European Journal of Population-Revue Europeenne De Demographie最新文献

Given population ageing and the emphasis on in-home care, more working-age adults are facing the demands of providing unpaid care to the elderly with potential implications for their own well-being. Such effects likely vary across Europe because care is differently organized with a differing emphasis on public support, dependence on family, and orientation toward gender equality. We studied the relationship between unpaid caregiving for elderly parents and the psychological well-being of older working-age (50-64) men and women by analysing data from the Survey of Health, Retirement, and Ageing in Europe (SHARE), covering 18 countries between 2004 and 2020 (N = 24,338), using ordinary least squares (OLS). We examined risk of depression by caregiving intensity and tested whether coresidence mediated outcomes. Men and women providing care to parents experience important psychological well-being losses across Europe, especially when caregiving is intensive. A heavier caregiving burden associated with coresidence explains a regime gradient in depression, not least for women in Southern Europe. Results highlight the spillover costs of unpaid caregiving across Europe and the need to address caregiver psychological well-being, especially in contexts where state support for elder care is low and coresidence is common.

The establishment of free mobility in Europe has lowered barriers to movement and given rise to diversity in migration and integration patterns. However, in part due to data constraints, it is difficult to study migration motives, integration and return migration together. Using linked Finnish and Swedish register data covering the period 1988-2005, we address these processes within the same framework and study how the reason for migration and trajectories at the destination relate to return migration. In particular, we assess the migration motives of 13,948 Finnish migrants in Sweden using pre- and post-migration information. Finland and Sweden have been part of the common Nordic labour market since 1954, which has allowed Nordic citizens to move without barriers between the two countries. We also study how income trajectories and trajectories of family formation differ across the assessed motives, and analyse how return migration risks are shaped by the motive and by trajectories of income and family formation. Results reveal that labour and tied migrants are initially more likely to have family abroad than student migrants. Student migrants instead continue their education and experience a steeper income increase. The income of student migrants eventually catches up and surpasses that of labour migrants. Return migration risks are shaped by trajectories at the destination, but also by the initial migration motive. These findings underline the importance of assessing diversity across migrants to gain a better understanding of how different migrant groups fare in the destination country and how this relates to subsequent moves.

The internal migration literature has identified various factors that deter migration and encourage staying, but has been less concerned with people's own reports about what makes it difficult for them to migrate or makes them want to stay. We explore factors that make it difficult to change the place of residence-from here on denoted as constraints-reported in the Spanish survey on Attitudes and Expectations of Spatial Mobility in the Labour Force (N = 3892). These constraints were uniquely asked from all respondents through an open-ended question, regardless of their migration intentions. We find that many self-reported constraints correspond to factors that have previously been associated with decreased migration propensities. In order of frequency, respondents reported ties to family and friends, ties to their residential environment, financial limitations, and ties to work as constraints to migration. Our results further show that the likelihood of mentioning ties to family and friends as constraints decreased with age, was higher for women than for men and for people who lived close to most of their social network than for those who did not. Mentioning ties to the residential environment as constraints was positively associated with being partnered, and also with living in one's birthplace. People who were unemployed were less likely to mention ties to work and were more likely to report financial limitations as constraints than people who had a permanent contract-whereas being self-employed was positively associated with mentioning ties to the residential environment.

Theoretically, whether a more loosely regulated labour market inhibits or fosters fertility in a society is ambiguous. Empirically, the few studies analysing the relationship between the strictness of employment protection legislation-the norms and procedures regulating labour markets' hiring and firing processes-and fertility have found mixed evidence. This paper reconciles the ambivalent conclusions of previous studies by analysing the impact of employment protection legislation and labour market dualism on total fertility across 19 European countries between 1990 and 2019. Our results indicate that an increase in employment protection for regular workers positively affects total fertility. Nonetheless, an increasing gap between the regulation of regular and temporary employment-that is, labour market dualism-negatively impacts total fertility. These effects, of small-to-moderate intensity, are relatively homogeneous across age groups and geographical areas and are especially pronounced among the lower educated. We conclude that labour market dualism, rather than a "rigid" employment protection legislation, discourages fertility.

This study evaluates the impact of introducing the Maternity Capital (MC) program-a child subsidy of 250,000 Rub (7,150 euros or 10,000 USD, in 2007)-provided to mothers giving birth to/adopting a second or subsequent child since January 2007. Eligible Russian families could use this subsidy to improve family housing conditions, fund child's education/childcare, or invest in the mother's retirement fund. This study evaluates the impact of MC eligibility on various child health and developmental outcomes, household consumption patterns, and housing quality. Using data from the representative Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey 2010-2017, I tested regression discontinuity models and found that MC eligibility may have led to a small improvement in child health status, which could be explained by improved housing conditions, particularly in rural areas. However, children living in MC-eligible families were also more likely to report reduced socialisation. Heterogeneity analysis by child gender, household poverty status, and urban/rural residence suggests that MC incentives may have had a differential impact on some analysed outcomes. Results are robust to different polynomial and nonparametric RDD specifications.

Numerous studies have shown that fertility behavior is spatially clustered. In addition to pure contextual effects, two causal mechanisms could drive this pattern. First, neighbors may influence each other's fertility and second, family size may influence decisions about where to live. In this study we examine these two potential causal mechanisms empirically, using the sex composition of the two eldest children and twin births as instrumental variables (IVs) for having a third child. We estimate how having a third child affects three separate outcomes: the fertility of neighbors; the propensity to move houses; and the likelihood of living in a family-friendly neighborhood with many children. We draw residential and childbearing histories (2000-2018) from Norwegian administrative registers (N ~ 167,000 women). Individuals' neighborhoods are defined using time-varying geocoordinates for place of residence. We identify selective moves as one plausible causal driver of residential clustering of large families. This study contributes to the understanding of fertility and relocation, and to the literature on the social interaction effects of fertility, by testing the relevance of yet another network: that of neighbors.

Subnational differences in male fertility within sub-Saharan African countries have not been explored, nor the differences in male fertility according to migration status been sufficiently probed. We study divergences in rural and urban male fertility and investigate the relationship between male fertility and migration across 30 sub-Saharan African countries. We employ 67 Demographic and Health Surveys to estimate completed cohort fertility among men aged 50-64 according to migration status. Overall, we find that urban male fertility has declined faster than rural male fertility, widening the gap between the sectors. Rural-urban migrant men have lower fertility than their rural non-migrant counterparts. Men migrating within the rural sector have similarly high fertility as rural non-migrants, while urban-urban migrant men have even lower fertility than non-migrant urban men. Using country-fixed effects models, we find that among men with at least secondary education, differences in completed cohort fertility by migration status are widest. When we consider the timing of migration in relation to the timing of the birth of the last child, we observe that migrant men are a select group, having around two children less than non-migrant rural men. There is also evidence of adaptation to destination, though to a lesser extent. Furthermore, migration within the rural sector does not seem to be disruptive to fathering. These results indicate that rural-to-urban migration has the potential to delay rural fertility decline, and that urban male fertility is likely to decline further, especially as the proportion of urban-to-urban migration increases.

In this study, we examine whether the long-term structural changes in the labour market, driven by automation, affect fertility. The adoption of industrial robots is used as a proxy for these changes. It has tripled since the mid-1990s in the EU, tremendously changing the conditions of participating in the labour market. On the one hand, new jobs are created, benefitting largely the highly skilled workers. On the other hand, the growing turnover in the labour market and changing content of jobs induce fears of job displacement and make workers continuously adjust to new requirements (reskill, upskill, increase work efforts). The consequences of these changes are particularly strong for the employment and earning prospects of low and middle-educated workers. Our focus is on six European countries: Czechia, France, Germany, Italy, Poland and the UK. We link regional data on fertility and employment structures by industry from Eurostat (NUTS-2) with data on robot adoption from the International Federation of Robotics. We estimate fixed effects linear models with instrumental variables in order to account for the external shocks which may affect fertility and robot adoption in parallel. Our findings suggest robots tend to exert a negative impact on fertility in highly industrialised regions, regions with relatively low educated populations and those which are technologically less advanced. At the same time, better educated and prospering regions may even experience fertility improvements as a result of technological change. The family and labour market institutions of the country may further moderate these effects.

Patterns of religiosity among both settled and migrant populations have been the subject of intense, and often conflicting, scholarly debate. In Europe, most analysis of migrant religiosity has focused on Islam, though migrants to Western European countries come from a wide range of religions and denominations. Despite a general assumption of assimilation over generations to greater secularization, evidence on trends in religiosity across migrants of different religions and for both first and second generations remains partial. We use the European Social Survey (rounds 1-9) to examine three dimensions of religiosity encompassing both performative and subjective domains, across 15 Western European destination countries over a 16-year period. While variation in religiosity between different affiliations is not large, migrants tend to have higher religiosity than non-migrants across the religious affiliations we consider. Over time we see that while natives show an overall decline in religiosity over the period, first- and second-generation Protestants and Muslims show increases in religiosity, providing some evidence for religious revival. We discuss the implications of our findings for theories of secularization and religious revival, and the future religious landscape of Europe.

Marriage is protective against suicide across most populations, including for persons of different ethnicities and immigrant backgrounds. However, the well-being benefits of marriage are contingent upon marital characteristics-such as conflict and quality-that may vary across spousal dyads with different immigration backgrounds. Leveraging Swedish register data, we compare suicide mortality among married persons on the basis of their and their spouse's immigration backgrounds. We find that relative to those in a native Swede-Swede union, Swedish men married to female immigrants and immigrant women married to native men are at higher risk of death by suicide, while immigrants of both genders who are married to someone from their birth country have a lower risk of suicide mortality. The findings support hypotheses about the strains that may be encountered by those who intermarry, as well as the potential selection of individuals into inter- and intra-ethnic marriages.