Journal of personality and social psychology最新文献

Ideal partner preferences (i.e., ratings of the desirability of attributes like attractiveness or intelligence) are the source of numerous foundational findings in the interdisciplinary literature on human mating. Recently, research on the predictive validity of ideal partner preference matching (i.e., Do people positively evaluate partners who match vs. mismatch their ideals?) has become mired in several problems. First, articles exhibit discrepant analytic and reporting practices. Second, different findings emerge across laboratories worldwide, perhaps because they sample different relationship contexts and/or populations. This registered report-partnered with the Psychological Science Accelerator-uses a highly powered design (N = 10,358) across 43 countries and 22 languages to estimate preference-matching effect sizes. The most rigorous tests revealed significant preference-matching effects in the whole sample and for partnered and single participants separately. The "corrected pattern metric" that collapses across 35 traits revealed a zero-order effect of β = .19 and an effect of β = .11 when included alongside a normative preference-matching metric. Specific traits in the "level metric" (interaction) tests revealed very small (average β = .04) effects. Effect sizes were similar for partnered participants who reported ideals before entering a relationship, and there was no consistent evidence that individual differences moderated any effects. Comparisons between stated and revealed preferences shed light on gender differences and similarities: For attractiveness, men's and (especially) women's stated preferences underestimated revealed preferences (i.e., they thought attractiveness was less important than it actually was). For earning potential, men's stated preferences underestimated-and women's stated preferences overestimated-revealed preferences. Implications for the literature on human mating are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).

How do descriptive norms shape injunctive norm beliefs, and what does this tell us about the cognitive processes underlying social norm cognition? Across six studies (N = 2,671), we examined whether people update their injunctive norm beliefs-as well as their moral judgments and behavioral intentions-after receiving descriptive norm information about how common (or uncommon) a behavior is. Specifically, we manipulated the descriptive normativity of behaviors, describing behaviors as uncommon (20% of people were doing the behavior) or common (80% of people were doing the behavior), and the type of behavior across studies (fairness, conventional, harm, preference). To measure belief updating, we assessed beliefs prior to and after receiving information about the descriptive norm. We had three main findings: First, participants positively updated their prior injunctive norm beliefs, moral judgments, and behavioral intentions (i.e., rated behaviors more injunctively normative and moral) after receiving a common descriptive norm and negatively updated their beliefs (i.e., rated behaviors less injunctive and moral) after receiving an uncommon descriptive norm, and updated to a larger extent for the common than uncommon descriptive norm. Second, participants were more likely to update their beliefs about what is moral for others compared to what is moral for the self. Third, participants updated their beliefs to a greater extent for fairness and conventional behaviors compared to harm behaviors and preferences. Together, our findings suggest that descriptive norms shape our injunctive norm beliefs and moral judgments and help to paint a fuller picture of the social cognition of social norms. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).

In this editorial, the author says that she is honored and excited to be entrusted with the responsibility of serving as editor of the Interpersonal Relations and Group Processes section of the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. Her team is actively working to increase submissions, increase acceptances, and make the articles we ultimately publish more accessible, widening readership. She presents her team's submission and review guidelines. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is the change of a conditioned stimulus's evaluation due to its pairing with an unconditioned stimulus (US). While learning typically shows negativity biases, we found no such biases in a reanalysis of meta-analytic EC data. We provide and test a cognitive-ecological answer for this lack of negativity bias. We assume that negativity effects follow from ecological differences in evaluative information's distributions (i.e., differential frequency). Accordingly, no negativity bias emerges because positive and negative information is equally frequent in most EC experiments. However, if negative (or positive) information is rare, we predict a negativity (positivity) bias. We tested this prediction in five preregistered experiments (three laboratory-based, N = 394, two online, N = 391). As predicted, if negative USs were rare, a negativity bias followed. However, if positive USs were rare, we also observed positivity biases in participants' conditioned stimulus evaluations. These data support a cognitive-ecological explanation of valence asymmetries and partially explain why EC experiments show no negativity bias: Typical EC designs do not reflect the ecological information structure that contributes to a negativity bias in the first place. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).

The current research presents and tests a new model: The Vicious Cycle of Status Insecurity. We define status insecurity as doubting whether one is respected and admired by others. Status insecurity leads people to view status as a limited and zero-sum resource, where a boost in the status of one individual inherently decreases that of other individuals. As a result, the insecure become reluctant to share status in the form of highlighting the contributions of others. However, we suggest this reluctance to give others credit is often counterproductive. In contrast to the zero-sum beliefs of the insecure, we propose that giving credit to others boosts the status of both the sharer and the recipient, expanding the overall status pie. Because the insecure miss opportunities to gain status by not elevating others, they reinforce their initial insecurity. We provide evidence for this vicious cycle across 17 studies, including a content analysis of people's personal experiences with status insecurity, an archival analysis of the final speeches held on the reality TV show Survivor (using ChatGPT), and more than a dozen experimental studies. To enhance generalizability and external validity, our experimental contexts include consulting pitches, venture capital competitions, and idea generation contests. To demonstrate discriminant validity, we differentiate status insecurity from self-esteem insecurity. Across the studies, status insecurity consistently decreased status sharing while status sharing reliably increased one's status. Ultimately, status insecurity paradoxically lowers one's status because it reduces the propensity to elevate and celebrate others. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).

People's attitudes toward almost any stimulus (e.g., brands, people, food items) can change in line with the valence of co-occurring stimuli (e.g., images, messages, other people), a phenomenon known as the evaluative conditioning (EC) effect. Recent research has shown that EC effects are not always controlled, which is problematic in many circumstances (e.g., advertising, misinformation). We examined conditions under which uncontrolled EC effects are more likely to reflect retrieval failures or uncontrolled encoding processes. To provide an experimental test of this question, we propose that people can either integrate or add validity information to the stimulus valence. Specifically, we propose that controlled processes can integrate validity information into the stored valence representations mostly when validity information is provided at the time of exposure to the evaluative information. Control attempts taking place later are more likely to add than to integrate the validity information to the stored representation. Moreover, if validity information is merely added to the stimulus valence as compared to integrated, forgetting this information potentially inflates indices of uncontrolled processes. Our findings demonstrate important boundary conditions for the interpretation of measures of uncontrolled encoding processes. Nevertheless, they provide further evidence that uncontrolled encoding processes can contribute to EC effects. We discuss implications for theories of attitude change and for protection from misinformation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).

Studies have shown that anomie, that is, the perception that a society's leadership and social fabric are breaking down, is a central predictor of individuals' support for authoritarianism. However, causal evidence for this relationship is missing. Moreover, previous studies are ambiguous regarding the mediating mechanism and lack empirical tests for the same. Against this background, we derive a set of integrative hypotheses: First, we argue that perceptions of anomie lead to a perceived lack of political control. The repeated failure to exert control in the political sphere leads to feelings of uncertainty about the functioning and meaning of the political world. This uncertainty heightens people's susceptibility to authoritarianism because, we argue, the latter promises a sense of order, meaning, and the guidance of a "strong leader." We support our hypothesis in a large-scale field study with a representative sample of the German population (N = 1,504) while statistically ruling out alternative explanations. Adding internal validity, we provide causal evidence for each path in our sequential mediation hypothesis in three preregistered, controlled experiments (conducted in the United States, total N = 846). Our insights may support policymakers in addressing the negative political consequences of anomie. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Although much is known about why people engage in collective action participation (e.g., politicized identity, group-based anger), little is known about the psychological consequences of such participation. For example, can participation in collective action facilitate attitude moralization (e.g., moralize their attitudes on the topic)? Based on the idea that collective action contexts often involve a strong social movement fighting against an immoral adversary, we propose that participating in collective action facilitates attitude moralization over time. By integrating the moralization and collective action literatures, we hypothesized that participation in collective action moralizes individuals' attitudes over time because it politicizes their identity, enrages them vis-a-vis the outgroup, and/or empowers them to achieve social change. We tested these hypotheses in a 2-year, five-wave longitudinal study (N = 1,214) in the contentious context of the Chilean student movement. We examined within-person (and between-person) changes over time and consistently found that participation in collective action predicted individual changes in moral conviction over time through politicized identification and group-based anger toward the outgroup. Furthermore, moral conviction predicted participation in collective action over time-an effect consistently explained by politicized identification. These findings are the first to show that (a) participation in collective action moralizes individuals' attitudes because it politicizes their identity and enrages them vis-a-vis the (immoral) outgroup and that (b) moralization in turn helps to better understand sustained movement participation. Theoretical implications for the literature on moralization and collective action are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Crime is an issue with severe consequences for individuals, economies, and society at large. Developing effective crime prevention strategies requires a clear understanding of who is likely to engage in crime and why. A promising approach in this regard likely is integrating established criminological theories with established models of basic personality structure. Correspondingly, the present investigation derives hypotheses from three criminological theories-self-control theory/general theory of crime, situational action theory, and general strain theory-on the relation between the HEXACO personality dimensions and crime. The preregistered hypotheses were tested by linking HEXACO data of a Danish adult personality panel (N = 12,496) to official records on all criminal convictions of the participants registered within the past 41 years. Results revealed negative associations of honesty-humility, emotionality, agreeableness versus anger, and conscientiousness with crime (0.71 ≤ odds ratios ≤ 0.88). Except for agreeableness, effects were robust to controlling for relevant background variables (e.g., sex, age, education, income). The relation of the HEXACO dimensions varied only slightly across different types of offenses (e.g., interpersonal crimes, property crimes). In sum, this investigation provides a robust theoretical and empirical basis for how personality relates to crime. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).