European Journal of Population-Revue Europeenne De Demographie最新文献

In this study, we examine whether the long-term structural changes in the labour market, driven by automation, affect fertility. The adoption of industrial robots is used as a proxy for these changes. It has tripled since the mid-1990s in the EU, tremendously changing the conditions of participating in the labour market. On the one hand, new jobs are created, benefitting largely the highly skilled workers. On the other hand, the growing turnover in the labour market and changing content of jobs induce fears of job displacement and make workers continuously adjust to new requirements (reskill, upskill, increase work efforts). The consequences of these changes are particularly strong for the employment and earning prospects of low and middle-educated workers. Our focus is on six European countries: Czechia, France, Germany, Italy, Poland and the UK. We link regional data on fertility and employment structures by industry from Eurostat (NUTS-2) with data on robot adoption from the International Federation of Robotics. We estimate fixed effects linear models with instrumental variables in order to account for the external shocks which may affect fertility and robot adoption in parallel. Our findings suggest robots tend to exert a negative impact on fertility in highly industrialised regions, regions with relatively low educated populations and those which are technologically less advanced. At the same time, better educated and prospering regions may even experience fertility improvements as a result of technological change. The family and labour market institutions of the country may further moderate these effects.

Patterns of religiosity among both settled and migrant populations have been the subject of intense, and often conflicting, scholarly debate. In Europe, most analysis of migrant religiosity has focused on Islam, though migrants to Western European countries come from a wide range of religions and denominations. Despite a general assumption of assimilation over generations to greater secularization, evidence on trends in religiosity across migrants of different religions and for both first and second generations remains partial. We use the European Social Survey (rounds 1-9) to examine three dimensions of religiosity encompassing both performative and subjective domains, across 15 Western European destination countries over a 16-year period. While variation in religiosity between different affiliations is not large, migrants tend to have higher religiosity than non-migrants across the religious affiliations we consider. Over time we see that while natives show an overall decline in religiosity over the period, first- and second-generation Protestants and Muslims show increases in religiosity, providing some evidence for religious revival. We discuss the implications of our findings for theories of secularization and religious revival, and the future religious landscape of Europe.

Marriage is protective against suicide across most populations, including for persons of different ethnicities and immigrant backgrounds. However, the well-being benefits of marriage are contingent upon marital characteristics-such as conflict and quality-that may vary across spousal dyads with different immigration backgrounds. Leveraging Swedish register data, we compare suicide mortality among married persons on the basis of their and their spouse's immigration backgrounds. We find that relative to those in a native Swede-Swede union, Swedish men married to female immigrants and immigrant women married to native men are at higher risk of death by suicide, while immigrants of both genders who are married to someone from their birth country have a lower risk of suicide mortality. The findings support hypotheses about the strains that may be encountered by those who intermarry, as well as the potential selection of individuals into inter- and intra-ethnic marriages.

This paper examines counterurban migration among young families with children in Sweden and the extent to which these moves reflect return migration, recognising the role of family members and family roots at the destination from a life course perspective. Drawing on register data for all young families with children leaving the Swedish metropolitan areas during the years 2003-2013, we analyse the pattern of counterurban moves and explore how the families' socioeconomic characteristics, childhood origins, and links to family networks are associated with becoming a counterurban mover and choice of destination. The results show that four out of ten counterurban movers are former urban movers who choose to return to their home region. Among them, almost all have family at the destination, indicating that family ties are important for counterurban migration. In general, urban residents with a background outside metropolitan areas are much more likely to become counterurban movers. Families' previous residential experiences during childhood, particularly in rural areas, are found to be associated with the residential environment they choose to resettle in when leaving the big city. Counterurban movers making a return move are similar to other counterurban movers in relation to employment status, but tend to be better off economically and move longer distances than other counterurban movers.

Migration and marriage are major life events that might interact and be jointly decided. Places with good labor market opportunities may or may not provide good marriage options. In this paper, I quantify gains and losses in marriage prospects for unmarried migrants and natives during the population redistribution driven by internal migration. I also examine how the experiences differ by individual characteristics and regional factors. The analysis measures marriage prospects using the availability ratio (AR) with adaptive assortative matching norms for every unmarried individual from sample data of the 2010 China population census. The AR quantifies the intensity of competition for suitable partners in the local marriage market. I compare (1) migrants' current AR with an alternative AR if the migrant returned to the hometown and (2) natives' AR with a hypothetical AR if all migrants returned to their hometown. The first comparison shows that among migrants moving for labor market opportunities, most women have higher ARs (better marriage prospects) in the place of residence than in their hometown, especially those of rural origin. In contrast, migrant men's ARs mostly decrease after migration except for the best educated. The second comparison reveals small negative externalities of internal migration on ARs for native women but positive impacts for some native men. The results suggest a conflict between labor market opportunities that dominate internal migration decisions and marriage market opportunities in China. This study demonstrates a method to quantify and compare marriage prospects and extends the literature on how migration and marriage interact.

Building on a thick strand of the literature on the determinants of higher-order births, this study uses a gender and class perspective to analyse second birth progression rates in Germany. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel from 1990 to 2020, individuals are classified based on their occupation into: upper service, lower service, skilled manual/higher-grade routine nonmanual, and semi-/unskilled manual/lower-grade routine nonmanual classes. Results highlight the "economic advantage" of men and women in service classes who experience strongly elevated second birth rates. Finally, we demonstrate that upward career mobility post-first birth is associated with higher second birth rates, particularly among men.

Children from separated parents are more likely to also experience the dissolution of their own union. For many children, parental separation thus is an adverse life course event that follows them into adulthood. We examine whether parents' social class mitigates this adversity and weakens the intergenerational transmission of family dissolution for children from advantaged class origins. This is the case if separated parents with more resources are able to offer better living conditions to their children and keep them longer in education, reducing children's incentives for early home-leaving, early cohabitation and early childbearing-three life course choices that increase the risk of later family dissolution. We analyse the existence of such a compensatory class advantage for three birth cohorts in the UK. Based on 38,000 life histories from two panel surveys (BHPS, UKLHS), we find a strong link between parents' family dissolution and offspring's family dissolution, and a reversal in the effect of parents' class on children's risk of family dissolution over the three birth cohorts of the Silent Generation (1925-45), Baby Boomers (1946-64) and Generation X (1965-79). However, there is no evidence that the intergenerational transmission of union dissolution is mitigated by a compensatory class effect for offspring from more advantaged class origins. Regardless of class origin, parents' union dissolution is associated with a much larger risk of union dissolution among their offspring.

This study demonstrates how an evolving negative educational gradient of single parenthood can interact with changing labour market conditions to shape labour market inequalities between partnered and single parents. We analysed trends in employment rates among Finnish partnered and single mothers and fathers from 1987 to 2018. In the late 1980s' Finland, single mothers' employment was internationally high and on par with that of partnered mothers, and single fathers' employment rate was just below that of partnered fathers. The gaps between single and partnered parents emerged and increased during the 1990s recession, and after the 2008 economic crisis, it widened further. In 2018, the employment rates of single parents were 11-12 percentage points lower than those of partnered parents. We ask how much of this single-parent employment gap could be explained by compositional factors, and the widening educational gradient of single parenthood in particular. We use Chevan and Sutherland's decomposition technique on register data, which allows us to decompose the single-parent employment gap into the composition and rate effects by each category of the background variables. The findings point to an increasing double disadvantage of single parents: the gradually evolving disadvantage in educational backgrounds together with large differences in employment rates between single and partnered parents with low education explain large parts of the widening employment gap. Sociodemographic changes in interaction with changes in the labour market can produce inequalities by family structure in a Nordic society known for its extensive support for combining childcare and employment for all parents.

Although the literature concerning the association between religiosity and fertility in European countries is already quite extensive, studies exploring the mechanisms of action of religiosity are rare. The main aim of this article is to investigate whether grandparental childcare is a mediating or moderating variable in the association between attendance at religious services and the intention to have a second or third child. Building on previous literature, we assume that parents who are more religious might put more effort into establishing a positive relation with the grandparents of their child/children. Consequently, compared to parents who are less religious, those who are more religious could be more receptive to possible encouragement from grandparents to have another child and may be more optimistic regarding grandparents' involvement with an additional child. Using Generations and Gender Survey (GGS) data for eleven European countries, we find evidence of a strong and positive effect of attendance at religious services on fertility intentions. Receipt of regular or weekly help from grandparents positively moderates the association between attendance at religious services and fertility intentions, albeit only for male respondents and mainly for the intention to have a second child.

How divorce influences parents' and children's time use has received very little scientific attention. This study uses high-quality longitudinal time-diary data across six waves from the Longitudinal Study of Australian Children to examine how parental separation shapes parent-child time and children's daily activities. Results show that separation leads to a strong increase of gender inequalities in parents' time use. After separation, mother-child time doubles, two-parent time declines by three, and father-child time remains low. Parental separation also leads to a decline in children's time allocated to educational activities (e.g., studying, reading) and an increase in children's time in unstructured activities (e.g., TV watching, video gaming, smartphone use). Additionally, the effect of separation on children's time use is twice as large for boys than for girls, with gender gaps in children's unstructured time increasing over time. Finally, mother-child time returns to similar pre-separation levels over time, but only after 4 years since separation occurred. The study findings are robust to different panel regression strategies. Overall, this study implies that parental divorce negatively affects children's developmental time use, especially among boys, and leads lone mothers to experience increasing 'time penalties' associated with gender inequalities in society.