Pub Date : 2023-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2285609
E. Kapstein
Abstract Economic conflicts among military allies may undermine their strategic alignment. Economic disputes in a wide range of areas – from weapons procurement to international trade to access to natural resources – go back to the very beginning of NATO. In recognition of these challenges, Article 2 of the NATO treaty calls upon the member states to ‘eliminate conflict in their … economic policies’. Examining the causes of such conflicts and efforts to resolve them hold the promise of yielding policy-relevant insights for contemporary public officials and defence strategists as they navigate the current geopolitical environment, including ‘de-risking’ economic relations with a more assertive China. One ally may need to make ‘side-payments’ to others in order to maintain strategic alignment on key security issues.
{"title":"Military Allies and Economic Conflict","authors":"E. Kapstein","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2285609","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2285609","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Economic conflicts among military allies may undermine their strategic alignment. Economic disputes in a wide range of areas – from weapons procurement to international trade to access to natural resources – go back to the very beginning of NATO. In recognition of these challenges, Article 2 of the NATO treaty calls upon the member states to ‘eliminate conflict in their … economic policies’. Examining the causes of such conflicts and efforts to resolve them hold the promise of yielding policy-relevant insights for contemporary public officials and defence strategists as they navigate the current geopolitical environment, including ‘de-risking’ economic relations with a more assertive China. One ally may need to make ‘side-payments’ to others in order to maintain strategic alignment on key security issues.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":"11 1","pages":"179 - 192"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139291036","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2285616
Dana H. Allin
Abstract Hamas launched its shocking infiltration of Israel and massacre of Israelis exactly a half century after the surprise attack by Egyptian and Syrian forces on Yom Kippur in 1973. The parallels with respect to America’s role, however, are potentially misleading. While strongly supporting Israel, the Biden administration has tried to summon the political imagination and diplomatic patience to conjure a better future from disaster – something the Nixon administration and its successors managed to do in the 1970s. But 50 years with no net progress on the Palestinian question have left Israel, and by extension the US, with fewer sympathisers. The longer this war continues and the more civilians it kills, the greater the reputational damage to both countries. Whether the US and its allies can emerge from the Gaza crisis in a stronger position – as they did from the Yom Kippur War – is a question at which history can only hint.
{"title":"Applying History: Gaza and the Twentieth Century","authors":"Dana H. Allin","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2285616","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2285616","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Hamas launched its shocking infiltration of Israel and massacre of Israelis exactly a half century after the surprise attack by Egyptian and Syrian forces on Yom Kippur in 1973. The parallels with respect to America’s role, however, are potentially misleading. While strongly supporting Israel, the Biden administration has tried to summon the political imagination and diplomatic patience to conjure a better future from disaster – something the Nixon administration and its successors managed to do in the 1970s. But 50 years with no net progress on the Palestinian question have left Israel, and by extension the US, with fewer sympathisers. The longer this war continues and the more civilians it kills, the greater the reputational damage to both countries. Whether the US and its allies can emerge from the Gaza crisis in a stronger position – as they did from the Yom Kippur War – is a question at which history can only hint.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":"22 1","pages":"223 - 230"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139290433","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2285600
Steven Simon, Jonathan Stevenson
Abstract In responding to Hamas’s devastating 7 October 2023 attack on Israel, the United States has two strategic interests: a geopolitical interest in preventing the conflict from widening; and a reputational interest in forestalling an even worse humanitarian catastrophe. Although the Biden administration has not questioned whether Israel should act decisively, it has counselled caution and deliberation to buy time for hostage negotiations and to minimise civilian casualties while deploying US military assets to deter Iran and Hizbullah from directly initiating hostilities against Israel. The unprecedented horror of the attack makes the argument for Israeli restraint more difficult to make, but questions will undoubtedly arise as to how the US can move Israel away from a maximally aggressive posture to preserve its bona fides with the rest of the world, including some American voters. The US would best cast the crisis as an urgent prompt to a more agreeable future based on an affirmative, multilateral plan.
{"title":"The Gaza Horror and US Policy","authors":"Steven Simon, Jonathan Stevenson","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2285600","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2285600","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In responding to Hamas’s devastating 7 October 2023 attack on Israel, the United States has two strategic interests: a geopolitical interest in preventing the conflict from widening; and a reputational interest in forestalling an even worse humanitarian catastrophe. Although the Biden administration has not questioned whether Israel should act decisively, it has counselled caution and deliberation to buy time for hostage negotiations and to minimise civilian casualties while deploying US military assets to deter Iran and Hizbullah from directly initiating hostilities against Israel. The unprecedented horror of the attack makes the argument for Israeli restraint more difficult to make, but questions will undoubtedly arise as to how the US can move Israel away from a maximally aggressive posture to preserve its bona fides with the rest of the world, including some American voters. The US would best cast the crisis as an urgent prompt to a more agreeable future based on an affirmative, multilateral plan.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":"9 1","pages":"37 - 56"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139290454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-03DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2261243
James M. Cowan
AbstractSince the United States withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021 and the Taliban quickly took over the country, Western governments, including the United Kingdom, have been reluctant to engage with an Islamist regime that has hosted al-Qaeda and trampled on human rights. Under the Taliban, however, violence, corruption and narcotics traffic appear to have been dramatically reduced. The Taliban regime has also established a reasonable level of security and cracked down on corruption. Completely isolating the regime could have perverse security as well as humanitarian consequences. Short of another invasion and occupation, there is no prospect of a secular, Western-style government re-emerging. Through discreet engagement, the West should try to nudge the current regime away from its unworldly posture towards a more pragmatic one.Key words: Afghanistanal-QaedaEuropean UnionHALO TrustIslamic State – Khorasan ProvinceTalibanTobias EllwoodUnited KingdomUnited NationsUnited States Notes1 See Arne Strand and Astrid Suhrke, ‘Quiet Engagement with the Taliban’, Survival, vol. 63, no. 5, October– November 2021, pp. 35–46.2 The Daily Mail has preserved the video for posterity. See ‘Tory MP Ellwood Hails “Transformation” of Afghanistan by the Taliban’, Daily Mail, 17 July 2023, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/video/news/video-2981441/Video-Tory-MP-Ellwood-hails-transformation-Afghanistan-Taliban.html.3 See, for example, Toby Dodge, ‘Afghanistan and the Failure of Liberal Peacebuilding’, Survival, vol. 63, no. 5, October–November 2021, pp. 47–58; and Laurel Miller, ‘Biden’s Afghanistan Withdrawal: A Verdict on the Limits of American Power’, Survival, vol. 63, no. 3, June–July 2021, pp. 37–44.4 See Laurel Miller, ‘Protecting US Interests in Afghanistan’, Survival, vol. 64, no. 2, April–May 2022, pp. 25–34; and Graeme Smith and Ibraheem Bahiss, ‘The World Has No Choice But to Work with the Taliban’, Foreign Affairs, 11 August 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/afghanistan/world-has-no-choice-work-taliban.Additional informationNotes on contributorsJames M. CowanMajor General (Retd) James M. Cowan is CEO of the HALO Trust and the former commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Helmand province. An earlier version of this essay appeared on the Survival Editors’ Blog on 14 August 2023 at https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/survival-online/2023/08/should-the-uk-engage-with-the-taliban-government/.
{"title":"Calibrating Engagement with the Taliban","authors":"James M. Cowan","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2261243","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2261243","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractSince the United States withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021 and the Taliban quickly took over the country, Western governments, including the United Kingdom, have been reluctant to engage with an Islamist regime that has hosted al-Qaeda and trampled on human rights. Under the Taliban, however, violence, corruption and narcotics traffic appear to have been dramatically reduced. The Taliban regime has also established a reasonable level of security and cracked down on corruption. Completely isolating the regime could have perverse security as well as humanitarian consequences. Short of another invasion and occupation, there is no prospect of a secular, Western-style government re-emerging. Through discreet engagement, the West should try to nudge the current regime away from its unworldly posture towards a more pragmatic one.Key words: Afghanistanal-QaedaEuropean UnionHALO TrustIslamic State – Khorasan ProvinceTalibanTobias EllwoodUnited KingdomUnited NationsUnited States Notes1 See Arne Strand and Astrid Suhrke, ‘Quiet Engagement with the Taliban’, Survival, vol. 63, no. 5, October– November 2021, pp. 35–46.2 The Daily Mail has preserved the video for posterity. See ‘Tory MP Ellwood Hails “Transformation” of Afghanistan by the Taliban’, Daily Mail, 17 July 2023, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/video/news/video-2981441/Video-Tory-MP-Ellwood-hails-transformation-Afghanistan-Taliban.html.3 See, for example, Toby Dodge, ‘Afghanistan and the Failure of Liberal Peacebuilding’, Survival, vol. 63, no. 5, October–November 2021, pp. 47–58; and Laurel Miller, ‘Biden’s Afghanistan Withdrawal: A Verdict on the Limits of American Power’, Survival, vol. 63, no. 3, June–July 2021, pp. 37–44.4 See Laurel Miller, ‘Protecting US Interests in Afghanistan’, Survival, vol. 64, no. 2, April–May 2022, pp. 25–34; and Graeme Smith and Ibraheem Bahiss, ‘The World Has No Choice But to Work with the Taliban’, Foreign Affairs, 11 August 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/afghanistan/world-has-no-choice-work-taliban.Additional informationNotes on contributorsJames M. CowanMajor General (Retd) James M. Cowan is CEO of the HALO Trust and the former commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Helmand province. An earlier version of this essay appeared on the Survival Editors’ Blog on 14 August 2023 at https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/survival-online/2023/08/should-the-uk-engage-with-the-taliban-government/.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134948823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-03DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2261246
David C. Gompert, Martin Libicki
AbstractThe threat that paces American force planning is not from Russia, but rather from China. This is leading to a new way of warfare. The authors call it ‘detect and engage’. The confluence of artificial intelligence, applied quantum mechanics and satellite networking permits dispersed and diverse units and platforms to operate as a unified joint force across sea, air, land and space. Cyber operations, practically indifferent to location, further enable the United States to reduce reliance on geographically concentrated and exposed forces. Advanced technology is just one step in operationalising new forms of warfare. Others include anticipating adversary responses; building robust inventories of extended-range weapons; knowing when and how to conduct close-in operations; integrating and empowering defence allies; and maintaining US forward presence. Harnessing leading-edge technology to improve global US military effectiveness reflects neither an isolationist nor an insular policy, but rather one of ongoing engagement.Key words: anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)artificial intelligence (AI)Chinacyberdetect and engagemultidomain operationsquantum technologiesRussiaspaceUnited States Notes1 See Stephen Biddle, ‘Back in the Trenches: Why New Technology Hasn’t Revolutionized Warfare in Ukraine’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 102, no. 5, September/October 2023; ‘The Future of War: A Special Report’, The Economist, 8 July 2023, https://www.economist.com/weeklyedition/2023-07-08?; and Franz-Stefan Gady and Michael Kofman, ‘Ukraine’s Strategy of Attrition’, Survival, vol. 65, no. 2, April–May 2023, pp. 7–22.2 See International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2023 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS), pp. 500–1.3 At the same time, intended vulnerabilities of the United States and its forces to cyber war may affect the viability of a strategy that assumes workable longdistance electronic communications.4 John Warden, a retired Air Force colonel and fighter pilot, has articulated the ways in which US airpower can achieve superiority and control and deliver large volumes of precision munitions at great distances, potentially gaining victory with diminished need for invading troops. See, for example, John A. Warden III, ‘Employing Air Power in the Twentyfirst Century’, in Richard H. Shultz, Jr, and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr (eds), The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1992).5 See Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade, ‘Shock & Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance’, National Defense University, Command and Control Research Program, October 1996, http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Ullman_Shock.pdf.6 Emphasising the importance of rapid decision-making is not new. Air Force officer and then consultant John Boyd coined the ‘OODA’ (observe–orient– decide–act) loop in the late twentieth century. It remains a good conception of superior command and control. See John R. Boyd, ed. Grant T. Hammond, A Disco
制约美国军事计划的威胁不是来自俄罗斯，而是来自中国。这导致了一种新的战争方式。作者称其为“发现并参与”。人工智能、应用量子力学、卫星网络等技术的融合，使分散的、多样化的单位和平台能够跨越海、空、陆、天，形成统一的联合力量。网络作战实际上与地点无关，这进一步使美国能够减少对地理上集中和暴露的力量的依赖。先进技术只是实现新型战争的一个步骤。其他包括预测对手的反应;建立强大的远程武器库存;知道何时以及如何进行近距离行动;整合和授权防务盟友;维持美国的前沿存在。利用尖端技术来提高美国的全球军事效能，既不是孤立主义政策，也不是孤立主义政策，而是一种持续接触政策。关键词:反介入/区域拒入(A2/AD)人工智能(AI)中国网络探测与参与多域作战量子技术俄罗斯空间美国注1参见Stephen Biddle，“回到战壕:为什么新技术没有彻底改变乌克兰的战争”，《外交事务》，第102卷，第2期。2023年9月/ 10月;《战争的未来:特别报告》，《经济学人》，2023年7月8日，https://www.economist.com/weeklyedition/2023-07-08?;弗兰兹-斯特凡·加迪和迈克尔·科夫曼，“乌克兰的消耗战略”，《生存》，第65卷，第65期。参见国际战略研究所(IISS)，《军事平衡2023》(阿宾登:IISS的劳特利奇)，第500-1.3页。与此同时，美国及其部队对网络战争的预期脆弱性可能会影响假设可行的远程电子通信战略的可行性退役空军上校兼战斗机飞行员约翰•沃登(John Warden)阐述了美国空中力量如何取得优势和控制权，并在远距离投放大量精确弹药，从而在减少入侵部队需求的情况下取得胜利。例如，参见约翰·a·沃登三世，“在21世纪使用空中力量”，载于小理查德·h·舒尔茨和小罗伯特·l·普法茨格拉夫(编)，《海湾战争后空中力量的未来》(麦克斯韦空军基地，AL:空军大学出版社，1992年)见Harlan K. Ullman和James P. Wade，“震慑与敬畏:实现快速优势”，国防大学，指挥与控制研究计划，1996年10月，http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Ullman_Shock.pdf.6强调快速决策的重要性并不是新的。空军军官兼顾问约翰·博伊德在20世纪后期创造了“OODA”(观察-导向-决定-行动)循环。它仍然是高级指挥和控制的好概念。参见约翰·r·博伊德主编格兰特·t·哈蒙德，《关于输赢的论述》(麦克斯韦空军基地，AL:航空大学出版社，2018年)，第217-44.7页，例如，参见国会研究服务处，“联合全域指挥与控制(JADC2)”，更新于2022年1月21日，https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF11493.pdf。关于多域作战的慎重批评，见Franz-Stefan Gady，“美国军事行动中的机动与消耗”，《生存》，第63卷，第6期。例如，参见美国国防部，“国防部长劳埃德·j·奥斯汀三世致部队的信息”，2023年3月23日，https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3316641/secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-message-to-the-force/.9对于仍需进行的广泛改革的评估，参见国防科学与技术战略审查工作组，“决定性十年的创新战略”，2023年7月17日。https://innovation.defense.gov/Portals/63/DIB_An%20Innovation%20Strategy%20for%20the%20Decisive%20Decade_230717_1.pdf.10见David C. Gompert，“Spin-on:美国如何应对中国的技术挑战”，《生存》，第62卷，第2期。“交易”优势最大化的想法是Arthur Cebrowski中将的见解，他是21世纪之交“网络中心战争”的主要先驱。参见Arthur K. Cebrowski和John H. Gartska，“以网络为中心的战争——它的起源和未来”，Proceedings, vol. 124, no。我们的假设是，不管是好是坏，对中程导弹没有军备控制限制参见Barry R. Posen，“公共指挥权:美国霸权的军事基础”，《国际安全》，第28卷，第5期。1, 2003年夏季，第5-46页。其他信息:贡献者说明 Gompert是美国海军学院的杰出客座教授、Ultratech Capital Partners的顾问、兰德公司的兼职研究员和前美国国家情报局代理局长。Martin Libicki是美国海军学院的玛丽莲和理查德·l·凯泽网络安全杰出客座教授。
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Pub Date : 2023-09-03DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2261245
Kimberly Marten
AbstractThe mutiny and death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of Russia’s Wagner Group paramilitary outfit, has created great uncertainty about how Russia will manage paramilitary organisations going forward. Wagner has played a key role in expanding Russian influence in the Middle East and Africa at relatively low cost, while keeping official casualty counts limited in Ukraine and Syria in particular. The group or some version of it, whether unified or fragmented, will likely continue to operate, probably under stronger control of the Russian Ministry of Defence, but with a continuing role for one or more oligarchs.Key words: AfricaLibyamutinyRussiaSyriaUkraineVladimir PutinWagner GroupYevgeny Prigozhin Notes1 See, for example, Julian E. Barnes et al., ‘Blast Likely Downed Jet and Killed Prigozhin, U.S. Officials Say’, New York Times, 24 August 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/24/us/politics/plane-crash-prigozhin-explosion.html.2 See Kimberly Marten et al., ‘Potential Russian Uses of Paramilitary Groups in Eurasia’, Center for a New American Security, September 2023.3 See, respectively, ‘Russia’s Prigozhin Admits Links to What U.S. Says Was Election-meddling Troll Farm’, Reuters, 14 February 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-prigozhin-admits-links-what-us-says-was-election-meddling-troll-farm-2023-02-14; and Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller III, ‘Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election’, vol. 1, US Department of Justice, March 2019, https://www.justice.gov/archives/sco/file/1373816/download.4 See Elena Cryst, ‘Stoking Conflict by Keystroke’, Stanford Internet Observatory, 15 December 2020, https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/africa-takedown-december-2020; and UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, ‘UK Exposes Sick Russian Troll Factory Plaguing Social Media with Kremlin Propaganda’, 1 May 2022, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-exposes-sick-russian-troll-factory-plaguing-social-media-with-kremlin-propaganda.5 For background analysis, see Kimberly Marten, ‘The GRU, Yevgeny Prigozhin, and Russia’s Wagner Group: Malign Russian Actors and Possible US Responses’, written testimony before the US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment, 7 July 2020, https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/110854/witnesses/HHRG-116-FA14-Wstate-MartenK-20200707.pdf; Kimberly Marten, ‘Russia’s Use of Semi-state Security Forces: The Case of the Wagner Group’, PostSoviet Affairs, vol. 35, no. 3, May 2019, pp. 181–204; and Kimberly Marten, ‘Russia’s Use of the Wagner Group: Definitions, Strategic Objectives, and Accountability’, written testimony before the US House of Representatives Oversight and Reform Subcommittee on National Security, 15 September 2022, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/GO/GO06/20220921/115113/HHRG-117-GO06-Wstate-MartenK-20220921.pdf.6 See András Rácz, ‘Band of Brothers: The Wagner Group and the Russian State’, Ce
摘要俄罗斯瓦格纳集团准军事组织领导人叶夫根尼·普里戈任的叛变和死亡，给俄罗斯今后如何管理准军事组织带来了很大的不确定性。瓦格纳在以相对较低的成本扩大俄罗斯在中东和非洲的影响力方面发挥了关键作用，同时在乌克兰和叙利亚的官方伤亡人数也受到限制。该集团或它的某种形式，无论是统一的还是分散的，都可能继续运作，可能在俄罗斯国防部的更强有力的控制下，但一个或多个寡头将继续发挥作用。关键词:注1参见，例如，Julian E. Barnes等人，“爆炸可能击落了喷气式飞机并杀死了Prigozhin，美国官员说”，纽约时报，2023年8月24日，https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/24/us/politics/plane-crash-prigozhin-explosion.html.2参见Kimberly Marten等人，“俄罗斯在欧亚大陆使用准军事组织的可能性”，新美国安全中心，2023年9月，分别参见。“俄罗斯的普里戈津承认与美国所说的干预选举的巨魔农场有关”，路透社，2023年2月14日，https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-prigozhin-admits-links-what-us-says-was-election-meddling-troll-farm-2023-02-14;特别顾问罗伯特·s·穆勒三世，“关于俄罗斯干涉2016年总统选举的调查报告”，第1卷，美国司法部，2019年3月，https://www.justice.gov/archives/sco/file/1373816/download.4见埃琳娜·克里斯特，“通过击键煽动冲突”，斯坦福互联网天文台，2020年12月15日，https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/africa-takedown-december-2020;和英国外交，联邦和发展办公室，“英国揭露病态的俄罗斯巨魔工厂与克里姆林宫的宣传困扰社交媒体”，2022年5月1日，https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-exposes-sick-russian-troll-factory-plaguing-social-media-with-kremlin-propaganda.5关于背景分析，见金伯利·马滕，GRU，叶夫根尼·普里戈津和俄罗斯瓦格纳集团:“恶意的俄罗斯行为者和美国可能的回应”，在美国众议院外交事务欧亚、能源和环境小组委员会面前的书面证词，2020年7月7日，https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/110854/witnesses/HHRG-116-FA14-Wstate-MartenK-20200707.pdf;金伯利·马滕，《俄罗斯对半国家安全部队的使用:瓦格纳集团的案例》，《后苏联事务》，第35卷，第35期。3, 2019年5月，第181-204页;金伯利·马滕，“俄罗斯对瓦格纳集团的利用:定义、战略目标和责任”，在美国众议院监督和改革国家安全小组委员会面前的书面证词，2022年9月15日，https://docs.house.gov/meetings/GO/GO06/20220921/115113/HHRG-117-GO06-Wstate-MartenK-20220921.pdf.6见András Rácz，“兄弟团:瓦格纳集团与俄罗斯国家”，战略与国际研究中心，2020年9月21日，https://www.csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/band-brothers-wagner-group-and-russian-state.7见Brian Katz等人，“莫斯科的雇佣军战争:“俄罗斯私营军事公司的扩张”，战略与国际研究中心，2020年9月，https://russianpmcs.csis.org/.8见俄罗斯总统，“与国防部人员会面”，2023年6月27日，http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/71535.9见“普里戈任的犯罪过去，直接从源头”，梅杜萨，2021年6月29日，https://meduza.io/en/feature/2021/06/29/prigozhin-s-criminal-past-straight-from-the-source.10见菲奥娜·希尔和克利福德·g·加迪，《普京先生:克里姆林宫的特工》(华盛顿特区:布鲁金斯学会，2013年)，第163.11页。参见“新闻报道:普京说普里戈任是一个“在生活中犯了严重错误”的人才”，PBS, 2023年8月24日，https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/news-wrap-putin-says-prigozhin-was-a-talented-person-who-made-serious-mistakes-in-life;安德鲁·奥斯本，“瓦格纳老板普里戈日坠机后普京打破沉默”，路透社，2023年8月24日，https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/investigators-trawl-site-plane-crash-believed-have-killed-wagner-boss-prigozhin-2023-08-24/.12见Anastasiia Yakoreva和Svetlana Reiter，“修复者普京”perestal byt“lyubimym podryadchikom Minoborny”[“普京的餐馆老板”不再是国防部最喜欢的承包商]，贝尔，2018年3月2日。https://thebell.io/restorator-putina-perestal-byt-lyubimym-podryadchikom-minoborony/.13见Ishaan Tharoor，“瓦格纳叛乱背后的叙利亚战役”，华盛顿邮报，2023年6月30日，https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/06/30/wagner-syria-russia-battle-united-states/.14见Kimberly Marten，“俄罗斯在Deir al-Zour的行为之谜”，War on The Rocks, 2018年7月5日，https://warontherocks.com/2018/07/the-puzzle-of-russian-behavior-in-deir-al-zour/。 com/2023/07/01/world/europe/russiaukraine-war.html.35https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/17/putin-shadow-warriors-stake-claimsyria-oil-energy-wagner-prigozhinlibya-middle-east/.38见Tal Beeri，“叙利亚:俄罗斯-叙利亚在天然气，油田和基础
{"title":"Whither Wagner? The Consequences of Prigozhin’s Mutiny and Demise","authors":"Kimberly Marten","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2261245","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2261245","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractThe mutiny and death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of Russia’s Wagner Group paramilitary outfit, has created great uncertainty about how Russia will manage paramilitary organisations going forward. Wagner has played a key role in expanding Russian influence in the Middle East and Africa at relatively low cost, while keeping official casualty counts limited in Ukraine and Syria in particular. The group or some version of it, whether unified or fragmented, will likely continue to operate, probably under stronger control of the Russian Ministry of Defence, but with a continuing role for one or more oligarchs.Key words: AfricaLibyamutinyRussiaSyriaUkraineVladimir PutinWagner GroupYevgeny Prigozhin Notes1 See, for example, Julian E. Barnes et al., ‘Blast Likely Downed Jet and Killed Prigozhin, U.S. Officials Say’, New York Times, 24 August 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/24/us/politics/plane-crash-prigozhin-explosion.html.2 See Kimberly Marten et al., ‘Potential Russian Uses of Paramilitary Groups in Eurasia’, Center for a New American Security, September 2023.3 See, respectively, ‘Russia’s Prigozhin Admits Links to What U.S. Says Was Election-meddling Troll Farm’, Reuters, 14 February 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-prigozhin-admits-links-what-us-says-was-election-meddling-troll-farm-2023-02-14; and Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller III, ‘Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election’, vol. 1, US Department of Justice, March 2019, https://www.justice.gov/archives/sco/file/1373816/download.4 See Elena Cryst, ‘Stoking Conflict by Keystroke’, Stanford Internet Observatory, 15 December 2020, https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/africa-takedown-december-2020; and UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, ‘UK Exposes Sick Russian Troll Factory Plaguing Social Media with Kremlin Propaganda’, 1 May 2022, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-exposes-sick-russian-troll-factory-plaguing-social-media-with-kremlin-propaganda.5 For background analysis, see Kimberly Marten, ‘The GRU, Yevgeny Prigozhin, and Russia’s Wagner Group: Malign Russian Actors and Possible US Responses’, written testimony before the US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment, 7 July 2020, https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/110854/witnesses/HHRG-116-FA14-Wstate-MartenK-20200707.pdf; Kimberly Marten, ‘Russia’s Use of Semi-state Security Forces: The Case of the Wagner Group’, PostSoviet Affairs, vol. 35, no. 3, May 2019, pp. 181–204; and Kimberly Marten, ‘Russia’s Use of the Wagner Group: Definitions, Strategic Objectives, and Accountability’, written testimony before the US House of Representatives Oversight and Reform Subcommittee on National Security, 15 September 2022, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/GO/GO06/20220921/115113/HHRG-117-GO06-Wstate-MartenK-20220921.pdf.6 See András Rácz, ‘Band of Brothers: The Wagner Group and the Russian State’, Ce","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134948821","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-03DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2261273
Pierre Hassner
Pierre Hassner, who died in May 2018 at the age of 85, was a long-standing friend of the IISS and contributor to Survival. His acclaimed Adelphi paper, Change and Security in Europe, appeared in 1968. His first book review for Survival was published in 1965, and his first original article, ‘Eurocommunism and Detente’, appeared in 1977. When the journal was relaunched in 2008, he accepted our invitation to become a Contributing Editor, and regularly contributed book reviews and articles until poor health forced him to stop in 2016.One of those articles is reprinted below. We asked him to write it after the August 2008 Russian attack on Georgia, knowing that a native of pre- and Second World War Romania who emigrated with his family to France to escape communism, and who became one of France’s most celebrated and profound philosophers on the canvas of international relations, would have something wise and important to say. He did not disappoint, and it seems especially valuable to reread this early assessment of renewed tension between Russia and the West that has now, 15 years later, metastasised into full-blown hostility.
{"title":"One Cold War Among Many?","authors":"Pierre Hassner","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2261273","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2261273","url":null,"abstract":"Pierre Hassner, who died in May 2018 at the age of 85, was a long-standing friend of the IISS and contributor to Survival. His acclaimed Adelphi paper, Change and Security in Europe, appeared in 1968. His first book review for Survival was published in 1965, and his first original article, ‘Eurocommunism and Detente’, appeared in 1977. When the journal was relaunched in 2008, he accepted our invitation to become a Contributing Editor, and regularly contributed book reviews and articles until poor health forced him to stop in 2016.One of those articles is reprinted below. We asked him to write it after the August 2008 Russian attack on Georgia, knowing that a native of pre- and Second World War Romania who emigrated with his family to France to escape communism, and who became one of France’s most celebrated and profound philosophers on the canvas of international relations, would have something wise and important to say. He did not disappoint, and it seems especially valuable to reread this early assessment of renewed tension between Russia and the West that has now, 15 years later, metastasised into full-blown hostility.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134948835","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-03DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2261261
Russell Crandall
AbstractArrested on 21 September 2001, Ana Montes’s life as a double agent for Cuba came as a tremendous shock to her Defense Intelligence Agency colleagues who, for more than 15 years, had esteemed the high-flying analyst for her methodical approach, self-effacing personality and brilliant mind. As journalist Jim Popkin writes in Code Name Blue Wren, Montes was a study in how to live a double life. Her betrayal of her country would be equalled only by her betrayal of her own family.Key words: Ana Belén MontesCode Name Blue WrenCubaDefense Intelligence Agency (DIA)Fidel CastroJim PopkinMarta Rita VelázquezOperación AvispaPuerto Rico Notes1 See Jim Popkin, ‘Ana Montes Did Much Harm Spying for Cuba. Chances Are, You Haven’t Heard of Her’, Washington Post, 18 April 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/feature/wp/2013/04/18/ana-montes-did-much-harm-spying-for-cuba-chances-are-you-havent-heard-of-her/.2 I discussed some of the details of Montes’s life and work in an essay published in these pages in 2013. See Russell Crandall, ‘The Cold War and Cuban Intelligence’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 4, August–September 2013, pp. 191–8. See also Popkin, ‘Ana Montes Did Much Harm Spying for Cuba’.3 See Daniel Golden, Spy School: How the FBI, CIA, and Foreign Intelligence Secretly Exploit America’s Universities (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2017).4 Carol Leonnig, ‘Transcript: Jim Popkin, Author “Code Name Blue Wren”’, Washington Post, 5 January 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/washington-post-live/2023/01/05/transcript-jim-popkin-author-code-name-blue-wren/.5 See Dina Temple-Raston, ‘Exchange of Spies Was Critical to U.S.–Cuba Deal’, NPR, 19 December 2014, https://www.npr.org/2014/12/19/371821107/exchange-of-spies-was-critical-to-u-s-cuba-deal.6 See also Lance Moore, ‘Motivations of an Ideologue: A Case Study of Cuban Spy Ana Belen Montes’, Institute of World Politics, 8 September 2019, https://www.iwp.edu/active-measures/2019/09/08/motivations-of-an-ideologue-a-case-study-of-cuban-spy-ana-belen-montes/.7 See US Department of Justice, ‘Unsealed Indictment Charges Former U.S. Federal Employee with Conspiracy to Commit Espionage for Cuba’, 25 April 2013, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/unsealed-indictment-charges-former-us-federal-employee-conspiracy-commit-espionage-cuba.8 Juliana Kim, ‘Ana Montes, Former U.S. Analyst Convicted of Spying for Cuba, Is Released from Prison’, NPR, 8 January 2023, https://www.npr.org/2023/01/08/1147741163/ana-montes-former-u-s-analyst-convicted-of-spying-for-cuba-is-released-from-pris.9 Johanna Neuman, ‘Unrepentant Spy Gets 25 Years’, Los Angeles Times, 17 October 2002, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2002-oct-17-na-spy17-story.html.10 Popkin notes that this was ‘quite a statement to share with a high schooler’ (p. 299).11 See Kim, ‘Ana Montes, Former U.S. Analyst Convicted of Spying for Cuba, Is Released from Prison’.Additional informationNotes on contributorsRussell CrandallRussell Crandall is a professor of American
{"title":"Ana Montes: An (Almost) Perfect SpyCode Name Blue Wren: The True Story of America’s Most Dangerous Female Spy – and the Sister She Betrayed, Jim Popkin. New York: Hanover Square Press, 2023. $27.99. 352 pp.","authors":"Russell Crandall","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2261261","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2261261","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractArrested on 21 September 2001, Ana Montes’s life as a double agent for Cuba came as a tremendous shock to her Defense Intelligence Agency colleagues who, for more than 15 years, had esteemed the high-flying analyst for her methodical approach, self-effacing personality and brilliant mind. As journalist Jim Popkin writes in Code Name Blue Wren, Montes was a study in how to live a double life. Her betrayal of her country would be equalled only by her betrayal of her own family.Key words: Ana Belén MontesCode Name Blue WrenCubaDefense Intelligence Agency (DIA)Fidel CastroJim PopkinMarta Rita VelázquezOperación AvispaPuerto Rico Notes1 See Jim Popkin, ‘Ana Montes Did Much Harm Spying for Cuba. Chances Are, You Haven’t Heard of Her’, Washington Post, 18 April 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/feature/wp/2013/04/18/ana-montes-did-much-harm-spying-for-cuba-chances-are-you-havent-heard-of-her/.2 I discussed some of the details of Montes’s life and work in an essay published in these pages in 2013. See Russell Crandall, ‘The Cold War and Cuban Intelligence’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 4, August–September 2013, pp. 191–8. See also Popkin, ‘Ana Montes Did Much Harm Spying for Cuba’.3 See Daniel Golden, Spy School: How the FBI, CIA, and Foreign Intelligence Secretly Exploit America’s Universities (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2017).4 Carol Leonnig, ‘Transcript: Jim Popkin, Author “Code Name Blue Wren”’, Washington Post, 5 January 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/washington-post-live/2023/01/05/transcript-jim-popkin-author-code-name-blue-wren/.5 See Dina Temple-Raston, ‘Exchange of Spies Was Critical to U.S.–Cuba Deal’, NPR, 19 December 2014, https://www.npr.org/2014/12/19/371821107/exchange-of-spies-was-critical-to-u-s-cuba-deal.6 See also Lance Moore, ‘Motivations of an Ideologue: A Case Study of Cuban Spy Ana Belen Montes’, Institute of World Politics, 8 September 2019, https://www.iwp.edu/active-measures/2019/09/08/motivations-of-an-ideologue-a-case-study-of-cuban-spy-ana-belen-montes/.7 See US Department of Justice, ‘Unsealed Indictment Charges Former U.S. Federal Employee with Conspiracy to Commit Espionage for Cuba’, 25 April 2013, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/unsealed-indictment-charges-former-us-federal-employee-conspiracy-commit-espionage-cuba.8 Juliana Kim, ‘Ana Montes, Former U.S. Analyst Convicted of Spying for Cuba, Is Released from Prison’, NPR, 8 January 2023, https://www.npr.org/2023/01/08/1147741163/ana-montes-former-u-s-analyst-convicted-of-spying-for-cuba-is-released-from-pris.9 Johanna Neuman, ‘Unrepentant Spy Gets 25 Years’, Los Angeles Times, 17 October 2002, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2002-oct-17-na-spy17-story.html.10 Popkin notes that this was ‘quite a statement to share with a high schooler’ (p. 299).11 See Kim, ‘Ana Montes, Former U.S. Analyst Convicted of Spying for Cuba, Is Released from Prison’.Additional informationNotes on contributorsRussell CrandallRussell Crandall is a professor of American","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134948829","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-03DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2261239
Nick Childs
The nascent Australia–United Kingdom–United States security partnership, known as AUKUS, aims to secure for the Royal Australian Navy from the US and the UK a capability in nuclear-powered submarines to bolster allied deterrence in the Pacific. The partnership’s strategic loft and immense ambition have already afforded it almost mythical status. But its pathway is hardly free of potential obstacles, which include limited defence-industrial capacities, production delays, personnel shortfalls, cost overruns and geopolitical change. If AUKUS is seen as strengthening the strategic linkage between the US and Australia, as an American endorsement of a close ally, and as Britain’s claim to great-power status, unravelling it would likely have the reverse effect. As the project unfolds, and particularly as divisive issues become more urgent, maintaining political and strategic alignments among the three capitals will inevitably become more challenging.
{"title":"The AUKUS Anvil: Promise and Peril","authors":"Nick Childs","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2261239","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2261239","url":null,"abstract":"The nascent Australia–United Kingdom–United States security partnership, known as AUKUS, aims to secure for the Royal Australian Navy from the US and the UK a capability in nuclear-powered submarines to bolster allied deterrence in the Pacific. The partnership’s strategic loft and immense ambition have already afforded it almost mythical status. But its pathway is hardly free of potential obstacles, which include limited defence-industrial capacities, production delays, personnel shortfalls, cost overruns and geopolitical change. If AUKUS is seen as strengthening the strategic linkage between the US and Australia, as an American endorsement of a close ally, and as Britain’s claim to great-power status, unravelling it would likely have the reverse effect. As the project unfolds, and particularly as divisive issues become more urgent, maintaining political and strategic alignments among the three capitals will inevitably become more challenging.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":"78 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134948831","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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