Journal of International Economics最新文献

We develop a quantitative framework for decomposing trade patterns. We derive price indexes that determine comparative advantage and the aggregate cost of living. If firms and products are imperfect substitutes, we show that these price indexes depend on variety, average appeal (including quality), and the dispersion of appeal-adjusted prices. We show that they are only weakly related to standard empirical measures of average prices. We find that 40 percent of the cross-section variation in comparative advantage, and 90 percent of the time-series variation, is accounted for by variety and average appeal, with less than 10 percent attributed to average prices.

By preemptive austerity, we mean a policy that increases taxes to deter potential rollover crises. The policy is so successful that the usual danger signal of a rollover crisis, a high yield on new bonds sold, does not show up, because the policy eliminates the danger. Mechanically, high taxes make the safe zone in the model – the set of sovereign debt levels for which the government prefers to repay its debt rather than default – larger. By announcing a high tax rate at the beginning of the period, the government ensures that tax revenue will be high enough to service sovereign debt becoming due, which deters panics by international lenders but is ex-post suboptimal. That is why, as it engages in preemptive austerity, the government continues to reduce the level of debt to a point where, at least asymptotically, high taxes are no longer necessary.

Firms in regional trade areas choose whether to comply with rules of origin (RoO) or pay a tariff penalty. Stricter content requirements initially expand regional part sourcing, but contract it when set at levels above a threshold, analogously to the Laffer curve for taxes. We calibrate the model to fit part cost shares for autos sold in North America. The effects of the 75% RoO imposed in 2020 depend on the relevant tariff and the ability to relocate assembly. With fixed assembly locations, the higher RoO reduces employment in all three countries for cars, where tariffs are low. For trucks, the 25% US tariff induces more compliance in Canada and Mexico, increasing employment in those countries. With the option to relocate assembly, higher RoOs redistribute employment to the US, but Canada and Mexico lose more, leading to a half percent decline in North American employment for both cars and trucks.

We quantify the joint impact of the China shock and automation of labor, across US commuting zones (CZs) in the period 2000–2007. To this end, we employ a multi-sector gravity model of trade with Roy-Fréchet worker heterogeneity across sectors, where labor input can be automated. Automation and increased import competition from China are both sector-specific; they lead to contractions in a sector’s labor demand and a decline in relative income for CZs more specialized in that sector, amplified by a voluntary reduction in hours worked and an increase in frictional unemployment. The estimated model fits well with the aggregate performance of manufacturing subsectors and with the variation across CZs in changes in average income, the hourly wage, hours worked, the employment rate and employment in manufacturing. By itself, the China shock has stronger distributional effects than automation, but its impact on aggregate gains is less than a third of automation’s impact.

We examine the impact of commodity price changes on the business cycles and capital flows in emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs), distinguishing between their role as a source of shock and as a channel of transmission of global shocks. Our findings reveal that surges in export prices, triggered by commodity price shocks, boost domestic GDP, an effect further amplified by the endogenous decline of country spreads. However, the effects on capital flows appear muted. Shifts in U.S. monetary policy and global risk appetite drive the global financial cycle in EMDEs. Eased global credit conditions, attributed to looser U.S. monetary policy or lower global risk appetite, lead to a rise in export prices, higher output, a decrease in government borrowing costs, and stimulate greater capital flows. The endogenous response of export prices amplifies the output effects of a more accommodative U.S. monetary policy while country spreads magnify the impact of shifts in global risk appetite.

We examine how a sovereign’s ability to borrow abroad affects the country’s growth and steady-state consumption when the government is both myopic and self-interested. Surprisingly, government myopia can increase a country’s access to external borrowing and extend the government’s effective horizon, giving it a stake in incentivizing private production and savings despite its self-interest. In a high-saving country, the lengthening of the government’s effective horizon can incentivize it to tax less, resulting in a “growth boost”, with higher steady-state household consumption than if it could not borrow abroad. However, in a country that saves little, the government may engage in repressive tax policies to channel domestic savings into government bonds. This increases future governments’ costs of default, and in turn enhances current debt capacity and spending, but can lead to a “growth trap” where steady-state household consumption is lower than without government’s access to external borrowing.

We examine the effects of unilateral structural reforms within a currency union. Focusing on the surge of German competitiveness following the introduction of the Euro, we first provide reduced-form causal evidence supporting the notion that German structural labor-market reforms in the early 2000s led to a crowding-out of manufacturing employment in other Eurozone economies. To assess the impact of this German competitiveness shock, we build a quantitative multi-sector trade model that features downward nominal wage rigidities, endogenous labor supply, unemployment-insurance benefits and international savings. The fixed nominal exchange rate can create binding nominal rigidities in response to a foreign real supply shock – like the one prompted by the German reforms – resulting in significant contraction of manufacturing sectors and increased involuntary unemployment across other Eurozone countries. We consider a number of counterfactual scenarios, such as the impact of German labor-market reforms in the absence of a fixed exchange-rate regime, the role of coordinated reforms within the Eurozone and a higher average inflation rate.

Access to foreign exchange (FX) liquidity is crucial to the growth and stability of emerging market economies. We examine the impact of U.S. dollar liquidity shocks on firm investments in Korea by constructing a dataset that merges four distinct micro-level data spanning ten years from 2006 to 2015. We trace the path of FX liquidity from the international financial market to Korean banks and subsequently to listed firms. During international liquidity shocks, banks borrow less FX but pay higher interest rates. Weak banks, whose FX borrowing rates are sensitive to these shocks, reduce their FX credit supply to firms. Among the FX loan-reliant firms that are highly productive, those borrowing from weak banks reduce their investments. This channel of FX borrowing and lending accounts for 19% of the decline in the investment of listed firms during the peak of the Global Financial Crisis.

This paper studies the differential effects of capital controls (CCs) on firms’ performance depending on the firm’s production technology and export status. We empirically characterize the firm’s responses to the introduction of a CC using the Chilean encaje implemented between 1991 and 1998. Motivated by the empirical insights, we build a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms, financial constraints and international trade and calibrate it to the Chilean economy. We find that CCs have heterogeneous effects on firms. Exporting firms operating in more capital-intensive sectors are more negatively affected than exporting firms operating in less capital-intensive sectors. Non-exporting firms in capital-intensive sectors experience more negative effects on capital than firms in less-capital intensive sectors, but the opposite is true for domestic sales. These results are a consequence of the increase in financing costs, the depreciation of the real exchange rate, and compositional effects on the mass of exporters and non-exporters.

How can a country design economic sanctions to maximize their economic cost to the sanctioned country at the lowest cost to the sanctioner? I consider this problem from the perspective of international trade and draw a close connection between trade restrictions as economic sanctions and trade restrictions as terms-of-trade manipulation. This connection has useful implications for the design of trade taxes as sanctions: Small sanctions increase welfare in the sanctioning country. Sanctions target the same goods as terms-of-trade manipulation. Sanctions ignore elasticities of demand and supply in the sanctioning country.