Pub Date : 2023-09-03DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2261241
Robert Ward
AbstractThe US–Japan–South Korea summit was historic, not least because it was the first stand-alone summit between the three countries. The severe deterioration in the security environment in East Asia, in particular China’s menacing of Taiwan and North Korea’s continued nuclear-weapons programme, has been a significant driver of the recent rapprochement between Japan and South Korea. The warming of bilateral ties thus helps to buttress the United States’ separate, formal security alliances between Japan on the one hand and South Korea on the other. But previous thaws have failed, reflecting lingering differences between Japan and South Korea in areas such as their shared history and territorial claims. This convergence is therefore a fragile one.Key words: Camp David SummitChina‘comfort women’East China SeaIndo-PacificJapanKishida FumioKorean PeninsulaPhnom Penh StatementSouth KoreaYoon Suk-yeol Notes1 US Embassy and Consulates in Japan, ‘Trilateral Leaders’ Summit of the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea’, 19 August 2023, https://jp.usembassy.gov/trilateral-leaders-summit-us-japan-south-korea/#:~:text=President%20Biden%20welcomed%20Japanese%20Prime,David%20during%20the%20Biden%2DHarris.2 Victor D. Cha, ‘Bridging the Gap: The Strategic Context of the 1965 Korea– Japan Normalization Treaty’, Korean Studies, vol. 20, 1996, p. 125.3 White House, ‘Phnom Penh Statement on US–Japan–Republic of Korea Trilateral Partnership for the Indo-Pacific’, 13 November 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/13/phnom-penh-statement-on-trilateral-partnership-for-the-indo-pacific/.4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘Japan–ROK Summit Telephone Call’, 28 December 2015, https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/page4e_000366.html.5 White House, ‘The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States’, 18 August 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/the-spirit-of-camp-david-joint-statement-of-japan-the-republic-of-korea-and-the-united-states/.6 One early example of this was the ‘Korea clause’ in the November 1969 communiqué between US president Richard Nixon and Japan’s prime minister Sato Eisaku. This was the first public recognition by Japan that South Korea’s security ‘was essential to Japan’s own security’, although support for the clause ebbed and flowed with the Japanese governments that followed. The communiqué came at a time of increased security tensions in Asia against the background of the Vietnam War and the threat of a newly nuclear China. See ‘The Nixon–Sato Communique’, New York Times, 22 November 1969, p. 14, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1969/11/22/issue.html; and Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The US–Korea– Japan Security Triangle (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), chapter 1.7 Prime Minister’s Office of Japan, ‘Keynote Address by Prime Minister Kishida Fumio at the IISS Shangri-La Di
摘要美日韩首脑会议具有历史意义,因为这是三国之间首次单独举行的首脑会议。东亚安全环境的严重恶化,特别是中国对台湾的威胁和朝鲜持续的核武器计划,是日本和韩国最近和解的一个重要推动因素。因此,双边关系的升温有助于巩固美国与日本和韩国之间独立的正式安全联盟。但之前的解冻都以失败告终,反映出日韩两国在共同的历史和领土主张等领域存在挥之不去的分歧。因此,这种趋同是脆弱的。关键词:戴维营峰会;中国“慰安妇”;东海太平洋;日本;岸田文雄;朝鲜半岛;金边声明;韩国;尹锡烈注1;美国驻日使领馆;《1965年韩日正常化条约的战略背景》,《韩国学》1996年第20期,第125.3页。白宫:《关于美、日、韩三国印太伙伴关系的金边声明》,2022年11月13日,https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/13/phnom-penh-statement-on-trilateral-partnership-for-the-indo-pacific/.4日本外务省:《日韩首脑通话》,2015年12月28日。https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/page4e_000366.html.5白宫:《戴维营的精神》《日、韩、美联合声明》,2023年8月18日,https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/the-spirit-of-camp-david-joint-statement-of-japan-the-republic-of-korea-and-the-united-states/.6这方面的一个早期例子是1969年11月美国总统理查德·尼克松和日本首相佐藤荣作之间的公报中的“韩国条款”。这是日本第一次公开承认韩国的安全“对日本自身的安全至关重要”,尽管对这一条款的支持在随后的日本政府中时断时续。上述公报发布之际,正值越南战争和中国新核威胁的背景下,亚洲的安全紧张局势加剧。见1969年11月22日《纽约时报》“尼克松-佐藤公报”,第14页,https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1969/11/22/issue.html;Victor D. Cha,《对抗中的结盟:美韩日安全三角》(斯坦福,加州);斯坦福大学出版社,1999年),第1.7章,日本首相办公室,“岸田文雄首相在国际战略研究所香格里拉对话上的主旨演讲”,2022年6月10日,https://japan.kantei.go.jp/101_kishida/statement/202206/_00002.html.8韩国,外交部,“介绍印太战略”,https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/wpge/m_26382/contents.do.9关于中俄联合巡逻和演习的地图,见小野洋香和罗伯特·沃德,“日本加强:岸田文雄领导下的安全和防务政策”,《2023年亚太地区安全评估:关键发展和趋势》(阿宾顿:劳特利奇研究所,2023年),第119.10页。例如,参见James Politi,“美国称,朝鲜金正日计划访问普京讨论军售”,《金融时报》,2023年9月4日,https://www.ft.com/content/11cc1d36-6783-4ab0-96d1-edd27d06b54d.11白宫,“戴维营的精神”白宫,“承诺咨询”,2023年8月18日,https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/commitment-to-consult/#:~:text=We%2C%20the%20leaders%20of%20Japan,our%20collective%20interests%20and%20security.13白宫,“戴维营的精神”三星已经在该市设立了一个研发中心。看到Kotaro细川”,三星在日本构建芯片开发设施,日经亚洲,2023年5月13日,https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Tech/Semiconductors/Samsung-to-build-chip-development-facility-in-Japan.15的Chugoku Sei Sentan欣德饥荒谢伊Kakudai 22 Nen Chosa的中国勢,先端品で世界シェア拡大22年調査(中国扩大全球先进的产品,2022年的调查),日本经济新闻,2023年9月5日,https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGKKZO74169420V00C23A9MM8000/.16华夏”,新华社评论:2023年8月20日,新华社,https://english.news.cn/20230820/55275e1196b14b6db7d7a099c91e842c/c.html.17日本外务省,1998年10月8日,《大韩民国联合宣言:面向21世纪的新伙伴关系》,https://www.mofa.go。 jp /地区/ asia-paci /韩国/ joint9810.html.18例如,1973年,金大中因批评朴正熙政权而在东京一家酒店被韩国中央情报局特工绑架。1980年,在郑斗焕掌权的光州起义后,他被判处死刑,不过后来改判为有期徒刑日本外务省,“关于历史的问题,内阁官房长官的谈话”,1993年8月4日,https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/rp/page25e_000343.html。关于这一时期双边关系恶化的解释,见Kimiya Tadashi, Nikkan Kankei Shi(东京:岩上新正,2021年),第169-71.20页。Lee Jong Won等人,Sengo Nikkan Kankei Shi(第二次世界大战以来的日韩关系史)(东京:Yuhikaku, 2017年),第252.21页。《关于解决日本和大韩民国财产和索赔问题及经济合作的协定》。签署了在东京,1965年6月22日,条约系列,1966年,p . 260年,https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20583/volume - 583 - i - 8473 - english.pdf.22金Han-joo,”尹的支持率英寸33 pct的通讯社,2023年7月21日,https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230721003000315.23日本外交部的韩国Japan-Republic关系,宣布日本和韩国外长举行的联合记者场合,2015年12月28日,https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/page4e_000364.html.24清宫亮,西村圭时,稻田清英,日北馆,“真雷奈瑞”de Anpo kyyorku e, Mae Nomeri no Beikoku,日北馆?’,“?面对空
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Pub Date : 2023-09-03DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2261262
Jonathan Stevenson
AbstractChristopher Nolan’s film Oppenheimer, centred on the eponymous American physicist who steered the Manhattan Project to completion of the first nuclear bomb in 1945, captures scientists reaching their own destructive capability at its most terrible. It prompts viewers to wonder why, over the course of nearly 80 years, Oppenheimer’s nuclear dread hasn’t been embraced with greater alarm, and informed praetorian critiques haven’t been entertained more openly. The short answer is that nuclear deterrence has worked. But the movie comes at a moment when it is being tested. With its spectacular suggestions of nuclear destruction and its intense examination of early anxieties about nuclear weapons that have never been satisfactorily addressed, Oppenheimer prompts a crucial question: whether mutual deterrence, shorn of arms control and regular diplomacy and under the pressure of a major war involving nuclear powers, can still work.Key words: Atomic Energy CommissionJ. Robert OppenheimerManhattan ProjectMcCarthyismmutual assured destruction (MAD)nuclear abolitionnuclear deterrencenuclear peaceOppenheimer Notes1 See Kai Bird and Martin J. Sherwin, American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005).2 See US Department of Energy, ‘Secretary Granholm Statement on DOE Order Vacating 1954 Atomic Energy Commission Decision in the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer’, 16 December 2022, https://www.energy.gov/articles/secretary-granholmstatement-doe-order-vacating-1954-atomic-energy-commission-decision; and Barton J. Bernstein, ‘Christopher Nolan’s Forthcoming “Oppenheimer” Movie: A Historian’s Questions, Worries, and Challenges’, Washington Decoded, 11 July 2023, https://www.washingtondecoded.com/site/2023/07/bernstein.html.3 See, for example, Andy Kifer, ‘The Real History Behind Christopher Nolan’s “Oppenheimer”’, Smithsonian Magazine, 18 July 2023, https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/the-real-history-behind-christopher-nolans-oppenheimer-180982529/.4 See Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995).5 See, for example, Daryl G. Kimball, ‘“Oppenheimer”, the Bomb, and Arms Control, Then and Now’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 29 July 2023, https://thebulletin.org/2023/07/oppenheimer-the-bomb-and-arms-control-then-and-now/.6 Quoted in, for example, Richard Rhodes, ‘Robert Oppenheimer: The Myth and the Mystery’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 18 December 2018, https://thebulletin.org/2018/12/robert-oppenheimer-the-myth-and-the-mystery/.7 ‘General Advisory Committee’s Majority and Minority Reports on Building the H-Bomb: Majority Annex’, 30 October 1949, available from Atomic Archive, https://www.atomicarchive.com/resources/documents/hydrogen/gac-report.html#Minority.8 See National Security Council, ‘NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security’, 14 April 1950, https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nsc-hst/n
克里斯托弗·诺兰(christopher Nolan)的电影《奥本海默》(Oppenheimer)以1945年指导曼哈顿计划(Manhattan Project)完成第一颗核弹的美国物理学家奥本海默(Oppenheimer)为中心,捕捉到了科学家们在最可怕的时候达到了自己的毁灭能力。它让观众想知道,为什么在近80年的时间里,奥本海默的核恐惧没有得到更大的警惕,而知情的禁卫军批评没有得到更公开的对待。简单地说,核威慑起作用了。但这部电影上映时,它正面临考验。《奥本海默》对核毁灭提出了引人注目的建议,并对从未得到令人满意解决的早期对核武器的担忧进行了深入审视,由此提出了一个关键问题:在失去了军备控制和常规外交、在涉及核大国的重大战争的压力下,相互威慑是否还能起作用?关键词:原子能委员会;罗伯特·奥本海默曼哈顿计划麦卡锡主义相互保证毁灭(MAD)核废除核威慑核和平奥本海默注1参见凯·伯德和马丁·j·舍温:《美国普罗米修斯:j·罗伯特·奥本海默的胜利与悲剧》(纽约:阿尔弗雷德·a·克诺夫出版社,2005)参见美国能源部,“部长格兰霍姆关于能源部命令撤销1954年原子能委员会关于J.罗伯特·奥本海默事件的决定的声明”,2022年12月16日,https://www.energy.gov/articles/secretary-granholmstatement-doe-order-vacating-1954-atomic-energy-commission-decision;巴顿·j·伯恩斯坦,克里斯托弗·诺兰即将上映的《奥本海默》电影;一位历史学家的问题、担忧和挑战”,华盛顿解码,2023年7月11日,https://www.washingtondecoded.com/site/2023/07/bernstein.html.3参见,例如,安迪·基弗,“克里斯托弗·诺兰的“奥本海默”背后的真实历史”,史密森尼杂志,2023年7月18日,https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/the-real-history-behind-christopher-nolans-oppenheimer-180982529/.4参见Gar Alperovitz,使用原子弹的决定和美国神话的架构(纽约:Alfred A. Knopf, 1995).5参见,例如,Daryl G. Kimball,“奥本海默,炸弹和军备控制,过去和现在”,原子科学家公报,2023年7月29日,https://thebulletin.org/2023/07/oppenheimer-the-bomb-and-arms-control-then-and-now/.6引用,例如,理查德·罗兹,“罗伯特·奥本海默:神话与神秘”,原子科学家公报,2018年12月18日,https://thebulletin.org/2018/12/robert-oppenheimer-the-myth-and-the-mystery/.7“一般咨询委员会关于制造氢弹的多数和少数报告:多数附件”,1949年10月30日,原子档案馆提供,https://www.atomicarchive.com/resources/documents/hydrogen/gac-report.html#Minority.8见国家安全委员会,“NSC 68”;《美国的国家安全目标和计划》,1950年4月14日,https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm.9参见劳伦斯·弗里德曼:《核战略的演变》,第三版(贝欣斯托克:帕尔格雷夫·麦克米伦出版社,2003)参见Philip Green,《致命逻辑:核威慑理论》(哥伦布,OH:俄亥俄州立大学出版社,1966)韦斯·安德森(Wes Anderson)执导的《小行星城》(Asteroid City)是2023年的另一部夏季电影,以20世纪50年代的美国西南部为背景,这部电影取笑了美国人的睡意,可能捕捉到了美国人普遍的冷战态度。当地面核弹试验产生的蘑菇云出现在地平线上时,没有人会眨一下眼睛。冷战被揭露为一种玩世不恭的荒诞手法,对科学的行政控制被揭露为一个笑话参见戈登·巴拉斯,《能手83:苏联人在想什么?》,《生存》,第58卷,第1期。参见乔纳森·史蒂文森,《超越想象的思考:利用从冷战到恐怖时代的毁灭》(纽约:维京,2008),第165-6.14页。例如,参见尼古拉·n·索科夫,《俄罗斯军事理论称有限的核打击为“降级”》。这就是为什么”,原子科学家公报,2022年3月8日,https://thebulletin.org/2022/03/russian-military-doctrine-calls-a-limited-nuclear-strike-de-escalation-heres-why/;和戴夫·约翰逊,“俄罗斯的欺骗性核政策”,《生存》,第63卷,no。3, 2021年6月- 7月,第123-42页。乔纳森·史蒂文森乔纳森·史蒂文森是国际战略研究所的高级研究员,《生存》杂志的执行主编,著有《超越想象》(维京出版社,2008年)和《一滴叛逆》(芝加哥大学出版社,2021年)。本文改编自作者2023年7月28日发表在《美国展望》上的《为什么奥本海默很重要》,以及2023年8月/ 9月出版的《Aufbau》德文版的早期版本。
{"title":"Oppenheimer: The Man, the Movie and Nuclear DreadOppenheimer (American film), Christopher Nolan, director and writer. Distributed by Universal Pictures, 2023.","authors":"Jonathan Stevenson","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2261262","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2261262","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractChristopher Nolan’s film Oppenheimer, centred on the eponymous American physicist who steered the Manhattan Project to completion of the first nuclear bomb in 1945, captures scientists reaching their own destructive capability at its most terrible. It prompts viewers to wonder why, over the course of nearly 80 years, Oppenheimer’s nuclear dread hasn’t been embraced with greater alarm, and informed praetorian critiques haven’t been entertained more openly. The short answer is that nuclear deterrence has worked. But the movie comes at a moment when it is being tested. With its spectacular suggestions of nuclear destruction and its intense examination of early anxieties about nuclear weapons that have never been satisfactorily addressed, Oppenheimer prompts a crucial question: whether mutual deterrence, shorn of arms control and regular diplomacy and under the pressure of a major war involving nuclear powers, can still work.Key words: Atomic Energy CommissionJ. Robert OppenheimerManhattan ProjectMcCarthyismmutual assured destruction (MAD)nuclear abolitionnuclear deterrencenuclear peaceOppenheimer Notes1 See Kai Bird and Martin J. Sherwin, American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005).2 See US Department of Energy, ‘Secretary Granholm Statement on DOE Order Vacating 1954 Atomic Energy Commission Decision in the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer’, 16 December 2022, https://www.energy.gov/articles/secretary-granholmstatement-doe-order-vacating-1954-atomic-energy-commission-decision; and Barton J. Bernstein, ‘Christopher Nolan’s Forthcoming “Oppenheimer” Movie: A Historian’s Questions, Worries, and Challenges’, Washington Decoded, 11 July 2023, https://www.washingtondecoded.com/site/2023/07/bernstein.html.3 See, for example, Andy Kifer, ‘The Real History Behind Christopher Nolan’s “Oppenheimer”’, Smithsonian Magazine, 18 July 2023, https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/the-real-history-behind-christopher-nolans-oppenheimer-180982529/.4 See Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995).5 See, for example, Daryl G. Kimball, ‘“Oppenheimer”, the Bomb, and Arms Control, Then and Now’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 29 July 2023, https://thebulletin.org/2023/07/oppenheimer-the-bomb-and-arms-control-then-and-now/.6 Quoted in, for example, Richard Rhodes, ‘Robert Oppenheimer: The Myth and the Mystery’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 18 December 2018, https://thebulletin.org/2018/12/robert-oppenheimer-the-myth-and-the-mystery/.7 ‘General Advisory Committee’s Majority and Minority Reports on Building the H-Bomb: Majority Annex’, 30 October 1949, available from Atomic Archive, https://www.atomicarchive.com/resources/documents/hydrogen/gac-report.html#Minority.8 See National Security Council, ‘NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security’, 14 April 1950, https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nsc-hst/n","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134948825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-04DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2239070
Franz-Stefan Gady
The Fortress: The Great Siege of Przemyśl Alexander Watson. London: Allen Lane, 2019. £12.99. 368 pp. Four Battlegrounds: Power in the Age of Artificial Intelligence Paul Scharre. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2023. $32.50. 496 pp. Information in War: Military Innovation, Battle Networks, and the Future of Artificial Intelligence Benjamin M. Jensen, Christopher Whyte and Scott Cuomo. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2022. $49.95. 252 pp. The Origins of Victory: How Disruptive Military Innovation Determines the Fates of Great Powers Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2023. £35.00/$40.00. 549 pp. Other People’s Wars: The US Military and the Challenge of Learning from Foreign Conflicts Brent L. Sterling. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2021. $39.95. 336 pp.
{"title":"War, Conflict and the Military","authors":"Franz-Stefan Gady","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2239070","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2239070","url":null,"abstract":"The Fortress: The Great Siege of Przemyśl Alexander Watson. London: Allen Lane, 2019. £12.99. 368 pp. Four Battlegrounds: Power in the Age of Artificial Intelligence Paul Scharre. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2023. $32.50. 496 pp. Information in War: Military Innovation, Battle Networks, and the Future of Artificial Intelligence Benjamin M. Jensen, Christopher Whyte and Scott Cuomo. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2022. $49.95. 252 pp. The Origins of Victory: How Disruptive Military Innovation Determines the Fates of Great Powers Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2023. £35.00/$40.00. 549 pp. Other People’s Wars: The US Military and the Challenge of Learning from Foreign Conflicts Brent L. Sterling. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2021. $39.95. 336 pp.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":"9 1","pages":"179 - 187"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82586796","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-04DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2239058
A. Carr
Abstract Australia’s 2023 Defence Strategic Review has inaugurated a new era of ‘archipelagic deterrence’. Despite Australia’s often forward-leaning rhetoric, it has turned away from making significant military contributions in Northeast Asia or globally, and instead is building a secure bastion across its northern approaches while inviting the United States to radically expand its military presence on Australian soil. The aim of archipelagic deterrence is to deter and deny China from a coercive maritime presence in the zone from the eastern Indian Ocean, through maritime Southeast Asia and into the South Pacific. It is hoped this will help stabilise the regional balance of power. This new model of alliance cooperation better reflects enduring differences in size and interests between Washington and Canberra, and should provide a stable and effective foundation for the United States’ presence and activity in the southern Indo-Pacific.
{"title":"Australia’s Archipelagic Deterrence","authors":"A. Carr","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2239058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2239058","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Australia’s 2023 Defence Strategic Review has inaugurated a new era of ‘archipelagic deterrence’. Despite Australia’s often forward-leaning rhetoric, it has turned away from making significant military contributions in Northeast Asia or globally, and instead is building a secure bastion across its northern approaches while inviting the United States to radically expand its military presence on Australian soil. The aim of archipelagic deterrence is to deter and deny China from a coercive maritime presence in the zone from the eastern Indian Ocean, through maritime Southeast Asia and into the South Pacific. It is hoped this will help stabilise the regional balance of power. This new model of alliance cooperation better reflects enduring differences in size and interests between Washington and Canberra, and should provide a stable and effective foundation for the United States’ presence and activity in the southern Indo-Pacific.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":"1 1","pages":"79 - 100"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79833399","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-04DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2239053
Nigel Gould-Davies
Abstract The Wagner Group’s revolt against Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime, though contained, holds important implications for Russia and lessons for the West. The revolt was a full-scale crisis for the regime, reflected Putin’s extraordinary misreading of domestic realities, undermined his rule’s core rationale of bringing stability and security to Russia, exposed the brittleness of the Russian state, revealed weak support of Russian elites, demonstrated his need for mediation from a despised foreign leader, and brought to the surface the strains that the Russia–Ukraine war has imposed on the Russian polity. The two main takeaways for the West are that Putin chose compromise rather than escalation to deal with the crisis, and that over time the war is likely to impose deeper strains on Russia. It is now less clear than ever not only that Russia can win the war, but also that the regime that launched it will survive intact.
{"title":"The Wagner Revolt: Implications for Russia, Lessons for the West","authors":"Nigel Gould-Davies","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2239053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2239053","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The Wagner Group’s revolt against Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime, though contained, holds important implications for Russia and lessons for the West. The revolt was a full-scale crisis for the regime, reflected Putin’s extraordinary misreading of domestic realities, undermined his rule’s core rationale of bringing stability and security to Russia, exposed the brittleness of the Russian state, revealed weak support of Russian elites, demonstrated his need for mediation from a despised foreign leader, and brought to the surface the strains that the Russia–Ukraine war has imposed on the Russian polity. The two main takeaways for the West are that Putin chose compromise rather than escalation to deal with the crisis, and that over time the war is likely to impose deeper strains on Russia. It is now less clear than ever not only that Russia can win the war, but also that the regime that launched it will survive intact.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":"16 1","pages":"25 - 30"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81680087","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-04DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2239057
S. Tsang
Abstract Under Xi Jinping, China puts regime security and a revived ideology, ‘Xi Thought’, at the core of its foreign policy. This distorts how ‘national interest’ is calculated and impedes China from behaving in the way neoclassical realism suggests a rising superpower would behave. Xi adheres to a China-first approach. The United States and its partners could respond more effectively to China’s conduct in three main ways. Firstly, they could stop framing their competition with China as one of democracy versus authoritarianism, as this has limited appeal for the Global South. Secondly, insofar as Xi’s approach is often not conducive to his stated goals for his ‘China dream’, the US could allow him to undermine them himself. Finally, the US could adopt a foreign policy of putting the interests of the global community first, as it effectively did during the Cold War, such that America’s allies would be more willing to support the United States over China in a crisis, and other countries less prone to taking sides against the US.
{"title":"Getting China Right","authors":"S. Tsang","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2239057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2239057","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Under Xi Jinping, China puts regime security and a revived ideology, ‘Xi Thought’, at the core of its foreign policy. This distorts how ‘national interest’ is calculated and impedes China from behaving in the way neoclassical realism suggests a rising superpower would behave. Xi adheres to a China-first approach. The United States and its partners could respond more effectively to China’s conduct in three main ways. Firstly, they could stop framing their competition with China as one of democracy versus authoritarianism, as this has limited appeal for the Global South. Secondly, insofar as Xi’s approach is often not conducive to his stated goals for his ‘China dream’, the US could allow him to undermine them himself. Finally, the US could adopt a foreign policy of putting the interests of the global community first, as it effectively did during the Cold War, such that America’s allies would be more willing to support the United States over China in a crisis, and other countries less prone to taking sides against the US.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":"21 1","pages":"43 - 54"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80962801","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-04DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2239065
M. Reiss
Abstract In Decision Advantage: Intelligence in International Politics from the Spanish Armada to Cyberwar, Jennifer E. Sims seeks to correct popular misconceptions of how espionage operates and rebut the views of those who dismiss its importance in international politics. Examining several well-documented historical cases, she argues that intelligence is widely misunderstood, on the common assumption that it consists of only what intelligence institutions do. With this in mind, she concludes that the proper goal of a government in utilising intelligence should be ‘the orchestration of intelligence in light of the competitive moment’ – ‘orchestration’ being a two-way street where communications pass up and down the chain between decision-makers and intelligence professionals, whom she believes should be encouraged to express strong views. Sims understands that an intelligence community reflects the strengths and weaknesses of the society it represents, and the abilities of the officials appointed to manage it and elected to oversee it. But she remains cautiously optimistic, providing an erudite road map for how ‘decision advantage’ can be realised.
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Pub Date : 2023-07-04DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2239076
Dana H. Allin, J. Harper
Abstract The late David P. Calleo was a long-standing contributing editor to Survival and one of the most original and multifaceted scholars of his generation. An American himself, he became known as a critic of US imperial overstretch, arguing that the US hegemonic role threatened the equilibrium of both the world system and the American domestic political economy. Yet his critique embedded a deep appreciation for America’s early post-war engagements, especially in Europe. He believed Europe needed more centralised diplomatic and military structures to cultivate greater strategic autonomy, while the US system of centralised federal hegemony was increasingly dysfunctional – in effect, that Europe needed to become more like America, and America more like Europe. Calleo warned against the pitfalls of the triumphalist ‘unipolar’ world view, including the rapid enlargement of NATO with scant regard for Russian interests.
David P. Calleo是《生存》杂志的长期特约编辑,也是同代人中最具独创性和多面手的学者之一。作为一名美国人,他以批评美国帝国主义过度扩张而闻名,认为美国的霸权角色威胁到世界体系和美国国内政治经济的平衡。然而,他的批评包含了对美国战后早期参与的深刻赞赏,尤其是在欧洲。他认为,欧洲需要更集中的外交和军事结构,以培养更大的战略自主权,而美国的中央集权联邦霸权体系日益失灵——实际上,欧洲需要变得更像美国,美国也需要变得更像欧洲。卡列奥警告了必胜主义的“单极”世界观的陷阱,包括北约的迅速扩张,缺乏对俄罗斯利益的考虑。
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Pub Date : 2023-07-04DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2239060
D. Byman
Abstract States usually support terrorist groups to weaken their rivals, silence their opponents and give themselves options they otherwise lack. By providing weapons, training, a sanctuary and other support, states can make terrorist groups more deadly, increasing their skill and survivability. At the same time, states often impose constraints on their proxies, creating many difficulties for the terrorists. Iran and other enemies of the United States and its allies have long supported terrorists, and state sponsorship is likely to play a role in any continued confrontation with Russia, which may double down on existing ties to extremists given its humiliation in Ukraine and desire for revenge on its enemies. Confronting state sponsors of terrorism is difficult, however. For democracies, applying a ‘state sponsor’ label can be a powerful rhetorical, legal and policy tool. At the same time, it can often be misused, become an empty political gesture or even backfire. The ‘state sponsor’ label is highly politicised, and long-standing sponsors like Pakistan have avoided it. Clarifying what state sponsorship is, increasing the flexibility of the designation, giving policymakers more leeway on when to impose sanctions, and otherwise knowing how to better combat a state sponsor is vital.
{"title":"How to Think About State Sponsorship of Terrorism","authors":"D. Byman","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2239060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2239060","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract States usually support terrorist groups to weaken their rivals, silence their opponents and give themselves options they otherwise lack. By providing weapons, training, a sanctuary and other support, states can make terrorist groups more deadly, increasing their skill and survivability. At the same time, states often impose constraints on their proxies, creating many difficulties for the terrorists. Iran and other enemies of the United States and its allies have long supported terrorists, and state sponsorship is likely to play a role in any continued confrontation with Russia, which may double down on existing ties to extremists given its humiliation in Ukraine and desire for revenge on its enemies. Confronting state sponsors of terrorism is difficult, however. For democracies, applying a ‘state sponsor’ label can be a powerful rhetorical, legal and policy tool. At the same time, it can often be misused, become an empty political gesture or even backfire. The ‘state sponsor’ label is highly politicised, and long-standing sponsors like Pakistan have avoided it. Clarifying what state sponsorship is, increasing the flexibility of the designation, giving policymakers more leeway on when to impose sanctions, and otherwise knowing how to better combat a state sponsor is vital.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":"80 11 1","pages":"101 - 122"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87974304","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-04DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2233347
F. Heisbourg
Abstract Russia has failed to achieve its stated purpose of taking political control of Ukraine, but still appears able to sustain the war at its current level. There is no prospect that the West will recognise de jure the annexation of Crimea, Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk or Zaporizhia as part of Russia. Within the West, however, disagreement may arise on the means, pace or conditions of the restoration of full territorial integrity. If Ukraine’s counter-offensive yields meaningful gains, Ukraine and its Western partners might consider a dispensation analogous to the ‘Adenauer option’ whereby the West German chancellor deferred the reunification of Germany and secured strong security guarantees for West Germany through its membership in NATO and integration into Europe’s security architecture. Ukraine would foreswear the use of force to recover Crimea while being fast-tracked into NATO. Russia would remain the de facto occupying power in Crimea and tolerate Ukrainian membership in NATO.
{"title":"How to End a War: Some Historical Lessons for Ukraine","authors":"F. Heisbourg","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2233347","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2233347","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Russia has failed to achieve its stated purpose of taking political control of Ukraine, but still appears able to sustain the war at its current level. There is no prospect that the West will recognise de jure the annexation of Crimea, Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk or Zaporizhia as part of Russia. Within the West, however, disagreement may arise on the means, pace or conditions of the restoration of full territorial integrity. If Ukraine’s counter-offensive yields meaningful gains, Ukraine and its Western partners might consider a dispensation analogous to the ‘Adenauer option’ whereby the West German chancellor deferred the reunification of Germany and secured strong security guarantees for West Germany through its membership in NATO and integration into Europe’s security architecture. Ukraine would foreswear the use of force to recover Crimea while being fast-tracked into NATO. Russia would remain the de facto occupying power in Crimea and tolerate Ukrainian membership in NATO.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":"117 1","pages":"7 - 24"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81033391","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}