Abstract We intuitively make a distinction between lying and misleading. As several philosophers have pointed out, on the account of this distinction favored here – the adverbial account, as I’ll call it – it provides evidence on the theoretical notion of what is said and the related theoretical distinction between semantics and pragmatics. For, on that account, the distinction tracks whether or not the content and the assertoric force with which it is presented are semantically conveyed. On an alternative (assertoric) commitment account, the difference between lying and misleading is predicated instead on the strength of assertoric commitment. One lies when one presents with full assertoric commitment what one believes to be false; one merely misleads when one presents it with short-of-full assertoric commitment, by merely hinting or otherwise implying it. Here I’ll present the debate confronting the two accounts, and I’ll provide support for the adverbial account and its methodological application.
{"title":"Lying vs. misleading: The adverbial account","authors":"M. García‐Carpintero","doi":"10.1515/ip-2021-2011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ip-2021-2011","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We intuitively make a distinction between lying and misleading. As several philosophers have pointed out, on the account of this distinction favored here – the adverbial account, as I’ll call it – it provides evidence on the theoretical notion of what is said and the related theoretical distinction between semantics and pragmatics. For, on that account, the distinction tracks whether or not the content and the assertoric force with which it is presented are semantically conveyed. On an alternative (assertoric) commitment account, the difference between lying and misleading is predicated instead on the strength of assertoric commitment. One lies when one presents with full assertoric commitment what one believes to be false; one merely misleads when one presents it with short-of-full assertoric commitment, by merely hinting or otherwise implying it. Here I’ll present the debate confronting the two accounts, and I’ll provide support for the adverbial account and its methodological application.","PeriodicalId":13669,"journal":{"name":"Intercultural Pragmatics","volume":"18 1","pages":"391 - 413"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/ip-2021-2011","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47209253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract It is usually maintained that a subject with manifestly contradictory beliefs is irrational. How can we account, then, for the intuitive rationality of dialetheists, who believe that some manifest contradictions are true? My paper aims to answer this question. Its ultimate goal is to determine a characterization of (or rather a constraint for) rational belief approvable by both the theorists of Dialetheism and its opponents. In order to achieve this goal, a two-step strategy will be adopted. First, a characterization of rational belief applicable to non-dialetheist believers will be determined; this characterization will involve the semantic apparatus of Nathan Salmon’s Millian Russellianism but will get rid of the problematic and obscure notion of mode of presentation (guise in his own terminology), replacing it with a couple of novel devices, belief subsystems and cognitive coordination. Second, using ideas from Graham Priest, the leading proponent of Dialetheism, such a characterization will be modified, so as to devise a new one able to account for the intuitive rationality of both dialetheist and non-dialetheist believers.
{"title":"Rational belief and Dialetheism","authors":"P. Bonardi","doi":"10.1515/ip-2021-2016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ip-2021-2016","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract It is usually maintained that a subject with manifestly contradictory beliefs is irrational. How can we account, then, for the intuitive rationality of dialetheists, who believe that some manifest contradictions are true? My paper aims to answer this question. Its ultimate goal is to determine a characterization of (or rather a constraint for) rational belief approvable by both the theorists of Dialetheism and its opponents. In order to achieve this goal, a two-step strategy will be adopted. First, a characterization of rational belief applicable to non-dialetheist believers will be determined; this characterization will involve the semantic apparatus of Nathan Salmon’s Millian Russellianism but will get rid of the problematic and obscure notion of mode of presentation (guise in his own terminology), replacing it with a couple of novel devices, belief subsystems and cognitive coordination. Second, using ideas from Graham Priest, the leading proponent of Dialetheism, such a characterization will be modified, so as to devise a new one able to account for the intuitive rationality of both dialetheist and non-dialetheist believers.","PeriodicalId":13669,"journal":{"name":"Intercultural Pragmatics","volume":"18 1","pages":"309 - 335"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49087062","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In the experiment described in the paper Noah Goodman & Andreas Stuhlmüller. 2013. Knowledge and im-plicature: Modeling language understanding as social cognition. Topics in Cognitive Science 5(1). 173–184, empirical support was provided for the predictive power of the Rational Speech Act (RSA) model concerning the interpretation of utterances employing numerals in uncertainty contexts. The RSA predicts a Bayesian interdependence between beliefs about the probability distribution of the occurrence of an event prior to receiving information and the updated probability distribution after receiving information. In this paper we analyze whether the RSA is a descriptive or a normative model. We present the results of two analogous experiments carried out in Polish. The first experiment does not replicate the original empirical results. We find that this is due to different answers on the prior probability distribution. However, the model predicts the different results on the basis of different collected priors: Bayesian updating predicts human reasoning. By contrast, the second experiment, where the answers on the prior probability distribution are as predicted, is a replication of the original results. In light of these results we conclude that the RSA is a robust, descriptive model, however, the experimental assumptions pertaining to the experimental setting adopted by Goodman and Stuhlmüller are normative.
论文中描述了Noah Goodman & Andreas stuhlm ller的实验。2013. 知识与内涵:语言理解作为社会认知的建模。认知科学专题5(1)。173-184，为理性言语行为(RSA)模型在不确定性语境中对使用数字的话语的解释的预测能力提供了经验支持。RSA预测了接收信息之前关于事件发生概率分布的信念与接收信息后更新的概率分布之间的贝叶斯相互依赖关系。本文分析了RSA是描述性模型还是规范性模型。我们提出用波兰语进行的两个类似实验的结果。第一个实验不能重复原来的实验结果。我们发现这是由于对先验概率分布的不同回答。然而，该模型基于不同收集的先验预测不同的结果:贝叶斯更新预测人类推理。相比之下，第二个实验是对原始结果的复制，其中先验概率分布的答案与预测一致。根据这些结果，我们得出结论，RSA是一个稳健的描述性模型，然而，与Goodman和stuhlm ller采用的实验设置有关的实验假设是规范的。
{"title":"Numeral terms and the predictive potential of Bayesian updating","authors":"Izabela Skoczeń, Aleksander Smywiński-Pohl","doi":"10.1515/ip-2021-2015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ip-2021-2015","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In the experiment described in the paper Noah Goodman & Andreas Stuhlmüller. 2013. Knowledge and im-plicature: Modeling language understanding as social cognition. Topics in Cognitive Science 5(1). 173–184, empirical support was provided for the predictive power of the Rational Speech Act (RSA) model concerning the interpretation of utterances employing numerals in uncertainty contexts. The RSA predicts a Bayesian interdependence between beliefs about the probability distribution of the occurrence of an event prior to receiving information and the updated probability distribution after receiving information. In this paper we analyze whether the RSA is a descriptive or a normative model. We present the results of two analogous experiments carried out in Polish. The first experiment does not replicate the original empirical results. We find that this is due to different answers on the prior probability distribution. However, the model predicts the different results on the basis of different collected priors: Bayesian updating predicts human reasoning. By contrast, the second experiment, where the answers on the prior probability distribution are as predicted, is a replication of the original results. In light of these results we conclude that the RSA is a robust, descriptive model, however, the experimental assumptions pertaining to the experimental setting adopted by Goodman and Stuhlmüller are normative.","PeriodicalId":13669,"journal":{"name":"Intercultural Pragmatics","volume":"18 1","pages":"359 - 390"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/ip-2021-2015","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45920286","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper presents the results of a study seeking insights into how speakers express oppositional stance in an online genre (businesses’ responses to negative customer reviews on TripAdvisor). The research is contrastive, exploring the differences between the practices of speakers in two types of setting – L1 English-speaking countries and countries where English is L2 – when performing oppositional speech acts (e.g. disagreement, criticism of the review/reviewer, etc.). Although there exists a large body of work concerned with contrastive differences in speech act realizations, oppositional speech acts remain under-researched – especially in contexts of non-politeness or impoliteness. This paper presents the results of a mixed-method qualitative/quantitative analysis revealing substantial differences along two principal dimensions of variation: the (in)directness with which opposition is expressed, and the downgrading (mitigation) or upgrading (aggravation) of oppositional speech acts. Some of these differences can be traced to well-known tendencies related to L1 versus L2 language use, while others represent new empirical findings that open up potential avenues for future research.
{"title":"Realizations of oppositional speech acts in English: a contrastive analysis of discourse in L1 and L2 settings","authors":"Christopher Hopkinson","doi":"10.1515/ip-2021-2002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ip-2021-2002","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper presents the results of a study seeking insights into how speakers express oppositional stance in an online genre (businesses’ responses to negative customer reviews on TripAdvisor). The research is contrastive, exploring the differences between the practices of speakers in two types of setting – L1 English-speaking countries and countries where English is L2 – when performing oppositional speech acts (e.g. disagreement, criticism of the review/reviewer, etc.). Although there exists a large body of work concerned with contrastive differences in speech act realizations, oppositional speech acts remain under-researched – especially in contexts of non-politeness or impoliteness. This paper presents the results of a mixed-method qualitative/quantitative analysis revealing substantial differences along two principal dimensions of variation: the (in)directness with which opposition is expressed, and the downgrading (mitigation) or upgrading (aggravation) of oppositional speech acts. Some of these differences can be traced to well-known tendencies related to L1 versus L2 language use, while others represent new empirical findings that open up potential avenues for future research.","PeriodicalId":13669,"journal":{"name":"Intercultural Pragmatics","volume":"18 1","pages":"163 - 202"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/ip-2021-2002","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42352973","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I. Gabbatore, F. Bosco, L. Mäkinen, E. Leinonen, Soile Loukusa
Abstract Efficient communication requires the interplay of linguistic, cognitive and social skills, including the ability to make contextual inferences and to understand others’ intentions and emotions. The capacity to effectively use language in specific contexts (i.e., pragmatic ability) develops with age, and an assessment of this ability is important for understanding both typical and atypical development. The Pragma test was originally developed and validated on Finnish children to assess social-pragmatic comprehension. The present study utilizes a slightly adapted version of the Pragma test, translated into Italian, and presents the results of the test given to 110 typically developing Italian children (4–8 years of age). The Italian version of the Pragma test shows content and concurrent validity, interrater reliability, and internal consistency, and it proves to be sensitive in detecting an age-dependent pattern of performance, across pre-school and school age children, in the pragmatic parameters investigated. The present study has ramifications for clinical contexts, as data for typical pragmatic development enables identification of strengths and weaknesses in the pragmatic performance in clinical populations. Finally, the results indicate that the Pragma test is relevant to both Finnish and Italian cultural contexts, thus providing the opportunity to make cross-cultural comparisons.
{"title":"Social-pragmatic contextual comprehension in Italian preschool and school-aged children: a study using the Pragma test","authors":"I. Gabbatore, F. Bosco, L. Mäkinen, E. Leinonen, Soile Loukusa","doi":"10.1515/ip-2021-2001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ip-2021-2001","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Efficient communication requires the interplay of linguistic, cognitive and social skills, including the ability to make contextual inferences and to understand others’ intentions and emotions. The capacity to effectively use language in specific contexts (i.e., pragmatic ability) develops with age, and an assessment of this ability is important for understanding both typical and atypical development. The Pragma test was originally developed and validated on Finnish children to assess social-pragmatic comprehension. The present study utilizes a slightly adapted version of the Pragma test, translated into Italian, and presents the results of the test given to 110 typically developing Italian children (4–8 years of age). The Italian version of the Pragma test shows content and concurrent validity, interrater reliability, and internal consistency, and it proves to be sensitive in detecting an age-dependent pattern of performance, across pre-school and school age children, in the pragmatic parameters investigated. The present study has ramifications for clinical contexts, as data for typical pragmatic development enables identification of strengths and weaknesses in the pragmatic performance in clinical populations. Finally, the results indicate that the Pragma test is relevant to both Finnish and Italian cultural contexts, thus providing the opportunity to make cross-cultural comparisons.","PeriodicalId":13669,"journal":{"name":"Intercultural Pragmatics","volume":"18 1","pages":"131 - 162"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/ip-2021-2001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45927230","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This cross-cultural study examines the differences in communicative styles between English and German email responses to customer complaints by analysing their discourse structure (through a rhetorical move analysis) and the frequency of first-person references (I and we and their different forms). The framework is given by House (House, Juliane. 2006. Communicative styles in English and German. European Journal of English Studies 10(3). 249–267.), who suggests that English speakers tend to use a more interpersonal (i.e., people-oriented) communicative style, while German speakers show a preference for a transactional (i.e., content-oriented) style. In addition, first-person references within the genre of email responses to complaints are associated with either the customer service agent’s personal or corporate identity. The data consist of 150 English and 84 German authentic emails. The results of the move analysis reveal that the discourse structure of both data sets is mainly similar, but the few differences point into the direction of support for House’s framework, in particular the dimension on addressee- or content-orientation. Although agents generally use more we than I-references in both data sets, thus exhibiting mainly a corporate identity, they tend to use the opposite in some moves (e.g., Apology), which points to pronominal shifting across move level, as suggested in previous research (Zhang, Yi & Camilla Vásquez. 2014. Hotels’ responses to online reviews: Managing consumer dissatisfaction. Discourse, Context and Media 6. 54–64.). Overall, the German agents use more we-references compared to their British colleagues. Finally, agents use pronominal shifting within move level to distance themselves from the company.
{"title":"Person- versus content-oriented approaches in English and German email responses to customer complaints: a cross-cultural analysis of moves and first-person pronouns","authors":"Rebecca Van Herck, Babette Dobbenie, S. Decock","doi":"10.1515/ip-2021-2003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ip-2021-2003","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This cross-cultural study examines the differences in communicative styles between English and German email responses to customer complaints by analysing their discourse structure (through a rhetorical move analysis) and the frequency of first-person references (I and we and their different forms). The framework is given by House (House, Juliane. 2006. Communicative styles in English and German. European Journal of English Studies 10(3). 249–267.), who suggests that English speakers tend to use a more interpersonal (i.e., people-oriented) communicative style, while German speakers show a preference for a transactional (i.e., content-oriented) style. In addition, first-person references within the genre of email responses to complaints are associated with either the customer service agent’s personal or corporate identity. The data consist of 150 English and 84 German authentic emails. The results of the move analysis reveal that the discourse structure of both data sets is mainly similar, but the few differences point into the direction of support for House’s framework, in particular the dimension on addressee- or content-orientation. Although agents generally use more we than I-references in both data sets, thus exhibiting mainly a corporate identity, they tend to use the opposite in some moves (e.g., Apology), which points to pronominal shifting across move level, as suggested in previous research (Zhang, Yi & Camilla Vásquez. 2014. Hotels’ responses to online reviews: Managing consumer dissatisfaction. Discourse, Context and Media 6. 54–64.). Overall, the German agents use more we-references compared to their British colleagues. Finally, agents use pronominal shifting within move level to distance themselves from the company.","PeriodicalId":13669,"journal":{"name":"Intercultural Pragmatics","volume":"18 1","pages":"203 - 243"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/ip-2021-2003","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46643306","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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