While the recognition of context as a dynamic construct is pervasive, the process of selecting context during utterance comprehension in real time remains largely unexamined. This paper addresses this issue by exploring the dynamism of context as part of joke interpretation. We assume a relevance-theoretic definition of context understood as a set of mental representations involved in inferential processes that operate on a propositionally incomplete linguistic form and yield a speaker-intended meaning, consisting of the explicit and implicit import. We also adopt a model of joke comprehension combining the standard notion of incongruity resolution with that of weak communication, positing that when the punchline comes there is a broad array of assumptions that suddenly become manifest to the hearer, as a result of which he experiences an effect of inferential overload. This effect hinges on the ability to obtain access to, or to inferentially construct contextual assumptions that were previously not immediately accessible to the hearer or not represented in their cognitive resources at all. By analysing jokes of various structure (with or without a build-up, one-liners) we explore details of the dynamism of context selection and construction, in which the hearer’s encyclopaedic knowledge is essential. We provide arguments in favour of the view of context as an entity dependent on the hearer’s mental representations, inferential abilities and the universal drive to maximize relevance in utterance comprehension.
{"title":"Dynamism of context: A case of joke interpretation","authors":"Maria Jodłowiec, A. Piskorska","doi":"10.1515/ip-2024-3006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ip-2024-3006","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 While the recognition of context as a dynamic construct is pervasive, the process of selecting context during utterance comprehension in real time remains largely unexamined. This paper addresses this issue by exploring the dynamism of context as part of joke interpretation. We assume a relevance-theoretic definition of context understood as a set of mental representations involved in inferential processes that operate on a propositionally incomplete linguistic form and yield a speaker-intended meaning, consisting of the explicit and implicit import. We also adopt a model of joke comprehension combining the standard notion of incongruity resolution with that of weak communication, positing that when the punchline comes there is a broad array of assumptions that suddenly become manifest to the hearer, as a result of which he experiences an effect of inferential overload. This effect hinges on the ability to obtain access to, or to inferentially construct contextual assumptions that were previously not immediately accessible to the hearer or not represented in their cognitive resources at all. By analysing jokes of various structure (with or without a build-up, one-liners) we explore details of the dynamism of context selection and construction, in which the hearer’s encyclopaedic knowledge is essential. We provide arguments in favour of the view of context as an entity dependent on the hearer’s mental representations, inferential abilities and the universal drive to maximize relevance in utterance comprehension.","PeriodicalId":13669,"journal":{"name":"Intercultural Pragmatics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140971893","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Theories of utterance meaning in the post-Gricean tradition have typically focused on the main proposition expressed by the speaker that is recovered by the addressee. In this tradition, successful communication rests on the assumption that speakers and addressees come to a shared understanding of these propositions as they are produced in conversation. We now have a wealth of empirical evidence that speakers and addressees need not always converge on the main proposition expressed in order for communication to proceed unhindered: they may share partial understandings of individual utterances, allowing the overarching discourse meaning to unravel as the interaction progresses. In this paper, we propose a novel unit of meaning that accounts for such a dynamic concept that can emerge and develop over several turns at talk. We call it a ‘dynamic functional proposition’. This unit includes not only the linguistic meaning that has been communicated, but also meaning conveyed through non-linguistic sources, as well as aspects of situation captured through what we call ‘filters’, such as interlocutors’ levels of attention, emotions, and other non-representational aspects. These various aspects will have greater or lesser salience for different speakers, hence offering an explanatory tool for how utterance meanings are negotiated, as well as when and why misunderstandings occur. We finish by proposing ways in which such a unit can be formally represented. We do this by motivating different cognitive, social and linguistic parameters that influence it.
{"title":"Towards a dynamic functional proposition for dynamic discourse meaning","authors":"Chi-Hé Elder, K. Jaszczolt","doi":"10.1515/ip-2024-3004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ip-2024-3004","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Theories of utterance meaning in the post-Gricean tradition have typically focused on the main proposition expressed by the speaker that is recovered by the addressee. In this tradition, successful communication rests on the assumption that speakers and addressees come to a shared understanding of these propositions as they are produced in conversation. We now have a wealth of empirical evidence that speakers and addressees need not always converge on the main proposition expressed in order for communication to proceed unhindered: they may share partial understandings of individual utterances, allowing the overarching discourse meaning to unravel as the interaction progresses. In this paper, we propose a novel unit of meaning that accounts for such a dynamic concept that can emerge and develop over several turns at talk. We call it a ‘dynamic functional proposition’. This unit includes not only the linguistic meaning that has been communicated, but also meaning conveyed through non-linguistic sources, as well as aspects of situation captured through what we call ‘filters’, such as interlocutors’ levels of attention, emotions, and other non-representational aspects. These various aspects will have greater or lesser salience for different speakers, hence offering an explanatory tool for how utterance meanings are negotiated, as well as when and why misunderstandings occur. We finish by proposing ways in which such a unit can be formally represented. We do this by motivating different cognitive, social and linguistic parameters that influence it.","PeriodicalId":13669,"journal":{"name":"Intercultural Pragmatics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140972827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article, we address the issue concerning the gestural patterns in expressing surprise and disapproval across various languages and cultures. The results obtained so far point to an interesting, and in a sense rather surprising, uniformity. We consider two types of special questions: counter-expectational questions expressing surprise and surprise-disapproval questions, i.e., sentences expressing surprise with a negative orientation, and adopt an experimental design involving sentence repetition and spontaneous production. We focus on the realization of these sentences in Vietnamese, Korean and Japanese, which we compare with the results previously obtained for Italian and replicated for Neapolitan, Spanish and German. Our research is based on the Minimalist theoretical framework developed by Chomsky and scholars in the tradition of generative grammar.
{"title":"A cross-cultural analysis of the gestural pattern of surprise and surprise-disapproval questions","authors":"Alessandra Giorgi, Erika Petrocchi","doi":"10.1515/ip-2024-3002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ip-2024-3002","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this article, we address the issue concerning the gestural patterns in expressing surprise and disapproval across various languages and cultures. The results obtained so far point to an interesting, and in a sense rather surprising, uniformity. We consider two types of special questions: counter-expectational questions expressing surprise and surprise-disapproval questions, i.e., sentences expressing surprise with a negative orientation, and adopt an experimental design involving sentence repetition and spontaneous production. We focus on the realization of these sentences in Vietnamese, Korean and Japanese, which we compare with the results previously obtained for Italian and replicated for Neapolitan, Spanish and German. Our research is based on the Minimalist theoretical framework developed by Chomsky and scholars in the tradition of generative grammar.","PeriodicalId":13669,"journal":{"name":"Intercultural Pragmatics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140977226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Cancellability – one of the most important tests for implicatures – has been attacked from different perspectives, and its reliability challenged by several cases and examples in which conversational implicatures seem to be hard or even impossible to cancel. To account for these phenomena, distinct approaches have been advanced aimed at weakening Grice’s cancellability test. However, what do we exactly mean when we claim that an implicature cannot be cancelled? Grice pointed out that implicatures are triggered by a possible conflict with the cooperativeness principle, and for this reason it is always possible to opt out of the observation thereof. This theoretical possibility needs to be distinguished from the practical problem of explaining why some implicatures are intuitively less cancellable than others, or even not cancellable. To address this latter – practical – dimension of cancellability, the reasoning and the presumptive premises involved in drawing an implicature and justifying its cancellation needs to be represented and evaluated. This approach will be shown to provide a possible instrument for evaluating the reasonableness of cancellability and its costs.
{"title":"When cancellation becomes unreasonable","authors":"Fabrizio Macagno, Roberto Graci","doi":"10.1515/ip-2024-3005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ip-2024-3005","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Cancellability – one of the most important tests for implicatures – has been attacked from different perspectives, and its reliability challenged by several cases and examples in which conversational implicatures seem to be hard or even impossible to cancel. To account for these phenomena, distinct approaches have been advanced aimed at weakening Grice’s cancellability test. However, what do we exactly mean when we claim that an implicature cannot be cancelled? Grice pointed out that implicatures are triggered by a possible conflict with the cooperativeness principle, and for this reason it is always possible to opt out of the observation thereof. This theoretical possibility needs to be distinguished from the practical problem of explaining why some implicatures are intuitively less cancellable than others, or even not cancellable. To address this latter – practical – dimension of cancellability, the reasoning and the presumptive premises involved in drawing an implicature and justifying its cancellation needs to be represented and evaluated. This approach will be shown to provide a possible instrument for evaluating the reasonableness of cancellability and its costs.","PeriodicalId":13669,"journal":{"name":"Intercultural Pragmatics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140975495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We review some of the most prominent challenges in the semantics and pragmatics of fictional names and propose a pragmatic theory of fictional names whereby understanding a fictional name requires imagining possible contexts of interpretation of the name. Similarly to other pragmatic approaches to fiction and fictional contexts, we maintain that fictional texts require that the interpreter engages in a game of pretense of sort and are, therefore, prescriptions to imagine a state of affairs that is not the real one. In contrast to these approaches, however, we propose that interpreting a fictional text does not require imagining a set of possible state of affairs where the text would be true but, rather, requires imagining a set of possible contexts where the text would be meaningful. In order to apply this framework to fictional names, we adopt a contextual theory of proper names, which we have proposed and defended in previous work.
{"title":"A contextual theory of fictional names","authors":"Gaetano Fiorin, D. Delfitto","doi":"10.1515/ip-2024-3003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ip-2024-3003","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We review some of the most prominent challenges in the semantics and pragmatics of fictional names and propose a pragmatic theory of fictional names whereby understanding a fictional name requires imagining possible contexts of interpretation of the name. Similarly to other pragmatic approaches to fiction and fictional contexts, we maintain that fictional texts require that the interpreter engages in a game of pretense of sort and are, therefore, prescriptions to imagine a state of affairs that is not the real one. In contrast to these approaches, however, we propose that interpreting a fictional text does not require imagining a set of possible state of affairs where the text would be true but, rather, requires imagining a set of possible contexts where the text would be meaningful. In order to apply this framework to fictional names, we adopt a contextual theory of proper names, which we have proposed and defended in previous work.","PeriodicalId":13669,"journal":{"name":"Intercultural Pragmatics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140971877","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Resemblance between languages could be due to relatedness in terms of etymology. Varieties of the same language or dialects resemble one another in many ways because they are related. The languages within a language family, descendants of a common ancestral language, also resemble one another in some ways. To contemplate resemblance between two languages, one could consider their mutual intelligibility or other kinds of formal similarities. For example, while the Chinese languages are not mutually intelligible, they exhibit very similar grammatical patterns. They are all tonal and share a largely common writing system. This paper, however, proposes another way of appreciating language resemblance. It has been observed in the Singapore context that when two different languages, English and Mandarin, are adopted by a community of speakers as dominant languages, over time, the two languages become nativized and resemble each other in terms of meaning, ways of speaking and the cultural values they embody. The Singaporean bilingual speakers in question are offspring of people from Southern Chinese culture who, as recent as a few generations ago, spoke neither English nor Mandarin as a dominant language. This paper presents evidence to show how Singapore English and Singapore Mandarin, which are mutually unintelligible, may resemble each other in terms of meaning, ways of speaking and cultural values.
{"title":"Resemblance by meaning and culture between Singapore English and Singapore Mandarin","authors":"Jock Wong","doi":"10.1515/ip-2024-3007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ip-2024-3007","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Resemblance between languages could be due to relatedness in terms of etymology. Varieties of the same language or dialects resemble one another in many ways because they are related. The languages within a language family, descendants of a common ancestral language, also resemble one another in some ways. To contemplate resemblance between two languages, one could consider their mutual intelligibility or other kinds of formal similarities. For example, while the Chinese languages are not mutually intelligible, they exhibit very similar grammatical patterns. They are all tonal and share a largely common writing system. This paper, however, proposes another way of appreciating language resemblance. It has been observed in the Singapore context that when two different languages, English and Mandarin, are adopted by a community of speakers as dominant languages, over time, the two languages become nativized and resemble each other in terms of meaning, ways of speaking and the cultural values they embody. The Singaporean bilingual speakers in question are offspring of people from Southern Chinese culture who, as recent as a few generations ago, spoke neither English nor Mandarin as a dominant language. This paper presents evidence to show how Singapore English and Singapore Mandarin, which are mutually unintelligible, may resemble each other in terms of meaning, ways of speaking and cultural values.","PeriodicalId":13669,"journal":{"name":"Intercultural Pragmatics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140971812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
After summarizing linguistic evidence against the thesis that actuality terms are indexical, I examine conceptual and epistemological arguments offered in favor of an indexical analysis. I argue that an indexical semantics provides no explanation of how we know what is actually the case, and no grounds for postulating a contingent a priori. Truth in every context, or in every model, does not imply knowledge of the fact a sentence expresses nor how we know it if we do. Moreover, descriptive analyses also predict that ‘I exist in the actual world’ and instances of ‘p ≡ Actually p’ are true in every context.
在总结了反对 "实际性术语是索引性的 "这一论点的语言学证据之后，我研究了支持索引分析的概念和认识论论据。我认为，索引语义学无法解释我们如何知道什么是实际情况，也没有理由假设先验的或然性。在每一种语境或每一种模式中，真理并不意味着我们知道句子所表达的事实，也不意味着我们如何知道它。此外，描述性分析也预示着 "我存在于现实世界中 "和 "p ≡ Actually p "在任何语境中都是真实的。
{"title":"Actuality, indexicality, and knowledge","authors":"Wayne A. Davis","doi":"10.1515/ip-2024-3001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ip-2024-3001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 After summarizing linguistic evidence against the thesis that actuality terms are indexical, I examine conceptual and epistemological arguments offered in favor of an indexical analysis. I argue that an indexical semantics provides no explanation of how we know what is actually the case, and no grounds for postulating a contingent a priori. Truth in every context, or in every model, does not imply knowledge of the fact a sentence expresses nor how we know it if we do. Moreover, descriptive analyses also predict that ‘I exist in the actual world’ and instances of ‘p ≡ Actually p’ are true in every context.","PeriodicalId":13669,"journal":{"name":"Intercultural Pragmatics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140973918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Grace Zhang and Vahid Parvaresh: Elastic Language in Persuasion and Comforting: A Cross-Cultural Perspective","authors":"Dan Zhang, Huiyu Zhang","doi":"10.1515/ip-2024-2006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ip-2024-2006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":13669,"journal":{"name":"Intercultural Pragmatics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140366574","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nowak argues that the problem with language loss is not linguists’ loss of data or that the loss of a language is often a result of discrimination against its speakers. Instead, the real problem is its speakers’ loss of illocutionary force. I argue that Nowak’s argument rests on two premises that are both empirically unjustified: that cultural knowledge is a prerequisite for illocutionary force, and that language is a prerequisite for illocutionary force. Languages are among the most fascinating accomplishments of mankind, surpassing Machu Picchu and the Great Wall of China in the eyes of many. I think language loss is comparable to loss of species. The intuition that the death of a language is a significant event, reflects that: Something that evolved gradually over hundreds of years, passed on through hundreds of generations and thousands of individual speakers, is irreversibly gone, once and for all. The illocutionary force of its individual speakers is not.
{"title":"What is lost when a language dies?","authors":"Anders Søgaard","doi":"10.1515/ip-2024-2004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ip-2024-2004","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Nowak argues that the problem with language loss is not linguists’ loss of data or that the loss of a language is often a result of discrimination against its speakers. Instead, the real problem is its speakers’ loss of illocutionary force. I argue that Nowak’s argument rests on two premises that are both empirically unjustified: that cultural knowledge is a prerequisite for illocutionary force, and that language is a prerequisite for illocutionary force. Languages are among the most fascinating accomplishments of mankind, surpassing Machu Picchu and the Great Wall of China in the eyes of many. I think language loss is comparable to loss of species. The intuition that the death of a language is a significant event, reflects that: Something that evolved gradually over hundreds of years, passed on through hundreds of generations and thousands of individual speakers, is irreversibly gone, once and for all. The illocutionary force of its individual speakers is not.","PeriodicalId":13669,"journal":{"name":"Intercultural Pragmatics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140367770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Presuppositions are typically considered as projective inferences that are triggered by certain expressions and taken for granted. Whereas Simons (Simons, Mandy. 2001. On the conversational basis of some presuppositions. Semantics and Linguistic Theory 11. 431–448) observes that expressions with a similar semantic content belonging to the same language give rise to the same presupposition, this has not been investigated in a systematic way for semantically equivalent expressions from different languages. Furthermore, more recent research has shown that different presupposition triggers are characterized by differing projective strength, therefore, a distinction of highly projective hard triggers and less projective soft triggers has been proposed (Abusch, Dorit. 2002. Lexical alternatives as a source of pragmatic presuppositions. Semantics and Linguistic Theory 12. 1–19, Abusch, Dorit. 2010. Presupposition triggering from alternatives. Journal of Semantics 27(1). 37–80). Here, we present an experiment comparing four classical presupposition triggers from German and their counterparts in Chinese (cleft sentences, win, factive predicates regret and discover) in order to a) investigate the cross-linguistic stability of their projective strength and b) to verify the heterogeneity of these triggers in both languages. Our results show that the projective behavior and the heterogeneity of presuppositions can be considered cross-linguistically stable, at least when suitable equivalences for both languages can be found. Furthermore, our data suggest that the group of soft triggers has to be more heterogeneous than previously assumed. More precisely, whereas hard triggers behave the same way, it is possible that each soft trigger might be soft in its own way. In sum, our experimental investigation aims to improve the understanding of presuppositions, the underlying triggering process and their projective behavior across different languages.
预设通常被认为是由某些表达引发的、理所当然的投射性推论。而西蒙斯（Simons, Mandy.2001.On the conversational basis of some presuppositions.语义学和语言学理论 11.431-448）观察到，属于同一语言的语义内容相似的表达会引起相同的预设，但对于不同语言中语义等同的表达，还没有系统的研究。此外，最近的研究表明，不同的预设触发器具有不同的投射强度，因此有人提出了高投射硬触发器和低投射软触发器的区别（Abusch, Dorit.2002.词汇替代作为语用预设的来源。语义学和语言学理论》，第 12 卷，第 1-19 页。1-19, Abusch, Dorit.2010.从替代词触发预设。语义学杂志》27（1）。37-80).在此，我们将德文中的四种经典预设触发器与中文中的对应预设触发器（裂句、赢、事实谓词后悔和发现）进行了实验比较，目的是：a）研究其投射强度的跨语言稳定性；b）验证这些触发器在两种语言中的异质性。我们的研究结果表明，预设的投射行为和异质性可以被认为是跨语言稳定的，至少在两种语言都能找到合适的等价物时是如此。此外，我们的数据还表明，软触发器组的异质性必须比以前假设的更强。更确切地说，虽然硬触发器的行为方式相同，但每个软触发器都有可能以自己的方式实现软触发。总之，我们的实验研究旨在加深对预设、潜在触发过程及其在不同语言中的投射行为的理解。
{"title":"Presuppositions cross-linguistically: A comparison of soft and hard triggers in Chinese and German","authors":"Yuqiu Chen, Mailin Antomo","doi":"10.1515/ip-2024-2001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ip-2024-2001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Presuppositions are typically considered as projective inferences that are triggered by certain expressions and taken for granted. Whereas Simons (Simons, Mandy. 2001. On the conversational basis of some presuppositions. Semantics and Linguistic Theory 11. 431–448) observes that expressions with a similar semantic content belonging to the same language give rise to the same presupposition, this has not been investigated in a systematic way for semantically equivalent expressions from different languages. Furthermore, more recent research has shown that different presupposition triggers are characterized by differing projective strength, therefore, a distinction of highly projective hard triggers and less projective soft triggers has been proposed (Abusch, Dorit. 2002. Lexical alternatives as a source of pragmatic presuppositions. Semantics and Linguistic Theory 12. 1–19, Abusch, Dorit. 2010. Presupposition triggering from alternatives. Journal of Semantics 27(1). 37–80). Here, we present an experiment comparing four classical presupposition triggers from German and their counterparts in Chinese (cleft sentences, win, factive predicates regret and discover) in order to a) investigate the cross-linguistic stability of their projective strength and b) to verify the heterogeneity of these triggers in both languages. Our results show that the projective behavior and the heterogeneity of presuppositions can be considered cross-linguistically stable, at least when suitable equivalences for both languages can be found. Furthermore, our data suggest that the group of soft triggers has to be more heterogeneous than previously assumed. More precisely, whereas hard triggers behave the same way, it is possible that each soft trigger might be soft in its own way. In sum, our experimental investigation aims to improve the understanding of presuppositions, the underlying triggering process and their projective behavior across different languages.","PeriodicalId":13669,"journal":{"name":"Intercultural Pragmatics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140365865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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