Pub Date : 2023-10-01DOI: 10.1353/asp.2023.a911621
Author's Response:Indian Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy—Refining Neoclassical Realism Rajesh Basrur (bio) The responses to Subcontinental Drift: Domestic Politics and India's Foreign Policy by the five reviewers in this roundtable (Ian Hall, Kate Sullivan de Estrada, Jivanta Schottli, Frank O'Donnell, and Sameer Lalwani) have been thought-provoking and have opened up several lines of refinement and inquiry. Additionally, my own reflections on the book several months after publication have led me to ponder its findings as well as the potential avenues it might open up for further research. Let me begin by responding to some critical comments. On the whole, while raising astute questions about the book, all the reviewers were positive about its contribution to the literature, noting the study's theoretical strengths, empirical grounding, and focus on a geopolitical context that has not received much theoretical attention in the global international relations literature. The reviewers have made searching comments and suggestions to consider, however. Criticism is essential to moving the intellectual enterprise forward, and I attempt—I daresay all too briefly—to engage with it. If the reviewer's task is fundamentally to help refine a line of thinking, they have all accomplished it. Hall touches on a vital point in his observation that the distinction between "involuntary" and "voluntary" drift is too sharp given that the reality is more nuanced. In the case of the India-U.S. nuclear deal, he correctly notes that despite the problem of structurally produced delay, the ultimate outcome was shaped by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's ability to override the limitations of his coalition and push through the Indian side of the deal. I may just say that this is a point I made myself in acknowledging that "the material distribution of power is not in itself the only arbiter of outcomes" and that there is also "the vital importance of commitment," which is a nonmaterial factor (p. 71). But there is certainly scope for a more nuanced approach that makes the point more generally with respect to other cases. I am glad Hall has drawn attention to this as it provides the [End Page 139] reader with a clearer sense of how the analytical framework employed in the book might be strengthened. Sullivan de Estrada usefully focuses on the importance of recognizing policy content as a possible factor producing drift. For instance, Indian policy on Russia's actions in Ukraine has clearly been awkward (though not novel if one looks back at Indira Gandhi's response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979–80 or even earlier cases). This uncertainty is the consequence of policymakers in New Delhi finding themselves caught between conflicting pressures that are structural (the changing power distribution in global politics) as well as domestically driven (the preference for maximizing policy autonomy by spreading India's strategic bets and establishing linkages with b
本次圆桌会议的五位评论者(Ian Hall, Kate Sullivan de Estrada, Jivanta Schottli, Frank O'Donnell和Sameer Lalwani)对《次大陆漂移:国内政治和印度外交政策》的回应发人深省，并开辟了几条改进和探究的路线。此外，在这本书出版几个月后，我自己对它的反思使我思考它的发现以及它可能为进一步研究开辟的潜在途径。让我先回应一些批评的评论。总体而言，尽管对本书提出了尖锐的问题，但所有评论者都对其对文献的贡献持肯定态度，指出了该研究的理论优势、实证基础以及对地缘政治背景的关注，而这在全球国际关系文献中并没有得到太多的理论关注。然而，审稿人提出了搜索性的评论和建议。批评对于推动知识事业的发展至关重要，我试图——我敢说，这一切都太短暂了——参与其中。如果审稿人的任务基本上是帮助改进思路，那么他们就已经完成了。霍尔在他的观察中触及了一个关键点，即考虑到现实更为微妙，“非自愿”和“自愿”漂移之间的区别过于尖锐。就印美关系而言。他正确地指出，尽管在结构上造成了拖延，但最终的结果是由印度总理曼莫汉·辛格(Manmohan Singh)克服其执政联盟的限制，推动印度方面达成协议的能力决定的。我只能说，这是我自己在承认“权力的物质分配本身并不是结果的唯一仲裁者”时提出的观点，而且还有“承诺的至关重要性”，这是一个非物质因素(第71页)。但当然也有余地采用一种更细致的方法，使这一观点更普遍地适用于其他情况。我很高兴霍尔引起了人们对这一点的注意，因为它为读者提供了一个更清晰的认识，即如何加强书中使用的分析框架。沙利文·德·埃斯特拉达(Sullivan de Estrada)着重强调了认识到政策内容是产生漂移的可能因素的重要性。例如，印度对俄罗斯在乌克兰的行动的政策显然是尴尬的(尽管如果回顾一下英迪拉·甘地对1979-80年苏联入侵阿富汗的反应，甚至更早的案例，就会发现这并不新鲜)。这种不确定性是新德里的政策制定者发现自己被夹在相互冲突的压力之间的结果，这些压力是结构性的(全球政治中不断变化的权力分配)和国内驱动的(通过扩大印度的战略赌注和与美国和俄罗斯建立联系来最大化政策自主权的偏好)。另外，政策的不确定性可能归因于相互冲突的“规范要求”——这一点适用于印度核战略的混乱，印度核战略被困在甘地道德的对立理念压力和获得更强威慑能力的现实要求之间。从某种程度上说，这导致印度战略家思维混乱，这是一个有道理的观点。尽管如此，我还是要断言，在后一种情况下，自愿漂移的根本原因是决策者忽视了核武器战略的基本原则，未能应对这些跨领域的压力。尽管如此，苏利文·德·埃斯特拉达指出，观念因素在制定政策方面发挥着重要作用，这是正确的，这是学者们应该密切关注的一个方面。肖特利提出了一个切题的问题:在多大程度上，领导层会影响对最初政策制定预期的偏离?在两种自愿漂移的情况下，我都指出了这个方向:领导的失败导致了核战略和反恐方面的不足，但我强调了前一种情况下战略精英的责任，以及后一种情况下公众的责任。然而，相对重要性的问题需要进行更深入的探讨，以评估可归因于不同类型行为者的责任程度。这是等待更近的事情……
{"title":"Author's Response: Indian Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy—Refining Neoclassical Realism","authors":"","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.a911621","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.a911621","url":null,"abstract":"Author's Response:Indian Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy—Refining Neoclassical Realism Rajesh Basrur (bio) The responses to Subcontinental Drift: Domestic Politics and India's Foreign Policy by the five reviewers in this roundtable (Ian Hall, Kate Sullivan de Estrada, Jivanta Schottli, Frank O'Donnell, and Sameer Lalwani) have been thought-provoking and have opened up several lines of refinement and inquiry. Additionally, my own reflections on the book several months after publication have led me to ponder its findings as well as the potential avenues it might open up for further research. Let me begin by responding to some critical comments. On the whole, while raising astute questions about the book, all the reviewers were positive about its contribution to the literature, noting the study's theoretical strengths, empirical grounding, and focus on a geopolitical context that has not received much theoretical attention in the global international relations literature. The reviewers have made searching comments and suggestions to consider, however. Criticism is essential to moving the intellectual enterprise forward, and I attempt—I daresay all too briefly—to engage with it. If the reviewer's task is fundamentally to help refine a line of thinking, they have all accomplished it. Hall touches on a vital point in his observation that the distinction between \"involuntary\" and \"voluntary\" drift is too sharp given that the reality is more nuanced. In the case of the India-U.S. nuclear deal, he correctly notes that despite the problem of structurally produced delay, the ultimate outcome was shaped by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's ability to override the limitations of his coalition and push through the Indian side of the deal. I may just say that this is a point I made myself in acknowledging that \"the material distribution of power is not in itself the only arbiter of outcomes\" and that there is also \"the vital importance of commitment,\" which is a nonmaterial factor (p. 71). But there is certainly scope for a more nuanced approach that makes the point more generally with respect to other cases. I am glad Hall has drawn attention to this as it provides the [End Page 139] reader with a clearer sense of how the analytical framework employed in the book might be strengthened. Sullivan de Estrada usefully focuses on the importance of recognizing policy content as a possible factor producing drift. For instance, Indian policy on Russia's actions in Ukraine has clearly been awkward (though not novel if one looks back at Indira Gandhi's response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979–80 or even earlier cases). This uncertainty is the consequence of policymakers in New Delhi finding themselves caught between conflicting pressures that are structural (the changing power distribution in global politics) as well as domestically driven (the preference for maximizing policy autonomy by spreading India's strategic bets and establishing linkages with b","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136205895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-01DOI: 10.1353/asp.2023.a911620
Lily Schlieman
executive summary: This essay identifies trends and actors involved in illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing in two of Southeast Asia's regional seascapes (the South China Sea and the Sulu-Sulawesi Seascape), explores the political and socioeconomic factors that enable IUU fishing, and offers recommendations to governments and other stakeholders. main argument IUU fishing threatens the food, ecological, and economic security of coastal communities in Southeast Asia's seascapes. The region is home to incredible marine biodiversity that supports commercially important fish stocks. However, IUU fishing, poor fisheries management, and bad governance—coupled with environmental degradation and a lack of monitoring, control, surveillance, and enforcement capacity—leave these stocks in a precarious position. The clandestine nature of IUU fishing can also attract crimes of convergence, including forced labor and trafficking of humans, arms, drugs, and wildlife. To counter IUU fishing, national governments in Southeast Asia should take steps to improve cooperation, build cohesiveness, and share data and relevant information with each other and with regional organizations. Likewise, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and regional fisheries management organizations should take a greater leadership role to facilitate data and information sharing between Southeast Asian governments. policy implications • Cooperative and joint stock assessments in the South China Sea and the Sulu-Sulawesi Seascape by governments, scientists, NGOs, and other stakeholders, with a focus on transboundary stocks, would significantly improve the monitoring and management of fisheries. • To bridge gaps in enforcement capacity, fisheries enforcement authorities should work with nontraditional partners, including local communities and trusted nations in the Indo-Pacific, such as the U.S., Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. • Southeast Asian coastal states should work together to settle remaining maritime boundary disputes they have with each other and develop a cohesive regional bloc that strengthens their collective commitment to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and efforts to combat IUU fishing. • National governments and law enforcement should increase their capacity and technical capabilities to stop labor and human rights abuses on the water and in seafood processing facilities by working with NGOs, survivors, and other relevant stakeholders with expertise in the field.
摘要:本文确定了东南亚两个区域海域(南中国海和苏拉威西海域)非法、不报告和不管制(IUU)捕捞的趋势和参与者，探讨了导致IUU捕捞的政治和社会经济因素，并向政府和其他利益相关者提出了建议。IUU捕鱼威胁着东南亚沿海社区的食物、生态和经济安全。该地区拥有令人难以置信的海洋生物多样性，支撑着重要的商业鱼类资源。然而，IUU捕鱼、糟糕的渔业管理和糟糕的治理，加上环境退化和缺乏监测、控制、监督和执法能力，使这些种群处于不稳定的境地。IUU捕鱼的秘密性质也可能吸引包括强迫劳动和贩运人口、武器、毒品和野生动物在内的趋同犯罪。为了打击IUU捕鱼，东南亚各国政府应采取措施加强合作，建立凝聚力，并相互之间以及与区域组织共享数据和相关信息。同样，东南亚国家联盟(Association of Southeast Asian Nations)和区域渔业管理组织应发挥更大的领导作用，促进东南亚各国政府之间的数据和信息共享。•各国政府、科学家、非政府组织和其他利益攸关方在南中国海和苏拉威西海域开展合作和联合种群评估，重点关注跨境种群，将显著改善渔业监测和管理。•为了弥合执法能力的差距，渔业执法当局应与非传统伙伴合作，包括当地社区和印度-太平洋地区值得信赖的国家，如美国、澳大利亚、日本和韩国。•东南亚沿海国家应共同努力，解决彼此之间遗留的海上边界争端，发展一个有凝聚力的区域集团，加强对《联合国海洋法公约》的集体承诺，并努力打击IUU捕鱼。•各国政府和执法部门应提高其能力和技术能力，通过与非政府组织、幸存者和其他具有该领域专业知识的利益相关者合作，制止水和海鲜加工设施中的劳工和人权侵犯。
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Pub Date : 2023-10-01DOI: 10.1353/asp.2023.a911623
Policy Drift as an Inevitability and an Occasional Success Sameer Lalwani (bio) As India rises in economic and geopolitical stature, it has sought to cultivate an image of a leading power with multialigned dexterity. In a year where India helms the G-20 presidency, champions the global South, caucuses with the G-7, assumes leadership roles in both the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Quad, and deepens strategic ties with the United States while steadily maintaining defense relations with Russia, one might ascribe Indian foreign policy with a Bismarckian level of skill and sophistication. And while this could be a reasonable assessment, Rajesh Basrur's thoroughly researched contribution to neoclassical realist theory, Subcontinental Drift: Domestic Politics and India's Foreign Policy, reveals serious shortcomings in Indian foreign policy over the past two decades of India's rise. He terms these faults "drift," and it is this Indian foreign policy drift—at times timidity, at times torpor—that Basrur seeks to critique and explain. Briefly summarized, Basrur seeks to explain the dependent variable of India's foreign policy drift—the delta between New Delhi's stated foreign policy aims and its actual choices. Drift is characterized as indecisiveness and treated as generally, though not exclusively, suboptimal behavior. It fits well within similar research on puzzling state behavior such as "underbalancing" or neutrality.1 Basrur distinguishes drift from paralysis, noting that there is movement, but it is "erratic, slow, and uncertain" (p. 8). He contends there are two sources of drift. Involuntary drift is when domestic politics, specifically weak coalitions, hamstring leaders' autonomy to make bold, decisive moves for fear of small pockets of opposition pulling out of coalitions, which would result in government collapse. Voluntary drift, however, is perhaps Basrur's more novel contribution. Basrur contends voluntary drift occurs when a leader possesses sufficient control over policy but simply fails to execute it by avoiding costly choices or difficult tradeoffs and effectively deflects [End Page 134] responsibility and accountability. Other strands of international relations scholarship might characterize this as poor leadership, whether the failing is a deficiency in charisma, confidence, acumen, or moral fiber.2 The book sets out to test his theory on four major but diverse episodes of Indian foreign policy: counterinsurgency, nuclear deterrence, internal security reforms, and geopolitical realignment. The episodes include India's nuclear deal with the United States (2005–2008), material support for the Sri Lanka's fight against the Tamil Tigers (2000–2009), nuclear doctrinal developments (1998–present), and contentions with cross-border terrorism (notably the 2008 Mumbai crisis). Even seasoned India foreign policy scholars well versed in these episodes can discover new details in Basrur's thoroughly researched empirical chapters, buttre
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Pub Date : 2023-10-01DOI: 10.1353/asp.2023.a911626
Gambling on India's Foreign Policy:The Importance of Implementation Kate Sullivan de Estrada (bio) As Indian prime minister Narendra Modi ricocheted around the globe in mid-2023—welcomed in Japan and Australia in May, embraced in a four-day state visit to the United States in June, and celebrated as the guest of honor at France's Bastille Day parade in July—newspapers and policy journals brimmed with India analysis. Confronted by the hype around Modi as a metonym for India's growing power and influence, rising uneasiness about the future of Indian democracy under his watch, and New Delhi's equivocal position on Russia's invasion of Ukraine, much of the commentary framed intensified relations with India through the metaphor of a "gamble." Ashley Tellis began with an analysis of "America's bad bet on India" in Foreign Affairs in early May, arguing that the deepening defense relationship between Washington and New Delhi was unlikely to lead to India partnering with the United States in a military coalition against China.1 Later that month, Christophe Jaffrelot argued in Le Monde that "betting on India is a short-sighted strategy for France," highlighting concerning domestic political trends and describing Indian democracy as "literally put on hold" between elections that are no longer fair.2 By July, Financial Times commentator Martin Wolf had concluded both that "Western leaders are making a sensible bet on India" because of its economic growth prospects and that "Modi's India is moving in an illiberal direction."3 Other analysts [End Page 120] questioned whether India's rise was "inevitable" and if it would be best to deal with India "as it is, not as we might like it to be."4 Anyone interested in these questions would benefit from reading Rajesh Basrur's careful and rigorous book Subcontinental Drift: Domestic Politics and India's Foreign Policy. Rather than assessing India's policy achievements and failures through the lens of the United States' imperative to counterbalance China in its systemic challenge or India's democratic potential to support the values-based construction of the Indo-Pacific as "free and open," Subcontinental Drift's start and end point is New Delhi. Basrur's interest is "the central concerns of Indian national security strategy" (p. 28) and, more specifically, the ability of the Indian state "to ensure the security of its people" (p. 24). Importantly—and this is where the book's emphasis on "drift" comes in—his focus is less on the formation of domestic policy preferences and more on whether policymakers are able or willing to make good on those preferences once they have been formed (p. 23). The study's overall conclusion is sobering: "India's potential for achieving major power status stands on a relatively weak foundation, owing to its inability to follow through on those policies that are crucial to its security" (p. 193). Subcontinental Drift's point of departure is the observation that "Indian foreign policy has ofte
{"title":"Gambling on India's Foreign Policy: The Importance of Implementation","authors":"","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.a911626","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.a911626","url":null,"abstract":"Gambling on India's Foreign Policy:The Importance of Implementation Kate Sullivan de Estrada (bio) As Indian prime minister Narendra Modi ricocheted around the globe in mid-2023—welcomed in Japan and Australia in May, embraced in a four-day state visit to the United States in June, and celebrated as the guest of honor at France's Bastille Day parade in July—newspapers and policy journals brimmed with India analysis. Confronted by the hype around Modi as a metonym for India's growing power and influence, rising uneasiness about the future of Indian democracy under his watch, and New Delhi's equivocal position on Russia's invasion of Ukraine, much of the commentary framed intensified relations with India through the metaphor of a \"gamble.\" Ashley Tellis began with an analysis of \"America's bad bet on India\" in Foreign Affairs in early May, arguing that the deepening defense relationship between Washington and New Delhi was unlikely to lead to India partnering with the United States in a military coalition against China.1 Later that month, Christophe Jaffrelot argued in Le Monde that \"betting on India is a short-sighted strategy for France,\" highlighting concerning domestic political trends and describing Indian democracy as \"literally put on hold\" between elections that are no longer fair.2 By July, Financial Times commentator Martin Wolf had concluded both that \"Western leaders are making a sensible bet on India\" because of its economic growth prospects and that \"Modi's India is moving in an illiberal direction.\"3 Other analysts [End Page 120] questioned whether India's rise was \"inevitable\" and if it would be best to deal with India \"as it is, not as we might like it to be.\"4 Anyone interested in these questions would benefit from reading Rajesh Basrur's careful and rigorous book Subcontinental Drift: Domestic Politics and India's Foreign Policy. Rather than assessing India's policy achievements and failures through the lens of the United States' imperative to counterbalance China in its systemic challenge or India's democratic potential to support the values-based construction of the Indo-Pacific as \"free and open,\" Subcontinental Drift's start and end point is New Delhi. Basrur's interest is \"the central concerns of Indian national security strategy\" (p. 28) and, more specifically, the ability of the Indian state \"to ensure the security of its people\" (p. 24). Importantly—and this is where the book's emphasis on \"drift\" comes in—his focus is less on the formation of domestic policy preferences and more on whether policymakers are able or willing to make good on those preferences once they have been formed (p. 23). The study's overall conclusion is sobering: \"India's potential for achieving major power status stands on a relatively weak foundation, owing to its inability to follow through on those policies that are crucial to its security\" (p. 193). Subcontinental Drift's point of departure is the observation that \"Indian foreign policy has ofte","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"91 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136205891","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-01DOI: 10.1353/asp.2023.a911625
Explaining Policy Drift—An Analytical Template Drawn from the World's Most Populous Democracy Jivanta Schottli (bio) Subcontinental Drift: Domestic Politics and India's Foreign Policy was written in response to what Rajesh Basrur describes as three tensions: "a desire to investigate the contradiction between India's quest for power and status and the limitations of its policies and policymakers"; "the gulf between studies on India's external relationships and cutting-edge theory"; and "the materialist/normative divide in academia" (p. xi–xii). Basrur, drawing on an illustrious and unique career that has bridged area studies and international relations theory, is eminently well placed to address all three. He delivers empirically rich chapters, an elegant theoretical argumentation, and a clear message. Situating the Gap between Objectives and Outcomes The book frames its central question as "why policymakers, consciously responding to systemic incentives, often find their policy initiatives caught up in prolonged and meandering pathways in trying to attain their objectives" (p. 2). The gap between objectives or intent and subsequent diversionary processes is what Basrur refers to as the phenomenon of "policy drift." In framing its question thusly, the book addresses two long-running debates. Scholars have engaged in ongoing discussions about the particularities of India's emergence as a power, puzzling over the slow or gradualist path the country has taken, the purposefulness and intent behind policy choices, and the strategic thinking of the country's policymakers. At the same time, the book's central question confronts a deep ontological challenge of how to overcome the external-internal distinction that is so often drawn within and between the disciplines of international relations and politics and in the categories of agency and structure. Drawing on neoclassical realism, Basrur analyzes instances where Indian foreign policy outcomes have deviated from realist expectations—not those of theorists, he is careful to point out, but of policymakers. In other words, he demonstrates how policymakers have responded clearly to systemic [End Page 125] incentives, broadly defined as the power differentials between states. This is the case for India, for instance, when opting to improve relations with the United States as a result of the recalibrations caused by the end of the Cold War, in the effort to rebuild relations with Sri Lanka following India's "intervention" in the country's civil war, in the long-postponed decision to go overtly nuclear in 1998, and in efforts to manage cross-border threats from neighboring Pakistan. Explaining why these policy shifts took place when they did, and the ways in which implementation was subsequently hampered by domestic politics, is a major part of the book's analysis. However, Basrur seeks to do much more than describe or explain what happened in the past. The additional objective of integrating a moral dimension
{"title":"Explaining Policy Drift—An Analytical Template Drawn from the World's Most Populous Democracy","authors":"","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.a911625","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.a911625","url":null,"abstract":"Explaining Policy Drift—An Analytical Template Drawn from the World's Most Populous Democracy Jivanta Schottli (bio) Subcontinental Drift: Domestic Politics and India's Foreign Policy was written in response to what Rajesh Basrur describes as three tensions: \"a desire to investigate the contradiction between India's quest for power and status and the limitations of its policies and policymakers\"; \"the gulf between studies on India's external relationships and cutting-edge theory\"; and \"the materialist/normative divide in academia\" (p. xi–xii). Basrur, drawing on an illustrious and unique career that has bridged area studies and international relations theory, is eminently well placed to address all three. He delivers empirically rich chapters, an elegant theoretical argumentation, and a clear message. Situating the Gap between Objectives and Outcomes The book frames its central question as \"why policymakers, consciously responding to systemic incentives, often find their policy initiatives caught up in prolonged and meandering pathways in trying to attain their objectives\" (p. 2). The gap between objectives or intent and subsequent diversionary processes is what Basrur refers to as the phenomenon of \"policy drift.\" In framing its question thusly, the book addresses two long-running debates. Scholars have engaged in ongoing discussions about the particularities of India's emergence as a power, puzzling over the slow or gradualist path the country has taken, the purposefulness and intent behind policy choices, and the strategic thinking of the country's policymakers. At the same time, the book's central question confronts a deep ontological challenge of how to overcome the external-internal distinction that is so often drawn within and between the disciplines of international relations and politics and in the categories of agency and structure. Drawing on neoclassical realism, Basrur analyzes instances where Indian foreign policy outcomes have deviated from realist expectations—not those of theorists, he is careful to point out, but of policymakers. In other words, he demonstrates how policymakers have responded clearly to systemic [End Page 125] incentives, broadly defined as the power differentials between states. This is the case for India, for instance, when opting to improve relations with the United States as a result of the recalibrations caused by the end of the Cold War, in the effort to rebuild relations with Sri Lanka following India's \"intervention\" in the country's civil war, in the long-postponed decision to go overtly nuclear in 1998, and in efforts to manage cross-border threats from neighboring Pakistan. Explaining why these policy shifts took place when they did, and the ways in which implementation was subsequently hampered by domestic politics, is a major part of the book's analysis. However, Basrur seeks to do much more than describe or explain what happened in the past. The additional objective of integrating a moral dimension","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136205900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1353/asp.2023.a903860
J. Nishino
Japan’s vision for a “free and open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) originated from Tokyo’s desire to promote a rules-based order, economic prosperity, and peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. In articulating and promoting Japan’s vision for the FOIP, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe played a significant role. In August 2007, Abe delivered a speech at the Indian Parliament in which he emphasized the importance of enhancing maritime security and cooperation between the Indian and Pacific Oceans through strategic cooperation among like-minded countries.1 This speech, titled “Confluence of the Two Seas,” is often seen as a precursor to Japan’s vision for the Indo-Pacific, highlighting the commitment to promoting regional stability, economic prosperity, and universal values such as freedom, democracy, and human rights in the broader two-ocean region. Another significant milestone in the development of Japan’s FOIP vision was a speech Abe gave in Kenya in August 2016. During the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development, Abe stressed that Japan “bore the responsibility of fostering the confluence of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and of Asia and Africa into a place that values freedom, the rule of law, and the market economy, free from force or coercion, and making it prosperous.”2 These speeches by Abe laid the groundwork for Japan’s FOIP vision by articulating the key principles and objectives that would guide Japan’s approach to the Indo-Pacific. Japan presented three pillars to realize a free and open Indo-Pacific:
{"title":"Japan's New Plan for a \"Free and Open Indo-Pacific\" and Its Challenges","authors":"J. Nishino","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.a903860","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.a903860","url":null,"abstract":"Japan’s vision for a “free and open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) originated from Tokyo’s desire to promote a rules-based order, economic prosperity, and peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. In articulating and promoting Japan’s vision for the FOIP, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe played a significant role. In August 2007, Abe delivered a speech at the Indian Parliament in which he emphasized the importance of enhancing maritime security and cooperation between the Indian and Pacific Oceans through strategic cooperation among like-minded countries.1 This speech, titled “Confluence of the Two Seas,” is often seen as a precursor to Japan’s vision for the Indo-Pacific, highlighting the commitment to promoting regional stability, economic prosperity, and universal values such as freedom, democracy, and human rights in the broader two-ocean region. Another significant milestone in the development of Japan’s FOIP vision was a speech Abe gave in Kenya in August 2016. During the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development, Abe stressed that Japan “bore the responsibility of fostering the confluence of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and of Asia and Africa into a place that values freedom, the rule of law, and the market economy, free from force or coercion, and making it prosperous.”2 These speeches by Abe laid the groundwork for Japan’s FOIP vision by articulating the key principles and objectives that would guide Japan’s approach to the Indo-Pacific. Japan presented three pillars to realize a free and open Indo-Pacific:","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"17 - 25"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43984975","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1353/asp.2023.a903868
Seong-hyon Lee
executive summary:This article provides insights on how U.S. semiconductor policy is reported, discussed, and perceived in the South Korean public sphere and proposes potential actions for Washington and Seoul as allies.main argumentAlthough not widely known in Washington, the U.S. faces accusations of pursuing "economic nationalism" at the expense of its allies. There are growing perceptions in South Korea that the U.S. is prioritizing its own self-interests while concurrently emphasizing unity among its allies against China. This view has led to grievances about U.S. strategy, particularly in relation to the semiconductor sector and supply chains—sensitive topics in Northeast Asia's trade-focused economies. While the U.S. has advocated for an alliancecentered reorganization of semiconductor supply chains, concerns persist that it is ultimately pursuing semiconductor hegemony. Increasing public discontent in South Korea regarding U.S. semiconductor and technology policies serves as an illustrative example and could develop into a contentious issue for the broader alliance between the two countries unless handled with care and attention to South Korea's concerns. While Washington may disregard South Korean public sentiment as inconsequential, in South Korea's vibrant and vocal democracy, public opinion can quickly shift to the extremes and significantly influence Seoul's policy choices. To maintain a strong alliance with South Korea and effectively advance its policy regarding China, the U.S. must closely monitor South Korean public opinion and confront these concerns.policy implications • Economic sacrifices made by allies will not benefit U.S. national interests and may lead to disenchantment and resentment on the part of these partners. It is imperative that the U.S. engage in dialogue with its allies to enhance economic collaboration and explore new market opportunities.• The public uproar observed so far in South Korea's young democracy has the potential to suddenly turn volatile. Consequently, preventive public diplomacy by Washington can play a crucial role in managing the semiconductor issue.• A technology alliance commits countries to jointly secure their national interests; thus, mutual trust and a shared vision for the future are essential.
{"title":"U.S. Semiconductor Policy and South Korea: A Delicate Balancing Act between National Priorities and International Collaboration","authors":"Seong-hyon Lee","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.a903868","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.a903868","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This article provides insights on how U.S. semiconductor policy is reported, discussed, and perceived in the South Korean public sphere and proposes potential actions for Washington and Seoul as allies.main argumentAlthough not widely known in Washington, the U.S. faces accusations of pursuing \"economic nationalism\" at the expense of its allies. There are growing perceptions in South Korea that the U.S. is prioritizing its own self-interests while concurrently emphasizing unity among its allies against China. This view has led to grievances about U.S. strategy, particularly in relation to the semiconductor sector and supply chains—sensitive topics in Northeast Asia's trade-focused economies. While the U.S. has advocated for an alliancecentered reorganization of semiconductor supply chains, concerns persist that it is ultimately pursuing semiconductor hegemony. Increasing public discontent in South Korea regarding U.S. semiconductor and technology policies serves as an illustrative example and could develop into a contentious issue for the broader alliance between the two countries unless handled with care and attention to South Korea's concerns. While Washington may disregard South Korean public sentiment as inconsequential, in South Korea's vibrant and vocal democracy, public opinion can quickly shift to the extremes and significantly influence Seoul's policy choices. To maintain a strong alliance with South Korea and effectively advance its policy regarding China, the U.S. must closely monitor South Korean public opinion and confront these concerns.policy implications • Economic sacrifices made by allies will not benefit U.S. national interests and may lead to disenchantment and resentment on the part of these partners. It is imperative that the U.S. engage in dialogue with its allies to enhance economic collaboration and explore new market opportunities.• The public uproar observed so far in South Korea's young democracy has the potential to suddenly turn volatile. Consequently, preventive public diplomacy by Washington can play a crucial role in managing the semiconductor issue.• A technology alliance commits countries to jointly secure their national interests; thus, mutual trust and a shared vision for the future are essential.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"101 - 127"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44872916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1353/asp.2023.a903869
Michael F. Martin
executive summary:This article examines how, in retrospect, the military coup in Myanmar in February 2021 was a foreseeable consequence of domestic political dynamics in the country and the misperceptions of the international community about the hybrid civilian-military government.main argumentOn February 1, 2021, the military in Myanmar deposed the civilian side of the hybrid civilian-military government to reassert direct military rule. The coup ignited a nationwide resistance against the new military junta, the State Administrative Council, involving many of the nation's decades-old ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), newly created People's Defense Forces (PDFs), and an opposition National Unity Government. Looking back, Myanmar's military saw the 2008 constitution and its hybrid government as the end point for political reform, not as the beginning of a transition. The military's actions during this decade reflect this. Attempts by Aung San Suu Kyi, the National League for Democracy, and the international community to foster further political changes may have been contributing factors to the military's decision to stage a coup. Myanmar is now embroiled in a multifront civil war involving most of the country's largest ethnic communities, including the Bamar majority, with no end in sight.policy implications • Peaceful resolution of the conflict in Myanmar is not likely at this time. The U.S. and other nations should consider providing limited and targeted military assistance to the EAOs and PDFs.• The Biden administration should expedite implementation of the authorities provided in the BURMA Act, including the provision of nonlethal assistance to the EAOs and PDFs. The U.S. State Department should rekindle its ties to the EAOs to facilitate nonlethal assistance and efforts to form local governments in areas "liberated" by the EAOs and PDFs.• The U.S. Agency for International Development should shift the delivery of humanitarian assistance to local organizations operating in India and Thailand to more effectively provide aid to refugees and internally displaced persons from the civil war.• The U.S. and other nations should provide financial assistance for efforts to document possible war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed by the junta's military forces and coordinate this effort with the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, the International Criminal Court, and the International Court of Justice.
{"title":"Misunderstanding Myanmar","authors":"Michael F. Martin","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.a903869","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.a903869","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This article examines how, in retrospect, the military coup in Myanmar in February 2021 was a foreseeable consequence of domestic political dynamics in the country and the misperceptions of the international community about the hybrid civilian-military government.main argumentOn February 1, 2021, the military in Myanmar deposed the civilian side of the hybrid civilian-military government to reassert direct military rule. The coup ignited a nationwide resistance against the new military junta, the State Administrative Council, involving many of the nation's decades-old ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), newly created People's Defense Forces (PDFs), and an opposition National Unity Government. Looking back, Myanmar's military saw the 2008 constitution and its hybrid government as the end point for political reform, not as the beginning of a transition. The military's actions during this decade reflect this. Attempts by Aung San Suu Kyi, the National League for Democracy, and the international community to foster further political changes may have been contributing factors to the military's decision to stage a coup. Myanmar is now embroiled in a multifront civil war involving most of the country's largest ethnic communities, including the Bamar majority, with no end in sight.policy implications • Peaceful resolution of the conflict in Myanmar is not likely at this time. The U.S. and other nations should consider providing limited and targeted military assistance to the EAOs and PDFs.• The Biden administration should expedite implementation of the authorities provided in the BURMA Act, including the provision of nonlethal assistance to the EAOs and PDFs. The U.S. State Department should rekindle its ties to the EAOs to facilitate nonlethal assistance and efforts to form local governments in areas \"liberated\" by the EAOs and PDFs.• The U.S. Agency for International Development should shift the delivery of humanitarian assistance to local organizations operating in India and Thailand to more effectively provide aid to refugees and internally displaced persons from the civil war.• The U.S. and other nations should provide financial assistance for efforts to document possible war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed by the junta's military forces and coordinate this effort with the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, the International Criminal Court, and the International Court of Justice.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"129 - 159"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47613827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1353/asp.2023.a903862
N. Bisley
A ustralia was one of the earliest adopters of the Indo-Pacific construct. First emerging in official documents in 2012, the construct by 2017 had become the central geographic concept organizing the country’s international engagement. During this time, Canberra’s mood toward the region shifted decisively. In the early 2010s, Australia remained optimistic about the region’s prospects, even as great-power rivalry resurfaced. Canberra thought that while the geopolitical landscape was going to become more difficult to navigate, stability and prosperity were likely to prevail. Ten years later, the country’s elites are much more pessimistic. Although Australia does not have a formal Indo-Pacific strategy, its approach to the region has moved away from hedging its bets concerning regional risks. In response to the growing power and increasingly assertive behavior of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as well as the rising influence of a set of policy thinkers who are very skeptical of the PRC, Australia hardened its rhetorical posture toward that country and has started to reorient its policy around hard balancing. Notwithstanding the policy consensus around this move—it has strong bipartisan support in the Australian Parliament, and the bureaucracy is of one mind in this regard—there remain significant challenges to its implementation. This essay will examine Australia’s strategic policy in the Indo-Pacific, analyze the dynamics surrounding this policy, and identify the tensions and challenges that Canberra faces in seeking to put a sharper edge on its approach to a region that is both its economic hope and the source of its greatest fears.
{"title":"Australia's Indo-Pacific Strategy: From Optimism to Hard Balancing","authors":"N. Bisley","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.a903862","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.a903862","url":null,"abstract":"A ustralia was one of the earliest adopters of the Indo-Pacific construct. First emerging in official documents in 2012, the construct by 2017 had become the central geographic concept organizing the country’s international engagement. During this time, Canberra’s mood toward the region shifted decisively. In the early 2010s, Australia remained optimistic about the region’s prospects, even as great-power rivalry resurfaced. Canberra thought that while the geopolitical landscape was going to become more difficult to navigate, stability and prosperity were likely to prevail. Ten years later, the country’s elites are much more pessimistic. Although Australia does not have a formal Indo-Pacific strategy, its approach to the region has moved away from hedging its bets concerning regional risks. In response to the growing power and increasingly assertive behavior of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as well as the rising influence of a set of policy thinkers who are very skeptical of the PRC, Australia hardened its rhetorical posture toward that country and has started to reorient its policy around hard balancing. Notwithstanding the policy consensus around this move—it has strong bipartisan support in the Australian Parliament, and the bureaucracy is of one mind in this regard—there remain significant challenges to its implementation. This essay will examine Australia’s strategic policy in the Indo-Pacific, analyze the dynamics surrounding this policy, and identify the tensions and challenges that Canberra faces in seeking to put a sharper edge on its approach to a region that is both its economic hope and the source of its greatest fears.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"35 - 45"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47639743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1353/asp.2023.a903864
Henryk Szadziewski, A. Powles
I n March 2023, Dame Meg Taylor, lawyer, diplomat, and former secretary general of the Pacific Islands Forum, told Radio New Zealand that Pacific leaders “should have paid much more attention to the Indo-Pacific strategy as it emerged.”1 Taylor’s comment highlighted not only the abundance of external strategies and policy frameworks targeting the Pacific Islands but also the increasing alignment of economic cooperation with security partnerships. Taylor was particularly concerned that island leaders were being sidelined while major geopolitical decisions were being made that affected the Pacific. This tension was highlighted in the Pacific Islands Forum’s latest security outlook report, which noted that “while geopolitical competition could draw much-needed attention and resources to the Pacific, it could also distract the region and its partners from efforts to address its existing security priorities—addressing climate security, supporting human security, and disrupting criminal activity.”2 These priorities are most cogently laid out in the 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional Security, which identified five key challenges in the Pacific: climate change, human security, environmental and resource security, transnational crime,
{"title":"The Question from the Pacific Islands: Will the United States Be a Credible and Consistent Indo-Pacific Partner?","authors":"Henryk Szadziewski, A. Powles","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.a903864","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.a903864","url":null,"abstract":"I n March 2023, Dame Meg Taylor, lawyer, diplomat, and former secretary general of the Pacific Islands Forum, told Radio New Zealand that Pacific leaders “should have paid much more attention to the Indo-Pacific strategy as it emerged.”1 Taylor’s comment highlighted not only the abundance of external strategies and policy frameworks targeting the Pacific Islands but also the increasing alignment of economic cooperation with security partnerships. Taylor was particularly concerned that island leaders were being sidelined while major geopolitical decisions were being made that affected the Pacific. This tension was highlighted in the Pacific Islands Forum’s latest security outlook report, which noted that “while geopolitical competition could draw much-needed attention and resources to the Pacific, it could also distract the region and its partners from efforts to address its existing security priorities—addressing climate security, supporting human security, and disrupting criminal activity.”2 These priorities are most cogently laid out in the 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional Security, which identified five key challenges in the Pacific: climate change, human security, environmental and resource security, transnational crime,","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"56 - 68"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45668250","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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