Pub Date : 2025-09-24DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2025.102449
Yukinori Iwata
When should a policymaker require active choosing or use a default rule to get people to make better choices? Are default rules unjustly manipulative, even if their use improves people’s welfare? This study addresses these questions by evaluating choice architecture in the limited attention with status quo bias model (Dean et al., 2017). We first show that an axiom that justifies default rules in terms of non-manipulation is inherently incompatible with another axiom that requires that revealed preferences be respected. Furthermore, we propose that there exists a welfarist justification for the argument that a policymaker should not set a worse alternative for a person as the default option, even if he or she gets better off. Based on these results, we define act-consequentialism and libertarian paternalism as evaluations of choice architecture and discuss their policy implications for policymakers.
什么时候政策制定者应该要求人们主动选择，或者使用默认规则来让人们做出更好的选择？默认规则是不公正的操纵吗，即使它们的使用提高了人们的福利？本研究通过使用现状偏见模型评估有限注意力中的选择架构来解决这些问题（Dean et al., 2017）。我们首先表明，一个以非操纵来证明默认规则的公理与另一个要求尊重揭示的偏好的公理本质上是不相容的。此外，我们提出存在福利主义的理由，即政策制定者不应该为一个人设置一个更坏的选择作为默认选择，即使他或她变得更好了。基于这些结果，我们将行为后果主义和自由意志家长式主义定义为选择架构的评估，并讨论了它们对决策者的政策含义。
{"title":"Active choosing or default rules? A revealed preference approach","authors":"Yukinori Iwata","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102449","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102449","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>When should a policymaker require active choosing or use a default rule to get people to make better choices? Are default rules unjustly manipulative, even if their use improves people’s welfare? This study addresses these questions by evaluating choice architecture in the limited attention with status quo bias model (Dean et al., 2017). We first show that an axiom that justifies default rules in terms of non-manipulation is inherently incompatible with another axiom that requires that revealed preferences be respected. Furthermore, we propose that there exists a welfarist justification for the argument that a policymaker should not set a worse alternative for a person as the default option, even if he or she gets better off. Based on these results, we define act-consequentialism and libertarian paternalism as evaluations of choice architecture and discuss their policy implications for policymakers.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 102449"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145218962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-19DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2025.102435
Magnus Våge Knutsen
I investigate the interaction between two solutions to the moral hazard problem in experience goods markets: Quality verification and reputational concerns. I set up an experimental market where a long-lived seller interacts with a sequence of short-lived buyers and where buyers observe previous decisions by sellers. I test the effect of letting buyers verify product quality at a cost in two distinctly different environments: One in which reputational concerns for sellers are induced by way of computerized sellers, and one without induced reputational concerns. My equilibrium analysis shows that with induced reputational concerns, costly quality verification may fully crowd out reputational concerns and lead to inferior market outcomes. However, when reputational concerns are not induced, verification can improve market outcomes. Results from the experiment to some extent corroborate these predictions. First, in the environment where reputational concerns are induced, short-run incentives created by verification almost fully crowd out the reputational concerns. Second, in the environment without induced reputational concerns, verification improves market outcomes by increasing quality and overall market surplus.
{"title":"Verification and reputational concerns: An experiment","authors":"Magnus Våge Knutsen","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102435","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102435","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I investigate the interaction between two solutions to the moral hazard problem in experience goods markets: Quality verification and reputational concerns. I set up an experimental market where a long-lived seller interacts with a sequence of short-lived buyers and where buyers observe previous decisions by sellers. I test the effect of letting buyers verify product quality at a cost in two distinctly different environments: One in which reputational concerns for sellers are induced by way of computerized sellers, and one without induced reputational concerns. My equilibrium analysis shows that with induced reputational concerns, costly quality verification may fully crowd out reputational concerns and lead to inferior market outcomes. However, when reputational concerns are not induced, verification can improve market outcomes. Results from the experiment to some extent corroborate these predictions. First, in the environment where reputational concerns are induced, short-run incentives created by verification almost fully crowd out the reputational concerns. Second, in the environment without induced reputational concerns, verification improves market outcomes by increasing quality and overall market surplus.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 102435"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145104974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study analyzes a modified dictatorship game in which, before splitting a fixed endowment, dictators are informed about the amount their recipients would have kept for themselves had they been assigned the role of allocators. We posit that dictators will selectively use the additional information and exploit a moral wiggle room — they will keep a larger amount when they face recipients who would have behaved more selfishly than themselves and ignore the knowledge in case of more benevolent recipients. We ran an experiment with treatment and control sessions, giving dictators information regarding potential recipients only in the former. Our experimental findings support our hypotheses, which suggest that dictators’ decisions are driven not just by their idiosyncratic preferences for fairness but also by those of others. Our paper contributes to the literature on subtle contextual cues that adversely affect the prosocial behavior of dictators.
{"title":"Moral wiggle room in the dictator game","authors":"Sanmitra Ghosh , Mridu Prabal Goswami , Shubhro Sarkar","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102431","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102431","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study analyzes a modified dictatorship game in which, before splitting a fixed endowment, dictators are informed about the amount their recipients would have kept for themselves had they been assigned the role of allocators. We posit that dictators will selectively use the additional information and exploit a moral wiggle room — they will keep a larger amount when they face recipients who would have behaved more selfishly than themselves and ignore the knowledge in case of more benevolent recipients. We ran an experiment with treatment and control sessions, giving dictators information regarding potential recipients only in the former. Our experimental findings support our hypotheses, which suggest that dictators’ decisions are driven not just by their idiosyncratic preferences for fairness but also by those of others. Our paper contributes to the literature on subtle contextual cues that adversely affect the prosocial behavior of dictators.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 102431"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145362022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-17DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2025.102448
Cong Li, Danlei Chen, Jingxian Wu, Qiqi Liu
Health behaviors, which involve trade-offs between current costs and future benefits, are closely associated with individuals’ time preferences. This study investigates the effectiveness of two time preference elicitation methods—indirect (experimental) and direct (self-reported)—in predicting health behaviors using a representative sample of rural residents from Shaanxi, China. These methods were evaluated across two domains: financial and health. Our findings indicate that direct methods significantly outperformed indirect methods in predicting smoking and physical exercise behaviors in survey settings. Furthermore, time preference methods in the health domain were more predictive of health behaviors than those in the financial domain. Specifically, health-domain time preferences significantly predicted both smoking and physical exercise, while financial-domain preferences only predicted physical exercise. Based on these findings, we recommend the use of direct time preference elicitation methods from the health domain in large-scale questionnaire surveys to assess time preferences related to health behaviors in rural populations.
{"title":"Effectiveness of direct and indirect time preference elicitation methods across domains in predicting health behaviors: Evidence from Rural China","authors":"Cong Li, Danlei Chen, Jingxian Wu, Qiqi Liu","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102448","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102448","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Health behaviors, which involve trade-offs between current costs and future benefits, are closely associated with individuals’ time preferences. This study investigates the effectiveness of two time preference elicitation methods—indirect (experimental) and direct (self-reported)—in predicting health behaviors using a representative sample of rural residents from Shaanxi, China. These methods were evaluated across two domains: financial and health. Our findings indicate that direct methods significantly outperformed indirect methods in predicting smoking and physical exercise behaviors in survey settings. Furthermore, time preference methods in the health domain were more predictive of health behaviors than those in the financial domain. Specifically, health-domain time preferences significantly predicted both smoking and physical exercise, while financial-domain preferences only predicted physical exercise. Based on these findings, we recommend the use of direct time preference elicitation methods from the health domain in large-scale questionnaire surveys to assess time preferences related to health behaviors in rural populations.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 102448"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145157440","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-17DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2025.102437
Neel Ocean, Roger Woodman
As part of a push towards sustainable transportation, there have been several rental e-scooter trials in UK cities. However, vandalism and mistreatment have plagued these schemes, and the adoption of e-scooters remains low. We test the effectiveness of nudges designed to improve attitudes towards shared e-scooters, as well as increase uptake. These are based on three main mechanisms: ownership, social norm messaging, and social status signalling. Using randomised survey experiments, we find that our main ownership and social status nudges are not only ineffective, they worsen attitudes towards shared e-scooters and reduce intended uptake. Injunctive norm messaging did not have any significant impact on stated adoption or willingness to report misuse. Our results highlight the potential consequences of nudges that backfire. We recommend carefully testing proposed nudges within the intended context before implementation, even if they have been successful in a different context, in order to avoid negative consequences.
{"title":"Unintended consequences of nudges: Challenges in improving attitudes towards shared e-scooters","authors":"Neel Ocean, Roger Woodman","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102437","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102437","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>As part of a push towards sustainable transportation, there have been several rental e-scooter trials in UK cities. However, vandalism and mistreatment have plagued these schemes, and the adoption of e-scooters remains low. We test the effectiveness of nudges designed to improve attitudes towards shared e-scooters, as well as increase uptake. These are based on three main mechanisms: ownership, social norm messaging, and social status signalling. Using randomised survey experiments, we find that our main ownership and social status nudges are not only ineffective, they worsen attitudes towards shared e-scooters and reduce intended uptake. Injunctive norm messaging did not have any significant impact on stated adoption or willingness to report misuse. Our results highlight the potential consequences of nudges that backfire. We recommend carefully testing proposed nudges within the intended context before implementation, even if they have been successful in a different context, in order to avoid negative consequences.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 102437"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145104976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-15DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2025.102447
Julieth Santamaria, Benjamin Roseth, Florencia Aguirre
Digital transformation has brought two conflicting trends: a demand for more customized services requiring the use of personal data, and a concern for data protection. Reconciling these trends may influence personalized public service design and adoption strategies. This study explores how to mitigate citizens’ reluctance to share data on personalized public services. Through a survey experiment, we offered two hypothetical services: one educational service (scholarship) and one health-related service (checkup). Respondents were randomly assigned to one of three groups, receiving different information: (i) a summary of service benefits; (ii) a summary of benefits with a data use disclosure; and (iii) a data usage disclosure. The findings show strong baseline interest in personalized services. However, data-use disclosures reduced interest in both services, resulting in declines of 2.7 to 3.0 percentage points. Providing detailed service descriptions increased interest by 5.0 and 6.1 percentage points for education and health services, respectively. This suggests that offering information about the benefits of the service can offset concerns about data privacy. These effects remained consistent among different population groups.
{"title":"Does reluctance to share personal data reduce citizen demand for personalized services? Evidence from a survey experiment","authors":"Julieth Santamaria, Benjamin Roseth, Florencia Aguirre","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102447","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102447","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Digital transformation has brought two conflicting trends: a demand for more customized services requiring the use of personal data, and a concern for data protection. Reconciling these trends may influence personalized public service design and adoption strategies. This study explores how to mitigate citizens’ reluctance to share data on personalized public services. Through a survey experiment, we offered two hypothetical services: one educational service (scholarship) and one health-related service (checkup). Respondents were randomly assigned to one of three groups, receiving different information: (i) a summary of service benefits; (ii) a summary of benefits with a data use disclosure; and (iii) a data usage disclosure. The findings show strong baseline interest in personalized services. However, data-use disclosures reduced interest in both services, resulting in declines of 2.7 to 3.0 percentage points. Providing detailed service descriptions increased interest by 5.0 and 6.1 percentage points for education and health services, respectively. This suggests that offering information about the benefits of the service can offset concerns about data privacy. These effects remained consistent among different population groups.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 102447"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145104973","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-11DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2025.102445
David Boto-García , Alessandro Bucciol
This paper examines the role of peers’ performance feedback on individual productivity in competitive environments. We specifically study the link between individual performance and the past performance of teammates and opposing teams. We use a dataset on all the penalty kicks in knockout stages of World Cup and European Cup competitions in male soccer from 1976 to 2024. We find that the probability of scoring a penalty kick is 17.9 percentage points lower after the opponent team scored a kick but does not change with the outcome of a teammate’s penalty kick. Our evidence supports the notion that individuals’ underperformance when feeling pressure (“choking under pressure”) is primarily driven by feedback on competitors’ performance, rather than by teammates’ performance.
{"title":"Peers’ performance feedback: Evidence from soccer penalty shootouts","authors":"David Boto-García , Alessandro Bucciol","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102445","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102445","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines the role of peers’ performance feedback on individual productivity in competitive environments. We specifically study the link between individual performance and the past performance of teammates and opposing teams. We use a dataset on all the penalty kicks in knockout stages of World Cup and European Cup competitions in male soccer from 1976 to 2024. We find that the probability of scoring a penalty kick is 17.9 percentage points lower after the opponent team scored a kick but does not change with the outcome of a teammate’s penalty kick. Our evidence supports the notion that individuals’ underperformance when feeling pressure (“choking under pressure”) is primarily driven by feedback on competitors’ performance, rather than by teammates’ performance.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 102445"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145104975","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
If a government highlighted the first producer to adopt green technology, how would the remaining producers react? This study is the first attempt to evaluate the impact of a message about a climate leader sent by the government to an industry. From among 374 wineries in Japan, half were randomly selected and received a message stating that a certain winery was an early adopter of renewable energy. We then observed whether other wineries participated in webinars on carbon footprint measurement to collect information. We find that this message about climate leadership did not encourage the wineries to participate in the webinar. We interpret this result as reflecting both the strategic decisions of competing wineries and the adverse psychological effects of the message. Further analysis reveals a substantial gap between the stated interest and actual participation, suggesting that self-reported intentions may not reliably predict behavior. Overall, this preregistered field experiment highlights the importance of carefully designing supply-side messaging policies and emphasizes the value of collecting behavioral data in real-world settings to better understand actual responses.
{"title":"When leadership messaging fails to encourage producers’ climate action: Field experiments reveal what works in the real world","authors":"Hide-Fumi Yokoo , Takahiro Kubo , Daisuke Kunii , Hiroki Sasaki","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102439","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102439","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>If a government highlighted the first producer to adopt green technology, how would the remaining producers react? This study is the first attempt to evaluate the impact of a message about a climate leader sent by the government to an industry. From among 374 wineries in Japan, half were randomly selected and received a message stating that a certain winery was an early adopter of renewable energy. We then observed whether other wineries participated in webinars on carbon footprint measurement to collect information. We find that this message about climate leadership did not encourage the wineries to participate in the webinar. We interpret this result as reflecting both the strategic decisions of competing wineries and the adverse psychological effects of the message. Further analysis reveals a substantial gap between the stated interest and actual participation, suggesting that self-reported intentions may not reliably predict behavior. Overall, this preregistered field experiment highlights the importance of carefully designing supply-side messaging policies and emphasizes the value of collecting behavioral data in real-world settings to better understand actual responses.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 102439"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145105009","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-04DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2025.102438
Grant S. Shields , Trey Malone
Perhaps all of us have heard of the term “comfort eating,” and many of us likely engage in the practice occasionally. Despite an intuitive understanding of at least one influence of stress on food choices, the influence of stress has largely gone unconsidered in economic models of food choice and consumer behavior. A growing body of literature, from a wide array of disciplines, has highlighted the importance of considering stress within food choices and consumer behavior. In this review, we survey this growing literature, focusing as narrowly as neurobiological mechanisms linking stress to food choices and as broadly as population-level studies that have examined such influences. Considered together, the literature suggests that even a mild nationwide stressor may alter food consumption patterns. Such effects have nontrivial implications, ranging from production considerations for major snack manufacturers to public health for policymakers. We conclude with recommendations for future work on the subject, including work aiming to understand food choices on a national scale.
{"title":"A narrative review of stress, food choices, and eating behavior: Integrating psychoneuroendocrinology and economic decision-making","authors":"Grant S. Shields , Trey Malone","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102438","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102438","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Perhaps all of us have heard of the term “comfort eating,” and many of us likely engage in the practice occasionally. Despite an intuitive understanding of at least one influence of stress on food choices, the influence of stress has largely gone unconsidered in economic models of food choice and consumer behavior. A growing body of literature, from a wide array of disciplines, has highlighted the importance of considering stress within food choices and consumer behavior. In this review, we survey this growing literature, focusing as narrowly as neurobiological mechanisms linking stress to food choices and as broadly as population-level studies that have examined such influences. Considered together, the literature suggests that even a mild nationwide stressor may alter food consumption patterns. Such effects have nontrivial implications, ranging from production considerations for major snack manufacturers to public health for policymakers. We conclude with recommendations for future work on the subject, including work aiming to understand food choices on a national scale.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 102438"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145105010","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-02DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2025.102432
Yasuhiro Nakamoto
In this study, we investigate earnings as a motivational tool on goal setting in economically equivalent gain and loss domains. The main finding indicates that a higher unit price, which corresponds to greater earnings, leads to a higher self-set goal in the Gain treatment but not in the economically equivalent Loss treatment. Using the reference-dependent utility model, one possible explanation is that in the loss domain, the positive effect of an increase in the unit price is weakened due to a corresponding change in the reference point formed by the initial endowment. Additionally, a higher unit price does not lead to greater performance in both the gain and loss domains. Finally, in the gain domain, our experiment finds that low rewards fail to motivate individuals to set goals that closely align with actual performance.
{"title":"The effect of an increase in unit price on self-set goals in a success-based fee system: Gain and loss domains","authors":"Yasuhiro Nakamoto","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102432","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102432","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In this study, we investigate earnings as a motivational tool on goal setting in economically equivalent gain and loss domains. The main finding indicates that a higher unit price, which corresponds to greater earnings, leads to a higher self-set goal in the Gain treatment but not in the economically equivalent Loss treatment. Using the reference-dependent utility model, one possible explanation is that in the loss domain, the positive effect of an increase in the unit price is weakened due to a corresponding change in the reference point formed by the initial endowment. Additionally, a higher unit price does not lead to greater performance in both the gain and loss domains. Finally, in the gain domain, our experiment finds that low rewards fail to motivate individuals to set goals that closely align with actual performance.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"118 ","pages":"Article 102432"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145003875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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