Pub Date : 2024-06-24DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2024.102259
Afnei Ngan Billy Tumba, Resfita Dewi, Tarysha Aulya Putri Rany
{"title":"","authors":"Afnei Ngan Billy Tumba, Resfita Dewi, Tarysha Aulya Putri Rany","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2024.102259","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2024.102259","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"112 ","pages":"Article 102259"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141480081","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-22DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2024.102253
Jonathan Hall , Sam Whitt
Existing behavioral studies of affective partisan polarization only capture a subset of decision-making preferences and strategies. We apply an innovative experimental design, the Equality Equivalency Test (EET), to investigate a broader range of affective behavior toward partisan others. Based on data from yearly nationwide surveys between 2019 and 2022 with over 6000 observations, we find that affective polarization is expressed through strong malevolent, and to a lesser degree, benevolent deviations from rational expected-utility maximization. The rising preponderance of spitefulness towards political opponents supports negative partisanship as the dominant mechanism governing affective polarization. In addition, we find evidence of growing negative partisanship among independents, who are turning increasingly spiteful toward members of both parties. We argue that the EET should be utilized by scholars as a next-generation design innovation to deepen our understanding of affective polarization.
{"title":"Examining affective partisan polarization through a novel behavioral experiment: The equality equivalency test in the United States (2019–2022)","authors":"Jonathan Hall , Sam Whitt","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2024.102253","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2024.102253","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Existing behavioral studies of affective partisan polarization only capture a subset of decision-making preferences and strategies. We apply an innovative experimental design, the Equality Equivalency Test (EET), to investigate a broader range of affective behavior toward partisan others. Based on data from yearly nationwide surveys between 2019 and 2022 with over 6000 observations, we find that affective polarization is expressed through strong malevolent, and to a lesser degree, benevolent deviations from rational expected-utility maximization. The rising preponderance of spitefulness towards political opponents supports negative partisanship as the dominant mechanism governing affective polarization. In addition, we find evidence of growing negative partisanship among independents, who are turning increasingly spiteful toward members of both parties. We argue that the EET should be utilized by scholars as a next-generation design innovation to deepen our understanding of affective polarization.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"112 ","pages":"Article 102253"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141480079","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Leading institutions are promoting several financial literacy initiatives worldwide, yet few of them are still measuring their impact on behavior. Following the current debate on the upcoming mandatory financial education implementation in Italy, this paper provides evidence of the consequences of financial education for Gen Zers’ decision-making. Specifically, we focus on the Bank of Italy's booklets initiative to measure the impact of financial education on intertemporal choices in a middle school in the South of Italy. Through a Randomized Control Trial (RCT) and eliciting time preferences with an incentivized task, we find robust evidence that enhancing financial literacy among Gen Zers significantly improves the quality of decision-making and the consistency of intertemporal choices.
世界范围内的领先机构正在推广多项金融知识普及计划,但很少有机构仍在衡量这些计划对行为的影响。随着意大利即将实施强制性金融教育的讨论,本文提供了金融教育对 Z 世代决策影响的证据。具体来说,我们将重点放在意大利银行的小册子计划上,以衡量金融教育对意大利南部一所中学的跨期选择的影响。通过随机对照试验(RCT)和通过激励任务激发时间偏好,我们发现有力的证据表明,提高 Z 世代的金融知识水平能显著改善决策质量和跨期选择的一致性。
{"title":"Gen Z and financial education: Evidence from a randomized control trial in the South of Italy","authors":"Alessia Sconti , Maurizio Caserta , Livio Ferrante","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2024.102256","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2024.102256","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Leading institutions are promoting several financial literacy initiatives worldwide, yet few of them are still measuring their impact on behavior. Following the current debate on the upcoming mandatory financial education implementation in Italy, this paper provides evidence of the consequences of financial education for Gen Zers’ decision-making. Specifically, we focus on the Bank of Italy's booklets initiative to measure the impact of financial education on intertemporal choices in a middle school in the South of Italy. Through a Randomized Control Trial (RCT) and eliciting time preferences with an incentivized task, we find robust evidence that enhancing financial literacy among Gen Zers significantly improves the quality of decision-making and the consistency of intertemporal choices.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"112 ","pages":"Article 102256"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214804324000946/pdfft?md5=be76fb275ebf9187f656604d8a486b2b&pid=1-s2.0-S2214804324000946-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141480083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-19DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2024.102255
Adolf Kwadzo Dzampe , Daisaku Goto
Physician motives remain a hotly debated and sensitive topic. Given the sensitive nature of this issue, direct questions may elicit either dishonest responses or no response at all. To mitigate this risk, we carried out two list experiments between November 2022 and February 2023 to examine two important physician behaviors from both the physician and patient perspectives. In these experiments, participants in the control and treatment groups were shown a list of non-sensitive statements. Additionally, each treatment group received a sensitive statement related to either demand inducement or demand enablement behavior. Participants were then asked to report only the number of statements with which they agreed. The difference in the mean number of statements agreed upon between the control and treatment groups revealed the prevalence rates of sensitive behaviors. In the physician experiment, we observed a 25 % prevalence rate (standard error (SE) = 0.127, p = 0.046) for demand inducement behavior and a 65 % rate (SE = 0.125, p < 0.001) for demand enablement behavior. In the patient experiment, compared to the control group, 52 % of participants (SE = 0.074, p < 0.001) perceived that physicians exhibit demand inducement behavior, while 39 % (SE = 0.073, p < 0.001) demonstrated behavior consistent with demand enablement. These findings indicate that physicians are more prone to offer unnecessary medical services when patients actively participate, underscoring the significant influence of patients on physician behavior.
{"title":"Physician behavior: Experimental evidence from physician and patient perspectives","authors":"Adolf Kwadzo Dzampe , Daisaku Goto","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2024.102255","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2024.102255","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Physician motives remain a hotly debated and sensitive topic. Given the sensitive nature of this issue, direct questions may elicit either dishonest responses or no response at all. To mitigate this risk, we carried out two list experiments between November 2022 and February 2023 to examine two important physician behaviors from both the physician and patient perspectives. In these experiments, participants in the control and treatment groups were shown a list of non-sensitive statements. Additionally, each treatment group received a sensitive statement related to either demand inducement or demand enablement behavior. Participants were then asked to report only the number of statements with which they agreed. The difference in the mean number of statements agreed upon between the control and treatment groups revealed the prevalence rates of sensitive behaviors. In the physician experiment, we observed a 25 % prevalence rate (standard error (SE) = 0.127, <em>p</em> = 0.046) for demand inducement behavior and a 65 % rate (SE = 0.125, <em>p</em> < 0.001) for demand enablement behavior. In the patient experiment, compared to the control group, 52 % of participants (SE = 0.074, <em>p</em> < 0.001) perceived that physicians exhibit demand inducement behavior, while 39 % (SE = 0.073, <em>p</em> < 0.001) demonstrated behavior consistent with demand enablement. These findings indicate that physicians are more prone to offer unnecessary medical services when patients actively participate, underscoring the significant influence of patients on physician behavior.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"112 ","pages":"Article 102255"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141480082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-08DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2024.102247
Andrej Angelovski , Praveen Kujal , Christos Mavridis
Given that pure public goods' broader use is often limited by distance, congestion, or borders, local public goods are prevalent. The decision for the provision of these local public goods is often made by individuals who do not get to consume them. It is, therefore, not clear whether the classic free-riding problem result holds in this framework. We study the provision of a local public good where the public good contribution decisions are made by non-local intermediaries who neither contribute from their own endowment nor directly benefit from the local public good. Each intermediary decides for only one public good beneficiary. Intermediaries make decisions under two compensation mechanisms where their incentives are either non-aligned (fixed), or aligned (variable), with those of the beneficiaries they represent. We find that the use of intermediaries, regardless of the compensation mechanism, significantly increases contributions to the provision of the public good.
{"title":"Deciding for others: Local public good contributions with intermediaries","authors":"Andrej Angelovski , Praveen Kujal , Christos Mavridis","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2024.102247","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2024.102247","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Given that pure public goods' broader use is often limited by distance, congestion, or borders, local public goods are prevalent. The decision for the provision of these local public goods is often made by individuals who do not get to consume them. It is, therefore, not clear whether the classic free-riding problem result holds in this framework. We study the provision of a local public good where the public good contribution decisions are made by non-local intermediaries who neither contribute from their own endowment nor directly benefit from the local public good. Each intermediary decides for only one public good beneficiary. Intermediaries make decisions under two compensation mechanisms where their incentives are either non-aligned (fixed), or aligned (variable), with those of the beneficiaries they represent. We find that the use of intermediaries, regardless of the compensation mechanism, significantly increases contributions to the provision of the public good.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"112 ","pages":"Article 102247"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214804324000855/pdfft?md5=999db66beaa68ed147621b4cc11d05a3&pid=1-s2.0-S2214804324000855-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141325947","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-07DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2024.102241
Matthias Greiff , Marcus Giamattei
In the workplace, incentive schemes may spill over on distributional preferences and beliefs, which underlie an employee’s willingness to cooperate. In an online experiment, we analyze how different incentive schemes and the corresponding feedback affect distributional preferences and beliefs. In six different treatments, we vary the incentive scheme (competitive vs team incentives) for a real-effort task and the feedback participants receive at the end of the real-effort task. Subsequently, we measure participants’ social value orientation (SVO), a proxy for distributional preferences, and the corresponding beliefs about other’s SVO. If no feedback is provided, participants show stronger SVOs if they are incentivized by team incentives in comparison to piece-rate remuneration. Surprisingly, this positive effect prevails under competitive incentives without feedback. With feedback about relative performance, the spillover effects differ between the incentive schemes. Under competitive incentives, participants show lower SVOs (negative spillovers), but only for low performers. Under team incentives, we find negative spillovers on preferences for high performers and positive spillovers for low performers. We find no evidence for spillovers on beliefs.
在工作场所,激励方案可能会影响分配偏好和信念,而分配偏好和信念是员工合作意愿的基础。在一项在线实验中,我们分析了不同的激励方案和相应的反馈如何影响分配偏好和信念。在六个不同的处理中,我们改变了实际工作任务的激励方案(竞争激励与团队激励)以及参与者在实际工作任务结束时收到的反馈。随后,我们测量了参与者的社会价值取向(SVO)(分配偏好的代表)以及对他人社会价值取向的相应信念。在没有反馈的情况下,与计件工资相比,如果参与者受到团队激励,他们会表现出更强的社会价值取向。令人惊讶的是,在没有反馈的竞争激励机制下,这种积极效应依然存在。在有相对绩效反馈的情况下,不同激励方案的溢出效应有所不同。在竞争激励机制下,参与者的 SVO 较低(负溢出效应),但仅限于低绩效者。在团队激励机制下,我们发现对高绩效者的偏好有负溢出效应,而对低绩效者则有正溢出效应。我们没有发现信念溢出效应的证据。
{"title":"Spillovers from incentive schemes on distributional preferences and expectations","authors":"Matthias Greiff , Marcus Giamattei","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2024.102241","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2024.102241","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In the workplace, incentive schemes may spill over on distributional preferences and beliefs, which underlie an employee’s willingness to cooperate. In an online experiment, we analyze how different incentive schemes and the corresponding feedback affect distributional preferences and beliefs. In six different treatments, we vary the incentive scheme (competitive vs team incentives) for a real-effort task and the feedback participants receive at the end of the real-effort task. Subsequently, we measure participants’ social value orientation (SVO), a proxy for distributional preferences, and the corresponding beliefs about other’s SVO. If no feedback is provided, participants show stronger SVOs if they are incentivized by team incentives in comparison to piece-rate remuneration. Surprisingly, this positive effect prevails under competitive incentives without feedback. With feedback about relative performance, the spillover effects differ between the incentive schemes. Under competitive incentives, participants show lower SVOs (negative spillovers), but only for low performers. Under team incentives, we find negative spillovers on preferences for high performers and positive spillovers for low performers. We find no evidence for spillovers on beliefs.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"112 ","pages":"Article 102241"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S221480432400079X/pdfft?md5=8a64e238acdb62ed62c51c130784b0e0&pid=1-s2.0-S221480432400079X-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141325877","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-07DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2024.102238
Noemi Pace , Silvio Daidone
In rural settings, individual risk preferences represent one of the channels driving the shift from low-return/low-risk activities towards high-return/high-risk activities. This study takes advantage of data collected for the impact evaluation of the Child Grants Programme, an unconditional cash transfer program, and the Sustainable Poverty Reduction through Income, Nutrition and Access to Government Services (SPRINGS) project, a community development package, in rural Lesotho. The paper has two major goals. First, we investigate the effects of the programs on risk preferences measured via laboratory experiments in the field and a survey instrument. Second, we perform a mediation analysis to quantify the extent to which the programs affect risky investment decisions in real life through changes in risk preferences. Results show that the combination of programs decreases risk aversion, partially mediating the impact of the programs on risky agricultural investment decisions in real life.
{"title":"Impact of development interventions on individual risk preferences: Evidence from a field-lab experiment and survey data","authors":"Noemi Pace , Silvio Daidone","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2024.102238","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2024.102238","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In rural settings, individual risk preferences represent one of the channels driving the shift from low-return/low-risk activities towards high-return/high-risk activities. This study takes advantage of data collected for the impact evaluation of the Child Grants Programme, an unconditional cash transfer program, and the Sustainable Poverty Reduction through Income, Nutrition and Access to Government Services (SPRINGS) project, a community development package, in rural Lesotho. The paper has two major goals. First, we investigate the effects of the programs on risk preferences measured via laboratory experiments in the field and a survey instrument. Second, we perform a mediation analysis to quantify the extent to which the programs affect risky investment decisions in real life through changes in risk preferences. Results show that the combination of programs decreases risk aversion, partially mediating the impact of the programs on risky agricultural investment decisions in real life.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"111 ","pages":"Article 102238"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141285941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-05DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2024.102246
Laura Galdikiene , Jurate Jaraite , Agne Kajackaite
To help contain the COVID-19 pandemic, many policymakers and health experts and the media have promoted responsible health behavior by using public narratives highlighting uncooperative behavior, including the lack of social distancing and resistance to various pandemic restrictions and COVID-19 vaccination. However, whether these uncooperative narratives may have detrimental consequences on trust is unclear. Hence, we conducted an online experiment to explore how the exposure to uncooperative and cooperative pandemic narratives affects people's trust in each other. We hypothesized that providing individuals with narratives depicting behaviors that violate (uncooperative narratives) and support pandemic social norms (cooperative narratives) would decrease and increase their trust in others, respectively. We showed that neither of the narratives had any effect on trust.
{"title":"Effects of cooperative and uncooperative narratives on trust during the COVID-19 pandemic: Experimental evidence","authors":"Laura Galdikiene , Jurate Jaraite , Agne Kajackaite","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2024.102246","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2024.102246","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>To help contain the COVID-19 pandemic, many policymakers and health experts and the media have promoted responsible health behavior by using public narratives highlighting uncooperative behavior, including the lack of social distancing and resistance to various pandemic restrictions and COVID-19 vaccination. However, whether these uncooperative narratives may have detrimental consequences on trust is unclear. Hence, we conducted an online experiment to explore how the exposure to uncooperative and cooperative pandemic narratives affects people's trust in each other. We hypothesized that providing individuals with narratives depicting behaviors that violate (uncooperative narratives) and support pandemic social norms (cooperative narratives) would decrease and increase their trust in others, respectively. We showed that neither of the narratives had any effect on trust.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"112 ","pages":"Article 102246"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141325948","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-03DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2024.102244
Angga Ardiansyah, Tifani Faraziska, Fransiskus Viktor Erlie
{"title":"","authors":"Angga Ardiansyah, Tifani Faraziska, Fransiskus Viktor Erlie","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2024.102244","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2024.102244","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"112 ","pages":"Article 102244"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141424061","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-01DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2024.102242
Zeynep B. Uğur , Salih Doğanay
War causes disruption. In this study, we examine risk and time preferences of young children from Syria as they were exposed to the Syrian war. We measure children's risk and time preferences using incentivized games. To discern the effect of the war from other confounding effects, we compare children born in Syria and exposed to the war with children living in the Turkish side of the border and not exposed to the war. We find that conflict affects behavior. After controlling for demographics and cognitive ability, children exposed to the war take more risks. We do not find a significant impact of exposure to the war on time preferences or on impulsivity.
{"title":"Risk and time preferences following war evidence from Syrian children","authors":"Zeynep B. Uğur , Salih Doğanay","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2024.102242","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2024.102242","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>War causes disruption. In this study, we examine risk and time preferences of young children from Syria as they were exposed to the Syrian war. We measure children's risk and time preferences using incentivized games. To discern the effect of the war from other confounding effects, we compare children born in Syria and exposed to the war with children living in the Turkish side of the border and not exposed to the war. We find that conflict affects behavior. After controlling for demographics and cognitive ability, children exposed to the war take more risks. We do not find a significant impact of exposure to the war on time preferences or on impulsivity.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"112 ","pages":"Article 102242"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141276662","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}