 1.5-1.6 in 2022, a decline of almost 10%. There is no association of the fertility trends with changes in unemployment, infection rates, or COVID-19 deaths, but a strong association with the onset of vaccination programmes and the weakening of pandemic-related restrictions. The fertility decline in 2022 in Germany and Sweden is remarkable. Common explanations of fertility change during the pandemic do not apply. The association between the onset of mass vaccinations and subsequent fertility decline indicates that women adjusted their behaviour to get vaccinated before becoming pregnant. Fertility decreased as societies were opening up with more normalized life conditions. We provide novel information on fertility declines and the COVID-19-fertility nexus during and in the immediate aftermath of the pandemic.