In the early years of the 20th century, African-American steelworkers were recruited to Cape Breton, Nova Scotia. This short article examines experiences of raciam and antiblackness in housing and employment.
In the early years of the 20th century, African-American steelworkers were recruited to Cape Breton, Nova Scotia. This short article examines experiences of raciam and antiblackness in housing and employment.
Extending recent developments in the neo-Durkheimian analysis of suicidality as an indicator of social pathology, this paper analyses individual level survey data on suicidal ideation, perceptions of social support, and the sense of belonging from three Canadian provinces drawn from the Canadian Community Health Survey (2015–16). We ask whether or not social support and a sense of belonging affect suicide ideation differently. In answering this question, we pay attention to both subjective and objective indicators of integration, and how subjective indicators independently affect suicide ideation. Results show that a higher level of social support had the largest effect on suicidal ideation and that the effect of a sense of belonging disappeared when measures of social support are accounted for. These findings are consistent with Durkheim's general theory of suicide and previous studies on mental health, highlighting the importance of regular, proximate social interaction as a prophylactic against suicidality.
This essay identifies Canada's recognition of the United Nations Declaration for People of African Descent (UNDPAD) as a multiculturalist iteration. In this scope, the essay discusses the Community Support, Multiculturalism and Anti-Racism Initiatives (CSMARI) program as a central element of state multiculturalism, through which Canada plans to meet commitments to Black Canadians—and by extension, the UNDPAD. Although the CSMARI program is well intended, it causes harm to Black Canadians by reinscribing stereotyped material lack and other forms of racialized scarcity. Rather than address longstanding social-economic histories that sustain racialized poverty, state multiculturalism policy inadvertently reinforces these. The CSMARI program's focus on material lack as opposed to the systemic aspects that underpin these, amplifies Canada's multicultural myth of inclusivity while leaving unquestioned the cultural barriers that block Black citizens. State multiculturalism policy maintains the status quo by commodifying and depoliticizing anti-racism, while also neutralizing the language of naming experiences of exclusion. This essay adapts an anti-Black racism feminist theory to recast state multiculturalism as, implicitly, a cause of harm. The paper questions ‘good intentions’ that ‘do harm’ as a critical reflection that speaks to the dissonance expressed by Black Canadians, despite state multiculturalism policy.
Based on a correspondence experiment, this article examines if the size of population of foreign background in a city exerts any significant effect on the extent of labour-market discrimination faced by job applicants of migrant origin. The study results find neither any statistically significant relationship between the two, nor do they lend support to the group threat and group contact conceptual frameworks. Rather, they appear to corroborate the pure discrimination model, as discrimination seems to be uniformly spread over all cities and all types of jobs with different characteristics. However, the findings of this study do not exclude the possibility that there could be a threshold value in the share of foreign population after which the picture of discrimination would become richer in nuances and some of the theories would gain more explanatory power.
For the first time in generations prairie capitalism has come to rely on migrant labor. Specifically, a global division of labor that intersects with the constellation of Canada's foreign worker programs has shaped the contemporary political economic character of the “New Saskatchewan.” These programs function to construct labour markets for growing low-wage industries that exist alongside high-wage resource sector employment in Western Canada. Along with these developments, the provincial government has attempted to mitigate the “unfreedom” experienced by foreign workers through the development of the Foreign Worker Recruitment and Immigration Act. The paper draws from data obtained through government access to information requests and unpacks the enforcement of migrant labor rights and efforts to confront status-induced precarity in Saskatchewan.
Despite continued interest in gender (in)equality at work, Canadian research on gender occupational segregation stopped in the early 2000s. We revisit gender occupational segregation trends using newly developed harmonized occupational categories which resolve temporal changes in occupational classifications. Our analysis of the 1991–2016 Canadian Census Masterfiles finds gender occupational segregation, whether measured by the index of dissimilarity or Gini index, has steadily decreased since the 1990s. Yet the pace of its decline has slowed since 2000. This can be explained by the diminishing changes in vertical segregation, measured by inequality in earnings across occupations. Our results contribute to an ongoing debate about a stalled gender revolution. We also suggest new topics for future study.
That young Canadians are obtaining more education than previous generations might suggest that the relationship between parents’ education and that of their children has weakened. However, accounts of intergenerational educational mobility in Canada published in the past two decades are scant. Drawing on the Longitudinal and International Study of Adults, this paper examines trends in intergenerational educational mobility from 1969 to 2016. Adopting an educational transition approach, I find no change in the relative relationship between parents’ and children's education over time despite the structural expansion of education. The results of a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition suggest the upgrading of parents’ education across cohorts partially explains this stability. The analyses further reveal a bifurcation in Canada's post-secondary system whereby higher parental education provides and advantage to youth for university degree completion while those whose parents have less education make their way to other post-secondary institutions.
Multiple studies examine how couples organize their economic resources, but most focus on wages, with little attention to assets. This paper helps to fill this research gap in Québec (Canada) by asking what proportion of married and cohabiting different-sex couples of working age jointly own their primary residence, instead of remaining in more independent arrangements regarding this asset—either through individual ownership of the home by the man or the woman or by not owning one at all. Also, drawing on transaction cost and institutional approaches to economic organization, we explore variation on several relationship characteristics. Individual ownership is uncommon, especially by the woman, but it is more prevalent among couples with little time together and who do not have children. Individual ownership is also more common among income-unequal couples than equal ones, because, we argue, it allows primary earners to cover housing costs without transferring wealth. Those results advance knowledge on both within-household wealth inequality and conjugal redistributive practices.
For many years, scholars have directed our attention to the gender gap in domestic labour. Even when women engage in paid employment, they nevertheless perform the majority of the household labour in most wealthy countries. At the same time, disasters and crises both expose and exacerbate existing social inequalities. In this paper, we ask: in what ways has the COVID−19 pandemic contributed to the gender gap in household labour, including childcare? How do women and men feel about this gap? Using data from the Canadian Perspectives survey series (Wave 3), conducted by Statistics Canada three months into the pandemic, our analyses consider the task distribution that made household labour intensely unequal during COVID−19, with women ten times more likely than men to say childcare fell mostly on them, for example. Yet, in nearly all of our models, women did not ubiquitously report being more dissatisfied with the division of domestic tasks within the house, nor were they more likely than men to say that the household division of labour “got worse” during COVID; however, parents did feel that it got worse. We discuss what these findings mean for women's mental health, long-term paid labour, and interpersonal power, and raise questions about why it is we are not seeing a decrease in women's reported satisfaction with this division of labour. These findings spotlight gender inequality and the family as ongoing pillars of capitalism, and how the structural and interpersonal weathering of the pandemic comes at a particularly great expense to women.
One type of climate change denial is the belief that climate change is naturally occurring instead of human caused; this form of denial is known as attribution skepticism or soft denial. While considerable research has addressed outright climate change denial, little research has focused specifically on soft denial and its complex and politicized relationship with science. We examine this form of denial using original survey data collected in 2017 in the United States (n = 1510) and in 2019 in Canada (n = 1545). Contrary to expectations about the United States being more divided by political ideology on the topic of climate change, we find that – after accounting for trust in political leaders – Canadians’ views are driven more by ideological position than those of Americans. In the United States, climate denial is related to trust in President Trump as a source of information about climate change. The study of soft denial is important as it undermines the rationale for climate change solutions.