Pub Date : 2025-10-09DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2025.102450
Rocco Caferra , Andrea Morone , Donato Pierno
This paper examines whether changes in risk preferences reflect genuine behavioural shifts or result from the elicitation method used. In a within-subject experiment, participants made initial risky choices, completed 24 unpaid learning rounds with real dice and recorded outcomes, and then made final choices. We compare four risk elicitation methods: two Ordered Lottery Selection (OLS) and two Multiple Price List (MPL) tasks. Our analysis focuses on how preferences evolve with experience, the role of reported errors during the learning phase, and the effect of method complexity (i.e., the number of potential payoff outcomes in a given lottery) on revealed risk attitudes. Results show that MPL tasks, particularly when more complex, produce stronger changes in behaviour. Participants who made errors during the MPL learning phase were more likely to display increased risk aversion. This suggests that task comprehension and cognitive load influence the stability of preferences. The findings contribute to the broader debate on preference stability and highlight the methodological relevance of comparing elicitation tools within the same experimental framework.
{"title":"Experimental methods: Learning your own risk preferences under different risk elicitation methods","authors":"Rocco Caferra , Andrea Morone , Donato Pierno","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102450","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102450","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines whether changes in risk preferences reflect genuine behavioural shifts or result from the elicitation method used. In a within-subject experiment, participants made initial risky choices, completed 24 unpaid learning rounds with real dice and recorded outcomes, and then made final choices. We compare four risk elicitation methods: two Ordered Lottery Selection (OLS) and two Multiple Price List (MPL) tasks. Our analysis focuses on how preferences evolve with experience, the role of reported errors during the learning phase, and the effect of method complexity (i.e., the number of potential payoff outcomes in a given lottery) on revealed risk attitudes. Results show that MPL tasks, particularly when more complex, produce stronger changes in behaviour. Participants who made errors during the MPL learning phase were more likely to display increased risk aversion. This suggests that task comprehension and cognitive load influence the stability of preferences. The findings contribute to the broader debate on preference stability and highlight the methodological relevance of comparing elicitation tools within the same experimental framework.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 102450"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145265487","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-08DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2025.102460
Femke Cnossen , Milena Nikolova
Does experiencing work meaningfulness—defined as perceiving one’s work as personally or socially significant and worthwhile—influence employee effort? Drawing on self-determination theory, we define need satisfaction as the fulfillment of autonomy, competence, and relatedness at work. We develop a utility framework in which need satisfaction enhances motivation, lowers the perceived marginal cost of effort, and fosters work meaningfulness, which in turn increases effort. Using original Dutch LISS panel survey data, we find that autonomy, competence, and relatedness are positively associated with work meaningfulness, which in turn relates to higher self-reported effort and stronger pro-effort attitudes. These results indicate that meaningfulness is not a fixed outcome but one that may be shaped by job design. This would imply that organizations can boost productivity and worker well-being by creating conditions that satisfy employees’ psychological needs. Our findings contribute to labor economics by integrating motivation as an endogenous outcome into labor supply models and by providing empirical evidence on the link between meaningfulness and effort.
{"title":"Work meaningfulness and effort","authors":"Femke Cnossen , Milena Nikolova","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102460","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102460","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Does experiencing work meaningfulness—defined as perceiving one’s work as personally or socially significant and worthwhile—influence employee effort? Drawing on self-determination theory, we define need satisfaction as the fulfillment of autonomy, competence, and relatedness at work. We develop a utility framework in which need satisfaction enhances motivation, lowers the perceived marginal cost of effort, and fosters work meaningfulness, which in turn increases effort. Using original Dutch LISS panel survey data, we find that autonomy, competence, and relatedness are positively associated with work meaningfulness, which in turn relates to higher self-reported effort and stronger pro-effort attitudes. These results indicate that meaningfulness is not a fixed outcome but one that may be shaped by job design. This would imply that organizations can boost productivity and worker well-being by creating conditions that satisfy employees’ psychological needs. Our findings contribute to labor economics by integrating motivation as an endogenous outcome into labor supply models and by providing empirical evidence on the link between meaningfulness and effort.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 102460"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145319919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-30DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2025.102454
Rima-Maria Rahal
Open Science adoption may be seen as a process of normative change: Researchers must decide whether they will integrate Open Science principles into their work. Here, I outline first steps for developing a utility function, modeling individual researchers’ choices to engage in Open (OS) or Covert (CR) Research. In addition, I suggest examining economic games for their potential to partially model decision settings in which researchers operate. I argue that empirically studying the influence of researcher considerations, research environments and the academic incentive system on research norm compliance is a promising basis for developing targeted interventions and designing effective institutions in which robust and transparent research practices become the norm.
{"title":"Advancing openness in economic research through the lens of behavioral and experimental economics","authors":"Rima-Maria Rahal","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102454","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102454","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Open Science adoption may be seen as a process of normative change: Researchers must decide whether they will integrate Open Science principles into their work. Here, I outline first steps for developing a utility function, modeling individual researchers’ choices to engage in Open (OS) or Covert (CR) Research. In addition, I suggest examining economic games for their potential to partially model decision settings in which researchers operate. I argue that empirically studying the influence of researcher considerations, research environments and the academic incentive system on research norm compliance is a promising basis for developing targeted interventions and designing effective institutions in which robust and transparent research practices become the norm.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 102454"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145265488","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-30DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2025.102453
Annamaria Nese , Patrizia Sbriglia , Luigi Senatore
This study examines the relationship between trust, social capital, and migration decisions through theoretical and experimental analyses of how social perception influences behaviour in trust games. Small societies are more likely to develop higher levels of cooperation and trust due to closer social bonds and informal mechanisms of social control. Also, related researches on emigration in some European countries stress the negative impact of such phenomenon both on human (brain drain hypothesis) and on social capital. In this paper, we take a different perspective. We conducted a field experiment in small towns of Southern Italy (2023), recruiting both migrants and non-migrants. Our evidence demonstrates that individuals who chose to stay exhibit higher levels of trust compared to those who left their community of origin. These results prompt the development of a theoretical model in which migration operates as a social perception filter affecting trust. In this framework, the greater trust observed among non-migrants is interpreted not simply as a consequence of staying, but as a pre-existing trait that may have influenced their decision not to leave. The main contribution of this study is to build a psychological game that formalizes how social perception mechanisms interact with migration decisions.
{"title":"Go your own way? social perception, migration and trust","authors":"Annamaria Nese , Patrizia Sbriglia , Luigi Senatore","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102453","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102453","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines the relationship between trust, social capital, and migration decisions through theoretical and experimental analyses of how social perception influences behaviour in trust games. Small societies are more likely to develop higher levels of cooperation and trust due to closer social bonds and informal mechanisms of social control. Also, related researches on emigration in some European countries stress the negative impact of such phenomenon both on human (brain drain hypothesis) and on social capital. In this paper, we take a different perspective. We conducted a field experiment in small towns of Southern Italy (2023), recruiting both migrants and non-migrants. Our evidence demonstrates that individuals who chose to stay exhibit higher levels of trust compared to those who left their community of origin. These results prompt the development of a theoretical model in which migration operates as a social perception filter affecting trust. In this framework, the greater trust observed among non-migrants is interpreted not simply as a consequence of staying, but as a pre-existing trait that may have influenced their decision not to leave. The main contribution of this study is to build a psychological game that formalizes how social perception mechanisms interact with migration decisions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 102453"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145265486","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-29DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2025.102452
Christian Ben Lakhdar , Antoine Deplancke , Fabrice Le Lec , Sophie Massin , Anthony Piermatteo , Nicolas G. Vaillant
In response to the health impacts of smoking, cigarette packs with health warnings have proven effective. However, it remains undetermined whether enhancements or modifications could amplify their impact, in helping smokers to quit and/or deterring initiation. We aimed at providing new evidence on this issue by using different motivational leverages identified in the psychology and economic literature. We developed new warnings based on commitment, cognitive dissonance, empowerment and Electronic Nicotine Delivery Systems use. To determine which types of warnings are the most effective, we conducted an online experiment where participants (n = 860, including 335 smokers) were exposed to a specific type of warning, using conventional regulatory warnings as a control. Traditional indicators (measures of emotions, reactions, beliefs, perceived efficacy and intentions) and an innovative behavioural indicator (incentive-compatible willingness-to-pay) were used to assess the efficacy of the warnings. The conventional regulatory warnings performed at least as well as the alternative ones in almost all the relevant dimensions. In this respect, alternative warnings are disappointing, although some have a positive effect compared to no warning and may be used as a basis for complementary or targeted warnings or prevention measures in other contexts.
{"title":"‘You can quit!’: Exploring the efficacy of new cigarette pack warnings through an experiment","authors":"Christian Ben Lakhdar , Antoine Deplancke , Fabrice Le Lec , Sophie Massin , Anthony Piermatteo , Nicolas G. Vaillant","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102452","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102452","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In response to the health impacts of smoking, cigarette packs with health warnings have proven effective. However, it remains undetermined whether enhancements or modifications could amplify their impact, in helping smokers to quit and/or deterring initiation. We aimed at providing new evidence on this issue by using different motivational leverages identified in the psychology and economic literature. We developed new warnings based on commitment, cognitive dissonance, empowerment and Electronic Nicotine Delivery Systems use. To determine which types of warnings are the most effective, we conducted an online experiment where participants (<em>n</em> = 860, including 335 smokers) were exposed to a specific type of warning, using conventional regulatory warnings as a control. Traditional indicators (measures of emotions, reactions, beliefs, perceived efficacy and intentions) and an innovative behavioural indicator (incentive-compatible willingness-to-pay) were used to assess the efficacy of the warnings. The conventional regulatory warnings performed at least as well as the alternative ones in almost all the relevant dimensions. In this respect, alternative warnings are disappointing, although some have a positive effect compared to no warning and may be used as a basis for complementary or targeted warnings or prevention measures in other contexts.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 102452"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145265491","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-25DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2025.102446
Vojtěch Zíka , Petra Olšová , Michaela Jánská
This incentivized laboratory experiment () maps survey-measured environmental attitudes onto behavior elicited through an effort task, enabling the analysis of both negative attitude–behavior gaps (where attitudes exceed behavior) and positive gaps (where behavior exceeds attitudes). Environmental attitudes were measured using the New Ecological Paradigm Scale. Behavior was assessed through the Survivor Task, in which participants had to press the spacebar at least once every 20 seconds to keep the task running. As long as the task remained active, it generated donations for a local project aimed at improving the environment. The experiment revealed not only the commonly discussed negative attitude–behavior gap but also a similarly sized positive gap. Although the negative gap was slightly larger, participants with a positive gap contributed three times more to the total donation of €182. Given gender differences in attitudes, exploratory analysis showed that women exhibited smaller gaps than men, indicating a closer alignment between attitudes and behavior. This aligns with our additional finding: attitudes and behavior were positively correlated for women but negatively for men. The results challenge the common belief that most people fail to act on their attitudes. Since many act better than their attitudes predict, efforts to close the negative gap may fail if the positive gap is overlooked.
{"title":"The attitude–behavior gap is not one-sided: Some do more for the environment than they believe","authors":"Vojtěch Zíka , Petra Olšová , Michaela Jánská","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102446","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102446","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This incentivized laboratory experiment (<span><math><mrow><mi>N</mi><mo>=</mo><mn>99</mn></mrow></math></span>) maps survey-measured environmental attitudes onto behavior elicited through an effort task, enabling the analysis of both negative attitude–behavior gaps (where attitudes exceed behavior) and positive gaps (where behavior exceeds attitudes). Environmental attitudes were measured using the New Ecological Paradigm Scale. Behavior was assessed through the Survivor Task, in which participants had to press the spacebar at least once every 20 seconds to keep the task running. As long as the task remained active, it generated donations for a local project aimed at improving the environment. The experiment revealed not only the commonly discussed negative attitude–behavior gap but also a similarly sized positive gap. Although the negative gap was slightly larger, participants with a positive gap contributed three times more to the total donation of €182. Given gender differences in attitudes, exploratory analysis showed that women exhibited smaller gaps than men, indicating a closer alignment between attitudes and behavior. This aligns with our additional finding: attitudes and behavior were positively correlated for women but negatively for men. The results challenge the common belief that most people fail to act on their attitudes. Since many act better than their attitudes predict, efforts to close the negative gap may fail if the positive gap is overlooked.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 102446"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145157441","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-25DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2025.102451
Andrea Guido , Louis Putterman , Rustam Romaniuc
Grouping cooperatively disposed subjects with one another has been shown to slow the decline of contributions in public goods games. So far, similar findings have been obtained both when groups are exogenously formed by the experimenter and when they are endogenously formed by algorithms taking subjects’ preferences for partners into account. We designed an experiment in which internally homogeneous groups – composed of like-minded subjects – can form either exogenously or endogenously, testing the conjecture that endogenously formed groups of cooperators will outperform similar exogenously formed groups due to subjects’ decision rights in the endogenous procedure. We find that the conjecture is not supported, discussing potential explanations.
{"title":"A comparison of endogenous and exogenous group formation to increase cooperation","authors":"Andrea Guido , Louis Putterman , Rustam Romaniuc","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102451","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102451","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Grouping cooperatively disposed subjects with one another has been shown to slow the decline of contributions in public goods games. So far, similar findings have been obtained both when groups are exogenously formed by the experimenter and when they are endogenously formed by algorithms taking subjects’ preferences for partners into account. We designed an experiment in which internally homogeneous groups – composed of like-minded subjects – can form either exogenously or endogenously, testing the conjecture that endogenously formed groups of cooperators will outperform similar exogenously formed groups due to subjects’ decision rights in the endogenous procedure. We find that the conjecture is not supported, discussing potential explanations.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 102451"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145218959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-24DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2025.102449
Yukinori Iwata
When should a policymaker require active choosing or use a default rule to get people to make better choices? Are default rules unjustly manipulative, even if their use improves people’s welfare? This study addresses these questions by evaluating choice architecture in the limited attention with status quo bias model (Dean et al., 2017). We first show that an axiom that justifies default rules in terms of non-manipulation is inherently incompatible with another axiom that requires that revealed preferences be respected. Furthermore, we propose that there exists a welfarist justification for the argument that a policymaker should not set a worse alternative for a person as the default option, even if he or she gets better off. Based on these results, we define act-consequentialism and libertarian paternalism as evaluations of choice architecture and discuss their policy implications for policymakers.
什么时候政策制定者应该要求人们主动选择,或者使用默认规则来让人们做出更好的选择?默认规则是不公正的操纵吗,即使它们的使用提高了人们的福利?本研究通过使用现状偏见模型评估有限注意力中的选择架构来解决这些问题(Dean et al., 2017)。我们首先表明,一个以非操纵来证明默认规则的公理与另一个要求尊重揭示的偏好的公理本质上是不相容的。此外,我们提出存在福利主义的理由,即政策制定者不应该为一个人设置一个更坏的选择作为默认选择,即使他或她变得更好了。基于这些结果,我们将行为后果主义和自由意志家长式主义定义为选择架构的评估,并讨论了它们对决策者的政策含义。
{"title":"Active choosing or default rules? A revealed preference approach","authors":"Yukinori Iwata","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102449","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102449","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>When should a policymaker require active choosing or use a default rule to get people to make better choices? Are default rules unjustly manipulative, even if their use improves people’s welfare? This study addresses these questions by evaluating choice architecture in the limited attention with status quo bias model (Dean et al., 2017). We first show that an axiom that justifies default rules in terms of non-manipulation is inherently incompatible with another axiom that requires that revealed preferences be respected. Furthermore, we propose that there exists a welfarist justification for the argument that a policymaker should not set a worse alternative for a person as the default option, even if he or she gets better off. Based on these results, we define act-consequentialism and libertarian paternalism as evaluations of choice architecture and discuss their policy implications for policymakers.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 102449"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145218962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-19DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2025.102435
Magnus Våge Knutsen
I investigate the interaction between two solutions to the moral hazard problem in experience goods markets: Quality verification and reputational concerns. I set up an experimental market where a long-lived seller interacts with a sequence of short-lived buyers and where buyers observe previous decisions by sellers. I test the effect of letting buyers verify product quality at a cost in two distinctly different environments: One in which reputational concerns for sellers are induced by way of computerized sellers, and one without induced reputational concerns. My equilibrium analysis shows that with induced reputational concerns, costly quality verification may fully crowd out reputational concerns and lead to inferior market outcomes. However, when reputational concerns are not induced, verification can improve market outcomes. Results from the experiment to some extent corroborate these predictions. First, in the environment where reputational concerns are induced, short-run incentives created by verification almost fully crowd out the reputational concerns. Second, in the environment without induced reputational concerns, verification improves market outcomes by increasing quality and overall market surplus.
{"title":"Verification and reputational concerns: An experiment","authors":"Magnus Våge Knutsen","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102435","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102435","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I investigate the interaction between two solutions to the moral hazard problem in experience goods markets: Quality verification and reputational concerns. I set up an experimental market where a long-lived seller interacts with a sequence of short-lived buyers and where buyers observe previous decisions by sellers. I test the effect of letting buyers verify product quality at a cost in two distinctly different environments: One in which reputational concerns for sellers are induced by way of computerized sellers, and one without induced reputational concerns. My equilibrium analysis shows that with induced reputational concerns, costly quality verification may fully crowd out reputational concerns and lead to inferior market outcomes. However, when reputational concerns are not induced, verification can improve market outcomes. Results from the experiment to some extent corroborate these predictions. First, in the environment where reputational concerns are induced, short-run incentives created by verification almost fully crowd out the reputational concerns. Second, in the environment without induced reputational concerns, verification improves market outcomes by increasing quality and overall market surplus.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 102435"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145104974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study analyzes a modified dictatorship game in which, before splitting a fixed endowment, dictators are informed about the amount their recipients would have kept for themselves had they been assigned the role of allocators. We posit that dictators will selectively use the additional information and exploit a moral wiggle room — they will keep a larger amount when they face recipients who would have behaved more selfishly than themselves and ignore the knowledge in case of more benevolent recipients. We ran an experiment with treatment and control sessions, giving dictators information regarding potential recipients only in the former. Our experimental findings support our hypotheses, which suggest that dictators’ decisions are driven not just by their idiosyncratic preferences for fairness but also by those of others. Our paper contributes to the literature on subtle contextual cues that adversely affect the prosocial behavior of dictators.
{"title":"Moral wiggle room in the dictator game","authors":"Sanmitra Ghosh , Mridu Prabal Goswami , Shubhro Sarkar","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102431","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102431","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study analyzes a modified dictatorship game in which, before splitting a fixed endowment, dictators are informed about the amount their recipients would have kept for themselves had they been assigned the role of allocators. We posit that dictators will selectively use the additional information and exploit a moral wiggle room — they will keep a larger amount when they face recipients who would have behaved more selfishly than themselves and ignore the knowledge in case of more benevolent recipients. We ran an experiment with treatment and control sessions, giving dictators information regarding potential recipients only in the former. Our experimental findings support our hypotheses, which suggest that dictators’ decisions are driven not just by their idiosyncratic preferences for fairness but also by those of others. Our paper contributes to the literature on subtle contextual cues that adversely affect the prosocial behavior of dictators.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 102431"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145362022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}