Pub Date : 2024-04-04DOI: 10.1017/s1369415424000128
Patricia Kitcher
My comments focus on Proops’s treatment of the Paralogisms. I agree with many aspects of his discussion, including his views about the project of Rational Psychology and his analyses of how, exactly, the arguments of the Paralogisms are defective in form, but I disagree with his interpretation of the First Paralogism. I argue that the source of confusion that Kant diagnoses is not the grammatical distribution of ‘I’ as singular, but the fact that the I-representation is both empty and necessary for cognition.
{"title":"Understanding the First Paralogism: A Friendly Disagreement","authors":"Patricia Kitcher","doi":"10.1017/s1369415424000128","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415424000128","url":null,"abstract":"My comments focus on Proops’s treatment of the Paralogisms. I agree with many aspects of his discussion, including his views about the project of Rational Psychology and his analyses of how, exactly, the arguments of the Paralogisms are defective in form, but I disagree with his interpretation of the First Paralogism. I argue that the source of confusion that Kant diagnoses is not the grammatical distribution of ‘I’ as singular, but the fact that the I-representation is both empty and necessary for cognition.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140572329","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-04DOI: 10.1017/s1369415424000153
Martin Sticker
I respond to a challenge raised by Jordan Pascoe: Kant’s conception of obtaining full citizenship through working oneself up necessarily condemns some people to passive citizenship. I argue that we should not focus on work to establish universal full citizenship. Rather, a Universal Basic Income, an income paid regularly to everyone and without conditions, can secure everyone’s full citizenship. Moreover, I argue that such a scheme is more Kantian in nature than hitherto assumed.
{"title":"Working Oneself Up and Universal Basic Income","authors":"Martin Sticker","doi":"10.1017/s1369415424000153","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415424000153","url":null,"abstract":"I respond to a challenge raised by Jordan Pascoe: Kant’s conception of obtaining full citizenship through working oneself up necessarily condemns some people to passive citizenship. I argue that we should not focus on work to establish universal full citizenship. Rather, a Universal Basic Income, an income paid regularly to everyone and without conditions, can secure everyone’s full citizenship. Moreover, I argue that such a scheme is more Kantian in nature than hitherto assumed.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140572237","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-04DOI: 10.1017/s1369415424000062
Robert Campbell
Philosophers traditionally interpret Kant as a retributivist, but modern interpreters, with reference to Kant’s theory of justice and problematic passages, instead propose penal theories that mix retributive and deterrent features. Although these mixed penal theories are substantively compelling and capture the Kantian spirit, their dual aspects lead to a justificatory conflict that generates an apparent dilemma. To resolve this dilemma and clear the ground for these mixed theories, I will outline and reinterpret Kant’s penal theory by situating it in his broader moral and political philosophy. This move grounds the followability requirement, which is necessary to resolve the dilemma.
{"title":"Followability, Necessity, and Excuse: Interpreting Kant’s Penal Theory","authors":"Robert Campbell","doi":"10.1017/s1369415424000062","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415424000062","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophers traditionally interpret Kant as a retributivist, but modern interpreters, with reference to Kant’s theory of justice and problematic passages, instead propose penal theories that mix retributive and deterrent features. Although these mixed penal theories are substantively compelling and capture the Kantian spirit, their dual aspects lead to a justificatory conflict that generates an apparent dilemma. To resolve this dilemma and clear the ground for these mixed theories, I will outline and reinterpret Kant’s penal theory by situating it in his broader moral and political philosophy. This move grounds the followability requirement, which is necessary to resolve the dilemma.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140572477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-04DOI: 10.1017/s1369415424000165
Jordan Pascoe
Elvira Basevich, Martin Sticker, and Helga Varden offered generative criticism of my monograph, Kant’s Theory of Labour. In this response, I explore how the resources they offer for thinking about gender, labour, and the state’s responsibility to ensure the material conditions of freedom can deepen both our attentiveness to patterns of systemic injustice in Kant’s political philosophy, and the resources Kant offers for addressing contemporary patterns of intersectional and material injustice.
{"title":"Response to Critics: Kant’s Theory of Labour","authors":"Jordan Pascoe","doi":"10.1017/s1369415424000165","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415424000165","url":null,"abstract":"Elvira Basevich, Martin Sticker, and Helga Varden offered generative criticism of my monograph, <jats:italic>Kant’s Theory of Labour</jats:italic>. In this response, I explore how the resources they offer for thinking about gender, labour, and the state’s responsibility to ensure the material conditions of freedom can deepen both our attentiveness to patterns of systemic injustice in Kant’s political philosophy, and the resources Kant offers for addressing contemporary patterns of intersectional and material injustice.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140572643","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-04DOI: 10.1017/s1369415424000207
Desmond P. Hogan
The Fiery Test of Critique describes Kant’s indirect proof of idealism from the Antinomy of Pure Reason as the ‘nugget of gold’ in the Critique of Pure Reason’s Transcendental Dialectic. Here, I offer critical reflections on Proops’s reading of Kant’s indirect proof.
{"title":"Proops’s ‘Nugget of Gold’ in Kant’s Dialectic","authors":"Desmond P. Hogan","doi":"10.1017/s1369415424000207","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415424000207","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:italic>The Fiery Test of Critique</jats:italic> describes Kant’s indirect proof of idealism from the Antinomy of Pure Reason as the ‘nugget of gold’ in the <jats:italic>Critique of Pure Reason</jats:italic>’s Transcendental Dialectic. Here, I offer critical reflections on Proops’s reading of Kant’s indirect proof.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140572285","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-04DOI: 10.1017/s1369415424000141
Allen Wood
Kant’s position on the problem of free will can be perplexing and frustrating: all the real questions about human agential capacities or even about issues of moral imputability are empirical questions, which have empirical answers. But there remains a metaphysical or transcendental problem about the possibility of freedom, which is forever insoluble. Ian Proops’ discussion in The Fiery Test of Critique is to be commended for displaying the rare virtue of appreciating this last point and presenting Kant’s position about it accurately. The only questionable part has to do with the standard terminology – ‘determinism’, ‘libertarianism’, ‘compatibilism’, and ‘incompatibilism’. I argue that it would be better to say, as Kant does, and Proops also does most of the time, that practical freedom, hence transcendental freedom, must be presupposed whenever we act or even judge, but how freedom is possible is both unknowable and even incomprehensible to us.
{"title":"Ian Proops: Kant on Transcendental Freedom (The Fiery Test of Critique: Chs. 11–12)","authors":"Allen Wood","doi":"10.1017/s1369415424000141","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415424000141","url":null,"abstract":"Kant’s position on the problem of free will can be perplexing and frustrating: all the real questions about human agential capacities or even about issues of moral imputability are empirical questions, which have empirical answers. But there remains a metaphysical or transcendental problem about the possibility of freedom, which is forever insoluble. Ian Proops’ discussion in <jats:italic>The Fiery Test of Critique</jats:italic> is to be commended for displaying the rare virtue of appreciating this last point and presenting Kant’s position about it accurately. The only questionable part has to do with the standard terminology – ‘determinism’, ‘libertarianism’, ‘compatibilism’, and ‘incompatibilism’. I argue that it would be better to say, as Kant does, and Proops also does most of the time, that practical freedom, hence transcendental freedom, must be presupposed whenever we act or even judge, but how freedom is possible is both unknowable and even incomprehensible to us.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140572234","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-03DOI: 10.1017/s1369415424000104
G. Lorini
{"title":"Luigi Filieri, Sintesi e Giudizio. Studio su Kant e Jakob Sigismund Beck Pisa: Edizioni ETS, 2020 Pp. 342 ISBN 9788846758699 (pbk) €30.00","authors":"G. Lorini","doi":"10.1017/s1369415424000104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415424000104","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140750007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-01DOI: 10.1017/s1369415424000190
Tobias Rosefeldt
This article offers the first systematic investigation of the linguistic forms in which Kant expresses his transcendental idealism since Gerold Prauss’ seminal book Kant und das Problem der Dinge an sich. It is argued that Prauss’ own argument for the claim that ‘in itself’ is an adverbial expression that standardly modifies verbs of philosophical reflection is flawed and that there is hence very poor exegetical evidence for so-called ‘methodological two-aspect’ interpretations of Kant’s transcendental idealism. A comprehensive investigation of Kant’s adverbial uses of ‘in itself’ rather reveals that there are various groups of verbs that ‘in itself’ modifies, which can more or less all be reduced to a standard use in which ‘in itself’ modifies verbs of predicative being such as the copula. It is also discussed how these findings can be accommodated by the two main alternative kinds of interpretations, that is, two-object and ontological two-aspect interpretations.
自格罗尔德-普劳斯（Gerold Prauss）的开创性著作《Kant und das Problem der Dinge an sich》问世以来，本文首次对康德表达其超验唯心主义的语言形式进行了系统研究。该书认为，普劳斯关于 "in itself "是一个副词表达式，用于修饰哲学思考动词的说法是有缺陷的，因此对康德超越论唯心主义的所谓 "方法论两方面 "解释的注释证据非常不足。对康德的 "本身 "副词用法的全面考察反而揭示出 "本身 "修饰的动词有多种，它们或多或少都可以归结为一种标准用法，即 "本身 "修饰谓词性存在的动词，如副词。本文还讨论了这些发现如何被两种主要的替代解释（即双客体解释和本体论双方面解释）所接受。
{"title":"‘In Itself’: A New Investigation of Kant’s Adverbial Wording of Transcendental Idealism","authors":"Tobias Rosefeldt","doi":"10.1017/s1369415424000190","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415424000190","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article offers the first systematic investigation of the linguistic forms in which Kant expresses his transcendental idealism since Gerold Prauss’ seminal book <span>Kant und das Problem der Dinge an sich</span>. It is argued that Prauss’ own argument for the claim that ‘in itself’ is an adverbial expression that standardly modifies verbs of philosophical reflection is flawed and that there is hence very poor exegetical evidence for so-called ‘methodological two-aspect’ interpretations of Kant’s transcendental idealism. A comprehensive investigation of Kant’s adverbial uses of ‘in itself’ rather reveals that there are various groups of verbs that ‘in itself’ modifies, which can more or less all be reduced to a standard use in which ‘in itself’ modifies verbs of predicative being such as the copula. It is also discussed how these findings can be accommodated by the two main alternative kinds of interpretations, that is, two-object and ontological two-aspect interpretations.</p>","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140572232","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-03-11DOI: 10.1017/s1369415424000025
Sara Di Giulio
There are two main meanings in Kant’s concept of moral certainty (moralische Gewissheit, certitudo moralis): first, it applies to the kind of certainty embodied in rational faith in the existence of God and a future life; second, it applies to the conscientiousness (Gewissenhaftigkeit) required of an agent in the practice of moral judgement. Despite the growing attention to Kant’s theory of conscience and his concept of conscientiousness, this article is the first to discuss ‘moral certainty’ as the aim of ‘conscientiousness’ and to highlight the relevance of both notions in regard to moral education and the purposes of Kant’s ethical doctrines of method.
{"title":"Between Faith and Judgement: Kant’s Dual Conception of Moral Certainty","authors":"Sara Di Giulio","doi":"10.1017/s1369415424000025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415424000025","url":null,"abstract":"There are two main meanings in Kant’s concept of moral certainty (<jats:italic>moralische Gewissheit</jats:italic>, <jats:italic>certitudo moralis</jats:italic>): first, it applies to the kind of certainty embodied in rational faith in the existence of God and a future life; second, it applies to the conscientiousness (<jats:italic>Gewissenhaftigkeit</jats:italic>) required of an agent in the practice of moral judgement. Despite the growing attention to Kant’s theory of conscience and his concept of conscientiousness, this article is the first to discuss ‘moral certainty’ as the aim of ‘conscientiousness’ and to highlight the relevance of both notions in regard to moral education and the purposes of Kant’s ethical doctrines of method.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140115589","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-03-01DOI: 10.1017/s1369415424000050
John Walsh
A core feature of Kant’s Critical account of moral motivation is that pure reason can be practical by itself. I argue that Kant developed this view in the 1770s concerning the principium diiudicationis and principium executionis. These principles indicate the normative and performative aspects of moral motivation. I demonstrate that cognition of the normative principle effects the moral incentive. So, the hallmark of Kant’s Critical account of motivation was contained in his pre-Critical view. This interpretation resolves a controversy about Kant’s apparent eudaimonism in the first Critique and shows that he developed his account of moral autonomy in the 1770s.
{"title":"Kant’s Principia Diiudicationis and Executionis","authors":"John Walsh","doi":"10.1017/s1369415424000050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415424000050","url":null,"abstract":"A core feature of Kant’s Critical account of moral motivation is that pure reason can be practical by itself. I argue that Kant developed this view in the 1770s concerning the <jats:italic>principium diiudicationis</jats:italic> and <jats:italic>principium executionis</jats:italic>. These principles indicate the normative and performative aspects of moral motivation. I demonstrate that cognition of the normative principle effects the moral incentive. So, the hallmark of Kant’s Critical account of motivation was contained in his pre-Critical view. This interpretation resolves a controversy about Kant’s apparent eudaimonism in the first <jats:italic>Critique</jats:italic> and shows that he developed his account of moral autonomy in the 1770s.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140025262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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