Pub Date : 2024-01-08DOI: 10.1017/s1369415423000547
Lucy Allais
{"title":"Barbara Herman (2022) The Moral Habitat. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 272. ISBN 9780192896353 (hbk) $41.99","authors":"Lucy Allais","doi":"10.1017/s1369415423000547","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415423000547","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":"6 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139445172","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-08DOI: 10.1017/s1369415423000523
Robert B. Louden
{"title":"Gualtiero Lorini (2023) Die anthropologische Normativität bei Kant. Würzburg: Könighausen & Neumann. pp. 151. ISBN 9783826072932 (pbk) 28.00€","authors":"Robert B. Louden","doi":"10.1017/s1369415423000523","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415423000523","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":"50 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139448014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-08DOI: 10.1017/s1369415423000511
Claudio La Rocca
The article addresses some aspects of Gava’s book, highlighting two main points: (1) the notion of philosophy in a cosmic sense; (2) its connection with the meaning of the concept of method. Regarding (1) I show how Gava’s interpretation of the systematic concept of philosophy does not account adequately for the scholastic concept. This has consequences for the notion of philosophy in a cosmic sense itself; its nature as an objective archetype and its personification in the ideal of a master of wisdom are not properly emphasized. These features are closely related to Kant’s claim that philosophy cannot be learned, which is connected with Kant’s peculiar idea of method. Regarding (2), I argue that ‘method’ for Kant does not concern only the construction of scientific systems, but also the establishment of a way of thinking, a stance embracing thought and action. The meaning of the postulates and the notion of ‘faith’ thus acquire a ‘weaker’ connotation, as an attitude, habitus, aimed at the establishment and promotion of a ‘life-structuring’ rationality, and not as an alternative route to a theoretical ‘commitment’.
{"title":"The Method of Metaphysics and the Architectonic: Remarks on Gava’s Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and the Method of Metaphysics","authors":"Claudio La Rocca","doi":"10.1017/s1369415423000511","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415423000511","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The article addresses some aspects of Gava’s book, highlighting two main points: (1) the notion of philosophy in a cosmic sense; (2) its connection with the meaning of the concept of method. Regarding (1) I show how Gava’s interpretation of the systematic concept of philosophy does not account adequately for the scholastic concept. This has consequences for the notion of philosophy in a cosmic sense itself; its nature as an objective archetype and its personification in the ideal of a master of wisdom are not properly emphasized. These features are closely related to Kant’s claim that philosophy cannot be learned, which is connected with Kant’s peculiar idea of method. Regarding (2), I argue that ‘method’ for Kant does not concern only the construction of scientific systems, but also the establishment of a way of thinking, a stance embracing thought and action. The meaning of the postulates and the notion of ‘faith’ thus acquire a ‘weaker’ connotation, as an attitude, <span>habitus</span>, aimed at the establishment and promotion of a ‘life-structuring’ rationality, and not as an alternative route to a theoretical ‘commitment’.</p>","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":"102 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139396776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-08DOI: 10.1017/s1369415423000559
Toshiro Osawa
{"title":"Luigi Caranti (2022) The Kantian Federation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 66. ISBN 9781009016971 (pbk) $22.00","authors":"Toshiro Osawa","doi":"10.1017/s1369415423000559","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415423000559","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":"51 18","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139447126","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-15DOI: 10.1017/s136941542300047x
Kristi Sweet
In this article, I offer a novel and in-depth account of how, for Kant, free speech is the mechanism that moves a society closer to justice. I argue that the criticism of the legislator preserved by free speech must also be the result of collective agreement. I further argue that structural features of judgements of taste and the sensus communis give guidance for how we should communicate publicly to succeed at the aims Kant has laid out, as judgements of taste, like politics, belong fundamentally to a transitional sphere between nature and freedom.
{"title":"Kant on Free Speech: Criticism, Enlightenment, and the Exercise of Judgement in the Public Sphere","authors":"Kristi Sweet","doi":"10.1017/s136941542300047x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s136941542300047x","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, I offer a novel and in-depth account of how, for Kant, free speech is the mechanism that moves a society closer to justice. I argue that the criticism of the legislator preserved by free speech must also be the result of collective agreement. I further argue that structural features of judgements of taste and the <jats:italic>sensus communis</jats:italic> give guidance for how we should communicate publicly to succeed at the aims Kant has laid out, as judgements of taste, like politics, belong fundamentally to a transitional sphere between nature and freedom.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138683696","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-13DOI: 10.1017/s1369415423000432
Zhengmi Zhouhuang
Different from the autonomy of understanding in cognition and the autonomy of practical reason in praxis, the heautonomy in the judgement of taste is reflexive. The reflexivity consists not only in the fact that the power of judgement legislates to its own usage but also, and more importantly, it legislates to itself through its own operative process. This normativity, based on the self-referential structure of pure aesthetic judgement and the a priori principle of subjective, internal purposiveness, can be regarded as a self-discovering and self-flourishing principle that organically grows out of the aesthetic experience and, at the same time, regulates its growth in return. In this scenario, aesthetic freedom can be identified as a third kind of freedom different from Kant’s transcendental freedom and practical freedom – a flexible and living freedom with spontaneous legislation, but not bound by any determinate laws.
{"title":"Living Freedom: The Heautonomy of the Judgement of Taste","authors":"Zhengmi Zhouhuang","doi":"10.1017/s1369415423000432","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415423000432","url":null,"abstract":"Different from the autonomy of understanding in cognition and the autonomy of practical reason in praxis, the heautonomy in the judgement of taste is reflexive. The reflexivity consists not only in the fact that the power of judgement legislates to its own usage but also, and more importantly, it legislates to itself through its own operative process. This normativity, based on the self-referential structure of pure aesthetic judgement and the a priori principle of subjective, internal purposiveness, can be regarded as a self-discovering and self-flourishing principle that organically grows out of the aesthetic experience and, at the same time, regulates its growth in return. In this scenario, aesthetic freedom can be identified as a third kind of freedom different from Kant’s transcendental freedom and practical freedom – a flexible and living freedom with spontaneous legislation, but not bound by any determinate laws.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138628539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-13DOI: 10.1017/s1369415423000468
Jon Mandle
Although maxims are central to Kant’s ethical theory, his account of them remains obscure. We can make progress towards understanding Kantian maxims by examining not only their role as the object of moral judgement but also their connection to freedom of the will and causality. This requires understanding maxims as causal laws that explain the actions that we impute to agents. In this way, they are analogous to causal laws of nature, but they are limited in scope to the agents who are responsible for them. Understanding maxims in this way explains our limited epistemic access to them and helps to clarify Kant’s account of virtue and character as well as how they mediate the relationship between practical and theoretical reason.
{"title":"Maxims: Responsibility and Causal Laws","authors":"Jon Mandle","doi":"10.1017/s1369415423000468","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415423000468","url":null,"abstract":"Although maxims are central to Kant’s ethical theory, his account of them remains obscure. We can make progress towards understanding Kantian maxims by examining not only their role as the object of moral judgement but also their connection to freedom of the will and causality. This requires understanding maxims as causal laws that explain the actions that we impute to agents. In this way, they are analogous to causal laws of nature, but they are limited in scope to the agents who are responsible for them. Understanding maxims in this way explains our limited epistemic access to them and helps to clarify Kant’s account of virtue and character as well as how they mediate the relationship between practical and theoretical reason.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":"196 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138628232","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-11DOI: 10.1017/s1369415423000420
Laurenz Ramsauer
On the currently dominant reading of the Groundwork, Kant’s derivation of ‘imperatives of duty’ exemplifies a decision procedure for the derivation of concrete duties in moral deliberation. However, Kant’s response to an often-misidentified criticism of the Groundwork by G. A. Tittel suggests that Kant was remarkably unconcerned with arguing for the practicality of the categorical imperative as a decision procedure. Instead, I argue that the main aim of Kant’s derivation of imperatives of duty was to show how his analysis of the form of moral judgement is indeed presupposed in the four types of moral imperative that philosophers of his time recognized.
根据目前对《基础》的主流解读，康德对 "义务要求 "的推导体现了在道德思考中推导具体义务的决策程序。然而，康德对 G. A. Tittel 经常被误认为是对《基础》的批评所做的回应表明，康德对论证绝对命令作为一种决策程序的实用性显然并不关心。相反，我認為康德引申出義務命令的主要目的，是要說明他對道德判斷形式的分析，如何確實預設了他那個時代的哲學家所認同的四種道德命令。
{"title":"Kant’s Derivation of Imperatives of Duty","authors":"Laurenz Ramsauer","doi":"10.1017/s1369415423000420","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415423000420","url":null,"abstract":"<p>On the currently dominant reading of the <span>Groundwork,</span> Kant’s derivation of ‘imperatives of duty’ exemplifies a decision procedure for the derivation of concrete duties in moral deliberation. However, Kant’s response to an often-misidentified criticism of the <span>Groundwork</span> by G. A. Tittel suggests that Kant was remarkably unconcerned with arguing for the practicality of the categorical imperative as a decision procedure. Instead, I argue that the main aim of Kant’s derivation of imperatives of duty was to show how his analysis of the form of moral judgement is indeed presupposed in the four types of moral imperative that philosophers of his time recognized.</p>","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138567391","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-30DOI: 10.1017/s1369415423000444
Wolfgang Ertl
While Kant’s position concerning human freedom and divine foreknowledge is perhaps the least Molinist element of his multifaceted take on free will, Kant’s Molinism (minimally defined) is undeniable when it comes to the threat ensuing from the idea of creation. In line with incompatibilism and with careful qualifications in place, he ultimately suggests regarding free agents as uncreated. Given the limitations of our rational insight, this assumption is indispensable for granting that finite free agents can acquire their intelligible characters by themselves. Nonetheless, Kant concedes that creation may, as a matter of fact, be compatible with what for Molina is the pre-volitionality of the counterfactuals of freedom.
{"title":"Free Will, Foreknowledge, and Creation: Further Explorations of Kant’s Molinism","authors":"Wolfgang Ertl","doi":"10.1017/s1369415423000444","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415423000444","url":null,"abstract":"While Kant’s position concerning human freedom and divine foreknowledge is perhaps the least Molinist element of his multifaceted take on free will, Kant’s Molinism (minimally defined) is undeniable when it comes to the threat ensuing from the idea of creation. In line with incompatibilism and with careful qualifications in place, he ultimately suggests regarding free agents as uncreated. Given the limitations of our rational insight, this assumption is indispensable for granting that finite free agents can acquire their intelligible characters by themselves. Nonetheless, Kant concedes that creation may, as a matter of fact, be compatible with what for Molina is the pre-volitionality of the counterfactuals of freedom.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":"65 13","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138506781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-21DOI: 10.1017/s1369415423000365
Emily Fitton
A key theme throughout Maimon’s works is a circularity he diagnoses at the heart of Kant’s response to Hume. The objective validity of Kant’s category of causality ultimately rests, Maimon argues, upon the logical status of the hypothetical judgement – on its inclusion among the forms of pure general logic. In turn, however, the inclusion of the hypothetical within pure general logic itself rests upon the objective validity of causal judgements. This article examines Maimon’s diagnosis and traces it back to a debate that has its origins in Wolff’s German Logic, concerning the relationship between categorical and hypothetical judgements.
{"title":"Kantian Circularity: Maimon on Causal Scepticism and the Status of the Hypothetical Judgement","authors":"Emily Fitton","doi":"10.1017/s1369415423000365","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415423000365","url":null,"abstract":"A key theme throughout Maimon’s works is a circularity he diagnoses at the heart of Kant’s response to Hume. The objective validity of Kant’s category of causality ultimately rests, Maimon argues, upon the logical status of the hypothetical judgement – on its inclusion among the forms of pure general logic. In turn, however, the inclusion of the hypothetical within pure general logic itself rests upon the objective validity of causal judgements. This article examines Maimon’s diagnosis and traces it back to a debate that has its origins in Wolff’s <jats:italic>German Logic</jats:italic>, concerning the relationship between categorical and hypothetical judgements.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":"65 9","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138506782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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