Pub Date : 2022-05-04DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2022.2070599
Eglantine Staunton, B. Day
ABSTRACT The centrepiece of the AUKUS defence pact agreed between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States in September 2021 was a commitment to help Australia acquire nuclear-powered submarines. This made redundant an earlier $90 billion deal Australia had entered into with France to deliver conventionally powered submarines. Australia’s decision to renege on the French deal, as well as the revelation that three of France’s key partners had negotiated AUKUS in secret, triggered a furious French diplomatic response. In this commentary, we explore the ramifications of this episode for future Australia-France relations. We begin by documenting the immediate diplomatic fallout of the AUKUS announcement and tracing how the dispute became personalised between Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison and French President Emmanuel Macron. We then move to consider how the episode reveals the divergent approaches Australia and France are taking in response to China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific. Finally, we highlight three reasons why this episode represents a theoretically valuable case study for scholars interested in the roles of trust and leadership in global politics, given it features the breakdown of interpersonal trust between leaders of friendly states.
{"title":"Australia-France relations after AUKUS: Macron, Morrison and trust in International Relations","authors":"Eglantine Staunton, B. Day","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2022.2070599","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2022.2070599","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The centrepiece of the AUKUS defence pact agreed between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States in September 2021 was a commitment to help Australia acquire nuclear-powered submarines. This made redundant an earlier $90 billion deal Australia had entered into with France to deliver conventionally powered submarines. Australia’s decision to renege on the French deal, as well as the revelation that three of France’s key partners had negotiated AUKUS in secret, triggered a furious French diplomatic response. In this commentary, we explore the ramifications of this episode for future Australia-France relations. We begin by documenting the immediate diplomatic fallout of the AUKUS announcement and tracing how the dispute became personalised between Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison and French President Emmanuel Macron. We then move to consider how the episode reveals the divergent approaches Australia and France are taking in response to China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific. Finally, we highlight three reasons why this episode represents a theoretically valuable case study for scholars interested in the roles of trust and leadership in global politics, given it features the breakdown of interpersonal trust between leaders of friendly states.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"77 1","pages":"11 - 18"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49593509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-03DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2022.2071834
I. Wicaksana
ABSTRACT The consequences of populism on foreign policy have been a rising topic of academic inquiry in recent years. The latest literature exposes diverse propensities in the state governments’ international behaviour led by populist leaders. In comparison, foreign policies of populists in the Americas and Europe exhibit anti-elitism and anti-pluralism toward the outside world. Those in Asia tend to be populist domestically, not in foreign policy. This article focuses on the foreign policies of Asian populist government leaders and addresses the question as to why are their foreign policies sterile from populism? It presents the case of Indonesia under President Joko Widodo (Jokowi). The argument is that the enduring pragmatism and domestic constraints have hindered Jokowi's populist motive from shaping the role of the state foreign policy as the defender of the suppressed people against the repressive elite. Hence, Jokowi is unable to make any substantial change to the foreign policy of his non-populist predecessors, and he has to maintain Indonesia’s traditional foreign policy pillars. Nevertheless, the case of Jokowi's Indonesia can open up the space to challenge the established Euro-American scholarship advancing a positive connection between leaders’ populism and foreign policy.
{"title":"Why does populism not make populist foreign policy? Indonesia under Jokowi","authors":"I. Wicaksana","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2022.2071834","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2022.2071834","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The consequences of populism on foreign policy have been a rising topic of academic inquiry in recent years. The latest literature exposes diverse propensities in the state governments’ international behaviour led by populist leaders. In comparison, foreign policies of populists in the Americas and Europe exhibit anti-elitism and anti-pluralism toward the outside world. Those in Asia tend to be populist domestically, not in foreign policy. This article focuses on the foreign policies of Asian populist government leaders and addresses the question as to why are their foreign policies sterile from populism? It presents the case of Indonesia under President Joko Widodo (Jokowi). The argument is that the enduring pragmatism and domestic constraints have hindered Jokowi's populist motive from shaping the role of the state foreign policy as the defender of the suppressed people against the repressive elite. Hence, Jokowi is unable to make any substantial change to the foreign policy of his non-populist predecessors, and he has to maintain Indonesia’s traditional foreign policy pillars. Nevertheless, the case of Jokowi's Indonesia can open up the space to challenge the established Euro-American scholarship advancing a positive connection between leaders’ populism and foreign policy.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"76 1","pages":"634 - 652"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43903700","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-29DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2022.2070598
F. Al-Fadhat
ABSTRACT Multilateralism at the regional and global stage is essential for Indonesia’s foreign policy. Apart from ASEAN, which has long been a pivotal array for Indonesia’s regional economic interdependence and political stability, the G20 is recently added to the country’s interest. It serves Indonesia’s desire for global leadership and middle-power status. As Indonesia began its year-long presidency of the G20 in 2022, the government is confident that hosting numerous meetings and the Group’s summit at the end of 2022 is a notable milestone for its international leadership exposure. This time, Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo emphasises priority agendas: strengthening global health architecture, transitioning to green and renewable energy, and promoting the digital economy. This commentary evaluates and projects Indonesia’s G20 presidency amidst the country’s democratic decline in recent years. It argues that Indonesia’s proposed agendas are more ambitious goals than strategic. Instead, the country’s priority will be marked by a solid neoliberal economic policy and stability, which is likely to cause even more democratic setbacks at home.
{"title":"Indonesia’s G20 presidency: neoliberal policy and authoritarian tendencies","authors":"F. Al-Fadhat","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2022.2070598","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2022.2070598","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Multilateralism at the regional and global stage is essential for Indonesia’s foreign policy. Apart from ASEAN, which has long been a pivotal array for Indonesia’s regional economic interdependence and political stability, the G20 is recently added to the country’s interest. It serves Indonesia’s desire for global leadership and middle-power status. As Indonesia began its year-long presidency of the G20 in 2022, the government is confident that hosting numerous meetings and the Group’s summit at the end of 2022 is a notable milestone for its international leadership exposure. This time, Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo emphasises priority agendas: strengthening global health architecture, transitioning to green and renewable energy, and promoting the digital economy. This commentary evaluates and projects Indonesia’s G20 presidency amidst the country’s democratic decline in recent years. It argues that Indonesia’s proposed agendas are more ambitious goals than strategic. Instead, the country’s priority will be marked by a solid neoliberal economic policy and stability, which is likely to cause even more democratic setbacks at home.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"76 1","pages":"617 - 623"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48926504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-27DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2022.2064972
K. Endo, N. Murashkin
ABSTRACT Japan formulated its first infrastructure export strategy in 2010. However, the outputs and effects of that strategy and its successive revisions over the preceding decade have not yet been extensively reviewed. Although infrastructure came to the fore of the international agenda over the past decade, existing research has mostly discussed individual infrastructure projects and accompanying signalling, sloganeering, and strategic communications in the geopolitical and geo-economic context. This paper therefore aims to make an empirical and interpretive contribution to existing scholarship by comprehensively reviewing Japan’s infrastructure exports in 2010–19 and elucidating further its oft-disregarded commercial and developmental aspects. To do so, this article focuses on Official Development Assistance (ODA) loan projects, which count among the largest items of Japan’s infrastructure exports. We introduce and analyse a previously unexamined dataset on infrastructure-related ODA loan projects and contract awards, while also showcasing the avoidance of zero-sum-game approaches in Japan’s related strategy. We then discuss whether and how the changes of Japanese infrastructure export strategy affected the performance of Japan’s infrastructure export through the ODA loan projects as well as Japan’s relationship with the recipient countries, especially in the various parts of the Indo-Pacific region, such as Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Africa.
{"title":"Japan’s infrastructure export and development cooperation: the role of ODA loan projects in the 2010s","authors":"K. Endo, N. Murashkin","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2022.2064972","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2022.2064972","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Japan formulated its first infrastructure export strategy in 2010. However, the outputs and effects of that strategy and its successive revisions over the preceding decade have not yet been extensively reviewed. Although infrastructure came to the fore of the international agenda over the past decade, existing research has mostly discussed individual infrastructure projects and accompanying signalling, sloganeering, and strategic communications in the geopolitical and geo-economic context. This paper therefore aims to make an empirical and interpretive contribution to existing scholarship by comprehensively reviewing Japan’s infrastructure exports in 2010–19 and elucidating further its oft-disregarded commercial and developmental aspects. To do so, this article focuses on Official Development Assistance (ODA) loan projects, which count among the largest items of Japan’s infrastructure exports. We introduce and analyse a previously unexamined dataset on infrastructure-related ODA loan projects and contract awards, while also showcasing the avoidance of zero-sum-game approaches in Japan’s related strategy. We then discuss whether and how the changes of Japanese infrastructure export strategy affected the performance of Japan’s infrastructure export through the ODA loan projects as well as Japan’s relationship with the recipient countries, especially in the various parts of the Indo-Pacific region, such as Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Africa.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"77 1","pages":"129 - 149"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48549504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-13DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2022.2063252
Joanne Wallis, A. Ireland, I. Robinson, A. Turner
ABSTRACT How did many Australians come to accept that competition, rather than cooperation, with China was necessary in the Pacific Islands? We use discourse analysis techniques to examine the role that framings in Australian official discourse, media, and commentary over the last decade (2011–2021) played in constructing China’s presence in the region as threatening such that many Australians have accepted that policies aimed at competing with China are the most reasonable foreign and strategic policy response. We find that Australian official discourse was characterised by qualified optimism about China’s role until 2018, when a more explicit emphasis on competition emerged. Echoing this shift, while the media and (much of) the commentary framed China’s role in terms of threat and competition throughout the decade, this framing increased significantly in 2018. It is impossible to isolate the Australian government’s policy approach to China in the Pacific Islands from its broader understanding of China’s increasingly activist role in Australia, the Indo-Pacific, and globally. But our findings suggest that, by consistently framing China in terms of threat and competition, the media and – to a lesser extent, commentary – created an enabling environment for the public to accept changes to the Australian government’s policies.
{"title":"Framing China in the Pacific Islands","authors":"Joanne Wallis, A. Ireland, I. Robinson, A. Turner","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2022.2063252","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2022.2063252","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT How did many Australians come to accept that competition, rather than cooperation, with China was necessary in the Pacific Islands? We use discourse analysis techniques to examine the role that framings in Australian official discourse, media, and commentary over the last decade (2011–2021) played in constructing China’s presence in the region as threatening such that many Australians have accepted that policies aimed at competing with China are the most reasonable foreign and strategic policy response. We find that Australian official discourse was characterised by qualified optimism about China’s role until 2018, when a more explicit emphasis on competition emerged. Echoing this shift, while the media and (much of) the commentary framed China’s role in terms of threat and competition throughout the decade, this framing increased significantly in 2018. It is impossible to isolate the Australian government’s policy approach to China in the Pacific Islands from its broader understanding of China’s increasingly activist role in Australia, the Indo-Pacific, and globally. But our findings suggest that, by consistently framing China in terms of threat and competition, the media and – to a lesser extent, commentary – created an enabling environment for the public to accept changes to the Australian government’s policies.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"76 1","pages":"522 - 545"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43016453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-07DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2022.2061418
Charles Miller
ABSTRACT The recent ‘trade war' between Australia and China has understandably sparked fear amongst Australian policymakers, voters and businesses. China's alleged economic coercion towards Australia has the strange property that Chinese leaders are not making any clear explicit demands of Australia. Moreover, this behaviour follows a pattern in recent Chinese dealings with other Asia-Pacific states. Why would a state initiate economic coercion without making clear demands? In this paper, I offer an explanation, building on the logic of audience costs in wars of attrition. I suggest that China's strategy of economic coercion without explicit demands serves a key strategic purpose. Omitting specific demands makes the outcome of any given dispute less clear and hence makes it easier for either side to claim victory. This negates a key advantage which democratic states have in bargaining with autocratic adversaries—the fact that their audience costs for backing down are usually higher, which makes them less likely to initiate but more likely to win international disputes. Implicit economic coercion should therefore be a strategy which is primarily targeted at China’s democratic trading partners. I examine the record of Chinese uses of economic coercion in the past and find that this pattern finds much support.
{"title":"Explaining China's strategy of implicit economic coercion. Best left unsaid?","authors":"Charles Miller","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2022.2061418","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2022.2061418","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The recent ‘trade war' between Australia and China has understandably sparked fear amongst Australian policymakers, voters and businesses. China's alleged economic coercion towards Australia has the strange property that Chinese leaders are not making any clear explicit demands of Australia. Moreover, this behaviour follows a pattern in recent Chinese dealings with other Asia-Pacific states. Why would a state initiate economic coercion without making clear demands? In this paper, I offer an explanation, building on the logic of audience costs in wars of attrition. I suggest that China's strategy of economic coercion without explicit demands serves a key strategic purpose. Omitting specific demands makes the outcome of any given dispute less clear and hence makes it easier for either side to claim victory. This negates a key advantage which democratic states have in bargaining with autocratic adversaries—the fact that their audience costs for backing down are usually higher, which makes them less likely to initiate but more likely to win international disputes. Implicit economic coercion should therefore be a strategy which is primarily targeted at China’s democratic trading partners. I examine the record of Chinese uses of economic coercion in the past and find that this pattern finds much support.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"76 1","pages":"507 - 521"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48826784","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-01DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2022.2057919
Elizabeth Buchanan, Patrick Flamm
For six decades the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) has succeeded in keeping the Antarctic continent free from military conflict while facilitating international scientific cooperation and environmental protection. As the international system undergoes profound changes once again today with the rise of Asia, a global resurgence of great power politics, an international pandemic, and an accelerating global climate crisis, it seems warranted to explore how this successful multilateral regime might be impacted. In the face of such systemic international challenges, what explains the continued success of the ATS? What does a future multipolar world order or a crisis of liberal democratic global order mean for this carefully balanced governance arrangement of one of the most fragile environmental systems on the planet? The relationships between a rising China and resurgent Russia, both with Antarctic interests and legitimate and important stakes in the ATS, and a United States of America engulfed in polarised domestic politics, yet holding the same set of ATS rights, will no doubt affect the ATS and the Earth’s Southernmost continent. Established Antarctic nations are nervous about the intentions of new players, particularly from Asia, while rapidly progressing environmental change and new regulatory challenges such as tourism and bioprospecting all place additional pressure on the ATS. Finding consensus and maintaining the status-quo in an increasingly anxious, contested and competitive international environment will be difficult. And Australia, which has the largest stake (claiming 42% of the Antarctic continent), has a particular interest. It seems fitting to produce a special issue of the Australian Journal of International Affairs to offer just some of the ways in which Antarctic scholars in Australia and New Zealand perceive the future of Antarctica and the ATS. Is the ATS fit for this more strategically competitive international environment and if not, what could and should be done about it? Where can Australia lead this effort? In the first article, Elizabeth Buchanan examines the character of strategic competition in Antarctica. Buchanan argues grey zone activities are a prominent (yet overlooked) feature of contemporary Antarctic geopolitics. Grey zone strategies have allowed states to facilitate their own strategic agendas under the guise of cooperation and yet such activities remain in adherence to the ATS, in many ways as Buchanan argues, the system turns on grey zone activity. She undertakes an in-depth analysis of Australian Antarctic policy settings across the defence and foreign policy sectors since 2000. Buchanan finds Australian policy overlooks grey zone activities and fails to grasp the
六十年来，《南极条约体系》成功地使南极大陆免于军事冲突，同时促进了国际科学合作和环境保护。今天，随着亚洲的崛起、大国政治的全球复苏、国际流行病和全球气候危机的加剧，国际体系再次经历深刻变化，似乎有必要探讨这一成功的多边体制可能受到的影响。面对如此系统性的国际挑战，如何解释ATS的持续成功?未来的多极世界秩序或自由民主全球秩序的危机，对地球上最脆弱的环境系统之一的这种精心平衡的治理安排意味着什么?崛起的中国和复兴的俄罗斯之间的关系，两者都有南极利益和在ATS中的合法和重要利益，而美国陷入了两极分化的国内政治，但拥有同样的ATS权利，毫无疑问将影响ATS和地球上最南端的大陆。老牌南极国家对新参与者的意图感到紧张，尤其是来自亚洲的新参与者，而快速发展的环境变化和新的监管挑战，如旅游业和生物勘探，都给ATS带来了额外的压力。在日益焦虑、争夺和竞争的国际环境中寻求共识和维持现状将是困难的。而拥有最大股份(声称拥有南极大陆42%的土地)的澳大利亚有着特殊的利益。似乎有必要在《澳大利亚国际事务杂志》(Australian Journal of International Affairs)上出一期特刊，提供澳大利亚和新西兰的南极学者对南极洲和南极研究中心未来的一些看法。ATS是否适合这种更具战略竞争性的国际环境?如果不适合，我们可以而且应该做些什么?澳大利亚可以在哪里领导这一努力?在第一篇文章中，伊丽莎白·布坎南考察了南极洲战略竞争的特点。布坎南认为，灰色地带活动是当代南极地缘政治的一个突出(但被忽视)特征。灰色地带战略允许各国在合作的幌子下促进自己的战略议程，但这些活动仍然遵守ATS，正如布坎南所说，在许多方面，该系统开启了灰色地带活动。自2000年以来，她对澳大利亚国防和外交政策部门的南极政策进行了深入分析。布坎南发现，澳大利亚的政策忽视了灰色地带的活动，未能把握住
{"title":"Antarctic Treaty System at 60: fit for the future?","authors":"Elizabeth Buchanan, Patrick Flamm","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2022.2057919","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2022.2057919","url":null,"abstract":"For six decades the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) has succeeded in keeping the Antarctic continent free from military conflict while facilitating international scientific cooperation and environmental protection. As the international system undergoes profound changes once again today with the rise of Asia, a global resurgence of great power politics, an international pandemic, and an accelerating global climate crisis, it seems warranted to explore how this successful multilateral regime might be impacted. In the face of such systemic international challenges, what explains the continued success of the ATS? What does a future multipolar world order or a crisis of liberal democratic global order mean for this carefully balanced governance arrangement of one of the most fragile environmental systems on the planet? The relationships between a rising China and resurgent Russia, both with Antarctic interests and legitimate and important stakes in the ATS, and a United States of America engulfed in polarised domestic politics, yet holding the same set of ATS rights, will no doubt affect the ATS and the Earth’s Southernmost continent. Established Antarctic nations are nervous about the intentions of new players, particularly from Asia, while rapidly progressing environmental change and new regulatory challenges such as tourism and bioprospecting all place additional pressure on the ATS. Finding consensus and maintaining the status-quo in an increasingly anxious, contested and competitive international environment will be difficult. And Australia, which has the largest stake (claiming 42% of the Antarctic continent), has a particular interest. It seems fitting to produce a special issue of the Australian Journal of International Affairs to offer just some of the ways in which Antarctic scholars in Australia and New Zealand perceive the future of Antarctica and the ATS. Is the ATS fit for this more strategically competitive international environment and if not, what could and should be done about it? Where can Australia lead this effort? In the first article, Elizabeth Buchanan examines the character of strategic competition in Antarctica. Buchanan argues grey zone activities are a prominent (yet overlooked) feature of contemporary Antarctic geopolitics. Grey zone strategies have allowed states to facilitate their own strategic agendas under the guise of cooperation and yet such activities remain in adherence to the ATS, in many ways as Buchanan argues, the system turns on grey zone activity. She undertakes an in-depth analysis of Australian Antarctic policy settings across the defence and foreign policy sectors since 2000. Buchanan finds Australian policy overlooks grey zone activities and fails to grasp the","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"76 1","pages":"245 - 247"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44824410","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-01DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2022.2056874
Rebecca Strating
ABSTRACT International Relations has become increasingly interested in maritime order as the oceans have emerged as a key site of strategic competition. The South China Sea has become totemic of contests between ‘free’ and ‘closed’ visions of the seas, and is viewed by some as a litmus test for China’s efforts to re-write the ‘rules-based order’ in other maritime domains. This article examines the maritime ‘rules-based order’ in Antarctica, critically examining how and why the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) matters for the Antarctic region, the Southern Ocean and mechanisms of regional governance. This article contributes to understanding the complexity of maritime order in Antarctica by using Australia’s maritime claims as a case study. Australia is the largest claimant state in Antarctica, with the Australian Antarctic Territory (AAT) constituting 42% of the landmass. This paper examines Australia’s contentious maritime jurisdiction and its ‘normative hedging’ strategy that simultaneously asserts maritime claims and defends collective governance mechanisms, despite the apparent dissonance between these two positions. It argues that the Antarctic region has its own unique ‘rules-based order’ and geographic realities that complicate cross-regional comparisons, and that even so-called ‘like-minded’ states interpret maritime rules in different ways.
{"title":"Assessing the maritime ‘rules-based order’ in Antarctica","authors":"Rebecca Strating","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2022.2056874","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2022.2056874","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT International Relations has become increasingly interested in maritime order as the oceans have emerged as a key site of strategic competition. The South China Sea has become totemic of contests between ‘free’ and ‘closed’ visions of the seas, and is viewed by some as a litmus test for China’s efforts to re-write the ‘rules-based order’ in other maritime domains. This article examines the maritime ‘rules-based order’ in Antarctica, critically examining how and why the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) matters for the Antarctic region, the Southern Ocean and mechanisms of regional governance. This article contributes to understanding the complexity of maritime order in Antarctica by using Australia’s maritime claims as a case study. Australia is the largest claimant state in Antarctica, with the Australian Antarctic Territory (AAT) constituting 42% of the landmass. This paper examines Australia’s contentious maritime jurisdiction and its ‘normative hedging’ strategy that simultaneously asserts maritime claims and defends collective governance mechanisms, despite the apparent dissonance between these two positions. It argues that the Antarctic region has its own unique ‘rules-based order’ and geographic realities that complicate cross-regional comparisons, and that even so-called ‘like-minded’ states interpret maritime rules in different ways.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"76 1","pages":"286 - 304"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43383990","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-01DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2022.2057917
Elizabeth Buchanan
ABSTRACT All appears quiet on Australia’s southern front – Antarctica. The continent remains a beacon of cooperation, home to a continued system of international governance and scientific engagement, lauded as a political win from the depths of the Cold War. Beneath the surface, however, this article argues that strategic competition is now building. In Antarctica, this competition takes the form of gray zone activities. This article argues that the proliferation of gray zone challenges could jeopardize the future of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). This article analyses gray zone activity in Antarctica and highlights the growing complexity Australia faces, as Canberra pursues the dual objectives of protecting Australia’s territorial claim to the Australian Antarctic Territory (AAT) and bolstering the ATS.
{"title":"Antarctica in the gray zone","authors":"Elizabeth Buchanan","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2022.2057917","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2022.2057917","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT\u0000 All appears quiet on Australia’s southern front – Antarctica. The continent remains a beacon of cooperation, home to a continued system of international governance and scientific engagement, lauded as a political win from the depths of the Cold War. Beneath the surface, however, this article argues that strategic competition is now building. In Antarctica, this competition takes the form of gray zone activities. This article argues that the proliferation of gray zone challenges could jeopardize the future of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). This article analyses gray zone activity in Antarctica and highlights the growing complexity Australia faces, as Canberra pursues the dual objectives of protecting Australia’s territorial claim to the Australian Antarctic Territory (AAT) and bolstering the ATS.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"76 1","pages":"324 - 339"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44223620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-31DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2022.2057920
A. Press, A. Constable
ABSTRACT The Antarctic Treaty System provides the corpus of law that governs the obligations of its Parties to protect and conserve the Antarctic environment. The System consists principally of the Antarctic Treaty (the Treaty), the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CAMLR Convention), and the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (Environmental Protocol). The Antarctic Treaty establishes the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting – the body that makes decisions under the provisions of the Treaty and Environmental Protocol. The CAMLR Convention establishes the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) – its decision-making body. Together, these two international bodies are responsible for the modern-day conservation and environmental management regimes for Antarctica and the Southern Ocean. This paper looks at the scope of law developed under the Antarctic Treaty System and its evolution; and at the interaction between the different components of the Antarctic Treaty System. The paper also forecasts some of the future challenges to conservation and environmental protection in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean.
{"title":"Conservation Law in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean: the Antarctic Treaty System, conservation, and environmental protection","authors":"A. Press, A. Constable","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2022.2057920","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2022.2057920","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The Antarctic Treaty System provides the corpus of law that governs the obligations of its Parties to protect and conserve the Antarctic environment. The System consists principally of the Antarctic Treaty (the Treaty), the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CAMLR Convention), and the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (Environmental Protocol). The Antarctic Treaty establishes the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting – the body that makes decisions under the provisions of the Treaty and Environmental Protocol. The CAMLR Convention establishes the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) – its decision-making body. Together, these two international bodies are responsible for the modern-day conservation and environmental management regimes for Antarctica and the Southern Ocean. This paper looks at the scope of law developed under the Antarctic Treaty System and its evolution; and at the interaction between the different components of the Antarctic Treaty System. The paper also forecasts some of the future challenges to conservation and environmental protection in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"76 1","pages":"305 - 323"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47512662","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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