Pub Date : 2024-01-01DOI: 10.1353/asp.2024.a918869
Yujia He
{"title":"Chinese Fintech Goes Global: Political Challenges and Business Strategies","authors":"Yujia He","doi":"10.1353/asp.2024.a918869","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2024.a918869","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140522638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-01DOI: 10.1353/asp.2024.a918881
Kota Umeda, Robert S. Wilson
executive summary: This article explores Japan's pursuit of missile-warning satellites and the opportunity this presents for the U.S.-Japanese security partnership in space. main argumentIn recent years, Japan has taken steps toward developing its own missile-warning satellites. Developing a space-based missile-warning system is a challenging feat, one that is complex and expensive, evidenced by the fact that only a few countries operate such systems. Given that the U.S. already shares some missile-warning information with Japan, Tokyo's pursuit of its own satellites reflects, at least in part, the country's push toward achieving a more independent capability. However, this push should not be construed as sudden or a shift away from its longtime ally. Rather, it represents (1) a continuation of latent historical efforts to acquire missile-warning satellites, and (2) a response to technological developments that have made potential adversarial missile systems more threatening and developing missile-warning satellites more feasible. Japan's pursuit of missile-warning satellites fits within the country's broader acceleration as a defense power and contributor to the U.S.-Japan security relationship. It also presents a compelling opportunity for more extensive collaboration between the two allies. policy implications• Japan has had a long-standing interest in space-based missile-warning systems and more broadly in mitigating missile threats using space-based technologies. Even if Japan does not acquire these assets soon, the issue of whether to acquire them will continue to be central to its defense debate. • Japan's development of a space-based missile-warning system, alongside the U.S.'s development of its own next-generation missile-warning capabilities, could offer opportunities for heightened collaboration between the two countries. Partnering on these assets could lead to financial savings and the potential for the alliance to develop a better protected and more capable missile-warning architecture.
{"title":"Space-Based Missile Warning: An Opportunity to Deepen U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation","authors":"Kota Umeda, Robert S. Wilson","doi":"10.1353/asp.2024.a918881","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2024.a918881","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary: This article explores Japan's pursuit of missile-warning satellites and the opportunity this presents for the U.S.-Japanese security partnership in space. main argumentIn recent years, Japan has taken steps toward developing its own missile-warning satellites. Developing a space-based missile-warning system is a challenging feat, one that is complex and expensive, evidenced by the fact that only a few countries operate such systems. Given that the U.S. already shares some missile-warning information with Japan, Tokyo's pursuit of its own satellites reflects, at least in part, the country's push toward achieving a more independent capability. However, this push should not be construed as sudden or a shift away from its longtime ally. Rather, it represents (1) a continuation of latent historical efforts to acquire missile-warning satellites, and (2) a response to technological developments that have made potential adversarial missile systems more threatening and developing missile-warning satellites more feasible. Japan's pursuit of missile-warning satellites fits within the country's broader acceleration as a defense power and contributor to the U.S.-Japan security relationship. It also presents a compelling opportunity for more extensive collaboration between the two allies. policy implications• Japan has had a long-standing interest in space-based missile-warning systems and more broadly in mitigating missile threats using space-based technologies. Even if Japan does not acquire these assets soon, the issue of whether to acquire them will continue to be central to its defense debate. • Japan's development of a space-based missile-warning system, alongside the U.S.'s development of its own next-generation missile-warning capabilities, could offer opportunities for heightened collaboration between the two countries. Partnering on these assets could lead to financial savings and the potential for the alliance to develop a better protected and more capable missile-warning architecture.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140521215","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-01DOI: 10.1353/asp.2024.a918878
Duyeon Kim
{"title":"South Korea's Quest for a Grand Strategy: Theory versus Practice, Domestic Factors, and Nuance","authors":"Duyeon Kim","doi":"10.1353/asp.2024.a918878","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2024.a918878","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140524727","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-01DOI: 10.1353/asp.2023.a911624
Essence of Indecision:Understanding Indian Security Policy Choices Frank O'Donnell (bio) As India's decisions become more consequential to global politics, understanding the influences behind them is increasingly crucial for scholars, policy experts, and world political leaders. Rajesh Basrur's new book, Subcontinental Drift: Domestic Politics and India's Foreign Policy, deftly explains the interplay of India's internal politics, external environment, and policymaker preference hierarchies to offer a persuasive theory of Indian decision-making on foreign and defense policy. Importantly, the book includes case selections that encompass security policy decisions made not only during the current government led by Narendra Modi, which began in 2014, but also during the previous several decades. As such, this book is highly recommended for both scholars and relative newcomers to the topics of South Asia studies, rising powers, and international security. As befits one of the most thoughtful scholars of India's security policies, Basrur eloquently engages with existing theoretical schools of international relations and their explanations of Indian external conduct. He develops the neoclassical realist paradigm as a theory more permissive of domestic political explanations than the external systemic focus of structural realism. The author modifies this paradigm to introduce an analytic tool of evaluating whether policymakers make the necessary decisions within their power to protect citizens. This test inherently draws upon realist thought, dating back to Kautilya and Machiavelli, that the primary—and moral—obligation of leaders is to protect their subjects. As Basrur powerfully argues, locating responsibility for state failures in this regard is crucial not just for better policymaking but for theoretical development in bridging the "materialist/normative divide in academia," as "in important respects, the moral is the empirical when accountability is neglected in making policy" (p. xii). Democratic leaders cannot control all elements of their domestic political context and have even less influence over often fast-moving developments in regional and international politics. Reflecting this reality, [End Page 129] Basrur conceptualizes the distinct categories of involuntary and voluntary drift (pp. 9–10) to explain why "uncertainty and indecisiveness have periodically afflicted India's foreign policy in areas of critical importance to its national security" (pp. 1–2). Involuntary drift occurs when leaders cannot implement effective policy due to players with domestic veto power. In the two cases of involuntary drift exemplified in negotiating the U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement (2005–8) and Indian policy toward the Sri Lankan civil war (1983–2009), these veto players were Indian political parties opposed to the prime minister's preferred course of action. The parliamentary fragility of coalition governments meant that these parties were able to variab
{"title":"Essence of Indecision: Understanding Indian Security Policy Choices","authors":"","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.a911624","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.a911624","url":null,"abstract":"Essence of Indecision:Understanding Indian Security Policy Choices Frank O'Donnell (bio) As India's decisions become more consequential to global politics, understanding the influences behind them is increasingly crucial for scholars, policy experts, and world political leaders. Rajesh Basrur's new book, Subcontinental Drift: Domestic Politics and India's Foreign Policy, deftly explains the interplay of India's internal politics, external environment, and policymaker preference hierarchies to offer a persuasive theory of Indian decision-making on foreign and defense policy. Importantly, the book includes case selections that encompass security policy decisions made not only during the current government led by Narendra Modi, which began in 2014, but also during the previous several decades. As such, this book is highly recommended for both scholars and relative newcomers to the topics of South Asia studies, rising powers, and international security. As befits one of the most thoughtful scholars of India's security policies, Basrur eloquently engages with existing theoretical schools of international relations and their explanations of Indian external conduct. He develops the neoclassical realist paradigm as a theory more permissive of domestic political explanations than the external systemic focus of structural realism. The author modifies this paradigm to introduce an analytic tool of evaluating whether policymakers make the necessary decisions within their power to protect citizens. This test inherently draws upon realist thought, dating back to Kautilya and Machiavelli, that the primary—and moral—obligation of leaders is to protect their subjects. As Basrur powerfully argues, locating responsibility for state failures in this regard is crucial not just for better policymaking but for theoretical development in bridging the \"materialist/normative divide in academia,\" as \"in important respects, the moral is the empirical when accountability is neglected in making policy\" (p. xii). Democratic leaders cannot control all elements of their domestic political context and have even less influence over often fast-moving developments in regional and international politics. Reflecting this reality, [End Page 129] Basrur conceptualizes the distinct categories of involuntary and voluntary drift (pp. 9–10) to explain why \"uncertainty and indecisiveness have periodically afflicted India's foreign policy in areas of critical importance to its national security\" (pp. 1–2). Involuntary drift occurs when leaders cannot implement effective policy due to players with domestic veto power. In the two cases of involuntary drift exemplified in negotiating the U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement (2005–8) and Indian policy toward the Sri Lankan civil war (1983–2009), these veto players were Indian political parties opposed to the prime minister's preferred course of action. The parliamentary fragility of coalition governments meant that these parties were able to variab","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136205889","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-01DOI: 10.1353/asp.2023.a911627
Shang-su Wu
executive summary: This article considers the strategic importance of mobile firepower for Taiwan's asymmetrical defense and analyzes the geostrategic threats to the survival of Taiwan's mobile surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and standoff firepower. main argumentIn the face of China's military superiority, Taiwan has adopted an asymmetrical approach to its defense that relies significantly on mobile SAMs and standoff firepower to deny People's Liberation Army (PLA) platforms, such as transport aircraft and landing ships, access to the island. Mobility presents a tactical advantage for Taiwan, as it renders Chinese surveillance more difficult. However, Taiwan's mobile units could be constrained or rendered immobile given the geographic environment in Taiwan, especially in urban regions like the Taipei metropolitan area. At the outbreak of a potential war with China, Taiwan's mobile units could face preemptive strikes, and concealing the deployed units for an indeterminate time while awaiting a PLA invasion would also be challenging. The amount of mobile firepower that Taipei can retain after PLA attacks may determine whether Beijing's invasion is successful, but with a narrow margin for losses and an incomplete buildup, Taiwan's mobile firepower may nevertheless not be adequate to redress the island's military inferiority. To consolidate the status quo in the strait, Taipei should strengthen its mobile firepower and Washington should offer critical support. policy implications • Although there is no clear minimum level of firepower that Taipei would need to retain in an attack scenario, the current margin is narrow. If the PLA efficiently neutralizes Taiwan's mobile units, Taiwan's asymmetrical defense would be significantly undermined or even fail. • Moving and hiding mobile units around Taiwan could be challenging, given that suitable routes in urban and mountainous areas are predictable and could be cut off. To thwart a potential PLA invasion, the mobile units would also need to be hidden for an indeterminate period, which could be difficult. The necessity of defending Taipei would further reduce the tactical flexibility of the mobile units. • China has various surveillance and attack means that could be used to neutralize Taiwan's mobile units and defensive means to lower the threat from mobile firepower. The efficacy of these measures and the extent to which Beijing could concentrate them for this mission is uncertain. • Third parties, particularly the U.S., are crucial in strengthening Taiwan's mobile firepower, especially in terms of quantity and evaluation.
{"title":"The Survival of Mobile Firepower: An Uncertain Factor in Taiwan's Asymmetrical Defense","authors":"Shang-su Wu","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.a911627","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.a911627","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary: This article considers the strategic importance of mobile firepower for Taiwan's asymmetrical defense and analyzes the geostrategic threats to the survival of Taiwan's mobile surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and standoff firepower. main argumentIn the face of China's military superiority, Taiwan has adopted an asymmetrical approach to its defense that relies significantly on mobile SAMs and standoff firepower to deny People's Liberation Army (PLA) platforms, such as transport aircraft and landing ships, access to the island. Mobility presents a tactical advantage for Taiwan, as it renders Chinese surveillance more difficult. However, Taiwan's mobile units could be constrained or rendered immobile given the geographic environment in Taiwan, especially in urban regions like the Taipei metropolitan area. At the outbreak of a potential war with China, Taiwan's mobile units could face preemptive strikes, and concealing the deployed units for an indeterminate time while awaiting a PLA invasion would also be challenging. The amount of mobile firepower that Taipei can retain after PLA attacks may determine whether Beijing's invasion is successful, but with a narrow margin for losses and an incomplete buildup, Taiwan's mobile firepower may nevertheless not be adequate to redress the island's military inferiority. To consolidate the status quo in the strait, Taipei should strengthen its mobile firepower and Washington should offer critical support. policy implications • Although there is no clear minimum level of firepower that Taipei would need to retain in an attack scenario, the current margin is narrow. If the PLA efficiently neutralizes Taiwan's mobile units, Taiwan's asymmetrical defense would be significantly undermined or even fail. • Moving and hiding mobile units around Taiwan could be challenging, given that suitable routes in urban and mountainous areas are predictable and could be cut off. To thwart a potential PLA invasion, the mobile units would also need to be hidden for an indeterminate period, which could be difficult. The necessity of defending Taipei would further reduce the tactical flexibility of the mobile units. • China has various surveillance and attack means that could be used to neutralize Taiwan's mobile units and defensive means to lower the threat from mobile firepower. The efficacy of these measures and the extent to which Beijing could concentrate them for this mission is uncertain. • Third parties, particularly the U.S., are crucial in strengthening Taiwan's mobile firepower, especially in terms of quantity and evaluation.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136205903","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-01DOI: 10.1353/asp.2023.a911618
Beverley Loke, Ralf Emmers
U.S.-China Great-Power Politics and Strategic Ambiguities in an Evolving Indo-Pacific Security Architecture Beverley Loke (bio) and Ralf Emmers (bio) A complex regional security architecture exists today in the Indo-Pacific, comprising overlapping multilateral and minilateral arrangements. Resulting from an incremental process of cooperation, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its associated forums such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN +3, and the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting–Plus (ADMM-Plus) have become important multilateral venues for regional countries to exchange strategic perspectives. However, these inclusive and multilateral ASEAN-led platforms have in recent years been challenged by the rise of exclusive minilateral arrangements driven by U.S.-China great-power politics. China's influence-building measures include the Belt and Road Initiative, the Xiangshan Forum, and, more recently, the Global Security Initiative. U.S.-led minilaterals include the Quad, which brings together Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, and AUKUS, a trilateral security pact signed in September 2021 by Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These developments have reinvigorated debates over the form, purpose, and effectiveness of the Indo-Pacific security architecture.1 They have also contributed to the emergence of additional ambiguity in the regional architecture at the level of embedded regional alignments. Institutions like the EAS are structured around ASEAN's impartiality in the rise of great-power competition and seek to institutionalize regional relations by promoting diplomatic rules of engagement that are acceptable to all. In contrast, the Quad and AUKUS are arrangements that openly exclude China and seek to balance its rising power. [End Page 52] While it might seem counterintuitive, we claim that constructive and purposeful strategic ambiguity in the regional architecture can help maintain regional stability, especially in light of the intensifying U.S.-China hegemonic ordering. Indeed, we posit that it is precisely when states are narrowly aligned on specific economic, security, or ideological grounds that perceptions become hardened, thereby cementing "us/them" binaries and heightening regional instabilities. In short, this essay argues that inclusive and exclusive forms of cooperation enhance stability by generating strategic ambiguities in an evolving Indo-Pacific security architecture. The argument is laid out in two sections. The first section describes how ASEAN's inclusive platforms—discussed here through the EAS—have lost momentum and how the regional architecture has in recent years been characterized by an exclusive approach that omits one of the great powers. The next section claims that inclusive and exclusive approaches to security cooperation are not incompatible, as they enable flexibility and fluidity in regional alignments. The Evolving Securit
美中大国政治和不断演变的印太安全架构中的战略模糊性今天，印太地区存在着一个复杂的地区安全架构，包括重叠的多边和多边安排。随着合作的逐步推进，东南亚国家联盟(ASEAN)及其相关论坛，如东亚峰会(EAS)、东盟地区论坛(ARF)、东盟+3和东盟国防部长扩大会议(ADMM-Plus)，已成为地区国家交流战略观点的重要多边场所。然而，这些由东盟主导的包容性和多边平台近年来受到中美大国政治推动下排他性多边安排兴起的挑战。中国的影响力建设措施包括“一带一路”倡议、香山论坛，以及最近的全球安全倡议。由美国主导的多边对话包括由澳大利亚、印度、日本和美国组成的四方对话，以及澳大利亚、英国和美国于2021年9月签署的三边安全协议AUKUS。这些事态发展重新激发了关于印太安全架构的形式、目的和有效性的辩论它们还导致区域架构在嵌入式区域联盟一级出现更多的模糊性。像东亚峰会这样的机构是围绕着东盟在大国竞争中保持中立的原则建立起来的，并寻求通过促进各方都能接受的外交接触规则来使地区关系制度化。相比之下，四方防务对话和太平洋安全联盟是公开排除中国并寻求平衡其崛起力量的安排。虽然这似乎有悖常理，但我们认为，在地区架构中，建设性和有目的的战略模糊性有助于维护地区稳定，尤其是在美中霸权秩序日益加剧的情况下。事实上，我们认为，正是当国家在特定的经济、安全或意识形态基础上狭隘地结盟时，观念才会变得更加顽固，从而巩固了“我们/他们”的二元对立，加剧了地区不稳定。简而言之，本文认为，包容和排他性的合作形式通过在不断演变的印太安全架构中产生战略模糊性来增强稳定。这个论点分为两个部分。第一部分描述了东盟的包容性平台(这里通过东盟讨论)是如何失去动力的，以及近年来区域架构是如何以排除大国之一的排他性方式为特征的。下一节声称，包容性和排他性的安全合作方法并非不相容，因为它们使区域联盟具有灵活性和流动性。东盟在地区秩序建设中的中心地位一直备受争议。尽管一些分析人士声称，持续的大国竞争和不信任导致了东盟“默认”的中心地位，但也有人强调，东南亚国家在塑造地区安全架构方面发挥了更大的作用。尽管澳大利亚前总理陆克文(Kevin Rudd)和日本前首相鸠山由纪夫(Yukio Hatoyama)分别呼吁建立“亚太共同体”(Asia-Pacific community)和“东亚共同体”(East Asian community)等其他各种地区主义项目，但都未能成功，但东盟在向其他地区国家传播其规范并推动更广泛合作方面表现出了弹性。在此背景下，东盟的成就包括为大国接触建立包容性的制度化平台，从而确保东盟在更广泛的地区秩序建设项目中仍然发挥关键作用正如胜俣弘所指出的那样，东盟成功地“积极构建了一种社会环境，使自己成为东亚共同体建设的合法领导者”。东亚峰会于2005年首次由东盟十国(澳大利亚、中国、印度、日本、新西兰和韩国)举行，代表了建立一个区域性多边机构的一次尝试。在成立之前，印度尼西亚、日本和新加坡认为成员应该广泛和包容，而其他成员，特别是中国和马来西亚，强调东亚峰会应该仅限于东亚国家。最终将澳大利亚、印度和新西兰——这些位于东亚地区之外的国家纳入其中——因此是对更包容的合作方式的外交让步。此外……
{"title":"U.S.-China Great-Power Politics and Strategic Ambiguities in an Evolving Indo-Pacific Security Architecture","authors":"Beverley Loke, Ralf Emmers","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.a911618","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.a911618","url":null,"abstract":"U.S.-China Great-Power Politics and Strategic Ambiguities in an Evolving Indo-Pacific Security Architecture Beverley Loke (bio) and Ralf Emmers (bio) A complex regional security architecture exists today in the Indo-Pacific, comprising overlapping multilateral and minilateral arrangements. Resulting from an incremental process of cooperation, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its associated forums such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN +3, and the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting–Plus (ADMM-Plus) have become important multilateral venues for regional countries to exchange strategic perspectives. However, these inclusive and multilateral ASEAN-led platforms have in recent years been challenged by the rise of exclusive minilateral arrangements driven by U.S.-China great-power politics. China's influence-building measures include the Belt and Road Initiative, the Xiangshan Forum, and, more recently, the Global Security Initiative. U.S.-led minilaterals include the Quad, which brings together Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, and AUKUS, a trilateral security pact signed in September 2021 by Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These developments have reinvigorated debates over the form, purpose, and effectiveness of the Indo-Pacific security architecture.1 They have also contributed to the emergence of additional ambiguity in the regional architecture at the level of embedded regional alignments. Institutions like the EAS are structured around ASEAN's impartiality in the rise of great-power competition and seek to institutionalize regional relations by promoting diplomatic rules of engagement that are acceptable to all. In contrast, the Quad and AUKUS are arrangements that openly exclude China and seek to balance its rising power. [End Page 52] While it might seem counterintuitive, we claim that constructive and purposeful strategic ambiguity in the regional architecture can help maintain regional stability, especially in light of the intensifying U.S.-China hegemonic ordering. Indeed, we posit that it is precisely when states are narrowly aligned on specific economic, security, or ideological grounds that perceptions become hardened, thereby cementing \"us/them\" binaries and heightening regional instabilities. In short, this essay argues that inclusive and exclusive forms of cooperation enhance stability by generating strategic ambiguities in an evolving Indo-Pacific security architecture. The argument is laid out in two sections. The first section describes how ASEAN's inclusive platforms—discussed here through the EAS—have lost momentum and how the regional architecture has in recent years been characterized by an exclusive approach that omits one of the great powers. The next section claims that inclusive and exclusive approaches to security cooperation are not incompatible, as they enable flexibility and fluidity in regional alignments. The Evolving Securit","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136205894","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-01DOI: 10.1353/asp.2023.a911613
Mathew Davies
ASEAN and Ambiguity Mathew Davies (bio) Perhaps more than any other regional organization, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and ambiguity seem to go hand in hand. Since the establishment of ASEAN more than 50 years ago, it has been easy to point to the region on a map but harder to say what the organization is for, and harder still to say what it does. This essay identifies the origins, workings, and consequences of this ambiguity in Southeast Asian regionalism. While the term ambiguity has been widely and often used in discussions of ASEAN, it has not been analyzed or dissected as its own analytical lens.1 To address this issue, I identify two types of ambiguity in this essay—an ambiguity of purpose (i.e., What is ASEAN for?) and an ambiguity of meaning (i.e., What values does ASEAN embody, promote, and protect?). Further, whereas the term ambiguity is often deployed negatively or derisively as a trait ASEAN should be faulted for and endeavor to overcome, this essay adopts a more nuanced position. Ambiguity is a risk mitigation strategy, and it can be a positive factor for the realization of goals. Very often, it is far from being unintentional or uninformed. At least for some of ASEAN's core goals, ambiguity has been a productive and intentional strategy; removing ambiguity through specification, especially when accompanied by growing regulation, is a governance misstep. This is not to say, of course, that ambiguity is only ever positive, and this essay also identifies the ways in which it both weakens regional governance and produces significant overconfidence. [End Page 22] The Origins and Growth of ASEAN Meeting in Bangkok in 1967 to sign the ASEAN Declaration (also known at the Bangkok Declaration), the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand most likely had the risks of failure uppermost in their minds. Previous attempts to establish a regional body, including the Association of Southeast Asia and MAPHILINDO, had been unsuccessful, and the five abovementioned states were dangerously vulnerable to the vagaries of domestic insurrection and global political competition.2 Failure would exacerbate the insecurities, material and ontological, of the region. Yet, the foreign ministers that met in Bangkok faced daunting obstacles to success. Most fundamentally, the five countries they represented neither liked nor trusted one another, and their diplomatic relations were marred by tensions, disagreements, and overlapping sovereignty claims. At least in part, these tensions were the product of centuries of colonial rule and the resulting political dislocations and silencing that accompanied first European colonialization and then, far more briefly, the Japanese occupation of the region. The ASEAN framework that was crafted was a response to the necessity of coexisting in similar circumstances, with similar economic and geopolitical needs, absent a common understanding, let alone mutual trus
{"title":"ASEAN and Ambiguity","authors":"Mathew Davies","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.a911613","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.a911613","url":null,"abstract":"ASEAN and Ambiguity Mathew Davies (bio) Perhaps more than any other regional organization, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and ambiguity seem to go hand in hand. Since the establishment of ASEAN more than 50 years ago, it has been easy to point to the region on a map but harder to say what the organization is for, and harder still to say what it does. This essay identifies the origins, workings, and consequences of this ambiguity in Southeast Asian regionalism. While the term ambiguity has been widely and often used in discussions of ASEAN, it has not been analyzed or dissected as its own analytical lens.1 To address this issue, I identify two types of ambiguity in this essay—an ambiguity of purpose (i.e., What is ASEAN for?) and an ambiguity of meaning (i.e., What values does ASEAN embody, promote, and protect?). Further, whereas the term ambiguity is often deployed negatively or derisively as a trait ASEAN should be faulted for and endeavor to overcome, this essay adopts a more nuanced position. Ambiguity is a risk mitigation strategy, and it can be a positive factor for the realization of goals. Very often, it is far from being unintentional or uninformed. At least for some of ASEAN's core goals, ambiguity has been a productive and intentional strategy; removing ambiguity through specification, especially when accompanied by growing regulation, is a governance misstep. This is not to say, of course, that ambiguity is only ever positive, and this essay also identifies the ways in which it both weakens regional governance and produces significant overconfidence. [End Page 22] The Origins and Growth of ASEAN Meeting in Bangkok in 1967 to sign the ASEAN Declaration (also known at the Bangkok Declaration), the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand most likely had the risks of failure uppermost in their minds. Previous attempts to establish a regional body, including the Association of Southeast Asia and MAPHILINDO, had been unsuccessful, and the five abovementioned states were dangerously vulnerable to the vagaries of domestic insurrection and global political competition.2 Failure would exacerbate the insecurities, material and ontological, of the region. Yet, the foreign ministers that met in Bangkok faced daunting obstacles to success. Most fundamentally, the five countries they represented neither liked nor trusted one another, and their diplomatic relations were marred by tensions, disagreements, and overlapping sovereignty claims. At least in part, these tensions were the product of centuries of colonial rule and the resulting political dislocations and silencing that accompanied first European colonialization and then, far more briefly, the Japanese occupation of the region. The ASEAN framework that was crafted was a response to the necessity of coexisting in similar circumstances, with similar economic and geopolitical needs, absent a common understanding, let alone mutual trus","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136205898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-01DOI: 10.1353/asp.2023.a911615
Natasha Hamilton-Hart
The Ambiguous Architecture of Economic Integration in East Asia Natasha Hamilton-Hart (bio) Regional economic integration in East Asia has been built on an architecture of ambiguity and informality. A foundational informal architecture of cross-border business ties and business-government relationships has facilitated regional commerce for many decades. Ambiguity has contributed to building formal integration through intergovernmental cooperation because commitments are often only possible due to the flexibility ambiguity provides. In the current moment of heightened tension between the United States and China, the United States is aiming to eliminate areas of ambiguity and flexibility in its growing array of export controls and other policies intended to hamper the acquisition of advanced technology by Chinese entities and "de-risk" exposure to China. This essay examines how informality and ambiguity have facilitated the development of East Asian economic regionalization and what this looks like in an environment of U.S.-China rivalry. The De Facto Economic Regional Architecture East Asia has emerged as a robust economic region over the past three decades, as evidenced by the growth of cross-border investment flows and the rise of intraregional trade. Regional trade and investment flows have been organized to reflect the logic of global value chains, sometimes referred to as global production networks, by which the production of goods is dispersed across national boundaries in an effort to realize efficiencies of scale and specialization.1 The rise in trade of intermediate products created a distinctive condition of complex interdependence: firms and national economies are enmeshed in multiple, crosscutting relationships of mutual [End Page 31] dependence that span not only critical inputs and final markets but also technology, logistics, distribution, digital services, and information flows.2 Early analyses of the emerging structure of regional integration in East Asia noted that the de facto regionalization occurring there, even by the 1990s, was different from the European experience in which integration was essentially a product of formal regionalism.3 Formal regionalism meant cooperative commitments by governments to liberalize trade and investment, harmonize standards, and remove other restrictions on the free flow of commerce and people. Regionalization, in contrast, appeared to occur in advance of formal intergovernmental agreements in East Asia and was, in this sense, informal and market-based rather than state-led. In fact, as was clear by the end of the twentieth century, the new structure of integration via global value chains was fundamentally different from that predicted by traditional trade and investment models based on the full production of finished goods, such as washing machines and automobiles.4 Instead, very specific production functions were disbursed geographically, while transactions along the value chain were governed
{"title":"The Ambiguous Architecture of Economic Integration in East Asia","authors":"Natasha Hamilton-Hart","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.a911615","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.a911615","url":null,"abstract":"The Ambiguous Architecture of Economic Integration in East Asia Natasha Hamilton-Hart (bio) Regional economic integration in East Asia has been built on an architecture of ambiguity and informality. A foundational informal architecture of cross-border business ties and business-government relationships has facilitated regional commerce for many decades. Ambiguity has contributed to building formal integration through intergovernmental cooperation because commitments are often only possible due to the flexibility ambiguity provides. In the current moment of heightened tension between the United States and China, the United States is aiming to eliminate areas of ambiguity and flexibility in its growing array of export controls and other policies intended to hamper the acquisition of advanced technology by Chinese entities and \"de-risk\" exposure to China. This essay examines how informality and ambiguity have facilitated the development of East Asian economic regionalization and what this looks like in an environment of U.S.-China rivalry. The De Facto Economic Regional Architecture East Asia has emerged as a robust economic region over the past three decades, as evidenced by the growth of cross-border investment flows and the rise of intraregional trade. Regional trade and investment flows have been organized to reflect the logic of global value chains, sometimes referred to as global production networks, by which the production of goods is dispersed across national boundaries in an effort to realize efficiencies of scale and specialization.1 The rise in trade of intermediate products created a distinctive condition of complex interdependence: firms and national economies are enmeshed in multiple, crosscutting relationships of mutual [End Page 31] dependence that span not only critical inputs and final markets but also technology, logistics, distribution, digital services, and information flows.2 Early analyses of the emerging structure of regional integration in East Asia noted that the de facto regionalization occurring there, even by the 1990s, was different from the European experience in which integration was essentially a product of formal regionalism.3 Formal regionalism meant cooperative commitments by governments to liberalize trade and investment, harmonize standards, and remove other restrictions on the free flow of commerce and people. Regionalization, in contrast, appeared to occur in advance of formal intergovernmental agreements in East Asia and was, in this sense, informal and market-based rather than state-led. In fact, as was clear by the end of the twentieth century, the new structure of integration via global value chains was fundamentally different from that predicted by traditional trade and investment models based on the full production of finished goods, such as washing machines and automobiles.4 Instead, very specific production functions were disbursed geographically, while transactions along the value chain were governed ","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136205902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-01DOI: 10.1353/asp.2023.a911617
Wesley Widmaier, Mathew Davies, Lorraine Elliott, Ralf Emmers, Natasha Hamilton-Hart, Wenting He, Beverley Loke, Susan Park
Introduction:Diplomacy and Ambiguity—Constructing Interests in Cooperation Wesley Widmaier (bio), Mathew Davies (bio), Lorraine Elliott (bio), Ralf Emmers (bio), Natasha Hamilton-Hart (bio), Wenting He (bio), Beverley Loke (bio), and Susan Park (bio) [End Page 1] "Diplomacy requires constant adjustment to changing circumstance; it must leave a margin for the unexpected; the unpredictable is what always happens in foreign affairs. Nuance, flexibility, and sometimes ambiguity are the tools of diplomacy." Henry Kissinger1 Scholars and practitioners of Asian diplomacy are well acquainted with notions of "constructive ambiguity," a concept associated most prominently with U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger. Indeed, Kissinger's use of ambiguous language—capable of being interpreted in a range of fashions—enabled what was arguably the most important geopolitical shift of the past half-century.2 Specifically, the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, issued by the governments of the United States and the People's Republic of [End Page 2] China (PRC), saw the United States affirm "that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China."3 By expressing U.S. views in this fashion, Kissinger elided disagreements over who might govern the "one China" and enabled the United States and the PRC to establish a de facto partnership opposing Soviet influence in Asia. This ambiguity also served to instill a degree of caution in the PRC and Taiwanese governments, leaving U.S. policy regarding any conflict opaque. Even as Kissinger should be faulted for pursuing an amoral realism in regional contexts, his pragmatic courting of interpretive "slack" enabled an era of geopolitical stability. Indeed, one might argue more broadly that key elements of the wider rules-based international order that arose after World War II were themselves based in a pragmatic acceptance of ambiguity, as such ambiguity might ease the process of responding to shifts in security and economic "fundamentals." For example, in place of the classical gold standard that had exacerbated deflationary pressures over the interwar decades, the fixed exchange rates of the Keynesian Bretton Woods framework had a normative component, reflecting a shared commitment to cooperation in pursuit of increased demand and growth. Even where it was recognized that a "fundamental disequilibrium" might compel devaluation, this criterion itself remained ambiguous, providing policymakers a zone of discretion in efforts to maintain growth.4 In this way, policymakers sought less to eliminate ambiguities than to manage them in ways that could buffer security or economic pressures. Nevertheless, such possibilities for the use of constructive ambiguity have been increasingly overlooked in recent decades. Rather than manage ambiguities, policymakers have sought to promote clarity and transparency in a way that can limit or eliminate the scope for interpretive nuance.5 Co
{"title":"Introduction: Diplomacy and Ambiguity—Constructing Interests in Cooperation","authors":"Wesley Widmaier, Mathew Davies, Lorraine Elliott, Ralf Emmers, Natasha Hamilton-Hart, Wenting He, Beverley Loke, Susan Park","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.a911617","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.a911617","url":null,"abstract":"Introduction:Diplomacy and Ambiguity—Constructing Interests in Cooperation Wesley Widmaier (bio), Mathew Davies (bio), Lorraine Elliott (bio), Ralf Emmers (bio), Natasha Hamilton-Hart (bio), Wenting He (bio), Beverley Loke (bio), and Susan Park (bio) [End Page 1] \"Diplomacy requires constant adjustment to changing circumstance; it must leave a margin for the unexpected; the unpredictable is what always happens in foreign affairs. Nuance, flexibility, and sometimes ambiguity are the tools of diplomacy.\" Henry Kissinger1 Scholars and practitioners of Asian diplomacy are well acquainted with notions of \"constructive ambiguity,\" a concept associated most prominently with U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger. Indeed, Kissinger's use of ambiguous language—capable of being interpreted in a range of fashions—enabled what was arguably the most important geopolitical shift of the past half-century.2 Specifically, the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, issued by the governments of the United States and the People's Republic of [End Page 2] China (PRC), saw the United States affirm \"that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.\"3 By expressing U.S. views in this fashion, Kissinger elided disagreements over who might govern the \"one China\" and enabled the United States and the PRC to establish a de facto partnership opposing Soviet influence in Asia. This ambiguity also served to instill a degree of caution in the PRC and Taiwanese governments, leaving U.S. policy regarding any conflict opaque. Even as Kissinger should be faulted for pursuing an amoral realism in regional contexts, his pragmatic courting of interpretive \"slack\" enabled an era of geopolitical stability. Indeed, one might argue more broadly that key elements of the wider rules-based international order that arose after World War II were themselves based in a pragmatic acceptance of ambiguity, as such ambiguity might ease the process of responding to shifts in security and economic \"fundamentals.\" For example, in place of the classical gold standard that had exacerbated deflationary pressures over the interwar decades, the fixed exchange rates of the Keynesian Bretton Woods framework had a normative component, reflecting a shared commitment to cooperation in pursuit of increased demand and growth. Even where it was recognized that a \"fundamental disequilibrium\" might compel devaluation, this criterion itself remained ambiguous, providing policymakers a zone of discretion in efforts to maintain growth.4 In this way, policymakers sought less to eliminate ambiguities than to manage them in ways that could buffer security or economic pressures. Nevertheless, such possibilities for the use of constructive ambiguity have been increasingly overlooked in recent decades. Rather than manage ambiguities, policymakers have sought to promote clarity and transparency in a way that can limit or eliminate the scope for interpretive nuance.5 Co","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136205892","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-01DOI: 10.1353/asp.2023.a911614
Lorraine Elliott
Ambiguity and Decarbonization Pathways in Southeast Asia Lorraine Elliott (bio) In a 2023 keynote address on Southeast Asian energy transitions, Asian Development Bank vice president Ahmed Saeed argued that the complexity of climate change mitigation and adaptation would require the region to become "comfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity."1 This essay examines what that uncertainty and ambiguity looks like as members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) commit to transition to low-carbon economies under the provisions of the 2015 Paris Agreement that was adopted under the auspices of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). While the "plurality of meanings" that created space for "more than one interpretation"2—i.e., constructive ambiguity—was strategically important for reaching international consensus on the Paris Agreement, it has at times proved counterproductive in the determination and governance of decarbonization modalities across ASEAN. As this essay will demonstrate, decarbonization ambiguity in Southeast Asia can be characterized as "the type of uncertainty that emerges from complexity,"3 in this case the bio-physical complexity of climate systems and the technological, social, and economic complexities and uncertainties of climate mitigation pathways and outcomes. Constructive ambiguity as a diplomatic strategy and possible governance modality is implicated in pathway and outcome ambiguities. This runs the risk of sending conflicting messages to both public- and private-sector stakeholders that can result in risk-averse responses, ineffective policy measures, or even policy paralysis in the face of complexity and uncertainty.4 [End Page 11] Constructive Ambiguity in the Climate Governance Context Under the Paris Agreement, parties committed, in principle, to ambitious efforts to keep global average temperatures "well below" 2ºC degrees above pre-industrial levels with the hope of limiting this to 1.5ºC.5 In pursuit of that goal, Article 4 of the agreement calls for a "global peaking" of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible and a "balance between anthropogenic emissions…and removals" in the second half of this century, a goal that is usually referred to as "net-zero."6 Several provisions in the Paris Agreement are deliberately or strategically ambiguous on how that ambition—itself a conceptually elusive term—might be operationalized and governed. This is relevant, for example, to Article 4 on whether a weakening or rollback of individual country mitigation commitments is permissible (though most commentators suggest that it is not),7 Article 6 on environmental integrity and voluntary cooperation on non-market approaches to internationally transferred mitigation outcomes,8 Article 9.1 on climate finance,9 and to the more general UNFCCC provisions on loss and damage.10 Aysha Fleming and Mark Howden make the case for embracing this kind of ambiguity, seeing value in "multiple knowledge spheres
{"title":"Ambiguity and Decarbonization Pathways in Southeast Asia","authors":"Lorraine Elliott","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.a911614","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.a911614","url":null,"abstract":"Ambiguity and Decarbonization Pathways in Southeast Asia Lorraine Elliott (bio) In a 2023 keynote address on Southeast Asian energy transitions, Asian Development Bank vice president Ahmed Saeed argued that the complexity of climate change mitigation and adaptation would require the region to become \"comfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity.\"1 This essay examines what that uncertainty and ambiguity looks like as members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) commit to transition to low-carbon economies under the provisions of the 2015 Paris Agreement that was adopted under the auspices of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). While the \"plurality of meanings\" that created space for \"more than one interpretation\"2—i.e., constructive ambiguity—was strategically important for reaching international consensus on the Paris Agreement, it has at times proved counterproductive in the determination and governance of decarbonization modalities across ASEAN. As this essay will demonstrate, decarbonization ambiguity in Southeast Asia can be characterized as \"the type of uncertainty that emerges from complexity,\"3 in this case the bio-physical complexity of climate systems and the technological, social, and economic complexities and uncertainties of climate mitigation pathways and outcomes. Constructive ambiguity as a diplomatic strategy and possible governance modality is implicated in pathway and outcome ambiguities. This runs the risk of sending conflicting messages to both public- and private-sector stakeholders that can result in risk-averse responses, ineffective policy measures, or even policy paralysis in the face of complexity and uncertainty.4 [End Page 11] Constructive Ambiguity in the Climate Governance Context Under the Paris Agreement, parties committed, in principle, to ambitious efforts to keep global average temperatures \"well below\" 2ºC degrees above pre-industrial levels with the hope of limiting this to 1.5ºC.5 In pursuit of that goal, Article 4 of the agreement calls for a \"global peaking\" of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible and a \"balance between anthropogenic emissions…and removals\" in the second half of this century, a goal that is usually referred to as \"net-zero.\"6 Several provisions in the Paris Agreement are deliberately or strategically ambiguous on how that ambition—itself a conceptually elusive term—might be operationalized and governed. This is relevant, for example, to Article 4 on whether a weakening or rollback of individual country mitigation commitments is permissible (though most commentators suggest that it is not),7 Article 6 on environmental integrity and voluntary cooperation on non-market approaches to internationally transferred mitigation outcomes,8 Article 9.1 on climate finance,9 and to the more general UNFCCC provisions on loss and damage.10 Aysha Fleming and Mark Howden make the case for embracing this kind of ambiguity, seeing value in \"multiple knowledge spheres ","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136205890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：