Abstract This article proposes an interpretive key to Bernard Williams's philosophy. It posits the idea that at its core, his philosophy consists in the following interconnected epistemological and metaphysical views: (1) scientific realism, (2) metaphysical naturalism, (3) methodological pluralism, (4) anthropological contingentism and (5) a post-analytical/humanistic under- standing of philosophy. These are extracted in the first two sections. The third section provides a demonstration of how this interpretation can be applied vis-a-vis Williams's critique of morality. The text concludes with some critical remarks on Williams's metaphilosophical position.
{"title":"Towards a Unified Interpretation of Bernard Williams's Philosophical Projects","authors":"Pawel Pijas","doi":"10.1515/krt-2019-330306","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2019-330306","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article proposes an interpretive key to Bernard Williams's philosophy. It posits the idea that at its core, his philosophy consists in the following interconnected epistemological and metaphysical views: (1) scientific realism, (2) metaphysical naturalism, (3) methodological pluralism, (4) anthropological contingentism and (5) a post-analytical/humanistic under- standing of philosophy. These are extracted in the first two sections. The third section provides a demonstration of how this interpretation can be applied vis-a-vis Williams's critique of morality. The text concludes with some critical remarks on Williams's metaphilosophical position.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131016801","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Whereas the progressive nature of science is widely recognised, specifying the standards of scientific progress has been subject to philosophical debate since the enlightenment. Recently, Ilkka Niiniluoto, Alexander Bird, and Finnur Dellsfien have revived this debate by setting forward a semantic, epistemic and noetic ac- count of scientific progress respectively. I argue that none of these accounts is satisfactory. The semantic and epistemic accounts might advance necessary conditions for scientific progress, namely an accumulation of true, justified, and non-Gettiered beliefs, but fail to specify sufficient conditions. The noetic account, in contrast, advances sufficient conditions for scientific progress, namely an increase of genuine understanding, but fails to specify the necessary conditions. To remedy these deficits, I advance a hybrid account of scientific progress between the epistemic and noetic accounts, according to which the accumulation of explanatorily or predictively powerful knowledge constitutes scientific progress. In contrast to the epistemic account, my account ensures that only scientifically relevant knowledge constitutes scientific progress, thereby evading the threat of underdemandingness. In contrast to the noetic account, my account does not impose a psychological requirement of grasping the explanatory or predictive power of a scientific development, thereby evading the threat of overdemandingness. A further advantage of my account is that it can preserve plausible features of the noetic account.
{"title":"A Hybrid Account of Scientific Progress: Finding Middle Ground Between the Epistemic and the Noetic Accounts","authors":"Clara Goebel","doi":"10.1515/krt-2019-330304","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2019-330304","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Whereas the progressive nature of science is widely recognised, specifying the standards of scientific progress has been subject to philosophical debate since the enlightenment. Recently, Ilkka Niiniluoto, Alexander Bird, and Finnur Dellsfien have revived this debate by setting forward a semantic, epistemic and noetic ac- count of scientific progress respectively. I argue that none of these accounts is satisfactory. The semantic and epistemic accounts might advance necessary conditions for scientific progress, namely an accumulation of true, justified, and non-Gettiered beliefs, but fail to specify sufficient conditions. The noetic account, in contrast, advances sufficient conditions for scientific progress, namely an increase of genuine understanding, but fails to specify the necessary conditions. To remedy these deficits, I advance a hybrid account of scientific progress between the epistemic and noetic accounts, according to which the accumulation of explanatorily or predictively powerful knowledge constitutes scientific progress. In contrast to the epistemic account, my account ensures that only scientifically relevant knowledge constitutes scientific progress, thereby evading the threat of underdemandingness. In contrast to the noetic account, my account does not impose a psychological requirement of grasping the explanatory or predictive power of a scientific development, thereby evading the threat of overdemandingness. A further advantage of my account is that it can preserve plausible features of the noetic account.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132099867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In their recent paper, Epistemology for Beginners: Two to Five-Year-Old Children's Representation of Falsity," Olivier Mascaro and Olivier Morin study the ontogeny of a naive understanding of truth in humans. Their paper is fascinating for several reasons, but most striking is their claim (given a rather optimistic reading of epistemology) that toddlers as young as two can, at times, recognize false from true assertions. Their Optimistic Epistemology Hypothesis holds that children seem to have an innate capacity to represent a state of affairs truthfully. In the following paper, I investigate the problems this research poses for deationist theories of truth. Richard Rorty and Huw Price hold that the best way to understand truth or the truth" is to understand the necessary conditions required for assertoric practice. Both philosophers present unique and very different deationary theories when it comes to construing truth. I argue that neither philosopher's approach is successful because they focus on truth and fail to recognize truthfulness as a norm of assertoric practice. I show that truthfulness is the elusive third norm of claim-based discourse and is consistent with Mascaro and Morin's findings.
{"title":"Letting the Truth Out: Children, Naive Truth, and Deflationism","authors":"Brian G. Lightbody","doi":"10.1515/krt-2019-330305","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2019-330305","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In their recent paper, Epistemology for Beginners: Two to Five-Year-Old Children's Representation of Falsity,\" Olivier Mascaro and Olivier Morin study the ontogeny of a naive understanding of truth in humans. Their paper is fascinating for several reasons, but most striking is their claim (given a rather optimistic reading of epistemology) that toddlers as young as two can, at times, recognize false from true assertions. Their Optimistic Epistemology Hypothesis holds that children seem to have an innate capacity to represent a state of affairs truthfully. In the following paper, I investigate the problems this research poses for deationist theories of truth. Richard Rorty and Huw Price hold that the best way to understand truth or the truth\" is to understand the necessary conditions required for assertoric practice. Both philosophers present unique and very different deationary theories when it comes to construing truth. I argue that neither philosopher's approach is successful because they focus on truth and fail to recognize truthfulness as a norm of assertoric practice. I show that truthfulness is the elusive third norm of claim-based discourse and is consistent with Mascaro and Morin's findings.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127293728","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The aim of the paper is to analyze the views of Willard van Orman Quine and compare them with the views of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, an eminent philosopher from the Lvov-Warsaw School. I will argue that Ajdukiewicz's approach to ontology is deationary and, in that respect, similar to Quine's. In my analysis of these two ontological stances, I would like to refer to Price's deationist interpretation of Quine's views in order to highlight the similarity between Ajdukiewicz's views and Quine's stance on ontology. Additionally, as both Ajdukiewicz and Quine used a method of paraphrase, my paper also discusses similarities and differences in the methods used by these central representatives of two philosophical environments { Polish and Anglosphere.
{"title":"On Ajdukiewicz's and Quine's Views on Ontology","authors":"Artur Kosecki","doi":"10.1515/krt-2019-330204","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2019-330204","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The aim of the paper is to analyze the views of Willard van Orman Quine and compare them with the views of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, an eminent philosopher from the Lvov-Warsaw School. I will argue that Ajdukiewicz's approach to ontology is deationary and, in that respect, similar to Quine's. In my analysis of these two ontological stances, I would like to refer to Price's deationist interpretation of Quine's views in order to highlight the similarity between Ajdukiewicz's views and Quine's stance on ontology. Additionally, as both Ajdukiewicz and Quine used a method of paraphrase, my paper also discusses similarities and differences in the methods used by these central representatives of two philosophical environments { Polish and Anglosphere.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129396403","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Review of Jeremy Shearmur and Georey Stokes (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Popper. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. x + 394 pp. Hardback ISBN 978-0-521-85645-4. GBP 84.99","authors":"Adam Tamas Tuboly","doi":"10.1515/krt-2019-330206","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2019-330206","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130828083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The fact that boundaries are ontologically dependent entities is agreed by Franz Brentano and Roderick Chisholm. This article studies both authors as a single metaphysical account about boundaries. The Brentano-Chisholm theory understands that boundaries and the objects to which they belong hold a mutual relationship of ontological dependence: the existence of a boundary depends upon a continuum of higher spatial dimensionality, but also is a conditio sine qua non for the existence of a continuum. Although the view that ordinary material objects and their boundaries (or surfaces) ontologically depend on each other is correct, it does not grasp their asymmetric relationship: while the existence of a surface rigidly depends upon the existence of the very object it belongs to, the existence of a physical object generically depends upon having some surface. In modal terms, both are two kinds of de re ontological dependence that this article tries to distinguish.
{"title":"Boundaries and Things. A Metaphysical Study of the Brentano-Chisholm Theory","authors":"Gonzalo Nuñez Erices","doi":"10.1515/krt-2019-330203","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2019-330203","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The fact that boundaries are ontologically dependent entities is agreed by Franz Brentano and Roderick Chisholm. This article studies both authors as a single metaphysical account about boundaries. The Brentano-Chisholm theory understands that boundaries and the objects to which they belong hold a mutual relationship of ontological dependence: the existence of a boundary depends upon a continuum of higher spatial dimensionality, but also is a conditio sine qua non for the existence of a continuum. Although the view that ordinary material objects and their boundaries (or surfaces) ontologically depend on each other is correct, it does not grasp their asymmetric relationship: while the existence of a surface rigidly depends upon the existence of the very object it belongs to, the existence of a physical object generically depends upon having some surface. In modal terms, both are two kinds of de re ontological dependence that this article tries to distinguish.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"2007 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123770104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Strict finitism is the position that only those natural numbers exist that we can represent in practice. Michael Dummett, in a paper called Wang's Paradox, famously tried to show that strict finitism is an incoherent position. By using the Sorites paradox, he claimed that certain predicates the strict finitist is committed to are incoherent. More recently, Ofra Magidor objected to Dummett's claims, arguing that Dummett fails to show the incoherence of strict finitism. In this paper, I shall investigate whether Magidor is successful in preventing Dummett from proving the incoherence of strict finitism. Though not all the counterarguments Magidor presents are successful, she does in the end manage to corner Dummett. There remains an opportunity for Dummett to insist on the incoherence of strict finitism, but this is a very small opening. The final conclusion of this paper is that Dummett cannot logically prove the incoherence of strict finitism, even though a limited chance for success remains.
{"title":"On the Coherence of Strict Finitism","authors":"Auke Alesander","doi":"10.1515/krt-2019-330202","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2019-330202","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Strict finitism is the position that only those natural numbers exist that we can represent in practice. Michael Dummett, in a paper called Wang's Paradox, famously tried to show that strict finitism is an incoherent position. By using the Sorites paradox, he claimed that certain predicates the strict finitist is committed to are incoherent. More recently, Ofra Magidor objected to Dummett's claims, arguing that Dummett fails to show the incoherence of strict finitism. In this paper, I shall investigate whether Magidor is successful in preventing Dummett from proving the incoherence of strict finitism. Though not all the counterarguments Magidor presents are successful, she does in the end manage to corner Dummett. There remains an opportunity for Dummett to insist on the incoherence of strict finitism, but this is a very small opening. The final conclusion of this paper is that Dummett cannot logically prove the incoherence of strict finitism, even though a limited chance for success remains.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124305506","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The purpose of this paper is to discuss conditions of rationality for scientific research (SR) where "conditions" are understood as "necessary conditions". This will be done in the following way: First, I shall deal with the aim of SR since conditions of rationality (for SR) are to be understood as necessary means for reaching the aim (goal) of SR. Subsequently, the following necessary conditions will be discussed: Rational Communication, Methodological Rules, Ideals of Rationality and its Realistic Aspects, Methodological and Ontological Conditions (Universality, Rules for Experiments, Causality), and Metaphysical Presuppositions and Extrapolations.
{"title":"Conditions of Rationality for Scientific Research","authors":"P. Weingartner","doi":"10.1515/krt-2019-330205","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2019-330205","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The purpose of this paper is to discuss conditions of rationality for scientific research (SR) where \"conditions\" are understood as \"necessary conditions\". This will be done in the following way: First, I shall deal with the aim of SR since conditions of rationality (for SR) are to be understood as necessary means for reaching the aim (goal) of SR. Subsequently, the following necessary conditions will be discussed: Rational Communication, Methodological Rules, Ideals of Rationality and its Realistic Aspects, Methodological and Ontological Conditions (Universality, Rules for Experiments, Causality), and Metaphysical Presuppositions and Extrapolations.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122872235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In this article, I maintain that the social process of labour commodification, through which the individual capability to uphold a decent welfare is bound to participation in the labour market, poses a problem of justice from the republican prospective on freedom as non-domination. I first discuss the reasons we might hold that capitalism brings a form of systemic domination by virtue of one of its intrinsic features: unequal access to the means of production. Then, I argue for a minimum de-commodification of labour power as a criterion of justice, adding that it should be conceived as a cosmopolitan proviso because states unfairly suffer from their limited economic capacity to neutralize capitalist systemic domination. Lastly, I compare the normative account of global justice that I am proposing in this article with sufficientarianism, with the capability approach, and with Thomas Pogge's 'Global Resources Dividend'
{"title":"Labour Commodification and Global Justice","authors":"F. Corvino","doi":"10.1515/krt-2019-330104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2019-330104","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this article, I maintain that the social process of labour commodification, through which the individual capability to uphold a decent welfare is bound to participation in the labour market, poses a problem of justice from the republican prospective on freedom as non-domination. I first discuss the reasons we might hold that capitalism brings a form of systemic domination by virtue of one of its intrinsic features: unequal access to the means of production. Then, I argue for a minimum de-commodification of labour power as a criterion of justice, adding that it should be conceived as a cosmopolitan proviso because states unfairly suffer from their limited economic capacity to neutralize capitalist systemic domination. Lastly, I compare the normative account of global justice that I am proposing in this article with sufficientarianism, with the capability approach, and with Thomas Pogge's 'Global Resources Dividend'","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121183613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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