Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2172855
Agnieszka Gehringer
Abstract As the energy crisis triggered by the Russian war against Ukraine vividly demonstrates, the EU suffers from inconvenient external dependencies. The trade dependence on China, the European Union’s main source of imports, could be an acute source of strategic vulnerability for the EU economy. Given the evident risks in maintaining close economic relations with authoritarian regimes, a policy change is needed to address the EU’s trade dependence, aimed not only at shifting economic incentives for businesses but also at reconciling sustainability goals with geopolitical priorities.
{"title":"Calibrating the EU’s Trade Dependency","authors":"Agnieszka Gehringer","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2172855","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2172855","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract As the energy crisis triggered by the Russian war against Ukraine vividly demonstrates, the EU suffers from inconvenient external dependencies. The trade dependence on China, the European Union’s main source of imports, could be an acute source of strategic vulnerability for the EU economy. Given the evident risks in maintaining close economic relations with authoritarian regimes, a policy change is needed to address the EU’s trade dependence, aimed not only at shifting economic incentives for businesses but also at reconciling sustainability goals with geopolitical priorities.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":"26 1","pages":"81 - 96"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89166193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2022.2150423
James Crabtree
Abstract The United States intends to manage China’s rise by forging a new balancing coalition of ‘like-minded’ partners and by developing deeper ties with other nations in the Indo-Pacific that view themselves as broadly non-aligned. Washington hopes that closer ties to the US and its partners will stop such countries from drifting towards China. But to create these deeper relationships, the non-aligned group also needs reassurance that attempts by the like-minded partners to integrate capabilities and fashion a new regional balance of power will not tip the Indo-Pacific towards conflict. Like-minded nations will need to appreciate the risks that security initiatives like the Quad and AUKUS are perceived to create, realise that Hanoi or Jakarta is unlikely to embrace Canberra’s or Tokyo’s vision of the region’s future warmly, and be willing to make substantial material investments. Tension between integration and reassurance will inevitably endure.
{"title":"Indo-Pacific Dilemmas: The Like-minded and the Non-aligned","authors":"James Crabtree","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2022.2150423","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2022.2150423","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The United States intends to manage China’s rise by forging a new balancing coalition of ‘like-minded’ partners and by developing deeper ties with other nations in the Indo-Pacific that view themselves as broadly non-aligned. Washington hopes that closer ties to the US and its partners will stop such countries from drifting towards China. But to create these deeper relationships, the non-aligned group also needs reassurance that attempts by the like-minded partners to integrate capabilities and fashion a new regional balance of power will not tip the Indo-Pacific towards conflict. Like-minded nations will need to appreciate the risks that security initiatives like the Quad and AUKUS are perceived to create, realise that Hanoi or Jakarta is unlikely to embrace Canberra’s or Tokyo’s vision of the region’s future warmly, and be willing to make substantial material investments. Tension between integration and reassurance will inevitably endure.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":"102 1","pages":"23 - 30"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89929676","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2022.2150441
M. Rouhi
Abstract Iran’s traumatised ‘Burnt Generation’ hoped that peaceful reform would eventually bring real change in the Islamic Republic’s repressive policies and ‘morality policing’. Despite the occasional tilt towards reform, however, the clerical autocracy invariably reasserted itself with brutal crackdowns and rigged elections. But the regime could not address the root causes of popular dissatisfaction. When Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old woman from Iran’s Kurdistan region, died in custody after being arrested for improperly wearing her hijab, a national wave of protests arose. Less scarred than the Burnt Generation but still burdened with repression, corruption and international sanctions, Amini’s generation is more willing to court risk. In addition, social media have offset organisational deficits and encouraged Iranians to forge solidarity. The new generation of dissenters now seems ready to match the fervour of the regime’s supporters. This is potentially a strategic shift that could drastically change Iran’s political landscape.
{"title":"Woman, Life, Freedom in Iran","authors":"M. Rouhi","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2022.2150441","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2022.2150441","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Iran’s traumatised ‘Burnt Generation’ hoped that peaceful reform would eventually bring real change in the Islamic Republic’s repressive policies and ‘morality policing’. Despite the occasional tilt towards reform, however, the clerical autocracy invariably reasserted itself with brutal crackdowns and rigged elections. But the regime could not address the root causes of popular dissatisfaction. When Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old woman from Iran’s Kurdistan region, died in custody after being arrested for improperly wearing her hijab, a national wave of protests arose. Less scarred than the Burnt Generation but still burdened with repression, corruption and international sanctions, Amini’s generation is more willing to court risk. In addition, social media have offset organisational deficits and encouraged Iranians to forge solidarity. The new generation of dissenters now seems ready to match the fervour of the regime’s supporters. This is potentially a strategic shift that could drastically change Iran’s political landscape.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":"69 1","pages":"189 - 196"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86746631","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2022.2150427
G. Magnus
Abstract In the aftermath of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi Jinping’s principal focus will be on state and national security, while an entirely new economic- and financial-policy team, with little experience, will take charge of China’s troubled economy. Its members will have to manage several systemic problems – a debt mountain, a property bust, a rapidly ageing population, zero-COVID policies – and develop a viable new economic-development model. This would be a demanding agenda anywhere, but Xi’s China has to tackle it guided by an ever more devoutly Leninist approach to economic management, industrial policy and governance, at a time when China faces the most hostile external environment it has known since Mao Zedong, as exemplified by foreign decoupling. Although Xi’s China is capable of important accomplishments in science and technology, and of flexing its diplomatic and military muscles in defence of its interests, China’s politics may be much less capable of fixing the country’s systemic economic and financial weaknesses. The consequences of Xi Jinping’s economic programme, including an emphasis on self-reliance, promise to extend beyond China’s borders to foreign actors and countries that once benefited from its economic rise.
{"title":"The Economic Consequences of Xi Jinping","authors":"G. Magnus","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2022.2150427","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2022.2150427","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In the aftermath of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi Jinping’s principal focus will be on state and national security, while an entirely new economic- and financial-policy team, with little experience, will take charge of China’s troubled economy. Its members will have to manage several systemic problems – a debt mountain, a property bust, a rapidly ageing population, zero-COVID policies – and develop a viable new economic-development model. This would be a demanding agenda anywhere, but Xi’s China has to tackle it guided by an ever more devoutly Leninist approach to economic management, industrial policy and governance, at a time when China faces the most hostile external environment it has known since Mao Zedong, as exemplified by foreign decoupling. Although Xi’s China is capable of important accomplishments in science and technology, and of flexing its diplomatic and military muscles in defence of its interests, China’s politics may be much less capable of fixing the country’s systemic economic and financial weaknesses. The consequences of Xi Jinping’s economic programme, including an emphasis on self-reliance, promise to extend beyond China’s borders to foreign actors and countries that once benefited from its economic rise.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":"35 1","pages":"57 - 76"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76338410","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2022.2150430
W. Alberque, Benjamin Schreer
Abstract Barring a Turkish veto, Finland and Sweden will join NATO as full members prior to the Alliance’s Vilnius Summit in June 2023. Both confront several political, military and defence-industrial choices regarding their membership, with different benefits and opportunity costs for each country and the Alliance depending on whether they select a low, medium or high level of ambition. Both are likely to adopt a medium level of ambition, opening up a range of new areas for cooperation with other allies and strengthening the Alliance as a whole. A high level of ambition is not likely in the short term, given the substantial political, financial and personnel costs it would entail. Nevertheless, it could eventually materialise.
{"title":"What Kind of NATO Allies Will Finland and Sweden Be?","authors":"W. Alberque, Benjamin Schreer","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2022.2150430","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2022.2150430","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Barring a Turkish veto, Finland and Sweden will join NATO as full members prior to the Alliance’s Vilnius Summit in June 2023. Both confront several political, military and defence-industrial choices regarding their membership, with different benefits and opportunity costs for each country and the Alliance depending on whether they select a low, medium or high level of ambition. Both are likely to adopt a medium level of ambition, opening up a range of new areas for cooperation with other allies and strengthening the Alliance as a whole. A high level of ambition is not likely in the short term, given the substantial political, financial and personnel costs it would entail. Nevertheless, it could eventually materialise.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":"16 1","pages":"123 - 136"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89457894","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2022.2150429
Michael Jonsson, Johan R. Norberg
Abstract After Vladimir Putin declared a partial Russian mobilisation in late September 2022 and annexed four additional Ukrainian regions, there was little to suggest that a negotiated settlement would be possible while he remained in power. This article instead explores three possible military outcomes of the war – an outright Ukrainian or Russian military victory, and a war of attrition. As of November 2022, a Ukrainian victory, so unlikely at the outset of Russia’s invasion, is a distinct possibility, provided the West offers sufficient military materiel and training swiftly enough. Russian forces have suffered heavy casualties and are low on precision-guided munitions, with their logistics under fire and having lost much of what air dominance they had. Hence, Moscow’s battlefield fortunes hinge on whether mobilised, poorly trained and equipped forces will be able to hold defensive lines over the winter to buy time to build new, more capable units, with troop morale ever more crucial, but also brittle. A key unknown, however, is the state of Ukrainian forces. Importantly, the scale and intensity of the war, the vital interests at stake and international involvement on both sides all gravitate towards a more drawn-out war over the winter and beyond.
{"title":"Russia’s War Against Ukraine: Military Scenarios and Outcomes","authors":"Michael Jonsson, Johan R. Norberg","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2022.2150429","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2022.2150429","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract After Vladimir Putin declared a partial Russian mobilisation in late September 2022 and annexed four additional Ukrainian regions, there was little to suggest that a negotiated settlement would be possible while he remained in power. This article instead explores three possible military outcomes of the war – an outright Ukrainian or Russian military victory, and a war of attrition. As of November 2022, a Ukrainian victory, so unlikely at the outset of Russia’s invasion, is a distinct possibility, provided the West offers sufficient military materiel and training swiftly enough. Russian forces have suffered heavy casualties and are low on precision-guided munitions, with their logistics under fire and having lost much of what air dominance they had. Hence, Moscow’s battlefield fortunes hinge on whether mobilised, poorly trained and equipped forces will be able to hold defensive lines over the winter to buy time to build new, more capable units, with troop morale ever more crucial, but also brittle. A key unknown, however, is the state of Ukrainian forces. Importantly, the scale and intensity of the war, the vital interests at stake and international involvement on both sides all gravitate towards a more drawn-out war over the winter and beyond.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":"116 1","pages":"91 - 122"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89643920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2022.2150433
R. Crandall
Abstract Since the middle of the twentieth century, Fidel Castro has cast an outsized shadow over all things Cuba, as if the Cuban leader and the communist Caribbean nation were one and the same. Yet, as veteran New York Times correspondent Anthony DePalma contends in his book The Cubans: Ordinary Lives in Extraordinary Times, this reflex obfuscates the complex society that is increasingly at cross purposes with all things Fidel. The author’s keen profiles of ‘ordinary’ citizens give readers an unvarnished entry into the so often unimaginable, surreal or heart-breaking realities at the core of contemporary Cuban life.
自20世纪中叶以来，菲德尔·卡斯特罗(Fidel Castro)在古巴的所有事情上都投下了巨大的阴影，仿佛这位古巴领导人和这个加勒比共产主义国家是一体的。然而，正如《纽约时报》资深记者安东尼·德帕尔马(Anthony DePalma)在他的著作《古巴人:非凡时代的平凡生活》(The cuban: Ordinary Lives in Extraordinary Times)中所指出的那样，这种反射混淆了这个复杂的社会，这个社会与菲德尔的一切越来越格格不入。作者对“普通”公民的敏锐描写，让读者得以不加粉饰地进入当代古巴生活核心中常常难以想象、超现实或令人心碎的现实。
{"title":"Castroism in Crisis","authors":"R. Crandall","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2022.2150433","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2022.2150433","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Since the middle of the twentieth century, Fidel Castro has cast an outsized shadow over all things Cuba, as if the Cuban leader and the communist Caribbean nation were one and the same. Yet, as veteran New York Times correspondent Anthony DePalma contends in his book The Cubans: Ordinary Lives in Extraordinary Times, this reflex obfuscates the complex society that is increasingly at cross purposes with all things Fidel. The author’s keen profiles of ‘ordinary’ citizens give readers an unvarnished entry into the so often unimaginable, surreal or heart-breaking realities at the core of contemporary Cuban life.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":"49 1","pages":"153 - 166"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75333470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2022.2143083
J. Wirtz
Abstract There is a maritime logic embedded in Thucydides’ ‘Melian Dialogue’ that until now has attracted little notice; observers have instead concentrated on the deeper philosophical and moral issues highlighted by Thucydides in his tale drawn from the Peloponnesian War. Nevertheless, the maritime logic that propelled a confrontation on the island nation of Melos nearly 2,500 years ago could re-emerge in the run-up to a conflict in the Western Pacific. Allies are the strategic enabler of the US naval presence in the region, and US forces are taking steps to develop concepts and doctrine to enable operations in and along the First Island Chain. Denying access to these logistical facilities might be a political priority for China in the run-up to potential military action, and it would not be surprising if Beijing delivered a simple message to the inhabitants of the First Island Chain: stay out of it, and we will leave you out of it. All of this suggests that the idea of ‘neutrality’, as encountered in the Melian Dialogue, might again emerge during a crisis. Because the incentives to restrict US access to forward-operating bases are so clear-cut, strategists need to anticipate the emergence of ideas related to limiting the ability of US naval units to use port and air facilities in the Western Pacific.
{"title":"The Maritime Logic of the Melian Dialogue: Deterrence in the Western Pacific","authors":"J. Wirtz","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2022.2143083","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2022.2143083","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract There is a maritime logic embedded in Thucydides’ ‘Melian Dialogue’ that until now has attracted little notice; observers have instead concentrated on the deeper philosophical and moral issues highlighted by Thucydides in his tale drawn from the Peloponnesian War. Nevertheless, the maritime logic that propelled a confrontation on the island nation of Melos nearly 2,500 years ago could re-emerge in the run-up to a conflict in the Western Pacific. Allies are the strategic enabler of the US naval presence in the region, and US forces are taking steps to develop concepts and doctrine to enable operations in and along the First Island Chain. Denying access to these logistical facilities might be a political priority for China in the run-up to potential military action, and it would not be surprising if Beijing delivered a simple message to the inhabitants of the First Island Chain: stay out of it, and we will leave you out of it. All of this suggests that the idea of ‘neutrality’, as encountered in the Melian Dialogue, might again emerge during a crisis. Because the incentives to restrict US access to forward-operating bases are so clear-cut, strategists need to anticipate the emergence of ideas related to limiting the ability of US naval units to use port and air facilities in the Western Pacific.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":"48 1","pages":"43 - 56"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78576728","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2022.2150435
David C. Unger
The Rise and Fall of the Neoliberal Order: America and the World in the Free Market Era Gary Gerstle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022. £21.99/$27.95. 406 pp. Wildland: The Making of America’s Fury Evan Osnos. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2021. $30.00. 480 pp. The End of Ambition: The United States and the Third World in the Vietnam Era Mark Atwood Lawrence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2021. £28.00/$35.00. 386 pp. The Wilson Circle: President Woodrow Wilson and His Advisers Charles E. Neu. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2022. £37.00/$49.95. 273 pp. Thirteen Cracks: Repairing American Democracy After Trump Allan Lichtman. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2021. £16.99/$21.95. 211 pp.
{"title":"United States","authors":"David C. Unger","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2022.2150435","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2022.2150435","url":null,"abstract":"The Rise and Fall of the Neoliberal Order: America and the World in the Free Market Era Gary Gerstle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022. £21.99/$27.95. 406 pp. Wildland: The Making of America’s Fury Evan Osnos. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2021. $30.00. 480 pp. The End of Ambition: The United States and the Third World in the Vietnam Era Mark Atwood Lawrence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2021. £28.00/$35.00. 386 pp. The Wilson Circle: President Woodrow Wilson and His Advisers Charles E. Neu. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2022. £37.00/$49.95. 273 pp. Thirteen Cracks: Repairing American Democracy After Trump Allan Lichtman. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2021. £16.99/$21.95. 211 pp.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":"38 1","pages":"167 - 174"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88277195","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2022.2150432
Suzanne Claeys, Heather Williams
Abstract Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeated nuclear threats in connection with the war in Ukraine since Russia invaded on 24 February 2022, and senior Russian military leaders have reportedly considered when and how Moscow might use a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine. On 27 October, in this context of rising nuclear risks, the US Department of Defense released its Nuclear Posture Review. It describes the present moment as a time to prepare rather than negotiate. Although now is not the time to begin negotiations towards a formal arms-control treaty, the end of the war in Ukraine will be an important opportunity for pursuing post-crisis arms-control efforts. Meanwhile, during this arms-control interlude, the United States and its allies should lay the groundwork for future arms-control efforts.
{"title":"War and Arms Control: When to Pursue Cooperation","authors":"Suzanne Claeys, Heather Williams","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2022.2150432","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2022.2150432","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeated nuclear threats in connection with the war in Ukraine since Russia invaded on 24 February 2022, and senior Russian military leaders have reportedly considered when and how Moscow might use a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine. On 27 October, in this context of rising nuclear risks, the US Department of Defense released its Nuclear Posture Review. It describes the present moment as a time to prepare rather than negotiate. Although now is not the time to begin negotiations towards a formal arms-control treaty, the end of the war in Ukraine will be an important opportunity for pursuing post-crisis arms-control efforts. Meanwhile, during this arms-control interlude, the United States and its allies should lay the groundwork for future arms-control efforts.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":"69 1","pages":"137 - 152"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81423792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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