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Noteworthy 值得注意的
3区 社会学 Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-09-03 DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2261244
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引用次数: 0
Detect and Engage: A New American Way of War 侦测与交战:一种新的美国战争方式
3区 社会学 Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-09-03 DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2261246
David C. Gompert, Martin Libicki
AbstractThe threat that paces American force planning is not from Russia, but rather from China. This is leading to a new way of warfare. The authors call it ‘detect and engage’. The confluence of artificial intelligence, applied quantum mechanics and satellite networking permits dispersed and diverse units and platforms to operate as a unified joint force across sea, air, land and space. Cyber operations, practically indifferent to location, further enable the United States to reduce reliance on geographically concentrated and exposed forces. Advanced technology is just one step in operationalising new forms of warfare. Others include anticipating adversary responses; building robust inventories of extended-range weapons; knowing when and how to conduct close-in operations; integrating and empowering defence allies; and maintaining US forward presence. Harnessing leading-edge technology to improve global US military effectiveness reflects neither an isolationist nor an insular policy, but rather one of ongoing engagement.Key words: anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)artificial intelligence (AI)Chinacyberdetect and engagemultidomain operationsquantum technologiesRussiaspaceUnited States Notes1 See Stephen Biddle, ‘Back in the Trenches: Why New Technology Hasn’t Revolutionized Warfare in Ukraine’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 102, no. 5, September/October 2023; ‘The Future of War: A Special Report’, The Economist, 8 July 2023, https://www.economist.com/weeklyedition/2023-07-08?; and Franz-Stefan Gady and Michael Kofman, ‘Ukraine’s Strategy of Attrition’, Survival, vol. 65, no. 2, April–May 2023, pp. 7–22.2 See International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2023 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS), pp. 500–1.3 At the same time, intended vulnerabilities of the United States and its forces to cyber war may affect the viability of a strategy that assumes workable longdistance electronic communications.4 John Warden, a retired Air Force colonel and fighter pilot, has articulated the ways in which US airpower can achieve superiority and control and deliver large volumes of precision munitions at great distances, potentially gaining victory with diminished need for invading troops. See, for example, John A. Warden III, ‘Employing Air Power in the Twentyfirst Century’, in Richard H. Shultz, Jr, and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr (eds), The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1992).5 See Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade, ‘Shock & Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance’, National Defense University, Command and Control Research Program, October 1996, http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Ullman_Shock.pdf.6 Emphasising the importance of rapid decision-making is not new. Air Force officer and then consultant John Boyd coined the ‘OODA’ (observe–orient– decide–act) loop in the late twentieth century. It remains a good conception of superior command and control. See John R. Boyd, ed. Grant T. Hammond, A Disco
制约美国军事计划的威胁不是来自俄罗斯,而是来自中国。这导致了一种新的战争方式。作者称其为“发现并参与”。人工智能、应用量子力学、卫星网络等技术的融合,使分散的、多样化的单位和平台能够跨越海、空、陆、天,形成统一的联合力量。网络作战实际上与地点无关,这进一步使美国能够减少对地理上集中和暴露的力量的依赖。先进技术只是实现新型战争的一个步骤。其他包括预测对手的反应;建立强大的远程武器库存;知道何时以及如何进行近距离行动;整合和授权防务盟友;维持美国的前沿存在。利用尖端技术来提高美国的全球军事效能,既不是孤立主义政策,也不是孤立主义政策,而是一种持续接触政策。关键词:反介入/区域拒入(A2/AD)人工智能(AI)中国网络探测与参与多域作战量子技术俄罗斯空间美国注1参见Stephen Biddle,“回到战壕:为什么新技术没有彻底改变乌克兰的战争”,《外交事务》,第102卷,第2期。2023年9月/ 10月;《战争的未来:特别报告》,《经济学人》,2023年7月8日,https://www.economist.com/weeklyedition/2023-07-08?;弗兰兹-斯特凡·加迪和迈克尔·科夫曼,“乌克兰的消耗战略”,《生存》,第65卷,第65期。参见国际战略研究所(IISS),《军事平衡2023》(阿宾登:IISS的劳特利奇),第500-1.3页。与此同时,美国及其部队对网络战争的预期脆弱性可能会影响假设可行的远程电子通信战略的可行性退役空军上校兼战斗机飞行员约翰•沃登(John Warden)阐述了美国空中力量如何取得优势和控制权,并在远距离投放大量精确弹药,从而在减少入侵部队需求的情况下取得胜利。例如,参见约翰·a·沃登三世,“在21世纪使用空中力量”,载于小理查德·h·舒尔茨和小罗伯特·l·普法茨格拉夫(编),《海湾战争后空中力量的未来》(麦克斯韦空军基地,AL:空军大学出版社,1992年)见Harlan K. Ullman和James P. Wade,“震慑与敬畏:实现快速优势”,国防大学,指挥与控制研究计划,1996年10月,http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Ullman_Shock.pdf.6强调快速决策的重要性并不是新的。空军军官兼顾问约翰·博伊德在20世纪后期创造了“OODA”(观察-导向-决定-行动)循环。它仍然是高级指挥和控制的好概念。参见约翰·r·博伊德主编格兰特·t·哈蒙德,《关于输赢的论述》(麦克斯韦空军基地,AL:航空大学出版社,2018年),第217-44.7页,例如,参见国会研究服务处,“联合全域指挥与控制(JADC2)”,更新于2022年1月21日,https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF11493.pdf。关于多域作战的慎重批评,见Franz-Stefan Gady,“美国军事行动中的机动与消耗”,《生存》,第63卷,第6期。例如,参见美国国防部,“国防部长劳埃德·j·奥斯汀三世致部队的信息”,2023年3月23日,https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3316641/secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-message-to-the-force/.9对于仍需进行的广泛改革的评估,参见国防科学与技术战略审查工作组,“决定性十年的创新战略”,2023年7月17日。https://innovation.defense.gov/Portals/63/DIB_An%20Innovation%20Strategy%20for%20the%20Decisive%20Decade_230717_1.pdf.10见David C. Gompert,“Spin-on:美国如何应对中国的技术挑战”,《生存》,第62卷,第2期。“交易”优势最大化的想法是Arthur Cebrowski中将的见解,他是21世纪之交“网络中心战争”的主要先驱。参见Arthur K. Cebrowski和John H. Gartska,“以网络为中心的战争——它的起源和未来”,Proceedings, vol. 124, no。我们的假设是,不管是好是坏,对中程导弹没有军备控制限制参见Barry R. Posen,“公共指挥权:美国霸权的军事基础”,《国际安全》,第28卷,第5期。1, 2003年夏季,第5-46页。其他信息:贡献者说明 Gompert是美国海军学院的杰出客座教授、Ultratech Capital Partners的顾问、兰德公司的兼职研究员和前美国国家情报局代理局长。Martin Libicki是美国海军学院的玛丽莲和理查德·l·凯泽网络安全杰出客座教授。
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引用次数: 0
Whither Wagner? The Consequences of Prigozhin’s Mutiny and Demise 瓦格纳将走向何方?普里戈津叛变和灭亡的后果
3区 社会学 Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-09-03 DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2261245
Kimberly Marten
AbstractThe mutiny and death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of Russia’s Wagner Group paramilitary outfit, has created great uncertainty about how Russia will manage paramilitary organisations going forward. Wagner has played a key role in expanding Russian influence in the Middle East and Africa at relatively low cost, while keeping official casualty counts limited in Ukraine and Syria in particular. The group or some version of it, whether unified or fragmented, will likely continue to operate, probably under stronger control of the Russian Ministry of Defence, but with a continuing role for one or more oligarchs.Key words: AfricaLibyamutinyRussiaSyriaUkraineVladimir PutinWagner GroupYevgeny Prigozhin Notes1 See, for example, Julian E. Barnes et al., ‘Blast Likely Downed Jet and Killed Prigozhin, U.S. Officials Say’, New York Times, 24 August 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/24/us/politics/plane-crash-prigozhin-explosion.html.2 See Kimberly Marten et al., ‘Potential Russian Uses of Paramilitary Groups in Eurasia’, Center for a New American Security, September 2023.3 See, respectively, ‘Russia’s Prigozhin Admits Links to What U.S. Says Was Election-meddling Troll Farm’, Reuters, 14 February 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-prigozhin-admits-links-what-us-says-was-election-meddling-troll-farm-2023-02-14; and Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller III, ‘Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election’, vol. 1, US Department of Justice, March 2019, https://www.justice.gov/archives/sco/file/1373816/download.4 See Elena Cryst, ‘Stoking Conflict by Keystroke’, Stanford Internet Observatory, 15 December 2020, https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/africa-takedown-december-2020; and UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, ‘UK Exposes Sick Russian Troll Factory Plaguing Social Media with Kremlin Propaganda’, 1 May 2022, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-exposes-sick-russian-troll-factory-plaguing-social-media-with-kremlin-propaganda.5 For background analysis, see Kimberly Marten, ‘The GRU, Yevgeny Prigozhin, and Russia’s Wagner Group: Malign Russian Actors and Possible US Responses’, written testimony before the US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment, 7 July 2020, https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/110854/witnesses/HHRG-116-FA14-Wstate-MartenK-20200707.pdf; Kimberly Marten, ‘Russia’s Use of Semi-state Security Forces: The Case of the Wagner Group’, PostSoviet Affairs, vol. 35, no. 3, May 2019, pp. 181–204; and Kimberly Marten, ‘Russia’s Use of the Wagner Group: Definitions, Strategic Objectives, and Accountability’, written testimony before the US House of Representatives Oversight and Reform Subcommittee on National Security, 15 September 2022, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/GO/GO06/20220921/115113/HHRG-117-GO06-Wstate-MartenK-20220921.pdf.6 See András Rácz, ‘Band of Brothers: The Wagner Group and the Russian State’, Ce
摘要俄罗斯瓦格纳集团准军事组织领导人叶夫根尼·普里戈任的叛变和死亡,给俄罗斯今后如何管理准军事组织带来了很大的不确定性。瓦格纳在以相对较低的成本扩大俄罗斯在中东和非洲的影响力方面发挥了关键作用,同时在乌克兰和叙利亚的官方伤亡人数也受到限制。该集团或它的某种形式,无论是统一的还是分散的,都可能继续运作,可能在俄罗斯国防部的更强有力的控制下,但一个或多个寡头将继续发挥作用。关键词:注1参见,例如,Julian E. Barnes等人,“爆炸可能击落了喷气式飞机并杀死了Prigozhin,美国官员说”,纽约时报,2023年8月24日,https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/24/us/politics/plane-crash-prigozhin-explosion.html.2参见Kimberly Marten等人,“俄罗斯在欧亚大陆使用准军事组织的可能性”,新美国安全中心,2023年9月,分别参见。“俄罗斯的普里戈津承认与美国所说的干预选举的巨魔农场有关”,路透社,2023年2月14日,https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-prigozhin-admits-links-what-us-says-was-election-meddling-troll-farm-2023-02-14;特别顾问罗伯特·s·穆勒三世,“关于俄罗斯干涉2016年总统选举的调查报告”,第1卷,美国司法部,2019年3月,https://www.justice.gov/archives/sco/file/1373816/download.4见埃琳娜·克里斯特,“通过击键煽动冲突”,斯坦福互联网天文台,2020年12月15日,https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/africa-takedown-december-2020;和英国外交,联邦和发展办公室,“英国揭露病态的俄罗斯巨魔工厂与克里姆林宫的宣传困扰社交媒体”,2022年5月1日,https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-exposes-sick-russian-troll-factory-plaguing-social-media-with-kremlin-propaganda.5关于背景分析,见金伯利·马滕,GRU,叶夫根尼·普里戈津和俄罗斯瓦格纳集团:“恶意的俄罗斯行为者和美国可能的回应”,在美国众议院外交事务欧亚、能源和环境小组委员会面前的书面证词,2020年7月7日,https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/110854/witnesses/HHRG-116-FA14-Wstate-MartenK-20200707.pdf;金伯利·马滕,《俄罗斯对半国家安全部队的使用:瓦格纳集团的案例》,《后苏联事务》,第35卷,第35期。3, 2019年5月,第181-204页;金伯利·马滕,“俄罗斯对瓦格纳集团的利用:定义、战略目标和责任”,在美国众议院监督和改革国家安全小组委员会面前的书面证词,2022年9月15日,https://docs.house.gov/meetings/GO/GO06/20220921/115113/HHRG-117-GO06-Wstate-MartenK-20220921.pdf.6见András Rácz,“兄弟团:瓦格纳集团与俄罗斯国家”,战略与国际研究中心,2020年9月21日,https://www.csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/band-brothers-wagner-group-and-russian-state.7见Brian Katz等人,“莫斯科的雇佣军战争:“俄罗斯私营军事公司的扩张”,战略与国际研究中心,2020年9月,https://russianpmcs.csis.org/.8见俄罗斯总统,“与国防部人员会面”,2023年6月27日,http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/71535.9见“普里戈任的犯罪过去,直接从源头”,梅杜萨,2021年6月29日,https://meduza.io/en/feature/2021/06/29/prigozhin-s-criminal-past-straight-from-the-source.10见菲奥娜·希尔和克利福德·g·加迪,《普京先生:克里姆林宫的特工》(华盛顿特区:布鲁金斯学会,2013年),第163.11页。参见“新闻报道:普京说普里戈任是一个“在生活中犯了严重错误”的人才”,PBS, 2023年8月24日,https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/news-wrap-putin-says-prigozhin-was-a-talented-person-who-made-serious-mistakes-in-life;安德鲁·奥斯本,“瓦格纳老板普里戈日坠机后普京打破沉默”,路透社,2023年8月24日,https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/investigators-trawl-site-plane-crash-believed-have-killed-wagner-boss-prigozhin-2023-08-24/.12见Anastasiia Yakoreva和Svetlana Reiter,“修复者普京”perestal byt“lyubimym podryadchikom Minoborny”[“普京的餐馆老板”不再是国防部最喜欢的承包商],贝尔,2018年3月2日。https://thebell.io/restorator-putina-perestal-byt-lyubimym-podryadchikom-minoborony/.13见Ishaan Tharoor,“瓦格纳叛乱背后的叙利亚战役”,华盛顿邮报,2023年6月30日,https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/06/30/wagner-syria-russia-battle-united-states/.14见Kimberly Marten,“俄罗斯在Deir al-Zour的行为之谜”,War on The Rocks, 2018年7月5日,https://warontherocks.com/2018/07/the-puzzle-of-russian-behavior-in-deir-al-zour/。 com/2023/07/01/world/europe/russiaukraine-war.html.35https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/17/putin-shadow-warriors-stake-claimsyria-oil-energy-wagner-prigozhinlibya-middle-east/.38见Tal Beeri,“叙利亚:俄罗斯-叙利亚在天然气,油田和基础
{"title":"Whither Wagner? The Consequences of Prigozhin’s Mutiny and Demise","authors":"Kimberly Marten","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2261245","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2261245","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractThe mutiny and death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of Russia’s Wagner Group paramilitary outfit, has created great uncertainty about how Russia will manage paramilitary organisations going forward. Wagner has played a key role in expanding Russian influence in the Middle East and Africa at relatively low cost, while keeping official casualty counts limited in Ukraine and Syria in particular. The group or some version of it, whether unified or fragmented, will likely continue to operate, probably under stronger control of the Russian Ministry of Defence, but with a continuing role for one or more oligarchs.Key words: AfricaLibyamutinyRussiaSyriaUkraineVladimir PutinWagner GroupYevgeny Prigozhin Notes1 See, for example, Julian E. Barnes et al., ‘Blast Likely Downed Jet and Killed Prigozhin, U.S. Officials Say’, New York Times, 24 August 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/24/us/politics/plane-crash-prigozhin-explosion.html.2 See Kimberly Marten et al., ‘Potential Russian Uses of Paramilitary Groups in Eurasia’, Center for a New American Security, September 2023.3 See, respectively, ‘Russia’s Prigozhin Admits Links to What U.S. Says Was Election-meddling Troll Farm’, Reuters, 14 February 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-prigozhin-admits-links-what-us-says-was-election-meddling-troll-farm-2023-02-14; and Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller III, ‘Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election’, vol. 1, US Department of Justice, March 2019, https://www.justice.gov/archives/sco/file/1373816/download.4 See Elena Cryst, ‘Stoking Conflict by Keystroke’, Stanford Internet Observatory, 15 December 2020, https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/africa-takedown-december-2020; and UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, ‘UK Exposes Sick Russian Troll Factory Plaguing Social Media with Kremlin Propaganda’, 1 May 2022, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-exposes-sick-russian-troll-factory-plaguing-social-media-with-kremlin-propaganda.5 For background analysis, see Kimberly Marten, ‘The GRU, Yevgeny Prigozhin, and Russia’s Wagner Group: Malign Russian Actors and Possible US Responses’, written testimony before the US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment, 7 July 2020, https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/110854/witnesses/HHRG-116-FA14-Wstate-MartenK-20200707.pdf; Kimberly Marten, ‘Russia’s Use of Semi-state Security Forces: The Case of the Wagner Group’, PostSoviet Affairs, vol. 35, no. 3, May 2019, pp. 181–204; and Kimberly Marten, ‘Russia’s Use of the Wagner Group: Definitions, Strategic Objectives, and Accountability’, written testimony before the US House of Representatives Oversight and Reform Subcommittee on National Security, 15 September 2022, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/GO/GO06/20220921/115113/HHRG-117-GO06-Wstate-MartenK-20220921.pdf.6 See András Rácz, ‘Band of Brothers: The Wagner Group and the Russian State’, Ce","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134948821","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
One Cold War Among Many? 众多冷战中的一场?
3区 社会学 Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-09-03 DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2261273
Pierre Hassner
Pierre Hassner, who died in May 2018 at the age of 85, was a long-standing friend of the IISS and contributor to Survival. His acclaimed Adelphi paper, Change and Security in Europe, appeared in 1968. His first book review for Survival was published in 1965, and his first original article, ‘Eurocommunism and Detente’, appeared in 1977. When the journal was relaunched in 2008, he accepted our invitation to become a Contributing Editor, and regularly contributed book reviews and articles until poor health forced him to stop in 2016.One of those articles is reprinted below. We asked him to write it after the August 2008 Russian attack on Georgia, knowing that a native of pre- and Second World War Romania who emigrated with his family to France to escape communism, and who became one of France’s most celebrated and profound philosophers on the canvas of international relations, would have something wise and important to say. He did not disappoint, and it seems especially valuable to reread this early assessment of renewed tension between Russia and the West that has now, 15 years later, metastasised into full-blown hostility.
皮埃尔·哈斯纳(Pierre Hassner)于2018年5月去世,享年85岁,他是国际战略研究所的老朋友,也是《生存》杂志的贡献者。他在1968年发表的论文《欧洲的变革与安全》广受好评。他的第一篇《生存》书评于1965年出版,他的第一篇原创文章《欧洲共产主义与缓和》发表于1977年。当杂志于2008年重新启动时,他接受了我们的邀请,成为特约编辑,并定期撰写书评和文章,直到2016年他因健康状况不佳而被迫停止。其中一篇文章转载如下。我们邀请他在2008年8月俄罗斯入侵格鲁吉亚之后写这篇文章,因为我们知道,作为一个二战前和二战后的罗马尼亚人,为了逃避共产主义而举家移民到法国,并成为法国在国际关系领域最著名、最深刻的哲学家之一,他一定会有睿智而重要的言论要说。他没有让人失望,重新阅读他对俄罗斯和西方之间重新紧张关系的早期评估似乎特别有价值,15年后的今天,这种紧张关系已经演变为全面的敌意。
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引用次数: 0
Ana Montes: An (Almost) Perfect SpyCode Name Blue Wren: The True Story of America’s Most Dangerous Female Spy – and the Sister She Betrayed, Jim Popkin. New York: Hanover Square Press, 2023. $27.99. 352 pp. 安娜·蒙特斯:《近乎完美的间谍代号蓝鹪鹩:美国最危险的女间谍的真实故事——以及她背叛的妹妹》,吉姆·波普金著。纽约:汉诺威广场出版社,2023。27.99美元。352页。
3区 社会学 Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-09-03 DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2261261
Russell Crandall
AbstractArrested on 21 September 2001, Ana Montes’s life as a double agent for Cuba came as a tremendous shock to her Defense Intelligence Agency colleagues who, for more than 15 years, had esteemed the high-flying analyst for her methodical approach, self-effacing personality and brilliant mind. As journalist Jim Popkin writes in Code Name Blue Wren, Montes was a study in how to live a double life. Her betrayal of her country would be equalled only by her betrayal of her own family.Key words: Ana Belén MontesCode Name Blue WrenCubaDefense Intelligence Agency (DIA)Fidel CastroJim PopkinMarta Rita VelázquezOperación AvispaPuerto Rico Notes1 See Jim Popkin, ‘Ana Montes Did Much Harm Spying for Cuba. Chances Are, You Haven’t Heard of Her’, Washington Post, 18 April 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/feature/wp/2013/04/18/ana-montes-did-much-harm-spying-for-cuba-chances-are-you-havent-heard-of-her/.2 I discussed some of the details of Montes’s life and work in an essay published in these pages in 2013. See Russell Crandall, ‘The Cold War and Cuban Intelligence’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 4, August–September 2013, pp. 191–8. See also Popkin, ‘Ana Montes Did Much Harm Spying for Cuba’.3 See Daniel Golden, Spy School: How the FBI, CIA, and Foreign Intelligence Secretly Exploit America’s Universities (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2017).4 Carol Leonnig, ‘Transcript: Jim Popkin, Author “Code Name Blue Wren”’, Washington Post, 5 January 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/washington-post-live/2023/01/05/transcript-jim-popkin-author-code-name-blue-wren/.5 See Dina Temple-Raston, ‘Exchange of Spies Was Critical to U.S.–Cuba Deal’, NPR, 19 December 2014, https://www.npr.org/2014/12/19/371821107/exchange-of-spies-was-critical-to-u-s-cuba-deal.6 See also Lance Moore, ‘Motivations of an Ideologue: A Case Study of Cuban Spy Ana Belen Montes’, Institute of World Politics, 8 September 2019, https://www.iwp.edu/active-measures/2019/09/08/motivations-of-an-ideologue-a-case-study-of-cuban-spy-ana-belen-montes/.7 See US Department of Justice, ‘Unsealed Indictment Charges Former U.S. Federal Employee with Conspiracy to Commit Espionage for Cuba’, 25 April 2013, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/unsealed-indictment-charges-former-us-federal-employee-conspiracy-commit-espionage-cuba.8 Juliana Kim, ‘Ana Montes, Former U.S. Analyst Convicted of Spying for Cuba, Is Released from Prison’, NPR, 8 January 2023, https://www.npr.org/2023/01/08/1147741163/ana-montes-former-u-s-analyst-convicted-of-spying-for-cuba-is-released-from-pris.9 Johanna Neuman, ‘Unrepentant Spy Gets 25 Years’, Los Angeles Times, 17 October 2002, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2002-oct-17-na-spy17-story.html.10 Popkin notes that this was ‘quite a statement to share with a high schooler’ (p. 299).11 See Kim, ‘Ana Montes, Former U.S. Analyst Convicted of Spying for Cuba, Is Released from Prison’.Additional informationNotes on contributorsRussell CrandallRussell Crandall is a professor of American
安娜·蒙特斯于2001年9月21日被捕,她是古巴的双重间谍,这对她在国防情报局的同事们来说是一个巨大的打击。15年来,他们一直以她有条不紊的方法、谦逊的个性和聪明的头脑而尊敬这位雄心壮志的分析师。正如记者吉姆·波普金在《代号蓝鹪鹩》中所写,蒙特斯是一个关于如何过双重生活的研究。她对祖国的背叛,只有对自己家庭的背叛才能与之相提并论。关键词:安娜·贝尔蒙特斯代号蓝色扳手古巴国防情报局(DIA)菲德尔·卡斯特罗吉姆·波普金玛尔塔·丽塔VelázquezOperación阿维斯·波多黎各注1见吉姆·波普金,“安娜·蒙特斯为古巴从事间谍活动危害很大。”很可能,你没有听说过她”,华盛顿邮报,2013年4月18日,https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/feature/wp/2013/04/18/ana-montes-did-much-harm-spying-for-cuba-chances-are-you-havent-heard-of-her/.2我在2013年发表的一篇文章中讨论了蒙特斯生活和工作的一些细节。参见罗素·克兰德尔,“冷战与古巴情报”,《生存》,第55卷,第55期。4, 2013年8月- 9月,第191-8页。参见Popkin,“Ana Montes为古巴间谍做了很多坏事”3 .参见丹尼尔·戈尔登,《间谍学校:联邦调查局、中央情报局和外国情报机构如何秘密利用美国大学》(纽约:亨利·霍尔特公司,2017年)卡罗尔·莱尼格,“文字记录:吉姆·波普金,“代号蓝鹪鹪鸟”的作者”,华盛顿邮报,2023年1月5日,https://www.washingtonpost.com/washington-post-live/2023/01/05/transcript-jim-popkin-author-code-name-blue-wren/.5见迪娜·坦普尔-拉斯顿,“间谍交换对美古协议至关重要”,NPR, 2014年12月19日,https://www.npr.org/2014/12/19/371821107/exchange-of-spies-was-critical-to-u-s-cuba-deal.6也见兰斯·摩尔,“一个理论家的动机:案例研究古巴间谍Ana Belen蒙特斯的世界政治研究所,2019年9月8日,https://www.iwp.edu/active-measures/2019/09/08/motivations-of-an-ideologue-a-case-study-of-cuban-spy-ana-belen-montes/.7看到美国司法部(Department of Justice),“启封起诉书指控前美国联邦雇员与合谋进行间谍活动对古巴,2013年4月25日,https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/unsealed-indictment-charges-former-us-federal-employee-conspiracy-commit-espionage-cuba.8朱莉安娜金,前美国分析师安娜蒙特斯的古巴间谍,从监狱被释放的,NPR, 2023年1月8日,https://www.npr.org/2023/01/08/1147741163/ana-montes-former-u-s-analyst-convicted-of-spying-for-cuba-is-released-from-pris.9 Johanna纽曼,顽固不化的间谍被25年,洛杉矶时报,2002年10月17日,https://www.latimes.com/archives/la xpm - 2002 - 10月- 17 - na - spy17 story.html.10 Popkin指出,这是“相当声明与中学生的分享(p。299)厚见金,“安娜·蒙特斯,前美国分析员,被判为古巴间谍,从监狱释放”。作者简介拉塞尔·克兰德尔拉塞尔·克兰德尔是北卡罗来纳州戴维森学院美国外交政策和国际政治教授,也是《生存》杂志的特约编辑。他的新书是《锻造拉丁美洲:1492年至今的权力与思想简介》(罗曼&利特菲尔德出版社,2024年出版)。
{"title":"Ana Montes: An (Almost) Perfect SpyCode Name Blue Wren: The True Story of America’s Most Dangerous Female Spy – and the Sister She Betrayed, Jim Popkin. New York: Hanover Square Press, 2023. $27.99. 352 pp.","authors":"Russell Crandall","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2261261","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2261261","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractArrested on 21 September 2001, Ana Montes’s life as a double agent for Cuba came as a tremendous shock to her Defense Intelligence Agency colleagues who, for more than 15 years, had esteemed the high-flying analyst for her methodical approach, self-effacing personality and brilliant mind. As journalist Jim Popkin writes in Code Name Blue Wren, Montes was a study in how to live a double life. Her betrayal of her country would be equalled only by her betrayal of her own family.Key words: Ana Belén MontesCode Name Blue WrenCubaDefense Intelligence Agency (DIA)Fidel CastroJim PopkinMarta Rita VelázquezOperación AvispaPuerto Rico Notes1 See Jim Popkin, ‘Ana Montes Did Much Harm Spying for Cuba. Chances Are, You Haven’t Heard of Her’, Washington Post, 18 April 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/feature/wp/2013/04/18/ana-montes-did-much-harm-spying-for-cuba-chances-are-you-havent-heard-of-her/.2 I discussed some of the details of Montes’s life and work in an essay published in these pages in 2013. See Russell Crandall, ‘The Cold War and Cuban Intelligence’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 4, August–September 2013, pp. 191–8. See also Popkin, ‘Ana Montes Did Much Harm Spying for Cuba’.3 See Daniel Golden, Spy School: How the FBI, CIA, and Foreign Intelligence Secretly Exploit America’s Universities (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2017).4 Carol Leonnig, ‘Transcript: Jim Popkin, Author “Code Name Blue Wren”’, Washington Post, 5 January 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/washington-post-live/2023/01/05/transcript-jim-popkin-author-code-name-blue-wren/.5 See Dina Temple-Raston, ‘Exchange of Spies Was Critical to U.S.–Cuba Deal’, NPR, 19 December 2014, https://www.npr.org/2014/12/19/371821107/exchange-of-spies-was-critical-to-u-s-cuba-deal.6 See also Lance Moore, ‘Motivations of an Ideologue: A Case Study of Cuban Spy Ana Belen Montes’, Institute of World Politics, 8 September 2019, https://www.iwp.edu/active-measures/2019/09/08/motivations-of-an-ideologue-a-case-study-of-cuban-spy-ana-belen-montes/.7 See US Department of Justice, ‘Unsealed Indictment Charges Former U.S. Federal Employee with Conspiracy to Commit Espionage for Cuba’, 25 April 2013, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/unsealed-indictment-charges-former-us-federal-employee-conspiracy-commit-espionage-cuba.8 Juliana Kim, ‘Ana Montes, Former U.S. Analyst Convicted of Spying for Cuba, Is Released from Prison’, NPR, 8 January 2023, https://www.npr.org/2023/01/08/1147741163/ana-montes-former-u-s-analyst-convicted-of-spying-for-cuba-is-released-from-pris.9 Johanna Neuman, ‘Unrepentant Spy Gets 25 Years’, Los Angeles Times, 17 October 2002, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2002-oct-17-na-spy17-story.html.10 Popkin notes that this was ‘quite a statement to share with a high schooler’ (p. 299).11 See Kim, ‘Ana Montes, Former U.S. Analyst Convicted of Spying for Cuba, Is Released from Prison’.Additional informationNotes on contributorsRussell CrandallRussell Crandall is a professor of American","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134948829","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The AUKUS Anvil: Promise and Peril AUKUS铁砧:希望与危险
3区 社会学 Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-09-03 DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2261239
Nick Childs
The nascent Australia–United Kingdom–United States security partnership, known as AUKUS, aims to secure for the Royal Australian Navy from the US and the UK a capability in nuclear-powered submarines to bolster allied deterrence in the Pacific. The partnership’s strategic loft and immense ambition have already afforded it almost mythical status. But its pathway is hardly free of potential obstacles, which include limited defence-industrial capacities, production delays, personnel shortfalls, cost overruns and geopolitical change. If AUKUS is seen as strengthening the strategic linkage between the US and Australia, as an American endorsement of a close ally, and as Britain’s claim to great-power status, unravelling it would likely have the reverse effect. As the project unfolds, and particularly as divisive issues become more urgent, maintaining political and strategic alignments among the three capitals will inevitably become more challenging.
新生的澳大利亚-英国-美国安全伙伴关系,即AUKUS,旨在确保澳大利亚皇家海军从美国和英国获得核动力潜艇的能力,以加强太平洋地区的盟军威慑。这一合作伙伴关系的战略高度和巨大雄心,已经赋予了它近乎神话般的地位。但它的发展之路并非没有潜在的障碍,包括有限的国防工业能力、生产延迟、人员短缺、成本超支和地缘政治变化。如果AUKUS被视为加强美国和澳大利亚之间的战略联系,作为美国对亲密盟友的认可,以及英国对大国地位的要求,那么解散它可能会产生相反的效果。随着项目的展开,特别是随着分歧问题变得更加紧迫,维持三个首都之间的政治和战略联盟将不可避免地变得更具挑战性。
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引用次数: 0
Middle East 中东
3区 社会学 Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-09-03 DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2261268
Ray Takeyh
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引用次数: 0
The Meaning of ‘Strategic’ in US National-security Policy “战略性”在美国国家安全政策中的意义
3区 社会学 Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-09-03 DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2261249
Jeffrey A. Larsen, James J. Wirtz
AbstractHow is the term ‘strategic’ used today within the US Department of Defense? To address this question, the article explores the evolution of the term ‘strategic’ from the interwar period to the end of the Cold War era, when Strategic Air Command was responsible for anything deemed strategic. The contemporary use of the term is a manifestation of a growing need to integrate the activities of various commands, capabilities and operations across the Defense Department that can produce significant military or political effects. Several problems could emerge due to a lack of clarity, integration and synchronisation across the US defence establishment. The Pentagon should and could establish greater clarity in defining strategic threats, operations, systems, command relationships and deterrence.Key words: Able ArcherCold Warcyber operationsintegrated deterrencenuclear deterrencespacestrategic deterrencestrategic effectsUS Strategic Command Notes1 Colin S. Gray, The Future of Strategy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015), p. 26, emphasis in original.2 See White House, ‘National Security Strategy’, October 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/8-November-Combined-PDF-for-Upload.pdf; and US Department of Defense, ‘2022 National Defense Strategy’, 27 October 2022, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF.3 See Gray, The Future of Strategy, p. 22.4 See Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 4th ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), pp. 1–15; and Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 3–9.5 See Giulio Douhet, Command of the Air (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2019).6 See Michael E. Brown, Flying Blind: The Politics of the US Strategic Bomber Program (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 35–62; and John T. Correll, ‘Daylight Precision Bombing’, Air & Space Forces Magazine, 1 October 2008, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/1008daylight/.7 See George Quester, Deterrence Before Hiroshima: The Influence of Airpower on Modern Strategy (New York: John Wiley, 1966), p. 52.8 See Brown, Flying Blind, pp. 61–5.9 This paradox is known to undergraduates from the ‘Sagan–Waltz Debate’. See Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate, 3rd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2012).10 See Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).11 Jonathan Schell, The Fate of the Earth (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982).12 See Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 1–34.13 See Gregory S. Gilmour, ‘From SAC to STRATCOM: The Origins of Unified Command Over Nuclear Forces’, MA Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 1993, pp. 60–2, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA268609.pdf.14 Some theatre commanders also retained the authority for
摘要:“战略”一词今天在美国国防部内是如何使用的?为了解决这个问题,本文探讨了“战略”一词从两次世界大战之间到冷战末期的演变,当时战略空军司令部负责任何被视为战略的事情。这一术语的当代使用表明,越来越需要整合国防部各种指挥、能力和行动的活动,这些活动可以产生重大的军事或政治影响。由于美国国防体系缺乏明确性、一体化和同步性,可能会出现几个问题。五角大楼应该而且能够更加明确地定义战略威胁、作战、系统、指挥关系和威慑。关键词:Able archers冷战网络作战综合威慑核威慑空间战略威慑战略效果战略司令部注1科林·s·格雷:《战略的未来》(剑桥:政治出版社,2015),第26页,重点为原文参见白宫,《国家安全战略》,2022年10月,https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/8-November-Combined-PDF-for-Upload.pdf;和美国国防部,“2022年国防战略”,2022年10月27日,https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF.3见格雷,战略的未来,第22.4页见劳伦斯·弗里德曼,核战略的演变,第4版(纽约:帕尔格雷夫·麦克米伦,2019),第1-15页;劳伦斯·弗里德曼,《战略:历史》(牛津:牛津大学出版社,2013年),第3-9.5页。参见朱利奥·杜赫,《空军司令部》(麦克斯韦空军基地,AL:航空大学出版社,2019年)参见迈克尔·e·布朗,《盲目飞行:美国战略轰炸机计划的政治》(伊萨卡,纽约:康奈尔大学出版社,1992),第35-62页;和John T. Correll,“日光精确轰炸”,航空与太空部队杂志,2008年10月1日,https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/1008daylight/.7见George Quester,广岛之前的威慑:空中力量对现代战略的影响(纽约:John Wiley, 1966),第52.8页见Brown, Flying Blind,第61-5.9页这个悖论是本科生从“萨根-华尔兹辩论”中知道的。参见斯科特·d·萨根和肯尼斯·n·瓦尔兹:《核武器的扩散:一场持久的辩论》,第3版(纽约:w.w.诺顿出版社,2012)见罗伯特·杰维斯,《核革命的意义:治国之道与世界末日的前景》(伊萨卡,纽约:康奈尔大学出版社,1989)乔纳森·谢尔,《地球的命运》(纽约:阿尔弗雷德·a·克诺夫出版社,1982)参见Thomas C. Schelling,《武器与影响》(纽黑文,康涅狄格州:耶鲁大学出版社,1966),第1-34.13页。参见Gregory S. Gilmour,《从战略司令部到战略司令部:核力量统一指挥的起源》,硕士论文,海军研究生院,1993年6月,第60-2页,https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA268609.pdf.14一些战区指挥官也保留了在其职责范围内进行战术核武器规划的权力参见美国战略司令部,“历史”,https://www.stratcom.mil/About/History/.16参见詹姆斯·j·维尔茨,“网络珍珠港:有用的类比还是网络炒作?”《情报与国家安全》,第33卷,第33期。见Harald m<e:1>勒和Annette Schaper,“冷战后的美国核政策”,PRIF报告第69期,法兰克福和平研究所,2004年,https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk_downloads/prif69.pdf.19作者采访澳大利亚和英国高级官员,2022.10参见David Hackett Fischer, Paul Revere的Ride(牛津:牛津大学出版社,1995),p. 402.24 Barry Posen,无意的升级:常规战争和核风险(伊萨卡,纽约州:康奈尔大学出版社,1991)见布鲁斯·g·布莱尔,《意外核战争的逻辑》(华盛顿特区:布鲁金斯学会,1993年)参见戈登·巴拉斯,《能手83:苏联人在想什么?》,《生存》,第58卷,第1期。6、2016年12月- 2017年1月,第7-30页;和Nate Jones(编),《能手83:差点引发核战争的北约演习的秘史》(纽约:新出版社,2016).27有关统一指挥计划的更多信息,请参见Andrew Feickert,“统一指挥计划和战斗指挥:国会的背景和问题”,CRS报告R42077,国会研究处,2013年1月3日,https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R42077.pdf.28白宫,“统一指挥计划”,2021年1月13日,第3页,第10a.29段引用自Justin Katz,“Berger:改变战斗指挥结构的时间”,Breaking Defense, 2023年5月24日,https://breakingdefense。
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引用次数: 0
Economy 经济
3区 社会学 Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-09-03 DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2261267
Erik Jones
Maarten Prak and Jan Luiten van Zanden. Ian Cressie, trans. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2022. £35.00/$39.95. 280 pp.
Maarten Prak和Jan Luiten van Zanden。伊恩·克雷西,变性人。普林斯顿,新泽西州:普林斯顿大学出版社,2022。£35.00 / 39.95美元。280页。
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引用次数: 0
The Consequences of Generative AI for Democracy, Governance and War 生成式人工智能对民主、治理和战争的影响
3区 社会学 Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-09-03 DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2261260
Steven Feldstein
AbstractThe potential impact of generative AI across politics, governance and war is enormous, and is the subject of considerable speculation informed by few hard facts. Yet it is possible to identify some major challenges. They include threats to democracies by privately controlled models that gain tremendous power to shape discourse and affect democratic deliberation; enhanced surveillance and propaganda dissemination by authoritarian regimes; new capacities for criminal and terrorist actors to carry out cyber attacks and related disruptions; and transformed war planning and military operations reflecting the accelerated dehumanisation of lethal force. While new innovations historically require time to take root, generative AI is likely to be adopted swiftly. Stakeholders must formulate pragmatic approaches to manage oncoming risks.Key words: Artificial intelligence (AI)chatbotsChatGPTcyber attackslarge language model (LLM)military planningpropagandasurveillance AcknowledgementsI would like to thank Tom Carothers, Matt O’Shaughnessy and Gavin Wilde for their valuable comments and feedback, and Brian (Chun Hey) Kot for his research assistance.Notes1 See Rishi Bommasani et al., ‘On the Opportunities and Risks of Foundation Models’, Center for Research on Foundational Models, Stanford University, 12 July 2022, https://crfm.stanford.edu/assets/report.pdf; and Helen Toner, ‘What Are Generative AI, Large Language Models, and Foundation Models?’, Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University, May 2023, https://cset.georgetown.edu/article/what-are-generative-ai-large-language-models-and-foundation-models/.2 See Kevin Roose, ‘How Does ChatGPT Really Work?’, New York Times, 28 March 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/28/technology/ai-chatbots-chatgpt-bing-bard-llm.html.3 See Jordan Hoffmann et al., ‘An Empirical Analysis of Computeoptimal Large Language Model Training’, Google DeepMind, 12 April 2022, https://www.deepmind.com/blog/an-empirical-analysis-of-compute-optimal-large-language-model-training; and Pranshu Verma and Kevin Schaul, ‘See Why AI Like ChatGPT Has Gotten So Good, So Fast’, Washington Post, 24 May 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/interactive/2023/artificial-intelligence-tech-rapid-advances/.4 See Tom B. Brown et al., ‘Language Models Are Few-shot Learners’, 34th Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (Neur IPS 2020), Vancouver, Canada, 22 July 2020, https://proceedings.neurips.cc/paper/2020/file/1457c0d6bfcb4967418bfb8ac142f64a-Paper.pdf.5 See Lukas Esterle, ‘Deep Learning in Multiagent Systems’, in Alexandros Iosifidis and Anastasios Tefas (eds), Deep Learning for Robot Perception and Cognition (Cambridge, MA: Academic Press, 2022), pp. 435–60; and David Nield, ‘Supercharge Your ChatGPT Prompts with Auto-GPT’, Wired, 21 May 2023, https://www.wired.co.uk/article/chatgpt-prompts-auto-gpt. It is worth noting that the autonomy of an AI system sits on a spectrum, rather than being binary. Whi
生成式人工智能在政治、治理和战争方面的潜在影响是巨大的,并且是很少有确凿事实的大量猜测的主题。然而,我们有可能发现一些重大挑战。它们包括私人控制的模式对民主的威胁,这些模式获得了塑造话语和影响民主审议的巨大力量;独裁政权加强监视和宣传传播;犯罪分子和恐怖分子实施网络攻击和相关破坏的新能力;改变了战争计划和军事行动,反映出致命武力的加速非人化。虽然新的创新在历史上需要时间来扎根,但生成式人工智能可能会很快被采用。利益相关者必须制定务实的方法来管理即将到来的风险。关键词:人工智能(AI)聊天机器人网络攻击大语言模型(LLM)军事规划宣传监视感谢Tom Carothers, Matt O 'Shaughnessy和Gavin Wilde的宝贵意见和反馈,以及Brian (Chun Hey) Kot的研究协助。注1参见Rishi Bommasani等人,“On Opportunities and Risks of Foundation Models”,斯坦福大学基础模型研究中心,2022年7月12日,https://crfm.stanford.edu/assets/report.pdf;Helen Toner,“什么是生成式人工智能,大型语言模型和基础模型?”,乔治城大学安全与新兴技术中心,2023年5月,https://cset.georgetown.edu/article/what-are-generative-ai-large-language-models-and-foundation-models/.2参见Kevin Roose,“ChatGPT如何真正工作?”,《纽约时报》,2023年3月28日,https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/28/technology/ai-chatbots-chatgpt-bing-bard-llm.html.3见Jordan Hoffmann等人,“计算机最优大型语言模型训练的实证分析”,谷歌DeepMind, 2022年4月12日,https://www.deepmind.com/blog/an-empirical-analysis-of-compute-optimal-large-language-model-training;和Pranshu Verma和Kevin Schaul,“看看为什么像ChatGPT这样的人工智能变得如此好,如此快”,华盛顿邮报,2023年5月24日,https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/interactive/2023/artificial-intelligence-tech-rapid-advances/.4见Tom B. Brown等人,“语言模型是几次学习”,第34届神经信息处理系统会议(Neur IPS 2020),加拿大温哥华,2020年7月22日。https://proceedings.neurips.cc/paper/2020/file/1457c0d6bfcb4967418bfb8ac142f64a-Paper.pdf.5见Lukas Esterle,“多智能体系统中的深度学习”,Alexandros Iosifidis和Anastasios Tefas(主编),机器人感知和认知的深度学习(剑桥,MA:学术出版社,2022),第435-60页;和David Nield,“用Auto-GPT增压您的ChatGPT提示”,Wired, 2023年5月21日,https://www.wired.co.uk/article/chatgpt-prompts-auto-gpt。值得注意的是,人工智能系统的自主性位于一个频谱上,而不是二元的。虽然开发人员的目标是提高人工智能系统完成日益复杂任务的能力,但这将是一个缓慢的进化过程,而不是能力的突然跃升参见Chloe Xiang,“开发人员正在连接多个AI代理以制造更多“自主”AI”,Vice, 2023年4月4日,https://www.vice.com/en/article/epvdme/developers-are-connecting-multiple-ai-agents-to-make-more-autonomous-ai.7参见Mark Sullivan,“Auto-GPT和BabyAGI:“自主代理”如何将生成式人工智能带给大众”,Fast Company, 2023年4月13日,https://www.fastcompany.com/90880294/auto-gpt-and-babyagi-how-autonomous-agents-are-bringing-generative-ai-to-the-masses.8参见Josh Zumbrun,“为什么ChatGPT在基础数学上变得越来越愚蠢”,华尔街日报,2023年8月4日,https://www.wsj.com/articles/chatgpt-openai-math-artificial-intelligence-8aba83f0.9参见,例如,Tristan Bove,《比尔·盖茨说,人工智能革命意味着每个人都将拥有自己的“白领”私人助理》,《财富》,2023年5月6日,https://fortune.com/2023/03/22/bill-gates-ai-work-productivity-personal-assistants-chatgpt/.10加里·马库斯,《参议院证词》,美国参议院司法委员会,隐私、技术和法律小组委员会,第118届国会,2023年5月16日,https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2023-05-16%20-%20Testimony%20-%20Marcus.pdf.11见戴维·阿尔巴,彭博社,2022年12月8日,https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2022-12-08/chatgpt-open-ai-s-chatbot-is-spitting-out-biased-sexist-results.12见Emily M. Bender等人,“关于随机鹦鹉的危险:语言模型会太大吗?, 2021年ACM公平,问责制和透明度会议论文集,2021年3月,第610-23页,https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3442188.3445922.13 Hannes Bajohr,“谁控制语言模型就控制政治”,2023年4月8日,https://hannesbajohr。 德/ en / 2023/04/08 / whoever-controls-language-models-controls-politics / .14点同上15参见史蒂文·费尔德斯坦,“评估欧洲制定人工智能法规的努力:这将如何影响全球规范?”民主化,2023年,第1-18.16见凯琳·德夫林和约书亚·奇塔姆,“假特朗普被捕照片:如何发现人工智能生成的图像”,BBC新闻,2023年3月24日,https://ww
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