Pub Date : 2023-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2285607
Lukas Milevski
Abstract Despite optimistic technological visions, future warfare is likely to consume and destroy military equipment and personnel at rates for which the West is ill prepared. Medium and larger militaries in particular may be primitivised during and by future warfare: they may become more socially, organisationally and technologically primitive versions of themselves. This is a process with historical and contemporary precedents, as experienced by Germany’s Wehrmacht during the Second World War and the Russian army in Ukraine today. The tactical and operational realities of sustained military campaigning against a major adversary may well primitivise Western militaries too, a challenge for which better technology is at once a partial answer and a vulnerability. Primitivisation has implications not only for defence-industrial and personnel policies, but also force design and ultimately employment.
{"title":"The Primitivisation of Major Warfare","authors":"Lukas Milevski","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2285607","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2285607","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Despite optimistic technological visions, future warfare is likely to consume and destroy military equipment and personnel at rates for which the West is ill prepared. Medium and larger militaries in particular may be primitivised during and by future warfare: they may become more socially, organisationally and technologically primitive versions of themselves. This is a process with historical and contemporary precedents, as experienced by Germany’s Wehrmacht during the Second World War and the Russian army in Ukraine today. The tactical and operational realities of sustained military campaigning against a major adversary may well primitivise Western militaries too, a challenge for which better technology is at once a partial answer and a vulnerability. Primitivisation has implications not only for defence-industrial and personnel policies, but also force design and ultimately employment.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139290366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2285608
Abstract The global nuclear order – encompassing measures to prevent nuclear war, slow the proliferation of nuclear weapons and manage peaceful nuclear technology – today faces pressures that threaten its very viability. Global cooperation to limit arms racing has all but ceased. Frustration with the failure of the nuclear powers to make progress towards disarmament has called into question the durability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The mixture of incentives and penalties to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons is losing its potency. A new grand bargain, equal in creativity and ambition to the one that birthed the NPT, is needed. The United States must signal willingness to make significant concessions to achieve a fresh consensus on global nuclear policy with two objectives. The first one is the prevention of a new arms race among the nuclear powers and the cessation of further proliferation. The second is a recommitment to sharing peaceful nuclear technology as part of a worldwide campaign to combat the climate crisis.
{"title":"Slouching Towards a Nuclear Gomorrah","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2285608","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2285608","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The global nuclear order – encompassing measures to prevent nuclear war, slow the proliferation of nuclear weapons and manage peaceful nuclear technology – today faces pressures that threaten its very viability. Global cooperation to limit arms racing has all but ceased. Frustration with the failure of the nuclear powers to make progress towards disarmament has called into question the durability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The mixture of incentives and penalties to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons is losing its potency. A new grand bargain, equal in creativity and ambition to the one that birthed the NPT, is needed. The United States must signal willingness to make significant concessions to achieve a fresh consensus on global nuclear policy with two objectives. The first one is the prevention of a new arms race among the nuclear powers and the cessation of further proliferation. The second is a recommitment to sharing peaceful nuclear technology as part of a worldwide campaign to combat the climate crisis.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139290672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2285602
Chuck Freilich
Abstract Hamas’s unprecedentedly brutal and indiscriminate attack against Israel on 7 October 2023 has probably permanently derailed, or at least substantially delayed, prospects for a two-state solution. Israel is likely to conclude that its most fundamental demand for any peace agreement – ironclad security arrangements – cannot be achieved. Even if a centrist Israeli government emerges following the war, the most the Palestinians can probably hope for is heightened autonomy, not full independence. Israel may show greater willingness to consider civil disengagement – that is, the dismantling of settlements in those parts of the West Bank that it would not wish to retain in a final peace settlement, probably over 90% of them – but with the Israel Defense Forces fully deployed throughout the area. Saudi–Israeli normalisation has been postponed, but may be salvageable, especially if the Saudis take an active role in the peace process and in reinstating the Palestinian Authority in Gaza. Growing tensions could diminish the extraordinary US–Israeli strategic cooperation that arose immediately after the attack.
{"title":"Israel and the Palestinians: The Day After","authors":"Chuck Freilich","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2285602","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2285602","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Hamas’s unprecedentedly brutal and indiscriminate attack against Israel on 7 October 2023 has probably permanently derailed, or at least substantially delayed, prospects for a two-state solution. Israel is likely to conclude that its most fundamental demand for any peace agreement – ironclad security arrangements – cannot be achieved. Even if a centrist Israeli government emerges following the war, the most the Palestinians can probably hope for is heightened autonomy, not full independence. Israel may show greater willingness to consider civil disengagement – that is, the dismantling of settlements in those parts of the West Bank that it would not wish to retain in a final peace settlement, probably over 90% of them – but with the Israel Defense Forces fully deployed throughout the area. Saudi–Israeli normalisation has been postponed, but may be salvageable, especially if the Saudis take an active role in the peace process and in reinstating the Palestinian Authority in Gaza. Growing tensions could diminish the extraordinary US–Israeli strategic cooperation that arose immediately after the attack.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139290977","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2285606
Sara Bjerg Moller
Abstract Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, NATO embarked on an ambitious series of military reforms aimed at enhancing deterrence and defence of the Euro-Atlantic area. However, as the Alliance approaches its 75th anniversary, concerns are mounting regarding the ability of non-US allies to meet their expanded security obligations. The Alliance’s updated regional-defence plans, and planned transformations to the NATO force and command structures, could pose considerable challenges for the European and Canadian allies who, following decades of cuts to their armed forces, lack the personnel required for implementing these reforms.
{"title":"NATO at 75: The Perils of Empty Promises","authors":"Sara Bjerg Moller","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2285606","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2285606","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, NATO embarked on an ambitious series of military reforms aimed at enhancing deterrence and defence of the Euro-Atlantic area. However, as the Alliance approaches its 75th anniversary, concerns are mounting regarding the ability of non-US allies to meet their expanded security obligations. The Alliance’s updated regional-defence plans, and planned transformations to the NATO force and command structures, could pose considerable challenges for the European and Canadian allies who, following decades of cuts to their armed forces, lack the personnel required for implementing these reforms.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139290308","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2285598
Lawrence Freedman
Abstract Both the Russian Federation and the United States and its allies have avoided taking actions carrying the greatest risk of escalation to nuclear-weapons use. Left uncertain is whether specific contingencies might yet prompt nuclear use. But the Russo-Ukrainian war has now been going on long enough to ground the debate in what has been said and done during its course. Russian nuclear decision-making requires the most attention, and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s statements about it have been the most authoritative. He has defined Russia’s nuclear red line consistently and relatively restrictively, reserving the threat of nuclear use for an existential threat to the state. He has focused on deterring the West from fighting alongside Ukraine, disregarding those who wanted to punish the West for the support it was providing. So long as NATO continues to respect Putin’s red line, there is no reason to believe Putin would authorise nuclear use.
{"title":"The Russo-Ukrainian War and the Durability of Deterrence","authors":"Lawrence Freedman","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2285598","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2285598","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Both the Russian Federation and the United States and its allies have avoided taking actions carrying the greatest risk of escalation to nuclear-weapons use. Left uncertain is whether specific contingencies might yet prompt nuclear use. But the Russo-Ukrainian war has now been going on long enough to ground the debate in what has been said and done during its course. Russian nuclear decision-making requires the most attention, and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s statements about it have been the most authoritative. He has defined Russia’s nuclear red line consistently and relatively restrictively, reserving the threat of nuclear use for an existential threat to the state. He has focused on deterring the West from fighting alongside Ukraine, disregarding those who wanted to punish the West for the support it was providing. So long as NATO continues to respect Putin’s red line, there is no reason to believe Putin would authorise nuclear use.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139291050","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2285613
Hanns W. Maull
Homelands: A Personal History of Europe Timothy Garton Ash. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2023. $28.00. 384 pp. Democracy Erodes from the Top: Leaders, Citizens, and the Challenge of Populism in Europe Larry M. Bartels. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2023. £25.00/$29.95. 280 pp. Trading Power: West Germany’s Rise to Global Influence, 1963–1975 William Glenn Gray. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022. £34.99. 498 pp. Energy and Power: Germany in the Age of Oil, Atoms, and Climate Change Stephen G. Gross. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023. £35.99. 408 pp. Europe Alone: Small State Security Without the United States David Schultz, Aurelija Pūraitė and Vidmantė Giedraitytė, eds. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2022. £100.00/$130.00. 451 pp.
家园：A Personal History of Europe Timothy Garton Ash.康涅狄格州纽黑文：耶鲁大学出版社，2023 年。$28.00.384 pp.Democracy Erodes from the Top: Leaders, Citizens, and the Challenge of Populism in Europe Larry M. Bartels.新泽西州普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社，2023 年。£25.00/$29.95.280 pp.Trading Power：Trading Power: West Germany's Rise to Global Influence, 1963-1975 William Glenn Gray.剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，2022 年。£34.99.498 pp.能源与权力：石油、原子和气候变化时代的德国》（Germany in the Age of Oil, Atoms, and Climate Change），斯蒂芬-G-格罗斯（Stephen G. Gross）著。牛津：牛津大学出版社，2023 年。£35.99.408 pp.单独的欧洲：没有美国的小国安全 David Schultz、Aurelija Pūraitė 和 Vidmantė Giedraitytė 编辑。Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2022.£100.00/$130.00.451 pp.
{"title":"Europe","authors":"Hanns W. Maull","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2285613","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2285613","url":null,"abstract":"Homelands: A Personal History of Europe Timothy Garton Ash. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2023. $28.00. 384 pp. Democracy Erodes from the Top: Leaders, Citizens, and the Challenge of Populism in Europe Larry M. Bartels. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2023. £25.00/$29.95. 280 pp. Trading Power: West Germany’s Rise to Global Influence, 1963–1975 William Glenn Gray. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022. £34.99. 498 pp. Energy and Power: Germany in the Age of Oil, Atoms, and Climate Change Stephen G. Gross. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023. £35.99. 408 pp. Europe Alone: Small State Security Without the United States David Schultz, Aurelija Pūraitė and Vidmantė Giedraitytė, eds. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2022. £100.00/$130.00. 451 pp.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139291124","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2285609
E. Kapstein
Abstract Economic conflicts among military allies may undermine their strategic alignment. Economic disputes in a wide range of areas – from weapons procurement to international trade to access to natural resources – go back to the very beginning of NATO. In recognition of these challenges, Article 2 of the NATO treaty calls upon the member states to ‘eliminate conflict in their … economic policies’. Examining the causes of such conflicts and efforts to resolve them hold the promise of yielding policy-relevant insights for contemporary public officials and defence strategists as they navigate the current geopolitical environment, including ‘de-risking’ economic relations with a more assertive China. One ally may need to make ‘side-payments’ to others in order to maintain strategic alignment on key security issues.
{"title":"Military Allies and Economic Conflict","authors":"E. Kapstein","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2285609","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2285609","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Economic conflicts among military allies may undermine their strategic alignment. Economic disputes in a wide range of areas – from weapons procurement to international trade to access to natural resources – go back to the very beginning of NATO. In recognition of these challenges, Article 2 of the NATO treaty calls upon the member states to ‘eliminate conflict in their … economic policies’. Examining the causes of such conflicts and efforts to resolve them hold the promise of yielding policy-relevant insights for contemporary public officials and defence strategists as they navigate the current geopolitical environment, including ‘de-risking’ economic relations with a more assertive China. One ally may need to make ‘side-payments’ to others in order to maintain strategic alignment on key security issues.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139291036","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2285616
Dana H. Allin
Abstract Hamas launched its shocking infiltration of Israel and massacre of Israelis exactly a half century after the surprise attack by Egyptian and Syrian forces on Yom Kippur in 1973. The parallels with respect to America’s role, however, are potentially misleading. While strongly supporting Israel, the Biden administration has tried to summon the political imagination and diplomatic patience to conjure a better future from disaster – something the Nixon administration and its successors managed to do in the 1970s. But 50 years with no net progress on the Palestinian question have left Israel, and by extension the US, with fewer sympathisers. The longer this war continues and the more civilians it kills, the greater the reputational damage to both countries. Whether the US and its allies can emerge from the Gaza crisis in a stronger position – as they did from the Yom Kippur War – is a question at which history can only hint.
{"title":"Applying History: Gaza and the Twentieth Century","authors":"Dana H. Allin","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2285616","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2285616","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Hamas launched its shocking infiltration of Israel and massacre of Israelis exactly a half century after the surprise attack by Egyptian and Syrian forces on Yom Kippur in 1973. The parallels with respect to America’s role, however, are potentially misleading. While strongly supporting Israel, the Biden administration has tried to summon the political imagination and diplomatic patience to conjure a better future from disaster – something the Nixon administration and its successors managed to do in the 1970s. But 50 years with no net progress on the Palestinian question have left Israel, and by extension the US, with fewer sympathisers. The longer this war continues and the more civilians it kills, the greater the reputational damage to both countries. Whether the US and its allies can emerge from the Gaza crisis in a stronger position – as they did from the Yom Kippur War – is a question at which history can only hint.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139290433","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2285600
Steven Simon, Jonathan Stevenson
Abstract In responding to Hamas’s devastating 7 October 2023 attack on Israel, the United States has two strategic interests: a geopolitical interest in preventing the conflict from widening; and a reputational interest in forestalling an even worse humanitarian catastrophe. Although the Biden administration has not questioned whether Israel should act decisively, it has counselled caution and deliberation to buy time for hostage negotiations and to minimise civilian casualties while deploying US military assets to deter Iran and Hizbullah from directly initiating hostilities against Israel. The unprecedented horror of the attack makes the argument for Israeli restraint more difficult to make, but questions will undoubtedly arise as to how the US can move Israel away from a maximally aggressive posture to preserve its bona fides with the rest of the world, including some American voters. The US would best cast the crisis as an urgent prompt to a more agreeable future based on an affirmative, multilateral plan.
{"title":"The Gaza Horror and US Policy","authors":"Steven Simon, Jonathan Stevenson","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2285600","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2285600","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In responding to Hamas’s devastating 7 October 2023 attack on Israel, the United States has two strategic interests: a geopolitical interest in preventing the conflict from widening; and a reputational interest in forestalling an even worse humanitarian catastrophe. Although the Biden administration has not questioned whether Israel should act decisively, it has counselled caution and deliberation to buy time for hostage negotiations and to minimise civilian casualties while deploying US military assets to deter Iran and Hizbullah from directly initiating hostilities against Israel. The unprecedented horror of the attack makes the argument for Israeli restraint more difficult to make, but questions will undoubtedly arise as to how the US can move Israel away from a maximally aggressive posture to preserve its bona fides with the rest of the world, including some American voters. The US would best cast the crisis as an urgent prompt to a more agreeable future based on an affirmative, multilateral plan.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139290454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-03DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2261243
James M. Cowan
AbstractSince the United States withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021 and the Taliban quickly took over the country, Western governments, including the United Kingdom, have been reluctant to engage with an Islamist regime that has hosted al-Qaeda and trampled on human rights. Under the Taliban, however, violence, corruption and narcotics traffic appear to have been dramatically reduced. The Taliban regime has also established a reasonable level of security and cracked down on corruption. Completely isolating the regime could have perverse security as well as humanitarian consequences. Short of another invasion and occupation, there is no prospect of a secular, Western-style government re-emerging. Through discreet engagement, the West should try to nudge the current regime away from its unworldly posture towards a more pragmatic one.Key words: Afghanistanal-QaedaEuropean UnionHALO TrustIslamic State – Khorasan ProvinceTalibanTobias EllwoodUnited KingdomUnited NationsUnited States Notes1 See Arne Strand and Astrid Suhrke, ‘Quiet Engagement with the Taliban’, Survival, vol. 63, no. 5, October– November 2021, pp. 35–46.2 The Daily Mail has preserved the video for posterity. See ‘Tory MP Ellwood Hails “Transformation” of Afghanistan by the Taliban’, Daily Mail, 17 July 2023, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/video/news/video-2981441/Video-Tory-MP-Ellwood-hails-transformation-Afghanistan-Taliban.html.3 See, for example, Toby Dodge, ‘Afghanistan and the Failure of Liberal Peacebuilding’, Survival, vol. 63, no. 5, October–November 2021, pp. 47–58; and Laurel Miller, ‘Biden’s Afghanistan Withdrawal: A Verdict on the Limits of American Power’, Survival, vol. 63, no. 3, June–July 2021, pp. 37–44.4 See Laurel Miller, ‘Protecting US Interests in Afghanistan’, Survival, vol. 64, no. 2, April–May 2022, pp. 25–34; and Graeme Smith and Ibraheem Bahiss, ‘The World Has No Choice But to Work with the Taliban’, Foreign Affairs, 11 August 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/afghanistan/world-has-no-choice-work-taliban.Additional informationNotes on contributorsJames M. CowanMajor General (Retd) James M. Cowan is CEO of the HALO Trust and the former commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Helmand province. An earlier version of this essay appeared on the Survival Editors’ Blog on 14 August 2023 at https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/survival-online/2023/08/should-the-uk-engage-with-the-taliban-government/.
{"title":"Calibrating Engagement with the Taliban","authors":"James M. Cowan","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2261243","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2261243","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractSince the United States withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021 and the Taliban quickly took over the country, Western governments, including the United Kingdom, have been reluctant to engage with an Islamist regime that has hosted al-Qaeda and trampled on human rights. Under the Taliban, however, violence, corruption and narcotics traffic appear to have been dramatically reduced. The Taliban regime has also established a reasonable level of security and cracked down on corruption. Completely isolating the regime could have perverse security as well as humanitarian consequences. Short of another invasion and occupation, there is no prospect of a secular, Western-style government re-emerging. Through discreet engagement, the West should try to nudge the current regime away from its unworldly posture towards a more pragmatic one.Key words: Afghanistanal-QaedaEuropean UnionHALO TrustIslamic State – Khorasan ProvinceTalibanTobias EllwoodUnited KingdomUnited NationsUnited States Notes1 See Arne Strand and Astrid Suhrke, ‘Quiet Engagement with the Taliban’, Survival, vol. 63, no. 5, October– November 2021, pp. 35–46.2 The Daily Mail has preserved the video for posterity. See ‘Tory MP Ellwood Hails “Transformation” of Afghanistan by the Taliban’, Daily Mail, 17 July 2023, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/video/news/video-2981441/Video-Tory-MP-Ellwood-hails-transformation-Afghanistan-Taliban.html.3 See, for example, Toby Dodge, ‘Afghanistan and the Failure of Liberal Peacebuilding’, Survival, vol. 63, no. 5, October–November 2021, pp. 47–58; and Laurel Miller, ‘Biden’s Afghanistan Withdrawal: A Verdict on the Limits of American Power’, Survival, vol. 63, no. 3, June–July 2021, pp. 37–44.4 See Laurel Miller, ‘Protecting US Interests in Afghanistan’, Survival, vol. 64, no. 2, April–May 2022, pp. 25–34; and Graeme Smith and Ibraheem Bahiss, ‘The World Has No Choice But to Work with the Taliban’, Foreign Affairs, 11 August 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/afghanistan/world-has-no-choice-work-taliban.Additional informationNotes on contributorsJames M. CowanMajor General (Retd) James M. Cowan is CEO of the HALO Trust and the former commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Helmand province. An earlier version of this essay appeared on the Survival Editors’ Blog on 14 August 2023 at https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/survival-online/2023/08/should-the-uk-engage-with-the-taliban-government/.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134948823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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