Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1353/asp.2023.a903867
Alison Szalwinski
B eginning in the late 2000s, the United States, as well as two of its allies in Asia—Japan and Australia—began to articulate variations of the geopolitical concept of the “Indo-Pacific.” The idea of linking the Pacific and Indian Oceans into a broader geographic region was not entirely new, but the accompanying strategic overlay, which was introduced as part of the “free and open Indo-Pacific” concept, imbued the idea with new and significant implications for how these three countries would approach foreign policy, economic coordination, and military posture in the region and within their broader national strategies. As each of these three democracies elected new leaders over the next two decades, subsequent administrations across political parties generally reaffirmed and built on the idea of the “Indo-Pacific,” refining their visions for a free, open, prosperous, and secure two-ocean region in contrast with China’s increasingly assertive behavior. By 2022, many countries in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere—including France, Indonesia, South Korea, and the United Kingdom—had announced their own version of an Indo-Pacific vision, concept, or strategy, as had both the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union. At present, the United States, South Korea, and France have all published official policy documents identifying an Indo-Pacific Strategy. Japan refers to its “free and open Indo-Pacific” vision or plan, while Indonesia has an Indo-Pacific concept. Perhaps most surprisingly, Australia lacks any dedicated government document or policy speech outlining an Indo-Pacific vision, instead electing to articulate its approach within its broader national security, foreign policy, and defense strategy papers. The United Kingdom similarly has outlined its thinking on an Indo-Pacific tilt within defense policy documents, while the Pacific Island countries and territories eschew “Indo-Pacific” as a defining construct but identify as a “Blue Pacific Continent” and have clarified regional security interests and priorities in the Boe Declaration on Regional Security.
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Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1353/asp.2023.a903870
Emily S. Weinstein
{"title":"Assessing a Range of Approaches to Data Privacy and Security","authors":"Emily S. Weinstein","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.a903870","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.a903870","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"161 - 164"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43185598","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1353/asp.2023.a903863
Natalie Sambhi
A mid the rapidly evolving environment characterized by multipolarity, increased geopolitical rivalry, accelerated military modernization, changing economic fortunes, and complex environmental pressures, Indonesia has endeavored to remain optimistic about its place in the region. To this end, its leaders have formulated the country’s own interpretation of the Indo-Pacific, the geopolitical construct spanning the Indian and Pacific Oceans, to maximize Indonesia’s role in shaping this environment within its means and values. While Indonesia strives to play an active role in the region and be a leader in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), it does so guided by principles and domestic interests rather than a strategy. Many of its Indo-Pacific multilateral efforts are extensions of domestic imperatives. It is expected that states will pursue foreign policy objectives that serve national affairs; however, in Indonesia’s case, its deep-seated attachment to ASEAN centrality as well as its upcoming election have shaped, if not constrained, its ability to breathe life into its Indo-Pacific construct. Because the country also lacks strong military power and economic heft, its regional approach is reliant on diplomacy and norms.1 So far, this Indo-Pacific approach has been developed and tested under only one president, Joko Widodo (also known as Jokowi), so it remains to be seen whether it becomes part of Indonesia’s legacy.
{"title":"Indonesia's Indo-Pacific Aspirations and the Reality of Its (Non)strategy","authors":"Natalie Sambhi","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.a903863","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.a903863","url":null,"abstract":"A mid the rapidly evolving environment characterized by multipolarity, increased geopolitical rivalry, accelerated military modernization, changing economic fortunes, and complex environmental pressures, Indonesia has endeavored to remain optimistic about its place in the region. To this end, its leaders have formulated the country’s own interpretation of the Indo-Pacific, the geopolitical construct spanning the Indian and Pacific Oceans, to maximize Indonesia’s role in shaping this environment within its means and values. While Indonesia strives to play an active role in the region and be a leader in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), it does so guided by principles and domestic interests rather than a strategy. Many of its Indo-Pacific multilateral efforts are extensions of domestic imperatives. It is expected that states will pursue foreign policy objectives that serve national affairs; however, in Indonesia’s case, its deep-seated attachment to ASEAN centrality as well as its upcoming election have shaped, if not constrained, its ability to breathe life into its Indo-Pacific construct. Because the country also lacks strong military power and economic heft, its regional approach is reliant on diplomacy and norms.1 So far, this Indo-Pacific approach has been developed and tested under only one president, Joko Widodo (also known as Jokowi), so it remains to be seen whether it becomes part of Indonesia’s legacy.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"46 - 55"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48903003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1353/asp.2023.a903873
Author's Response:Reactions to Trafficking Data Reflect Debates about Global Data Security Risk Aynne Kokas (bio) Global data governance is highly fragmented, and policy debates about it reflect intense disagreements about the expected role of corporations, the state, and civil society. The impact of data governance practices remains unsettled both within and across nations. Most central to these policy debates, and at the core of how new technologies develop domestically and internationally, is the notion of what constitutes risk and how best to prevent or mitigate it—by either taking a precautionary approach to data governance or attempting to abate data governance problems once they occur. I feel fortunate to engage in this debate. A major focus of my book Trafficking Data: How China Is Winning the Battle for Digital Sovereignty is on how the United States, China, and other developed digital economies perceive and respond to risks differently. Whereas Trafficking Data urges a precautionary approach, the reviews of this book reflect the robust debate about when and how to address the risks inherent in our increasingly digital world. I want to thank Emily S. Weinstein, Kendra Schaefer, Paul Triolo, and Asia Policy for the opportunity to engage on the book's themes with thinkers from the academic research, consulting, and think tank worlds. The issues that Trafficking Data raises concern many people, from journalists and regulators to investors and everyday citizens. Writing about U.S.-China relations in the current moment presents a challenge due, at least in part, to heightened domestic tensions in both countries. Using critiques of the United States' data governance system first, followed by critiques of China's approach, Trafficking Data argues that both approaches exploit users in their own distinctive ways. Indeed, interactions between the tech and data oversight practices of China and the United States present a worst-case scenario for users globally. [End Page 175] One area of seeming agreement among all three reviewers and the book is the importance of more comprehensive data oversight in the United States. Disagreement about what this might look like and the appropriate level of risk underscores one of the central points of the book and, indeed, in contemporary debates about data governance: Should countries follow an approach based on risk regulation or precautionary principles when responding to data gathering, integration, and movement?1 That is, does it make more sense to prepare for potential harm or to make policies that respond to harms that have already occurred or are knowable? This is not just a difference among specialists on China's tech policy; it is a raging debate among tech analysts more broadly. Policymakers that rely on the precautionary principle, which is most common in European lawmaking, do not wait for harm to happen or for uncertainty to be resolved.2 Rather, this approach recommends, at minimum, to avoid inactio
作者回应:对非法交易数据的反应反映了对全球数据安全风险的争论。全球数据治理是高度分散的，关于它的政策辩论反映了对公司、国家和公民社会预期角色的强烈分歧。数据治理实践的影响在国家内部和国家之间仍然不确定。这些政策辩论的最核心，也是新技术如何在国内和国际上发展的核心，是什么构成风险以及如何最好地预防或减轻风险的概念——要么采取预防性的数据治理方法，要么在数据治理问题发生时试图减轻它们。能参与这场辩论，我感到很幸运。我的书《贩运数据:中国如何赢得数字主权之战》的一个主要焦点是美国、中国和其他发达数字经济体如何以不同的方式感知和应对风险。虽然《贩运数据》敦促采取预防措施，但本书的评论反映了关于何时以及如何应对日益数字化的世界所固有风险的激烈辩论。我要感谢Emily S. Weinstein、Kendra Schaefer、Paul Triolo和Asia Policy让我有机会与来自学术研究、咨询和智库界的思想家就本书的主题进行交流。贩卖数据引发了许多人的关注，从记者、监管机构到投资者和普通公民。当前撰写中美关系的文章面临挑战，至少在一定程度上是由于两国国内紧张局势的加剧。《贩运数据》首先对美国的数据治理体系提出批评，然后对中国的方法提出批评，认为这两种方法都以自己独特的方式剥削用户。事实上，中国和美国的技术和数据监管实践之间的互动为全球用户带来了最坏的情况。三位审稿人和这本书似乎在一个方面达成了一致，那就是在美国进行更全面的数据监管的重要性。关于这可能是什么样子以及适当的风险水平的分歧强调了本书的一个中心观点，事实上，在当代关于数据治理的辩论中:在应对数据收集、整合和移动时，各国应该遵循基于风险监管或预防原则的方法?也就是说，是为潜在的危害做准备更有意义，还是制定政策应对已经发生或已知的危害更有意义?这不仅是中国科技政策专家之间的分歧;在更广泛的科技分析师中，这是一场激烈的辩论。政策制定者依靠预防原则，这在欧洲立法中是最常见的，他们不会坐等伤害发生或不确定性得到解决相反，这种方法建议，至少要避免对潜在风险不采取行动，最多要进行监管，“直到明确没有严重危害的危险为止”。在日本、澳大利亚、印度和其他美国的盟友和合作伙伴，也有明确的政策努力来预防数据传输的风险。相比之下，基于风险的监管在美国更常见，并对美国当前的监控资本主义制度负责，它更接受已知和未知的风险，以换取经济和社会效益在本书的前言中，我讨论了与气候政策相关的数据贩运，这并非巧合，气候政策是预防性政策制定的先驱之一。在气候政策方面，欧洲、日本、澳大利亚以及美国的其他盟友和合作伙伴也采取了与美国不同的做法，采取行动保护本国公民免受风险影响，而不是等到风险出现后再寻求缓解措施。在数据监管方面，预防性监管和基于风险的监管之间的争论不仅是美中科技关系的核心，也是美国和其他国家如何应对从可再生人工智能到生物工程等一系列新技术的核心，这些技术的风险很大，但不可预测。尽管我很欣赏其中两位评论者的观点，他们认为这带来的全部风险……
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Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1353/asp.2023.a903872
Paul Triolo
T he issue of China and data, including Chinese government access to data, has become one of the most discussed topics in U.S.-China relations. News on this issue seems to emerge on a daily basis—whether it is the Montana governor banning TikTok, claims that Chinese drones are sending data back to Beijing, or headlines claiming that China is blocking outbound data flows due to national security concerns. In her new book Trafficking Data: How China Is Winning the Battle for Digital Sovereignty, Aynne Kokas offers a sweeping view of the data landscape and its nexus with China, from TikTok to WeChat to the Digital Silk Road. There is much to say about the evolution of China’s data governance, which has progressed substantially since its Cybersecurity Law was enacted in 2016 and implemented in 2017, as well as about successful Chinese apps such as TikTok and WeChat. While well-researched in places, the book, like many articles on China and data, makes initial assumptions, and then builds theories of risks on top of a largely unexamined set of theses about the Chinese government, its ability and intention regarding data handling, and how it interacts with private-sector companies that dominate the data space in China. Kokas seems to accept, somewhat uncritically, that the Chinese government demands and can access all data collected and processed by Chinese technology platforms. The book also argues that the Chinese government seeks to put together bits of information from different Chinese and Western sources under the concept of “mosaic theory,” which holds that such data points, when taken together, present risks to individuals or companies (see p. 147). Both of these approaches assume that China has grand designs to control all data and leverage it for nefarious ends. But on closer examination, the validity of building further constructs upon these assumptions looks quite dubious. The standard assessment of China’s national security and intelligence laws (including the Cybersecurity Law) as mandating companies to turn over data to the government is inaccurate on several levels (see p. 120).
{"title":"Trafficking in Assertions on Data in China Lacks Explanatory Power","authors":"Paul Triolo","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.a903872","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.a903872","url":null,"abstract":"T he issue of China and data, including Chinese government access to data, has become one of the most discussed topics in U.S.-China relations. News on this issue seems to emerge on a daily basis—whether it is the Montana governor banning TikTok, claims that Chinese drones are sending data back to Beijing, or headlines claiming that China is blocking outbound data flows due to national security concerns. In her new book Trafficking Data: How China Is Winning the Battle for Digital Sovereignty, Aynne Kokas offers a sweeping view of the data landscape and its nexus with China, from TikTok to WeChat to the Digital Silk Road. There is much to say about the evolution of China’s data governance, which has progressed substantially since its Cybersecurity Law was enacted in 2016 and implemented in 2017, as well as about successful Chinese apps such as TikTok and WeChat. While well-researched in places, the book, like many articles on China and data, makes initial assumptions, and then builds theories of risks on top of a largely unexamined set of theses about the Chinese government, its ability and intention regarding data handling, and how it interacts with private-sector companies that dominate the data space in China. Kokas seems to accept, somewhat uncritically, that the Chinese government demands and can access all data collected and processed by Chinese technology platforms. The book also argues that the Chinese government seeks to put together bits of information from different Chinese and Western sources under the concept of “mosaic theory,” which holds that such data points, when taken together, present risks to individuals or companies (see p. 147). Both of these approaches assume that China has grand designs to control all data and leverage it for nefarious ends. But on closer examination, the validity of building further constructs upon these assumptions looks quite dubious. The standard assessment of China’s national security and intelligence laws (including the Cybersecurity Law) as mandating companies to turn over data to the government is inaccurate on several levels (see p. 120).","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"170 - 174"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48175237","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1353/asp.2023.a903859
Jeffrey W. Hornung
The United States:A Comprehensive Strategy with Challenges Ahead Jeffrey W. Hornung (bio) The importance of the Indo-Pacific region to the United States stretches back to the founding of the American republic. For over two centuries, political, diplomatic, commercial, and people-to-people ties with Asian countries have helped the United States build the country. World War II demonstrated that conflict and instability in the Indo-Pacific region can have a direct impact on the United States. The war, as well as subsequent others, reinforced the United States' security interests in the region, which have since been strengthened through decades of treaty alliances with key regional actors. In February 2022, the Biden administration released its Indo-Pacific Strategy, which advocates freedom and openness through regional connectivity, trade, investment, and deeper bilateral and multilateral partnerships. In this strategy, the Biden administration follows in the footsteps of its predecessors. The Obama administration, though, was the first to declare a U.S. pivot—later rebranded a "rebalance"—to Asia, which followed the Bush administration's push for greater cooperation with Japan and India and closer engagement with China. In 2019, the Trump administration issued its "free and open Indo-Pacific" strategy.1 It is with this last effort that President Joe Biden's strategy shows the greatest continuity. Not only does Biden's strategy maintain the focus on a free and open Indo-Pacific—a concept directly adopted from Japanese policy—but the core tenants of the strategy essentially remain the same as Donald Trump's strategy. Despite their varied approaches to the Indo-Pacific, these Republican and Democrat administrations maintain a shared consistency in their understanding of the region's relative importance, one that places an emphasis on allies and partners and—particularly since Obama—advocates the goal of keeping the region free from coercion and [End Page 7] open to trade, investment, and ideas.2 Collectively, this suggests that, despite centuries of engagement with the region, U.S. strategy toward the Indo-Pacific has been formalizing over the past twenty years, with the Biden administration's policy being the most recent iteration. This essay seeks to assess Biden's Indo-Pacific Strategy by examining what it is and where potential challenges in its implementation lie. What Is the United States' Indo-Pacific Strategy? Despite President Biden's critique of the Trump administration's approach to the Indo-Pacific, both Biden and Trump pursued strategies that were more similar than different. The strategy contains five key objectives that the United States intends to pursue with its allies, partners, and regional institutions. These objectives are (1) advance a free and open Indo-Pacific, (2) build connections within and beyond the region, (3) drive regional prosperity, (4) bolster Indo-Pacific security, and (5) build regional resilience to transnational
美国:面临挑战的全面战略杰弗里·w·霍农(Jeffrey W. Hornung)(生物)印度-太平洋地区对美国的重要性可以追溯到美利坚共和国的建立。两个多世纪以来，与亚洲国家的政治、外交、商业和民间联系帮助美国建设了这个国家。第二次世界大战表明，印太地区的冲突和不稳定可能对美国产生直接影响。这场战争，以及随后的其他战争，加强了美国在该地区的安全利益，此后，通过与该地区主要国家几十年的条约联盟，美国的安全利益得到了加强。2022年2月，拜登政府发布了《印度-太平洋战略》，主张通过地区互联互通、贸易、投资以及深化双边和多边伙伴关系实现自由和开放。在这一战略中，拜登政府追随了前任政府的脚步。然而，奥巴马政府是第一个宣布美国将重心转向亚洲的政府——后来更名为“再平衡”战略——紧随布什政府推动与日本和印度加强合作，并与中国加强接触。2019年，特朗普政府发布了“自由开放的印太战略”乔·拜登(Joe Biden)总统的战略正是在这最后一项努力中显示出最大的连续性。拜登的战略不仅保持了对自由开放的印太地区的关注——这一概念直接来自日本的政策——而且该战略的核心租户本质上与唐纳德·特朗普的战略保持一致。尽管共和党和民主党政府对印太地区的态度各不相同，但他们对该地区相对重要性的理解是一致的，即强调盟友和合作伙伴，特别是自奥巴马政府以来，他们主张保持该地区免受胁迫，并对贸易、投资和思想开放总的来说，这表明，尽管美国与该地区进行了几个世纪的接触，但美国对印太地区的战略在过去20年里一直在正规化，而拜登政府的政策是最近的一次迭代。本文试图通过分析拜登的印太战略是什么以及在实施过程中面临的潜在挑战，来评估拜登的印太战略。美国的印太战略是什么?尽管拜登总统对特朗普政府的印太政策提出了批评，但拜登和特朗普都采取了相似而非不同的战略。该战略包括美国打算与其盟友、伙伴和地区机构共同追求的五个关键目标。这些目标是:(1)推进一个自由开放的印度-太平洋地区;(2)建立地区内外的联系;(3)推动地区繁荣;(4)加强印度-太平洋地区的安全;(5)建立地区应对跨国威胁的能力。为实现上述每一项目标，该战略确定了以下任务:•推进一个自由开放的印度-太平洋地区:投资于民主机构、新闻自由和充满活力的公民社会。改善财政透明度。确保本地区的海洋和天空按照国际法进行管理和使用。对关键技术和新兴技术、互联网和网络空间采取共同措施。•建立区域内外的联系:4°加深区域条约联盟。加强与区域伙伴的关系(特别提到印度、印度尼西亚、马来西亚、蒙古、新西兰、太平洋岛屿、新加坡、台湾和越南)。加强四方会谈(即由澳大利亚、印度、日本和美国组成的安全对话小组)。加深与东南亚国家联盟(ASEAN)的合作(特别提到东盟的中心地位)。与太平洋岛国合作，优先与《自由联合契约》(cofa)谈判。扩大美国的外交存在(特别提到东南亚和太平洋岛屿)。在印度-太平洋地区和欧洲-大西洋地区之间建立联系。•推动地区繁荣:6°提出一个印度-太平洋经济框架(提及贸易、数字经济和数据流治理以及供应链的新方法)。通过亚太经济合作组织(APEC)促进自由、公平、开放的贸易和投资。通过与七国集团成员的“重建更美好的世界”伙伴关系，缩小本地区的基础设施差距。•支持……
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Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1353/asp.2023.a903871
Kendra Schaefer
I n Trafficking Data: How China Is Winning the Battle for Digital Sovereignty, Aynne Kokas does what so many books addressing China’s data governance regime fail to do: she urges U.S. policymakers to “look to thine own house first.” This book’s key argument is that the failure of U.S. policymakers to pass federal, cross-sector legislation protecting the data of U.S. citizens leaves the door open for any malicious actor—state-sponsored or otherwise—to abuse and exfiltrate it. Without a federal data privacy law or a centralized, cross-agency, and cross-sector framework for oversight of data security, U.S. government bodies seeking to protect the privacy of their citizens from competing countries are left combating threats on a whack-a-mole, case-by-case basis, which is both ineffective and ultimately unsustainable. Trafficking Data successfully draws attention to these important issues and highlights a multitude of gaps in the current U.S. policy approach that are worthy of consideration by policymakers. However, Trafficking Data is less successful in accurately describing the nuances of China’s data and network policy, the mechanisms through which the Chinese state and private actors collect and employ data, and the structure and functions of the Chinese government. The result is that the specific nature of the threat presented by data trafficking may be misrepresented. One such misrepresentation made repeatedly is that China’s 2017 Cybersecurity Law requires “Chinese or foreign firms operating in China [to] legally store their data in Chinese government-run servers” (p. 4, also pp. 51 and 209). For example, the book notes:
{"title":"An Excellent Point Lost in Execution","authors":"Kendra Schaefer","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.a903871","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.a903871","url":null,"abstract":"I n Trafficking Data: How China Is Winning the Battle for Digital Sovereignty, Aynne Kokas does what so many books addressing China’s data governance regime fail to do: she urges U.S. policymakers to “look to thine own house first.” This book’s key argument is that the failure of U.S. policymakers to pass federal, cross-sector legislation protecting the data of U.S. citizens leaves the door open for any malicious actor—state-sponsored or otherwise—to abuse and exfiltrate it. Without a federal data privacy law or a centralized, cross-agency, and cross-sector framework for oversight of data security, U.S. government bodies seeking to protect the privacy of their citizens from competing countries are left combating threats on a whack-a-mole, case-by-case basis, which is both ineffective and ultimately unsustainable. Trafficking Data successfully draws attention to these important issues and highlights a multitude of gaps in the current U.S. policy approach that are worthy of consideration by policymakers. However, Trafficking Data is less successful in accurately describing the nuances of China’s data and network policy, the mechanisms through which the Chinese state and private actors collect and employ data, and the structure and functions of the Chinese government. The result is that the specific nature of the threat presented by data trafficking may be misrepresented. One such misrepresentation made repeatedly is that China’s 2017 Cybersecurity Law requires “Chinese or foreign firms operating in China [to] legally store their data in Chinese government-run servers” (p. 4, also pp. 51 and 209). For example, the book notes:","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"165 - 169"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43369773","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1353/asp.2023.a903861
J. Hwang
I s the region we live in called the “Asia-Pacific” or the “Indo-Pacific”?1 Many countries around the world are currently formulating their positions toward the United States’ Indo-Pacific Strategy, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, actively or passively, and regardless of whether they support it. In the case of South Korea, at a summit with U.S. president Joe Biden in May 2022, President Yoon Suk-yeol agreed to strengthen cooperation with the United States with the goal of promoting a free and open IndoPacific region.2 This move by the newly inaugurated Yoon signified that South Korea, which until that point had been debating whether to use the term “Asia-Pacific” or “Indo-Pacific,” had determined decisively to go all in on the latter. Then, on December 28, the administration officially unveiled its Strategy for a Free, Peaceful and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region, in which it pledged to transform South Korea into a “global pivotal state” that contributes to the freedom, peace, and prosperity of the international community.3 South Korean foreign minister Park Jin not only described the strategy as a “turning point in the history of South Korea’s foreign policy” but also announced that it would serve as the “foreign policy doctrine of the Yoon Suk-yeol government.”4 This essay argues that the Yoon administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy plays a crucial role in realizing the president’s vision of South Korea as a
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Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1353/asp.2023.a903858
J. Hwang, Jeffrey W. Hornung
I n May 2022, South Korea saw a new government, led by Yoon Suk-yeol, come to power. Part of the defining characteristics of the new government has been a more forward-looking approach in engagement with countries in the region, illustrated, in part, by the release of an Indo-Pacific strategy. This strategy’s release sparked debate within South Korea and abroad, not only regarding its vision and implementation challenges but also regarding its content, feasibility, and alignment with reality. Amid this active debate, the Institute for Global Strategy and Cooperation hosted an international conference on the Indo-Pacific in Seoul in March 2023. Entitled “The Path of Korean Diplomacy in the Era of the Indo-Pacific,” the conference brought together over one hundred participants from twenty-two countries, including experts from sixteen countries, ambassadors and diplomatic representatives in Seoul from thirteen countries, the deputy speaker of the National Assembly of South Korea, and parliamentarians from four countries. The conference highlighted the fact that interest in the Indo-Pacific has transcended any one country and become an integral part of regional policy approaches. Indeed, many countries today have their own Indo-Pacific strategies. However, these strategies are not in lockstep with one another. Indo-Pacific strategies mean different things to different states. And yet, for most, the defining characteristic of the growing interest in the Indo-Pacific region appears to be a looming showdown between China and the United States. The competition between the two nations is fierce, and many countries feel forced to choose sides despite the desire to maintain positive relations with both powers. This roundtable seeks to build upon the proceedings in Seoul and invite additional regional voices to explore how countries in the Indo-Pacific perceive the growing U.S.-China competition, how these states plan to
{"title":"Introduction","authors":"J. Hwang, Jeffrey W. Hornung","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.a903858","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.a903858","url":null,"abstract":"I n May 2022, South Korea saw a new government, led by Yoon Suk-yeol, come to power. Part of the defining characteristics of the new government has been a more forward-looking approach in engagement with countries in the region, illustrated, in part, by the release of an Indo-Pacific strategy. This strategy’s release sparked debate within South Korea and abroad, not only regarding its vision and implementation challenges but also regarding its content, feasibility, and alignment with reality. Amid this active debate, the Institute for Global Strategy and Cooperation hosted an international conference on the Indo-Pacific in Seoul in March 2023. Entitled “The Path of Korean Diplomacy in the Era of the Indo-Pacific,” the conference brought together over one hundred participants from twenty-two countries, including experts from sixteen countries, ambassadors and diplomatic representatives in Seoul from thirteen countries, the deputy speaker of the National Assembly of South Korea, and parliamentarians from four countries. The conference highlighted the fact that interest in the Indo-Pacific has transcended any one country and become an integral part of regional policy approaches. Indeed, many countries today have their own Indo-Pacific strategies. However, these strategies are not in lockstep with one another. Indo-Pacific strategies mean different things to different states. And yet, for most, the defining characteristic of the growing interest in the Indo-Pacific region appears to be a looming showdown between China and the United States. The competition between the two nations is fierce, and many countries feel forced to choose sides despite the desire to maintain positive relations with both powers. This roundtable seeks to build upon the proceedings in Seoul and invite additional regional voices to explore how countries in the Indo-Pacific perceive the growing U.S.-China competition, how these states plan to","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"2 - 6"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49154759","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1353/asp.2023.a903866
John Nilsson-Wright
T he United Kingdom’s formal articulation of its policy toward the Indo-Pacific dates from 2021 and is associated with two key policy documents: Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy (hereafter the Integrated Review), which articulated a position for “global Britain in a competitive age,” and the government’s Defence Command Paper Defence in a Competitive Age, also published in 2021.1 The review advocated a “tilt” toward Asia, with a focus primarily on engaging economically and politically with the region and secondarily on advocating for an expanded UK military role in addressing critical security issues in the region. This essay examines the origins, rationales, and policies set forth in the UK government’s tilt toward the Indo-Pacific; addresses the UK’s areas of strength operating in the region; assesses challenges toward actualizing the tilt’s objectives; and concludes with recommendations for UK policy.
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