European Journal of Population-Revue Europeenne De Demographie最新文献

Women's labor force participation has increased in Western countries, but gender gaps remain, especially among parents. Using a novel comparative perspective, we assess women's and men's employment trajectories from midlife onward by parity and education. We provide insights into the gendered parenthood-employment gaps examining the long-term implications of parenthood beyond the core childbearing ages by decomposing years lived between ages 40-74, in years of employment, joblessness, and retirement. Using multistate incidence-based life tables, we compare different cultural and institutional contexts: Finland, Italy, and the USA. Our results document large cross-national variation, with education playing a key role. In Finland, the number of years of employment increases with parity for women and men, and the gender gap is small; in the USA, the relationship between parity and years of employment is relatively flat, although a gender gap emerges among those with two or more children; in Italy, the number of years of employment decreases sharply for women as parity increases, while it increases for men. Notably, education has a similar positive impact on years of employment across all groups in Finland. In contrast, in the USA and Italy, the gender gap is only half as large among highly educated mothers as it is among low educated mothers. The employment trajectories of childless women and men differ greatly across countries.

In Denmark and Sweden, statutory retirement age is indexed to life expectancy to account for mortality improvements in their populations. However, mortality improvements have not been uniform across different sub-populations. Notably, in both countries, individuals of lower socioeconomic status (SES) have experienced slower mortality improvements. As a result, a uniform rise in the statutory retirement age could disproportionally affect these low-SES groups and may unintentionally lead to a reverse redistribution effect, shifting benefits from short-lived low-SES individuals to long-lived high-SES individuals. The aim of this study is twofold: to quantify and contextualise mortality inequalities by SES in Denmark and Sweden, and to assess how indexing retirement age will affect future survival to retirement age by SES in these countries. We used Danish and Swedish registry data (1988-2019), to aggregate individuals aged 50 + based on their demographic characteristics and SES. We computed period life tables by year, sex, and SES to estimate the difference in survival across different SES groups. We then forecast mortality across SES groups to assess how indexing retirement age will affect survival inequalities to retirement age, using two forecasting models-the Mode model and the Li-Lee model. Mortality inequalities are comparable in Denmark and Sweden, even though the latter generally has higher survival. We also find that indexing retirement age to life expectancy will have two main consequences: it will reduce the probability of reaching retirement for all SES groups, particularly those of low SES, and time spent in retirement will be reduced, particularly for those of high SES.

This paper examines childbearing in and outside of marriage as a manifestation of the Second Demographic Transition among immigrant populations in Switzerland. Based on full-population register data, we simultaneously analyse fertility and partnership changes at different stages of the migration process. Results from a multistate event history model show that most of the differences in family formation patterns between migrant groups and natives are in the sequencing of marriage and first birth among childless unmarried women. Out of wedlock family trajectories prove to be a common experience for European migrants, but a sustainable family pathway only among natives, as well as among immigrants from France, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Among married women, it is the risk of a third birth that marks the differences between groups; first and second birth rates are relatively similar across migrant groups. Distinguishing between the transition patterns of newly arrived immigrants and settled immigrants (characterised by various residence durations) support the disruption hypothesis among EU migrants and the interrelated life events hypothesis among non-EU groups. Family size and the partnership context of fertility highlight which family regime prevails in different population subgroups and the role that immigrants play in the Second Demographic Transition and family transformation in Europe.

Developments over time in the prevalence of marriage and cohabitation formation has long received much interest, but less is known about more recent developments for different population subgroups in European countries. This applies as well to Sweden, a country considered a forerunner in family-demographic change. In contrast, much attention has been paid to the falling birth rates during the 2010s, and explanations that focus on the role of increasing uncertainties. In the Swedish case, the fertility decline has been documented across all main socio-demographic subgroups. The objective of this study is to examine whether the same situation holds for first marriage and cohabitation formation during the 2010s and the exceptional years of the Covid-19 pandemic. Based on Swedish population registers, including with new cohabitation data, we present annual indices of first marriage formation (1991-2022) and cohabitation formation (2012-2022) across a number of socio-demographic strata. We demonstrate a continuous decline in first marriage formation since the early 2010s with an additional sharp dip during the pandemic and a post-pandemic recovery. In contrast, there was a remarkable stability in cohabitation formation during 2012-2022. Although socio-demographic groups differ in their overall levels of marriage and cohabitation formation, the recent trends are strikingly similar across groups. Cohabiting couples, across population subgroups, have become less inclined to transition their union status to a more committed level, as manifested by marriage or parenthood. This occurred in spite of a positive economic climate in the 2010s and stable family policies, indicating that other forces are at play.

Rising employment uncertainty featured by higher risks of being temporarily employed or unemployed is often seen as the driving force behind delayed and declined partnering in Western countries. However, such an employment-partnering relationship is contextualized by labour market institutions and thus could diverge across countries over time. This paper aims to investigate how country-level variations in labour market regulations moderate individual-level effects of unstable employment on union formation, including the transitions into marriage or cohabitation unions. Using comparative panel data for 26 countries from the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (the years 2010-2019), our multilevel fixed effects models showed that temporary employment and unemployment negatively affected the probability of union formation for single women and men in Europe. Moreover, the negative relationship between unstable employment and union formation was reinforced when labour market reforms were stimulating insider-outsider segregations or decreasing welfare provisions. Specifically, stricter employment protection legislations and higher coverage rates of collective bargaining agreements could reinforce the negative effects of temporary employment and unemployment on union formation, while more generous provisions of unemployment benefits could buffer such negative effects.

The association between economic cycles-typically measured in terms of GDP growth or swings in unemployment-and macro-level fertility trends has received ample attention in the literature. Compared to studies that consider macro-level fertility, individual-based models can address the association between economic cycles and specific stages of family formation (e.g. entry into parenthood) more precisely while allowing for structural factors that contribute to fertility postponement. Using population-wide longitudinal microdata from the Belgian censuses we combine discrete-time hazard models of entry into parenthood for the period 1960 to 2010 with microsimulation models to assess whether economic cycles in tandem with educational expansion can account for year-to-year variation in the proportion of women entering parenthood and variation in the pace of fertility postponement at the macro-level. Results indicate that educational expansion has been a structural driver of fertility postponement, whereas the procyclical effect of economic cycles accounts for accelerations and decelerations of fertility postponement throughout the period considered. Microsimulation of macro-level fertility trends indicates that individual-based models predict the annual proportion of women entering parenthood and the mean age at first birth with average errors of prediction below 1 per cent and 3 months, respectively, while also showing strong correlations between first differences of observed and simulated time-series. Because the extended observation window encompasses several severe recessions, we test whether the association between economic cycles and entry into parenthood has changed over time and how this affected macro-level trends, discussing several mechanisms that may account for such temporal variation.

In this study we examine partnership dynamics among people with different sexual orientations in Germany. More specifically, we explore the process of first partnership formation and first cohabitation among men and women who self-identify as heterosexual, homosexual or bisexual. Given the various discriminations against same-sex lifestyles, and the limited opportunities to meet potential partners, we assume that lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) people form partnerships later in life and less frequently than heterosexuals. We further expect that the constantly improving social and legal climate for sexual minorities will lead to a reduction in differences in partnership behaviour by sexual orientation. We use retrospectively reported partnership biographies from the German Socio-Economic Panel, which was supplemented in 2019 with a boost sample of sexual and gender minority households. Using discrete-time event history models, we analyse nearly 15,000 episodes of being single and nearly 20,000 episodes of living without a partner in the household. Around 4.5% of these episodes are from people who self-identify as LGB. The results clearly show that patterns of partnership and coresidential union formation differ by sexual orientation. People with a homosexual orientation-and to a lesser extent people with a bisexual orientation-are less likely to enter into a first partnership and a first cohabitation than people with a heterosexual orientation. Significant changes occur across cohorts: LGB people from younger birth cohorts enter (cohabiting) partnerships much earlier and more frequently than those from older cohorts. Thus, the union formation patterns of LGB and straight people have converged slightly.

The share of young adults living in married-couple family households in the USA has declined in recent decades. Research on alternative living arrangements focuses on cohabitation among unmarried couples and parent-adult child coresidence. Less is known about trends in non-family living arrangements and the characteristics of young adults living with non-relatives. This study documents trends over time in non-family living arrangements among young adults in the USA and examines the sociodemographic profile of those living with non-relatives. Using pooled US Census and American Community Survey microdata from 1990 to 2019, the authors document age patterns in non-family living arrangements over time and use logistic regression to estimate the likelihood of living with non-family based on individual-level characteristics. Results indicate that non-family living among young adults has increased over time, and that the arrangement is associated with markers of both advantage and disadvantage. Differences across age groups explain some of these mixed results. Trends among younger groups are linked to socioeconomic patterns around family formation. Among older groups, the demographic and labor force characteristics of the foreign born and constraints of their kin availability may be driving trends. The exploratory analysis provides relevant evidence around an increasingly common living arrangement in the USA and also identifies several areas for future research on living arrangements among young adults and the implications of these trends.

We use longitudinal data on religious affiliation in Finland to examine childbearing behavior. All analyses are based on detailed fertility information from the Finnish national register of each person's religious denomination for men and women born in 1956-1975. We identify higher fertility according to parity among members of the Evangelical Lutheran state church and other Protestant churches, and lower fertility among individuals with no religious affiliation. Most other religious groups-Orthodox Christians, Jews, Muslims, and adherents of Eastern religions-have intermediate levels of fertility. We also find that religious converts, that is, those observed with more than one religious denomination over their life course, typically are similar to the non-converts of the group they convert to, though with more distinct deviations from the Finnish population. Women show larger differences by religious affiliation than men. We find the largest differences across religions when we examine the proportion of childless men and women. Overall, differences between religious groups are rather modest, and childbearing patterns are quite similar. Our results provide, to our knowledge, the first examination of religion and fertility using national-level longitudinal data.

Proximate determinants theory considers infertility rates a risk factor for lower fertility rates, but the assumption that people who perceive infertility will have fewer children has not been tested. This study investigates the association of self-perceived infertility with the number of children people have had after 11 years. Infertility implies reduced chances of conception (rather than sterility), but people do not always consistently perceive infertility over time. If people who think they are infertile at one time can later report no infertility, then does self-perceived infertility necessarily lead to having fewer children? We answer this question by analyzing 11 waves of the German family panel (pairfam) data using negative binomial growth curve models for eight core demographic subgroups created by combinations of gender (men/women), parity (0/1+children), and initial age groups (25-27 and 35-37). Those who repeatedly perceived themselves to be infertile (three times or more) had fewer children than those who perceived themselves to be infertile once or twice in only four of eight gender by initial parity by age groups. Only in four groups did people who perceived themselves to be infertile once or twice have fewer children than those who never perceived themselves to be infertile in both the unadjusted and adjusted models. Thus, self-perceived infertility does not necessarily result in fewer children. Rather, the association depends upon life course context and gender.