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Ambiguity and National Interests: Foreign Policy Frames and U.S.-China Relations 模棱两可与国家利益:外交政策框架与美中关系
Pub Date : 2023-10-01 DOI: 10.1353/asp.2023.a911616
Wenting He, Wesley Widmaier
Ambiguity and National Interests:Foreign Policy Frames and U.S.-China Relations Wenting He (bio) and Wesley Widmaier (bio) In early 2023, one might have been excused for expecting that a downward turn in U.S.-China relations would only accelerate. Indeed, two years earlier in January 2021, despite Joe Biden's 2020 presidential campaign having cast Donald Trump as a threat to the "soul of this nation,"1 Biden's nominee for secretary of state, Antony Blinken, singled out Trump's China policy for praise. In his confirmation hearings, Blinken declared that "Trump was right in taking a tougher approach to China."2 Over the Biden administration's first two years, U.S.-China relations accordingly maintained a broadly confrontational tone. While the administration dropped the crudely nativist language of the Trump administration, it substituted instead the crusading narrative of a global struggle between democratic and authoritarian regimes. This approach would be reinforced by an initially cool diplomatic tone toward China, spanning a tense bilateral meeting in Anchorage, Alaska, in March 2021 to the postponement of Blinken's February 2023 visit to China, prompted by the dispatch of a Chinese spy balloon into U.S. airspace. Nevertheless, one could go too far in anticipating an accelerating decline. Despite tensions over specific technological exchanges, the Biden administration has also persistently rejected wider arguments for a "decoupling" of the U.S. and Chinese economies, seeking to place a floor under any broader decline in relations. Indeed, in April 2023, [End Page 41] Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen attracted considerable attention with a speech at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies that, while acknowledging the primacy of security concerns, warned against any attempt to decouple the two economies, even holding out hope for the possibility of economic and environmental cooperation.3 Further, in July 2023, Yellen visited Beijing, where she stressed the need for joint U.S.-China leadership in addressing common interests concerning the global macroeconomy, developing country debt, and climate change. This essay suggests that the coexistence of Blinken-styled tensions and Yellen-styled accommodation encapsulates a more enduring feature of U.S.-China relations. Throughout interpretations of policy challenges, "zero-sum" framings, which draw on security discourses and trade metaphors to highlight concerns for relative position, have existed in tension with oft-overlooked "positive-sum" framings that reflect Keynesian perspectives that stress the need for cooperation in the face of uncertainty and instability. To enable an understanding of these tensions, this essay offers an analysis highlighting the ambiguity of national interests, which are in turn shaped by agents acting as interpretive practitioners who construct events in ways that shape interests in cooperation or conflict.4 To draw attention to the overlooked
在2023年初,人们可能会有理由期待美中关系的下滑只会加速。事实上,两年前的2021年1月,尽管乔·拜登(Joe Biden)在2020年的总统竞选中将唐纳德·特朗普(Donald Trump)描绘成对“这个国家灵魂”的威胁,但拜登提名的国务卿安东尼·布林肯(Antony Blinken)还是单独称赞了特朗普的中国政策。在他的确认听证会上,布林肯宣称“特朗普对中国采取更强硬的态度是正确的。”在拜登政府的头两年里,美中关系相应地保持了一种广泛的对抗性基调。虽然奥巴马政府放弃了特朗普政府粗暴的本土主义语言,但取而代之的是民主与威权政权之间全球斗争的十字军叙事。从2021年3月在阿拉斯加州安克雷奇举行的紧张双边会议,到布林肯总统2023年2月因中国向美国领空发射间谍气球而推迟对中国的访问,最初对中国的冷淡外交基调将加强这种做法。然而,预测经济加速下滑可能有些过头了。尽管在具体的技术交流问题上存在紧张关系,但拜登政府也一直拒绝接受有关中美经济“脱钩”的更广泛的论点,试图为两国关系的任何更广泛的恶化设定底线。事实上,在2023年4月,美国财政部长珍妮特·耶伦在约翰霍普金斯大学高级国际研究学院的一次演讲引起了相当大的关注,她承认安全问题是首要的,但警告不要试图使两国经济脱钩,甚至对经济和环境合作的可能性抱有希望此外,在2023年7月,耶伦访问了北京,在那里她强调了美中在解决全球宏观经济、发展中国家债务和气候变化等共同利益方面的联合领导的必要性。本文认为,布林肯式的紧张和耶伦式的妥协并存,概括了美中关系的一个更持久的特征。在对政策挑战的解读中,利用安全话语和贸易隐喻来强调相对地位的“零和”框架与经常被忽视的“正和”框架存在矛盾,后者反映了凯恩斯主义的观点,强调在面对不确定性和不稳定时需要合作。为了能够理解这些紧张关系,本文提供了一个分析,强调了国家利益的模糊性,而国家利益反过来又由作为解释实践者的代理人塑造,他们以塑造合作或冲突中的利益的方式构建事件为了使人们注意到美中合作被忽视的潜力,我们特别提到持久的凯恩斯主义框架,该框架引导各国认识到合作应对共同威胁的共同利益。此外,即使这种倾向起源于经济领域,我们认为这种合作潜力可能超越经济学,因为凯恩斯主义思想导致各国在全球经济治理中确定共同利益,也可能影响全球环境治理的利益。追踪这些动态,本文叙述了美国与中国合作的辩论,强调了“新凯恩斯主义”经济学家和长期政策制定者珍妮特耶伦在经济和环境问题上的作用。美国国家利益的模糊性是不同政策制定者偏好的结果,这可以从耶伦在全球问题上与中国合作的凯恩斯主义方法中看出。特别是与最近的经济外交方法形成对比,这些方法跨越了特朗普政府重商主义式的对国际收支的强调,以及拜登政府人物(如国务卿布林肯和国家安全顾问杰克·沙利文)更有针对性的以安全为重点的方法。首先,本文研究了20世纪90年代中期关于亚洲金融危机、《京都议定书》和中国加入世界贸易组织(WTO)的辩论。关注耶伦的凯恩斯主义立场,强调潜在全球公共产品的存在;其次,它解决了2008年全球金融危机,耶伦认为这可能是美国联合行动的动力……
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引用次数: 0
India's Foreign Policy and the Ethic of Responsibility 印度的外交政策与责任伦理
Pub Date : 2023-10-01 DOI: 10.1353/asp.2023.a911622
India's Foreign Policy and the Ethic of Responsibility Ian Hall (bio) Classical realism was formulated in the United States in the 1940s and 1950s to tackle a pressing problem: how to reconcile democratic politics with power politics. Most classical realists valued democracy as the form of government most likely to protect rights, uphold freedoms, and enable a majority of citizens to flourish.1 But at the same time, they observed that democracies often pursue foreign policies that are ill-conceived or downright dangerous.2 For this reason, classical realists lamented that democratic leaders are frequently outmaneuvered by authoritarians better schooled in the dark arts of international relations. Rajesh Basrur's excellent book Subcontinental Drift: Domestic Politics and India's Foreign Policy responds to a similar challenge. This time, however, it is faced by India, a rising power whose foreign policy is "periodically afflicted" by "uncertainty and indecisiveness" (p. 1). Basrur's concern is the mismatch between India's ambition and its mixed record of success in the post–Cold War world. He argues the problems stem from domestic political constraints and the "limitations" of India's policies and policymakers (p. xi). If the postwar classical realists looked at India today, they would likely agree. They also blamed subpar foreign policies on domestic politics, which in democracies can empower poor leaders and flimsy ideas. They pointed to strategies like isolationism and appeasement, championed by popular politicians and widely supported in the interwar years but which undermined the capacity of democratic states to deter aggression and defend [End Page 116] their citizens when conflict eventually erupted.3 Even when it comes to their own security, the classical realists complained, democratic leaders and peoples can be feckless and reckless. Sometimes they were naive. At other times, they were prone to crusading moralism and ideological dogmatism, which could have even worse effects on national security and international order than simple idealism.4 For Basrur, the shortcomings with foreign policymaking in India—in particular, the causes of "policy drift," in which necessary action is not taken or is performed suboptimally—are more quotidian. He shows how they can and do arise from the messiness of coalition politics, the complexities of federalism, and elite irresponsibility. But the consequences of these shortcomings, as his book shows, are still serious, and analysts and policymakers need to understand them properly if they are to remedy them effectively. Subcontinental Drift contributes to this effort by examining four episodes in India's foreign policy with the help of neoclassical realism, which draws inspiration from its classical forebear to explain state behavior in international relations.5 Each case study is impeccably argued. Basrur finds evidence for what he terms "involuntary drift" in the long struggle to secure support for the U.S
经典现实主义在20世纪40年代和50年代在美国形成,以解决一个紧迫的问题:如何调和民主政治与强权政治。大多数古典现实主义者认为民主是最有可能保护权利、维护自由和使大多数公民富裕的政府形式但与此同时,他们也注意到,民主国家的外交政策往往考虑不周,甚至是彻头彻尾的危险出于这个原因,古典现实主义者哀叹,民主领导人经常被在国际关系的黑暗艺术中受过更好教育的独裁者所打败。拉杰什•巴斯鲁的优秀著作《次大陆漂移:国内政治与印度外交政策》回应了类似的挑战。然而,这一次,它面对的是印度,一个正在崛起的大国,其外交政策“周期性地受到”“不确定性和优柔寡断”的折磨(第1页)。Basrur关注的是印度的雄心与其在后冷战世界中喜忧参半的成功记录之间的不匹配。他认为,这些问题源于国内政治约束以及印度政策和决策者的“局限性”。如果战后的古典现实主义者看看今天的印度,他们可能会同意这一观点。他们还将低劣的外交政策归咎于国内政治,因为在民主国家,国内政治可能会让糟糕的领导人和脆弱的想法获得权力。他们指出了孤立主义和绥靖政策等策略,这些策略受到流行政治家的拥护,并在两次世界大战之间的年代得到广泛支持,但当冲突最终爆发时,这些策略削弱了民主国家遏制侵略和保护公民的能力古典现实主义者抱怨说,即使涉及到自己的安全问题,民主国家的领导人和人民也可能无能为力,不计后果。有时他们很天真。在其他时候,他们倾向于十字军般的道德主义和意识形态教条主义,这对国家安全和国际秩序的影响比单纯的理想主义更严重对于Basrur来说,印度外交政策制定的缺点——特别是“政策漂移”的原因,即没有采取必要的行动或执行得不够理想——是司空见惯的。他展示了这些问题是如何从混乱的联合政治、复杂的联邦制和精英的不负责任中产生的。但正如他在书中所指出的,这些缺陷的后果仍然很严重,分析师和政策制定者如果要有效地补救这些问题,就需要正确地理解它们。《次大陆漂移》在新古典现实主义的帮助下研究了印度外交政策的四个片段,从而有助于这一努力,新古典现实主义从其古典前辈那里获得灵感,以解释国际关系中的国家行为每个案例研究都有无可挑剔的论证。巴斯鲁发现了他所说的“非自愿漂移”的证据,包括在争取美印核协议获得支持的长期斗争中,以及在斯里兰卡内战后期,新德里对与科伦坡的双边关系处理不当。他认为,在这两种情况下,新德里的行动自由都受到了很大程度上超出其控制范围的环境的限制:主要是一个四分五裂的议会,给了小党派过大的影响力。在后两个案例中,Basrur发现了印度核战略悬而未决的故事中“自愿漂移”的迹象,以及在2008年11月孟买袭击之前,印度未能为大规模伤亡的恐怖袭击做好充分准备。他认为,在这里,领导者有足够的控制权来进行必要的变革,但未能负责任地行事(第111页)。他认为,印度的政客们早就有办法建立一个明确的核战略,但却没有这样做,这导致了既定原则与不断发展的能力之间出现了不一致。同样,Basrur声称,印度领导人可以也应该注意到藏在巴基斯坦的激进伊斯兰组织所构成的威胁的警告。然而,他们并没有采取行动解决国内安全的明显弱点,而是把精力集中在迫使伊斯兰堡停止秘密支持恐怖主义的徒劳尝试上。这些论点精雕细琢,令人信服。然而,次大陆漂移的理论创新也值得探讨。特别是,Basrur重新引入了对政策制定和执行的分析的规范维度,这是工作中一直存在的……
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引用次数: 0
Meeting in the Middle? Multilateral Development Finance, China, and Norm Harmonization 在中间开会?多边发展金融、中国与规范协调
Pub Date : 2023-10-01 DOI: 10.1353/asp.2023.a911619
Susan Park
Meeting in the Middle?Multilateral Development Finance, China, and Norm Harmonization Susan Park (bio) International norms are strong when they are taken for granted and followed automatically.1 Through contestation, norms may erode over time as challengers focus on how to procedurally follow the norm or substantively interrogate the idea itself.2 Some scholars have observed that norms may be contested because actors can seek to reject, revise, or deny the purpose of the norm.3 Yet norms can prove resilient and robust even in the face of opposition, highlighting the importance of structural factors as they relate to a norm's embeddedness, institutionalization, and legal character.4 In the 1990s, China was viewed as a novice in multilateral forums, and it was hoped that China would be socialized into international norm adherence through engagement in multilateral economic and security settings.5 Decades on, China is now promoting and changing international norms within multilateral institutions that may fundamentally reshape how finance, trade, development, and energy policy are practiced.6 [End Page 61] The scholarship on China and norms has emphasized its role shifting from being a norm-taker to a norm-maker.7 This essay examines how China's changing role in multilateral development finance is opening an ambiguous space for the reconciliation of a variety of development finance norms with Chinese practices, specifically through inside and outside pathways that could lead to norm harmonization. The first section looks at how China is fundamentally reshaping traditional, Western-led multilateral development finance. The section examines the institutions created by China to pursue Beijing's own international development agenda. The essay then unpacks how responses to Chinese development finance are reshaping Western activities that open the way for harmonizing some multilateral development norms, such as environmental protection. The question remains as to whether this harmonization process will lead to China leveling up to meet international norms, whether certain norms may weaken to enable China to follow them, or whether China and these norms may meet somewhere in the middle. For decades, international development was driven by the Western-led Bretton Woods institutions—the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Highlighting how policy norms could be taken up and diffused to borrowers,8 the IMF and World Bank promoted neoliberal "Washington Consensus" policies in the 1980s, which morphed into the post–Washington Consensus approach in the 1990s to incorporate good governance, gender, development, environmental, and social protection norms, among others. Although this approach experienced some decline following the global financial crisis,9 the IMF and World Bank remain engaged in maintaining the neoliberal economic paradigm they constructed in their activities.10 International political economy scholars have noted how China's promo
在中间开会?多边发展金融、中国和规范协调Susan Park(生物)当国际规范被视为理所当然并自动遵循时,它是强大的通过争论,规范可能会随着时间的推移而削弱,因为挑战者关注的是如何在程序上遵循规范或从实质上质疑理念本身一些学者观察到,规范可能会受到质疑,因为行为者可以试图拒绝、修改或否认规范的目的然而,即使面对反对,规范也可以证明是有弹性和强健的,这突出了结构性因素的重要性,因为它们与规范的嵌入性、制度化和法律特征有关在20世纪90年代,中国被视为多边论坛的新手,并希望通过参与多边经济和安全环境,中国能够融入社会,遵守国际规范几十年来,中国正在推动和改变多边机构内的国际准则,这些准则可能从根本上重塑金融、贸易、发展和能源政策的实施方式。关于中国和规范的研究强调了其角色从规范接受者到规范制定者的转变本文考察了中国在多边发展金融中的角色变化如何为各种发展金融规范与中国实践的调和打开了一个模糊的空间,特别是通过可能导致规范协调的内部和外部途径。第一部分着眼于中国如何从根本上重塑传统的、西方主导的多边发展金融。本节探讨了中国为追求自己的国际发展议程而创建的机构。然后,文章揭示了对中国发展融资的反应如何重塑了西方的活动,这些活动为协调一些多边发展规范(如环境保护)开辟了道路。问题仍然是,这种协调过程是否会导致中国升级以符合国际规范,某些规范是否会削弱以使中国能够遵循它们,或者中国是否会在中间的某个地方与这些规范相遇。几十年来,国际发展是由西方主导的布雷顿森林机构——国际货币基金组织(IMF)和世界银行——推动的。国际货币基金组织和世界银行在20世纪80年代推广了新自由主义的“华盛顿共识”政策,强调了政策规范如何被接受并传播给借款人8,这些政策在20世纪90年代演变成后华盛顿共识方法,将善治、性别、发展、环境和社会保护规范等纳入其中。虽然这种方法在全球金融危机之后有所下降,但国际货币基金组织和世界银行仍然致力于维护他们在其活动中构建的新自由主义经济范式国际政治经济学学者已经注意到,中国对国际发展的推动与国际货币基金组织和世界银行提供的新自由主义处方在根本上是不一致的,而这些处方得到了西方的大力支持。从本质上讲,中国在强调资本主义模式的同时,推行了一种强有力的新国家主义发展方式,这种发展方式以中国倡导南南合作、不干涉和国家主权的准则为基础。当然,这只是中国如何促进国际发展的表面描述。除了北京提出的“一带一路”倡议(BRI)之外,中国银行的开发贷款的绝对数量和不同模式远远超过了多边开发金融机构所推动的贷款此外,被Gregory Chin和Kevin Gallagher称为“协调信贷空间”的推广方法展示了中国如何向发展项目以及债权人和项目供应商提供信贷。13 .中国全面、全面的发展贷款模式与布雷顿森林机构的条件限制有着根本的不同(批评人士认为这助长了中国的债务陷阱外交)中国的支持不仅涵盖单一的、现有的项目,还可能将这些国家锁定在尚未可行的进一步项目中,从而导致资源协议贷款。更广泛地说,中国可能会向从未成为西方贷款目标的国家提供贷款中国的开发贷款活动产生了三方面的影响:首先,它们影响了现有的多边开发机构改变其开发贷款做法;其次,他们……
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引用次数: 0
Author's Response: Indian Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy—Refining Neoclassical Realism 作者回应:印度国内政治与外交政策——新古典现实主义的提炼
Pub Date : 2023-10-01 DOI: 10.1353/asp.2023.a911621
Author's Response:Indian Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy—Refining Neoclassical Realism Rajesh Basrur (bio) The responses to Subcontinental Drift: Domestic Politics and India's Foreign Policy by the five reviewers in this roundtable (Ian Hall, Kate Sullivan de Estrada, Jivanta Schottli, Frank O'Donnell, and Sameer Lalwani) have been thought-provoking and have opened up several lines of refinement and inquiry. Additionally, my own reflections on the book several months after publication have led me to ponder its findings as well as the potential avenues it might open up for further research. Let me begin by responding to some critical comments. On the whole, while raising astute questions about the book, all the reviewers were positive about its contribution to the literature, noting the study's theoretical strengths, empirical grounding, and focus on a geopolitical context that has not received much theoretical attention in the global international relations literature. The reviewers have made searching comments and suggestions to consider, however. Criticism is essential to moving the intellectual enterprise forward, and I attempt—I daresay all too briefly—to engage with it. If the reviewer's task is fundamentally to help refine a line of thinking, they have all accomplished it. Hall touches on a vital point in his observation that the distinction between "involuntary" and "voluntary" drift is too sharp given that the reality is more nuanced. In the case of the India-U.S. nuclear deal, he correctly notes that despite the problem of structurally produced delay, the ultimate outcome was shaped by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's ability to override the limitations of his coalition and push through the Indian side of the deal. I may just say that this is a point I made myself in acknowledging that "the material distribution of power is not in itself the only arbiter of outcomes" and that there is also "the vital importance of commitment," which is a nonmaterial factor (p. 71). But there is certainly scope for a more nuanced approach that makes the point more generally with respect to other cases. I am glad Hall has drawn attention to this as it provides the [End Page 139] reader with a clearer sense of how the analytical framework employed in the book might be strengthened. Sullivan de Estrada usefully focuses on the importance of recognizing policy content as a possible factor producing drift. For instance, Indian policy on Russia's actions in Ukraine has clearly been awkward (though not novel if one looks back at Indira Gandhi's response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979–80 or even earlier cases). This uncertainty is the consequence of policymakers in New Delhi finding themselves caught between conflicting pressures that are structural (the changing power distribution in global politics) as well as domestically driven (the preference for maximizing policy autonomy by spreading India's strategic bets and establishing linkages with b
本次圆桌会议的五位评论者(Ian Hall, Kate Sullivan de Estrada, Jivanta Schottli, Frank O'Donnell和Sameer Lalwani)对《次大陆漂移:国内政治和印度外交政策》的回应发人深省,并开辟了几条改进和探究的路线。此外,在这本书出版几个月后,我自己对它的反思使我思考它的发现以及它可能为进一步研究开辟的潜在途径。让我先回应一些批评的评论。总体而言,尽管对本书提出了尖锐的问题,但所有评论者都对其对文献的贡献持肯定态度,指出了该研究的理论优势、实证基础以及对地缘政治背景的关注,而这在全球国际关系文献中并没有得到太多的理论关注。然而,审稿人提出了搜索性的评论和建议。批评对于推动知识事业的发展至关重要,我试图——我敢说,这一切都太短暂了——参与其中。如果审稿人的任务基本上是帮助改进思路,那么他们就已经完成了。霍尔在他的观察中触及了一个关键点,即考虑到现实更为微妙,“非自愿”和“自愿”漂移之间的区别过于尖锐。就印美关系而言。他正确地指出,尽管在结构上造成了拖延,但最终的结果是由印度总理曼莫汉·辛格(Manmohan Singh)克服其执政联盟的限制,推动印度方面达成协议的能力决定的。我只能说,这是我自己在承认“权力的物质分配本身并不是结果的唯一仲裁者”时提出的观点,而且还有“承诺的至关重要性”,这是一个非物质因素(第71页)。但当然也有余地采用一种更细致的方法,使这一观点更普遍地适用于其他情况。我很高兴霍尔引起了人们对这一点的注意,因为它为读者提供了一个更清晰的认识,即如何加强书中使用的分析框架。沙利文·德·埃斯特拉达(Sullivan de Estrada)着重强调了认识到政策内容是产生漂移的可能因素的重要性。例如,印度对俄罗斯在乌克兰的行动的政策显然是尴尬的(尽管如果回顾一下英迪拉·甘地对1979-80年苏联入侵阿富汗的反应,甚至更早的案例,就会发现这并不新鲜)。这种不确定性是新德里的政策制定者发现自己被夹在相互冲突的压力之间的结果,这些压力是结构性的(全球政治中不断变化的权力分配)和国内驱动的(通过扩大印度的战略赌注和与美国和俄罗斯建立联系来最大化政策自主权的偏好)。另外,政策的不确定性可能归因于相互冲突的“规范要求”——这一点适用于印度核战略的混乱,印度核战略被困在甘地道德的对立理念压力和获得更强威慑能力的现实要求之间。从某种程度上说,这导致印度战略家思维混乱,这是一个有道理的观点。尽管如此,我还是要断言,在后一种情况下,自愿漂移的根本原因是决策者忽视了核武器战略的基本原则,未能应对这些跨领域的压力。尽管如此,苏利文·德·埃斯特拉达指出,观念因素在制定政策方面发挥着重要作用,这是正确的,这是学者们应该密切关注的一个方面。肖特利提出了一个切题的问题:在多大程度上,领导层会影响对最初政策制定预期的偏离?在两种自愿漂移的情况下,我都指出了这个方向:领导的失败导致了核战略和反恐方面的不足,但我强调了前一种情况下战略精英的责任,以及后一种情况下公众的责任。然而,相对重要性的问题需要进行更深入的探讨,以评估可归因于不同类型行为者的责任程度。这是等待更近的事情……
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引用次数: 0
Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing in Southeast Asia: Trends and Actors 东南亚的非法、未报告和无管制捕鱼:趋势和行为者
Pub Date : 2023-10-01 DOI: 10.1353/asp.2023.a911620
Lily Schlieman
executive summary: This essay identifies trends and actors involved in illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing in two of Southeast Asia's regional seascapes (the South China Sea and the Sulu-Sulawesi Seascape), explores the political and socioeconomic factors that enable IUU fishing, and offers recommendations to governments and other stakeholders. main argument IUU fishing threatens the food, ecological, and economic security of coastal communities in Southeast Asia's seascapes. The region is home to incredible marine biodiversity that supports commercially important fish stocks. However, IUU fishing, poor fisheries management, and bad governance—coupled with environmental degradation and a lack of monitoring, control, surveillance, and enforcement capacity—leave these stocks in a precarious position. The clandestine nature of IUU fishing can also attract crimes of convergence, including forced labor and trafficking of humans, arms, drugs, and wildlife. To counter IUU fishing, national governments in Southeast Asia should take steps to improve cooperation, build cohesiveness, and share data and relevant information with each other and with regional organizations. Likewise, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and regional fisheries management organizations should take a greater leadership role to facilitate data and information sharing between Southeast Asian governments. policy implications • Cooperative and joint stock assessments in the South China Sea and the Sulu-Sulawesi Seascape by governments, scientists, NGOs, and other stakeholders, with a focus on transboundary stocks, would significantly improve the monitoring and management of fisheries. • To bridge gaps in enforcement capacity, fisheries enforcement authorities should work with nontraditional partners, including local communities and trusted nations in the Indo-Pacific, such as the U.S., Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. • Southeast Asian coastal states should work together to settle remaining maritime boundary disputes they have with each other and develop a cohesive regional bloc that strengthens their collective commitment to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and efforts to combat IUU fishing. • National governments and law enforcement should increase their capacity and technical capabilities to stop labor and human rights abuses on the water and in seafood processing facilities by working with NGOs, survivors, and other relevant stakeholders with expertise in the field.
摘要:本文确定了东南亚两个区域海域(南中国海和苏拉威西海域)非法、不报告和不管制(IUU)捕捞的趋势和参与者,探讨了导致IUU捕捞的政治和社会经济因素,并向政府和其他利益相关者提出了建议。IUU捕鱼威胁着东南亚沿海社区的食物、生态和经济安全。该地区拥有令人难以置信的海洋生物多样性,支撑着重要的商业鱼类资源。然而,IUU捕鱼、糟糕的渔业管理和糟糕的治理,加上环境退化和缺乏监测、控制、监督和执法能力,使这些种群处于不稳定的境地。IUU捕鱼的秘密性质也可能吸引包括强迫劳动和贩运人口、武器、毒品和野生动物在内的趋同犯罪。为了打击IUU捕鱼,东南亚各国政府应采取措施加强合作,建立凝聚力,并相互之间以及与区域组织共享数据和相关信息。同样,东南亚国家联盟(Association of Southeast Asian Nations)和区域渔业管理组织应发挥更大的领导作用,促进东南亚各国政府之间的数据和信息共享。•各国政府、科学家、非政府组织和其他利益攸关方在南中国海和苏拉威西海域开展合作和联合种群评估,重点关注跨境种群,将显著改善渔业监测和管理。•为了弥合执法能力的差距,渔业执法当局应与非传统伙伴合作,包括当地社区和印度-太平洋地区值得信赖的国家,如美国、澳大利亚、日本和韩国。•东南亚沿海国家应共同努力,解决彼此之间遗留的海上边界争端,发展一个有凝聚力的区域集团,加强对《联合国海洋法公约》的集体承诺,并努力打击IUU捕鱼。•各国政府和执法部门应提高其能力和技术能力,通过与非政府组织、幸存者和其他具有该领域专业知识的利益相关者合作,制止水和海鲜加工设施中的劳工和人权侵犯。
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引用次数: 0
Policy Drift as an Inevitability and an Occasional Success 政策漂移是不可避免的,也是偶尔的成功
Pub Date : 2023-10-01 DOI: 10.1353/asp.2023.a911623
Policy Drift as an Inevitability and an Occasional Success Sameer Lalwani (bio) As India rises in economic and geopolitical stature, it has sought to cultivate an image of a leading power with multialigned dexterity. In a year where India helms the G-20 presidency, champions the global South, caucuses with the G-7, assumes leadership roles in both the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Quad, and deepens strategic ties with the United States while steadily maintaining defense relations with Russia, one might ascribe Indian foreign policy with a Bismarckian level of skill and sophistication. And while this could be a reasonable assessment, Rajesh Basrur's thoroughly researched contribution to neoclassical realist theory, Subcontinental Drift: Domestic Politics and India's Foreign Policy, reveals serious shortcomings in Indian foreign policy over the past two decades of India's rise. He terms these faults "drift," and it is this Indian foreign policy drift—at times timidity, at times torpor—that Basrur seeks to critique and explain. Briefly summarized, Basrur seeks to explain the dependent variable of India's foreign policy drift—the delta between New Delhi's stated foreign policy aims and its actual choices. Drift is characterized as indecisiveness and treated as generally, though not exclusively, suboptimal behavior. It fits well within similar research on puzzling state behavior such as "underbalancing" or neutrality.1 Basrur distinguishes drift from paralysis, noting that there is movement, but it is "erratic, slow, and uncertain" (p. 8). He contends there are two sources of drift. Involuntary drift is when domestic politics, specifically weak coalitions, hamstring leaders' autonomy to make bold, decisive moves for fear of small pockets of opposition pulling out of coalitions, which would result in government collapse. Voluntary drift, however, is perhaps Basrur's more novel contribution. Basrur contends voluntary drift occurs when a leader possesses sufficient control over policy but simply fails to execute it by avoiding costly choices or difficult tradeoffs and effectively deflects [End Page 134] responsibility and accountability. Other strands of international relations scholarship might characterize this as poor leadership, whether the failing is a deficiency in charisma, confidence, acumen, or moral fiber.2 The book sets out to test his theory on four major but diverse episodes of Indian foreign policy: counterinsurgency, nuclear deterrence, internal security reforms, and geopolitical realignment. The episodes include India's nuclear deal with the United States (2005–2008), material support for the Sri Lanka's fight against the Tamil Tigers (2000–2009), nuclear doctrinal developments (1998–present), and contentions with cross-border terrorism (notably the 2008 Mumbai crisis). Even seasoned India foreign policy scholars well versed in these episodes can discover new details in Basrur's thoroughly researched empirical chapters, buttre
随着印度在经济和地缘政治地位上的提升,它一直在寻求塑造一种具有多联盟灵活性的领导大国形象。在这一年里,印度担任20国集团轮值主席国,支持全球南方国家,与七国集团举行核心会议,在上海合作组织和四方会议中担任领导角色,深化与美国的战略关系,同时稳定地保持与俄罗斯的防务关系,人们可能会认为印度的外交政策具有俾斯麦式的技巧和成熟程度。虽然这可能是一个合理的评估,但拉杰什·巴斯鲁(Rajesh Basrur)对新古典现实主义理论进行了深入研究的贡献,《次大陆漂移:国内政治和印度的外交政策》,揭示了印度在过去20年崛起过程中外交政策的严重缺陷。他将这些错误称为“随波逐流”,而正是这种印度外交政策的随波逐流——时而胆怯,时而呆滞——巴斯鲁试图加以批判和解释。简而言之,Basrur试图解释印度外交政策漂移的因变量——新德里宣称的外交政策目标与其实际选择之间的三角关系。漂移的特点是优柔寡断,并被视为一般(尽管不是唯一)次优行为。这与“欠平衡”或“中立”等令人困惑的状态行为的类似研究非常吻合Basrur将漂移与麻痹区分开来,指出运动是存在的,但它是“不稳定、缓慢和不确定的”(第8页)。他认为漂移有两个来源。“非自愿漂移”指的是国内政治,特别是软弱的联盟,阻碍了领导人采取大胆果断行动的自主权,因为他们担心一小部分反对派会退出联盟,从而导致政府垮台。然而,自愿漂移也许是Basrur更新颖的贡献。Basrur认为,当领导者对政策拥有足够的控制权,但却无法通过避免昂贵的选择或困难的权衡来执行政策,并有效地转移责任和责任时,就会发生自愿漂移。国际关系学术的其他分支可能将其描述为领导力低下,不管这种失败是缺乏魅力、自信、敏锐还是道德品质这本书从印度外交政策的四个主要但不同的方面来检验他的理论:反叛乱、核威慑、内部安全改革和地缘政治重组。这些事件包括印度与美国的核协议(2005-2008年),对斯里兰卡打击泰米尔猛虎组织的物质支持(2000-2009年),核教义的发展(1998年至今),以及与跨境恐怖主义的争论(特别是2008年孟买危机)。即使是精通这些事件的经验丰富的印度外交政策学者,也可以在Basrur深入研究的实证章节中发现新的细节,这些章节有48页的参考书目作为支撑。Basrur不仅因其丰富的实证研究而受到赞誉,而且还因其对冷战后印度外交政策中一些最重要事件的探索而受到赞誉,尽管每个事件的持续时间有些不协调,从几天(例如孟买袭击)到几十年(例如核学说的审议)不等。这些案例与印度前国家安全顾问希夫尚卡尔·梅农(Shivshankar Menon)的政策回忆录中几乎所有章节都有密切的联系,该书熟练地阐明了印度外交政策决策中许多令人费解的机制由于印度近十年来一直由一个霸权政党和强有力的领导人领导,它的联合权力分享和有争议的联邦政治有时会被模糊或遗忘,这些政治塑造了印度自上世纪80年代以来30年的崛起。Basrur书中的许多章节展示了印度内部与专家科学团体,技术官僚机构(如原子能委员会),国家安全和情报机构的庞大网络,以及州一级地区政党之间的竞争,形成了国家一级的联盟政治,从而限制了行政决策的动态。不难想象,联合政治的回归将在未来阻碍印度外交政策的雄心。这本书的另一个优点是Basrur运用了多种经验方法。考虑到机密政府文件的不可访问性,关于核战略的章节巧妙地利用了几位前文职和军事官员的著作来编码他们隐含的核威慑观点……
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引用次数: 0
Gambling on India's Foreign Policy: The Importance of Implementation 印度外交政策的赌博:执行的重要性
Pub Date : 2023-10-01 DOI: 10.1353/asp.2023.a911626
Gambling on India's Foreign Policy:The Importance of Implementation Kate Sullivan de Estrada (bio) As Indian prime minister Narendra Modi ricocheted around the globe in mid-2023—welcomed in Japan and Australia in May, embraced in a four-day state visit to the United States in June, and celebrated as the guest of honor at France's Bastille Day parade in July—newspapers and policy journals brimmed with India analysis. Confronted by the hype around Modi as a metonym for India's growing power and influence, rising uneasiness about the future of Indian democracy under his watch, and New Delhi's equivocal position on Russia's invasion of Ukraine, much of the commentary framed intensified relations with India through the metaphor of a "gamble." Ashley Tellis began with an analysis of "America's bad bet on India" in Foreign Affairs in early May, arguing that the deepening defense relationship between Washington and New Delhi was unlikely to lead to India partnering with the United States in a military coalition against China.1 Later that month, Christophe Jaffrelot argued in Le Monde that "betting on India is a short-sighted strategy for France," highlighting concerning domestic political trends and describing Indian democracy as "literally put on hold" between elections that are no longer fair.2 By July, Financial Times commentator Martin Wolf had concluded both that "Western leaders are making a sensible bet on India" because of its economic growth prospects and that "Modi's India is moving in an illiberal direction."3 Other analysts [End Page 120] questioned whether India's rise was "inevitable" and if it would be best to deal with India "as it is, not as we might like it to be."4 Anyone interested in these questions would benefit from reading Rajesh Basrur's careful and rigorous book Subcontinental Drift: Domestic Politics and India's Foreign Policy. Rather than assessing India's policy achievements and failures through the lens of the United States' imperative to counterbalance China in its systemic challenge or India's democratic potential to support the values-based construction of the Indo-Pacific as "free and open," Subcontinental Drift's start and end point is New Delhi. Basrur's interest is "the central concerns of Indian national security strategy" (p. 28) and, more specifically, the ability of the Indian state "to ensure the security of its people" (p. 24). Importantly—and this is where the book's emphasis on "drift" comes in—his focus is less on the formation of domestic policy preferences and more on whether policymakers are able or willing to make good on those preferences once they have been formed (p. 23). The study's overall conclusion is sobering: "India's potential for achieving major power status stands on a relatively weak foundation, owing to its inability to follow through on those policies that are crucial to its security" (p. 193). Subcontinental Drift's point of departure is the observation that "Indian foreign policy has ofte
2023年年中,印度总理纳伦德拉·莫迪(Narendra Modi)在全球范围内大行其道,5月访问日本和澳大利亚,6月对美国进行为期四天的国事访问,7月成为法国巴士底日(Bastille Day)阅兵的贵宾,报纸和政策杂志上充斥着对印度的分析。莫迪被大肆宣传为印度日益增长的实力和影响力的代名词,人们对他治下印度民主的未来日益感到不安,新德里在俄罗斯入侵乌克兰问题上的立场模棱两可,面对这种情况,许多评论都用“赌博”的比喻来描述印印关系的强化。5月初,阿什利·泰利斯在《外交事务》上分析了“美国在印度押下的错误赌注”,认为华盛顿和新德里之间日益加深的防务关系不太可能导致印度与美国结成对抗中国的军事联盟。当月晚些时候,克里斯托弗·贾夫雷罗在《世界报》上指出,“对法国来说,押注印度是一种短视的战略。”强调对国内政治趋势的担忧,并将印度的民主描述为在不再公平的选举之间“实际上被搁置”到今年7月,《金融时报》评论员马丁•沃尔夫(Martin Wolf)总结道,鉴于印度的经济增长前景,“西方领导人正在明智地押注印度”,而“莫迪领导下的印度正朝着不自由的方向发展”。其他分析人士质疑印度的崛起是否“不可避免”,以及是否最好是“按照印度的现状,而不是按照我们希望的样子”来对待印度。任何对这些问题感兴趣的人都应该读读拉杰什•巴斯鲁的《次大陆漂移:国内政治与印度外交政策》这本严谨严谨的书。《次大陆漂移》的出发点和终点都是新德里,而不是通过美国在系统性挑战中制衡中国的必要性,或者印度支持印太地区“自由和开放”的基于价值观的建设的民主潜力来评估印度政策的成就和失败。Basrur的兴趣是“印度国家安全战略的核心问题”(第28页),更具体地说,是印度政府“确保其人民安全”的能力(第24页)。重要的是——这也是本书强调“漂移”的地方——他关注的不是国内政策偏好的形成,而是政策制定者一旦形成,是否能够或愿意兑现这些偏好(第23页)。该研究的总体结论发人深思:“印度取得大国地位的潜力建立在一个相对薄弱的基础上,因为它没有能力贯彻那些对其安全至关重要的政策”(第193页)。《次大陆漂移》的出发点是观察到“印度的外交政策常常以多次犹豫、拖延和转向为特征”(第181页)。这证明了本书将分析重点放在政策漂移的国内驱动因素上是合理的,政策漂移被定义为“有目的地启动,但……受到干预因素的极大阻碍”的政策过程(第8页)。印度最紧迫的一些安全问题——关键时刻与大国美国和小国斯里兰卡的战略关系,其长期核战略,以及它在保护印度公民免受跨境恐怖主义侵害方面的不完整记录——构成了本书的经验基础。Basrur对这些案例中政策漂移的国内决定因素的关注,将《次大陆漂移》与为数不多(尽管在不断增长)的现有作品放在了一个多产的公司中,这些作品认真地考虑了印度国内背景如何产生和塑造其外交政策。Basrur澄清说,政策漂移不同于“政策瘫痪”或无目的(第7页)。政策漂移有一个方向,但不会移动,或者只是以缓慢或蜿蜒的方式移动。这是一个重要的澄清:印度国内外对印度外交政策矛盾的看法,用政策漂移来解释比用政策偏好来解释更好吗?例如,……
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引用次数: 0
Explaining Policy Drift—An Analytical Template Drawn from the World's Most Populous Democracy 解释政策漂移——来自世界上人口最多的民主国家的分析模板
Pub Date : 2023-10-01 DOI: 10.1353/asp.2023.a911625
Explaining Policy Drift—An Analytical Template Drawn from the World's Most Populous Democracy Jivanta Schottli (bio) Subcontinental Drift: Domestic Politics and India's Foreign Policy was written in response to what Rajesh Basrur describes as three tensions: "a desire to investigate the contradiction between India's quest for power and status and the limitations of its policies and policymakers"; "the gulf between studies on India's external relationships and cutting-edge theory"; and "the materialist/normative divide in academia" (p. xi–xii). Basrur, drawing on an illustrious and unique career that has bridged area studies and international relations theory, is eminently well placed to address all three. He delivers empirically rich chapters, an elegant theoretical argumentation, and a clear message. Situating the Gap between Objectives and Outcomes The book frames its central question as "why policymakers, consciously responding to systemic incentives, often find their policy initiatives caught up in prolonged and meandering pathways in trying to attain their objectives" (p. 2). The gap between objectives or intent and subsequent diversionary processes is what Basrur refers to as the phenomenon of "policy drift." In framing its question thusly, the book addresses two long-running debates. Scholars have engaged in ongoing discussions about the particularities of India's emergence as a power, puzzling over the slow or gradualist path the country has taken, the purposefulness and intent behind policy choices, and the strategic thinking of the country's policymakers. At the same time, the book's central question confronts a deep ontological challenge of how to overcome the external-internal distinction that is so often drawn within and between the disciplines of international relations and politics and in the categories of agency and structure. Drawing on neoclassical realism, Basrur analyzes instances where Indian foreign policy outcomes have deviated from realist expectations—not those of theorists, he is careful to point out, but of policymakers. In other words, he demonstrates how policymakers have responded clearly to systemic [End Page 125] incentives, broadly defined as the power differentials between states. This is the case for India, for instance, when opting to improve relations with the United States as a result of the recalibrations caused by the end of the Cold War, in the effort to rebuild relations with Sri Lanka following India's "intervention" in the country's civil war, in the long-postponed decision to go overtly nuclear in 1998, and in efforts to manage cross-border threats from neighboring Pakistan. Explaining why these policy shifts took place when they did, and the ways in which implementation was subsequently hampered by domestic politics, is a major part of the book's analysis. However, Basrur seeks to do much more than describe or explain what happened in the past. The additional objective of integrating a moral dimension
《次大陆漂移:国内政治与印度外交政策》是针对拉杰什·巴斯鲁(Rajesh Basrur)所描述的三种紧张关系而写的:“希望调查印度对权力和地位的追求与政策和决策者的局限性之间的矛盾”;“印度对外关系研究与前沿理论之间的鸿沟”;和“学术界唯物主义/规范的分歧”(第12 - 12页)。Basrur凭借其杰出而独特的职业生涯,在区域研究和国际关系理论之间架起了桥梁,非常适合解决这三个问题。他提供了经验丰富的章节,一个优雅的理论论证,和一个明确的信息。这本书将其核心问题定义为“为什么政策制定者有意识地响应系统激励,经常发现他们的政策举措在试图实现其目标的过程中陷入了漫长而曲折的道路”(第2页)。目标或意图与随后的转移过程之间的差距是Basrur所说的“政策漂移”现象。在这样构建问题的过程中,这本书解决了两个长期存在的争论。学者们对印度崛起为大国的特殊性进行了持续的讨论,对该国所采取的缓慢或渐进的道路、政策选择背后的目的性和意图以及该国决策者的战略思维感到困惑。与此同时,本书的中心问题面临着一个深刻的本体论挑战,即如何克服国际关系和政治学科内部以及机构和结构类别之间经常出现的外部-内部区别。利用新古典现实主义,Basrur分析了印度外交政策结果偏离现实主义预期的例子——他小心翼翼地指出,不是理论家的预期,而是政策制定者的预期。换句话说,他展示了政策制定者是如何对系统性激励(广义上定义为国家之间的权力差异)做出明确回应的。例如,当印度选择改善与美国的关系时,这是冷战结束后重新调整的结果,在印度“干预”斯里兰卡内战后努力重建与斯里兰卡的关系时,在1998年推迟已久的公开核决定中,以及在努力管理来自邻国巴基斯坦的跨境威胁时。解释这些政策转变发生的原因,以及这些政策的实施后来如何受到国内政治的阻碍,是本书分析的主要部分。然而,Basrur试图做的远不止描述或解释过去发生的事情。通过强调责任问题,将道德维度纳入分析的另一个目标增加了一层发人深省的复杂性,但也导致了几个进一步的问题。这个故事的寓意是什么?在书的最后,Basrur声称,当他的分析框架应用于印度政策漂移的案例时,他强调并整合了物质和非物质因素,以解释为什么次优结果会发生并持续下去。他使用“非自愿”和“自愿”政策漂移的分类来捕捉物质因素和非物质因素发挥作用的程度。在非自愿漂移的情况下,物质约束起着核心作用,主要被定义为决策者对其政策环境的控制。这相对来说比较容易确定,例如,执政党在议会中占有的席位数量,以及它对联盟伙伴的亏欠程度。不太清楚的是造成Basrur所说的“放弃责任”的非物质因素(第196页)。他确定的非物质因素包括文职领导层在核战略问题上缺乏严谨的认识和知识,领导层无能的证据,以及中央和州政府持续忽视建立健全的安全基础设施和有效的政策来预防和阻止恐怖袭击。通过把政策制定者放在前台,并赋予他们一种道德责任,Basrur提供了一条解决之道……
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引用次数: 0
U.S. Semiconductor Policy and South Korea: A Delicate Balancing Act between National Priorities and International Collaboration 美国半导体政策与韩国:国家优先事项与国际合作之间的微妙平衡
IF 1.3 Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1353/asp.2023.a903868
Seong-hyon Lee
executive summary:This article provides insights on how U.S. semiconductor policy is reported, discussed, and perceived in the South Korean public sphere and proposes potential actions for Washington and Seoul as allies.main argumentAlthough not widely known in Washington, the U.S. faces accusations of pursuing "economic nationalism" at the expense of its allies. There are growing perceptions in South Korea that the U.S. is prioritizing its own self-interests while concurrently emphasizing unity among its allies against China. This view has led to grievances about U.S. strategy, particularly in relation to the semiconductor sector and supply chains—sensitive topics in Northeast Asia's trade-focused economies. While the U.S. has advocated for an alliancecentered reorganization of semiconductor supply chains, concerns persist that it is ultimately pursuing semiconductor hegemony. Increasing public discontent in South Korea regarding U.S. semiconductor and technology policies serves as an illustrative example and could develop into a contentious issue for the broader alliance between the two countries unless handled with care and attention to South Korea's concerns. While Washington may disregard South Korean public sentiment as inconsequential, in South Korea's vibrant and vocal democracy, public opinion can quickly shift to the extremes and significantly influence Seoul's policy choices. To maintain a strong alliance with South Korea and effectively advance its policy regarding China, the U.S. must closely monitor South Korean public opinion and confront these concerns.policy implications • Economic sacrifices made by allies will not benefit U.S. national interests and may lead to disenchantment and resentment on the part of these partners. It is imperative that the U.S. engage in dialogue with its allies to enhance economic collaboration and explore new market opportunities.• The public uproar observed so far in South Korea's young democracy has the potential to suddenly turn volatile. Consequently, preventive public diplomacy by Washington can play a crucial role in managing the semiconductor issue.• A technology alliance commits countries to jointly secure their national interests; thus, mutual trust and a shared vision for the future are essential.
执行摘要:这篇文章深入了解了美国半导体政策在韩国公共领域的报道、讨论和看法,并提出了华盛顿和首尔作为盟友的潜在行动。主要论点尽管在华盛顿并不广为人知,但美国面临着以牺牲盟友为代价追求“经济民族主义”的指控。韩国越来越多的人认为,美国在优先考虑自身利益的同时,也在强调盟友团结一致反对中国。这种观点引发了人们对美国战略的不满,尤其是在半导体行业和供应链方面,这是东北亚以贸易为重点的经济体的敏感话题。尽管美国一直主张对半导体供应链进行以联盟为中心的重组,但人们仍然担心它最终是在追求半导体霸权。韩国公众对美国半导体和技术政策日益不满就是一个例证,如果不小心和关注韩国的担忧,这可能会成为两国更广泛联盟的一个有争议的问题。尽管华盛顿可能会无视韩国公众的情绪,认为这无关紧要,但在韩国充满活力和声音的民主国家,公众舆论可能会迅速转向极端,并对首尔的政策选择产生重大影响。为了与韩国保持强有力的联盟并有效推进其对华政策,美国必须密切关注韩国公众舆论,应对这些担忧。政策影响•盟友做出的经济牺牲不会有利于美国的国家利益,可能会导致这些伙伴的失望和怨恨。美国必须与其盟友进行对话,以加强经济合作并探索新的市场机会。•到目前为止,在韩国年轻的民主国家中观察到的公众骚动有可能突然变得动荡。因此,华盛顿的预防性公共外交可以在管理半导体问题方面发挥关键作用。•技术联盟承诺各国共同确保其国家利益;因此,相互信任和对未来的共同愿景至关重要。
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引用次数: 0
Japan's New Plan for a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" and Its Challenges 日本“自由开放的印太”新构想及其挑战
IF 1.3 Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1353/asp.2023.a903860
J. Nishino
Japan’s vision for a “free and open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) originated from Tokyo’s desire to promote a rules-based order, economic prosperity, and peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. In articulating and promoting Japan’s vision for the FOIP, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe played a significant role. In August 2007, Abe delivered a speech at the Indian Parliament in which he emphasized the importance of enhancing maritime security and cooperation between the Indian and Pacific Oceans through strategic cooperation among like-minded countries.1 This speech, titled “Confluence of the Two Seas,” is often seen as a precursor to Japan’s vision for the Indo-Pacific, highlighting the commitment to promoting regional stability, economic prosperity, and universal values such as freedom, democracy, and human rights in the broader two-ocean region. Another significant milestone in the development of Japan’s FOIP vision was a speech Abe gave in Kenya in August 2016. During the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development, Abe stressed that Japan “bore the responsibility of fostering the confluence of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and of Asia and Africa into a place that values freedom, the rule of law, and the market economy, free from force or coercion, and making it prosperous.”2 These speeches by Abe laid the groundwork for Japan’s FOIP vision by articulating the key principles and objectives that would guide Japan’s approach to the Indo-Pacific. Japan presented three pillars to realize a free and open Indo-Pacific:
日本提出的“自由开放的印度-太平洋”构想,源于日本希望在印度-太平洋地区促进基于规则的秩序、经济繁荣、和平与稳定。在阐明和推动日本对FOIP的愿景方面,安倍晋三首相发挥了重要作用。2007年8月,安倍在印度议会发表演讲,强调通过志同道合的国家之间的战略合作,加强印度洋和太平洋海上安全与合作的重要性这篇题为“两海汇合处”的演讲通常被视为日本对印太地区愿景的先兆,强调了在更广泛的两大洋地区促进地区稳定、经济繁荣和自由、民主和人权等普遍价值观的承诺。2016年8月,安倍在肯尼亚发表了一次演讲,这是实现日本自由贸易协定愿景的另一个重要里程碑。在第六届东京非洲发展国际会议上,安倍强调,日本“有责任促进太平洋和印度洋以及亚洲和非洲的汇合处成为一个重视自由、法治和市场经济的地方,不受武力或胁迫,并使其繁荣。”安倍的这些讲话为日本的FOIP愿景奠定了基础,阐明了指导日本在印太地区战略的关键原则和目标。日本提出了实现自由开放的印度太平洋的三大支柱:
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引用次数: 0
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Asia Policy
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