Pub Date : 2023-11-30DOI: 10.32625/kjei.2023.31.247
Jiyoung Kim
Hungary’s Prime Minister Orbán Viktor and Fidesz came to power by exaggerating the opinions of some disaffected segments of the Hungarian population, particularly by capitalizing on anti-EU sentiment in the election. The Orbán government's policies have been labeled illiberal democracy. Hungary's undemocratic policies are characterized by restrictions on freedom of speech, assembly, and association, negative policies toward LGBT people, and unfriendly policies toward refugees. However, the Hungarian public recognizes the Orbán government's use of undemocratic policies, but supports it because it is accompanied by economic development. The European Union has criticized Hungary's undemocratic political behavior and has used the threat of suspending subsidies to force Orbán to change his policies. Hungary's economic development is largely due to EU support. Without the EU's economic and political support, it would be difficult to see Hungary's economic development in the future, so it is likely that Hungary will be more receptive to the EU's demands. In reality, the Hungarian government has no other alternative than to go against the EU. Of course, this assumes that Hungary's economic growth continues. If the economic situation deteriorates, there is plenty of room for Hungarian public opinion and the Orbán government's attitude to turn sharply anti-European.
{"title":"Hungary's Illliberal Democratic Policies and the EU's Response","authors":"Jiyoung Kim","doi":"10.32625/kjei.2023.31.247","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.32625/kjei.2023.31.247","url":null,"abstract":"Hungary’s Prime Minister Orbán Viktor and Fidesz came to power by exaggerating the opinions of some disaffected segments of the Hungarian population, particularly by capitalizing on anti-EU sentiment in the election. The Orbán government's policies have been labeled illiberal democracy. Hungary's undemocratic policies are characterized by restrictions on freedom of speech, assembly, and association, negative policies toward LGBT people, and unfriendly policies toward refugees. However, the Hungarian public recognizes the Orbán government's use of undemocratic policies, but supports it because it is accompanied by economic development. The European Union has criticized Hungary's undemocratic political behavior and has used the threat of suspending subsidies to force Orbán to change his policies. Hungary's economic development is largely due to EU support. Without the EU's economic and political support, it would be difficult to see Hungary's economic development in the future, so it is likely that Hungary will be more receptive to the EU's demands. In reality, the Hungarian government has no other alternative than to go against the EU. Of course, this assumes that Hungary's economic growth continues. If the economic situation deteriorates, there is plenty of room for Hungarian public opinion and the Orbán government's attitude to turn sharply anti-European.","PeriodicalId":167194,"journal":{"name":"Korean Society for European Integration","volume":"19 9","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139205983","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-31DOI: 10.32625/kjei.2023.30.237
Seokwoo Kim, Jiyoung Kim
This study examines the impact of COVID-19 on aid policy of donors. We aim to understand how COVID-19 global pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war followed by the economic stagnation worldwide have affected aid policy of major donor countries. This study first traces the changes in ODA of OECD DAC countries after the break out of COVID-19. Based on the understanding of the general pattern of aid policy after the COVID-19, we then compare and analyze the cases of the UK and Germany. Soon after the breakout of the COVID-19, the UK drastically decreased the amount of ODA and adopted the 'UK first policy' as the guiding principle of the UK ODA policy. On the other hand, the ODA volume of Germany has seen a significant increase during the period of the COVID-19 crisis and played a leading role in supporting international cooperation to meet COVID-19 crisis and protect global peace and order. This study highlights major factors that have affected such divergent aid policies of the UK and Germany.
{"title":"COVID-19 Global Pandemic and ODA Policy: A Comparative Study of the UK and Germany","authors":"Seokwoo Kim, Jiyoung Kim","doi":"10.32625/kjei.2023.30.237","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.32625/kjei.2023.30.237","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the impact of COVID-19 on aid policy of donors. We aim to understand how COVID-19 global pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war followed by the economic stagnation worldwide have affected aid policy of major donor countries. This study first traces the changes in ODA of OECD DAC countries after the break out of COVID-19. Based on the understanding of the general pattern of aid policy after the COVID-19, we then compare and analyze the cases of the UK and Germany. Soon after the breakout of the COVID-19, the UK drastically decreased the amount of ODA and adopted the 'UK first policy' as the guiding principle of the UK ODA policy. On the other hand, the ODA volume of Germany has seen a significant increase during the period of the COVID-19 crisis and played a leading role in supporting international cooperation to meet COVID-19 crisis and protect global peace and order. This study highlights major factors that have affected such divergent aid policies of the UK and Germany.","PeriodicalId":167194,"journal":{"name":"Korean Society for European Integration","volume":"82 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115759133","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-31DOI: 10.32625/kjei.2023.30.63
J. Kim
Today’s socio-demographic changes are based on parameters such as natural population growth rates, such as births and deaths, and migration abroad by emigration and immigration. Migration phenomena record the permanent evolution of inflows and outflows of people affected by a variety of factors. The factors that caused migration are very diverse, and depending on the era, they were influenced by social (war, invasion, and disease), natural (natural phenomena, earthquakes, floods), political (exportation), and economic (low wages, high costs, high prices, etc.) factors. Among these, economic factors, especially economic power and purchasing power, and the gap in wage levels between countries of origin and destination have the greatest influence. Migration flows from countries with low economic and purchasing power to developed countries are significant. After World War II, Romania's demographic history experienced three inflection points. The first is the temporary population increase caused by Ceausescu’s fertility policy in the 1960s and the continued decline thereafter. The second is the decline in the birth rate due to the economic situation immediately after the fall of socialism and the gradual decline in mortality due to the development of universal welfare and medical technology. The third is the ongoing change of population in the freedom of migration due to the integrated transition. Romanian international migration before 1989 is based on two mechanisms. One was permanent migration due to political and ethnic issues, and the other was temporary migration for study or employment based on an agreement between the governments of the other countries. However, since 1989, the main reasons for international migration have changed from political and racial issues to unified economic reasons. Thus, the trend of temporary migration has increased both in the number and percentage of total migrants. The world economy and Romania's integration into the EU have brought important changes in terms of economic development, purchasing power and population mobility within the EU. Migration refers to the change of residence of a person under the influence of various economic, political and social factors in relation to the country of origin or destination. During the transition to integration since 2007, international migration in Romania is characterized by two parallel trends: ‘emigration’ and ‘immigration’. The former is the emigration of Romanian citizens abroad, the latter is mainly the Republic of Moldova and foreign nationals from third countries to Romania. One of the most striking phenomena today is that the purpose of international migration is no longer driven by money or economic motives, but by various issues such as culture, education, society and health.
{"title":"The Social and Demographic Trends of Romanians before and after Transition to Integration","authors":"J. Kim","doi":"10.32625/kjei.2023.30.63","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.32625/kjei.2023.30.63","url":null,"abstract":"Today’s socio-demographic changes are based on parameters such as natural population growth rates, such as births and deaths, and migration abroad by emigration and immigration. Migration phenomena record the permanent evolution of inflows and outflows of people affected by a variety of factors. The factors that caused migration are very diverse, and depending on the era, they were influenced by social (war, invasion, and disease), natural (natural phenomena, earthquakes, floods), political (exportation), and economic (low wages, high costs, high prices, etc.) factors. Among these, economic factors, especially economic power and purchasing power, and the gap in wage levels between countries of origin and destination have the greatest influence. Migration flows from countries with low economic and purchasing power to developed countries are significant. After World War II, Romania's demographic history experienced three inflection points. The first is the temporary population increase caused by Ceausescu’s fertility policy in the 1960s and the continued decline thereafter. The second is the decline in the birth rate due to the economic situation immediately after the fall of socialism and the gradual decline in mortality due to the development of universal welfare and medical technology. The third is the ongoing change of population in the freedom of migration due to the integrated transition. Romanian international migration before 1989 is based on two mechanisms. One was permanent migration due to political and ethnic issues, and the other was temporary migration for study or employment based on an agreement between the governments of the other countries. However, since 1989, the main reasons for international migration have changed from political and racial issues to unified economic reasons. Thus, the trend of temporary migration has increased both in the number and percentage of total migrants. The world economy and Romania's integration into the EU have brought important changes in terms of economic development, purchasing power and population mobility within the EU. Migration refers to the change of residence of a person under the influence of various economic, political and social factors in relation to the country of origin or destination. During the transition to integration since 2007, international migration in Romania is characterized by two parallel trends: ‘emigration’ and ‘immigration’. The former is the emigration of Romanian citizens abroad, the latter is mainly the Republic of Moldova and foreign nationals from third countries to Romania. One of the most striking phenomena today is that the purpose of international migration is no longer driven by money or economic motives, but by various issues such as culture, education, society and health.","PeriodicalId":167194,"journal":{"name":"Korean Society for European Integration","volume":"158 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131171564","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-31DOI: 10.32625/kjei.2023.30.275
Sung-Won Yoon
It has been more than 30 years since the Treaty of Maastricht officially introduced cultural policy in 1992. Cultural policy has been restructured in accordance with the EU’s Multi-annual Financial Framework. Sometimes the policy had to change its official programmes and its policy orientation had to change as well, accordingly. Cultural policy in earlier times implemented various cultural programmes in which different foci were given in providing financial support. DIfferent programmes supported either cultural heritage preservation, performing art or literary translation depending on their respective objectives of the programmes. From the year 2000 onwards, however, the existing programmes were converged into a single programme as the EU emphasised the effectiveness of operating different programmes in a single instrument. From 2014, the focal point of the cultural policy is cultural and creative sectors. The ‘Creative Europe’ programme the EU introduced for the sake of establishing creative Europe, integrated audiovisual policy (which had existed separately from cultural policy) into the programme aiming at strengthening cultural and creative sectors in the digital era. In addition, the EU proclaimed that it will actively make use of culture in its external relations in its communication on ‘International Cultural Relations’. While expanding various types of ‘networks’ through Creative Europe at a global level, the EU makes attempt to establish ‘European Spaces of Culture’ worldwide in the end. By doing so, the EU pursues enhancing its position as a global actor in this field.
{"title":"Some Considerations of the EU’s International Cultural Strategy","authors":"Sung-Won Yoon","doi":"10.32625/kjei.2023.30.275","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.32625/kjei.2023.30.275","url":null,"abstract":"It has been more than 30 years since the Treaty of Maastricht officially introduced cultural policy in 1992. Cultural policy has been restructured in accordance with the EU’s Multi-annual Financial Framework. Sometimes the policy had to change its official programmes and its policy orientation had to change as well, accordingly. Cultural policy in earlier times implemented various cultural programmes in which different foci were given in providing financial support. DIfferent programmes supported either cultural heritage preservation, performing art or literary translation depending on their respective objectives of the programmes. From the year 2000 onwards, however, the existing programmes were converged into a single programme as the EU emphasised the effectiveness of operating different programmes in a single instrument. From 2014, the focal point of the cultural policy is cultural and creative sectors. The ‘Creative Europe’ programme the EU introduced for the sake of establishing creative Europe, integrated audiovisual policy (which had existed separately from cultural policy) into the programme aiming at strengthening cultural and creative sectors in the digital era. In addition, the EU proclaimed that it will actively make use of culture in its external relations in its communication on ‘International Cultural Relations’. While expanding various types of ‘networks’ through Creative Europe at a global level, the EU makes attempt to establish ‘European Spaces of Culture’ worldwide in the end. By doing so, the EU pursues enhancing its position as a global actor in this field.","PeriodicalId":167194,"journal":{"name":"Korean Society for European Integration","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125491136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-31DOI: 10.32625/kjei.2023.30.141
Yoo-Joung Kim
This study examines and compares the visions of de Gaulle and Monnet for Europe, considering both their shared aspirations and perceived differences. Both figures played significant roles in shaping European international relations throughout the 20th century, but their portrayals often diverged. De Gaulle is often characterized as a nationalist figure, while Monnet is often revered as ‘the Father of European Integration'. While the prevailing narrative emphasizes the divergences between De Gaulle and Monnet, it is important to acknowledge that they shared the same dream of a strong Europe built upon a strong France. Both de Gaulle and Monnet recognized the necessity of European integration in maintaining European peace, addressing the 'German Problem' after World War II, and creating a strong and independent Europe. However, they differed significantly in their approaches to constructing Europe, particularly in terms of methods, institutions, and relationships with the United States. These differences often resulted in conflicts between the two leaders, especially regarding the issue of British participation in the EEC and the Europe-United States relationship. By comparing de Gaulle's Europe to Monnet's Europe, this study aims to enhance our understanding of their contributions to European integration and shed light on the complex motivations and ambitions that influenced their visions of Europe.
{"title":"같은 꿈, 다른 야망: 1960년대 샤를르 드골의 유럽과 장 모네의 유럽","authors":"Yoo-Joung Kim","doi":"10.32625/kjei.2023.30.141","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.32625/kjei.2023.30.141","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines and compares the visions of de Gaulle and Monnet for Europe, considering both their shared aspirations and perceived differences. Both figures played significant roles in shaping European international relations throughout the 20th century, but their portrayals often diverged. De Gaulle is often characterized as a nationalist figure, while Monnet is often revered as ‘the Father of European Integration'. While the prevailing narrative emphasizes the divergences between De Gaulle and Monnet, it is important to acknowledge that they shared the same dream of a strong Europe built upon a strong France. Both de Gaulle and Monnet recognized the necessity of European integration in maintaining European peace, addressing the 'German Problem' after World War II, and creating a strong and independent Europe. However, they differed significantly in their approaches to constructing Europe, particularly in terms of methods, institutions, and relationships with the United States. These differences often resulted in conflicts between the two leaders, especially regarding the issue of British participation in the EEC and the Europe-United States relationship. By comparing de Gaulle's Europe to Monnet's Europe, this study aims to enhance our understanding of their contributions to European integration and shed light on the complex motivations and ambitions that influenced their visions of Europe.","PeriodicalId":167194,"journal":{"name":"Korean Society for European Integration","volume":"106 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131754962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-31DOI: 10.32625/kjei.2023.30.307
Yeonbo Jeong
This paper delves into the concept of the ‘Français de l'Orient,’ invented by the Lebanese Maronite intellectuals and the French Romantic intellectuals in the 19th century. The downfall of Mehmet Ali Pasha in 1840, coupled with the banishment of Bashir Shihab II, triggered a crisis within the Maronite Church due to its close political, social, and religious ties with Bashir II, the contemporary political leader. Seeking to restore the Shihab dynasty, the Maronite Church turned to Western powers for assistance, with France responding to their plea. Positioning itself as the protector of Catholics within the Ottoman Empire, France supplanted the Holy See. However, the defeat of Mehmet Ali by the Ottoman Empire and Allied forces also jeopardized France's influence over Syria. Amid this dual crisis, the Maronite Church and France embarked on constructing an imagined identity called ‘Français de l'Orient,’ drawing from the shared historical context of the ‘Crusade.’ This identity portrayed the Maronites, who had previously established a Christian state in the Levant with French crusaders, as the ‘Crusaders of the East.’ Essentially, the Lebanese Maronites were presented as brethren of France, united by cultural, religious, and historical bonds. Therefore, this paper posits that the ‘Français de l'Orient’ is a fictional entity created by the Maronite Church and France to serve their political interests, subsequently exploited by the French during their colonization of Syria and Lebanon.
本文探讨了“法国东方”的概念，这一概念是由黎巴嫩马龙派知识分子和法国浪漫主义知识分子在19世纪发明的。1840年穆罕默德·阿里·帕夏的倒台，再加上巴希尔·希哈布二世的流放，引发了马龙派教会内部的危机，因为它与当代政治领袖巴希尔二世有着密切的政治、社会和宗教联系。为了恢复什叶派王朝，马龙派教会转向西方列强寻求援助，法国回应了他们的请求。法国将自己定位为奥斯曼帝国内天主教徒的保护者，取代了罗马教廷。然而，穆罕默德·阿里被奥斯曼帝国和盟军击败也危及了法国对叙利亚的影响力。在这种双重危机中，马龙派教会和法国从“十字军东征”的共同历史背景出发，着手构建一种名为“法国东方”(francarais de l’orient)的想象身份。马龙派曾与法国十字军在黎凡特建立了一个基督教国家，这种身份将马龙派描述为“东方的十字军”。从本质上讲，黎巴嫩马龙派教徒被认为是法国的兄弟，因为文化、宗教和历史的纽带而团结在一起。因此，本文认为“franais de l’orient”是一个虚构的实体，由马龙派教会和法国创造，以服务于他们的政治利益，随后被法国在叙利亚和黎巴嫩殖民期间利用。
{"title":"Invented ‘Français de l'Orient’: Memories of Lebanese Maronites and France","authors":"Yeonbo Jeong","doi":"10.32625/kjei.2023.30.307","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.32625/kjei.2023.30.307","url":null,"abstract":"This paper delves into the concept of the ‘Français de l'Orient,’ invented by the Lebanese Maronite intellectuals and the French Romantic intellectuals in the 19th century. The downfall of Mehmet Ali Pasha in 1840, coupled with the banishment of Bashir Shihab II, triggered a crisis within the Maronite Church due to its close political, social, and religious ties with Bashir II, the contemporary political leader. Seeking to restore the Shihab dynasty, the Maronite Church turned to Western powers for assistance, with France responding to their plea. Positioning itself as the protector of Catholics within the Ottoman Empire, France supplanted the Holy See. However, the defeat of Mehmet Ali by the Ottoman Empire and Allied forces also jeopardized France's influence over Syria. Amid this dual crisis, the Maronite Church and France embarked on constructing an imagined identity called ‘Français de l'Orient,’ drawing from the shared historical context of the ‘Crusade.’ This identity portrayed the Maronites, who had previously established a Christian state in the Levant with French crusaders, as the ‘Crusaders of the East.’ Essentially, the Lebanese Maronites were presented as brethren of France, united by cultural, religious, and historical bonds. Therefore, this paper posits that the ‘Français de l'Orient’ is a fictional entity created by the Maronite Church and France to serve their political interests, subsequently exploited by the French during their colonization of Syria and Lebanon.","PeriodicalId":167194,"journal":{"name":"Korean Society for European Integration","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115518626","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-31DOI: 10.32625/kjei.2023.30.91
Jong Seog Kim, Yong-deog Kim
The region called ‘Eastern Europe’ in Korea lies between three European seas - the Adriatic Sea, the Baltic Sea, and the Black Sea. In the Polish academic world, this region was called Central Europe, Central-Eastern Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, Central and Southern Europe, or several other ways, depending on time and conditions. And each of these names had justification to be called that. In this paper, the authors will focus on the use of the term ‘Central Europe’ and make the argument. Based on the research achievements of the Institute of Political Studies, the Polish Academy of Sciences, the current discourse in Polish academic world is the subject of this thesis. Numerous attempts have been made to define the concept of Central Europe in Polish literature on international relations. In this process, controversy often arose over which countries should be included in the Central European region. In this paper, while developing the thesis on Central European terminology, it was divided into four stages by period. With the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian War in 2022, the concept of ‘Central-Eastern Europe’, which was widely used in Polish academic world, began to lose its reason for existence. In the authors’ opinion, it seems logical to refer to the territory of the Three Seas Initiative as Central Europe. In other words, we conclude that it is reasonable to call Central Europe the group of 12 countries of the Three Seas Initiative, which are members of the European Union.
{"title":"A Study on Territory Names for Eastern Europe Discussed in Polish Academic World","authors":"Jong Seog Kim, Yong-deog Kim","doi":"10.32625/kjei.2023.30.91","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.32625/kjei.2023.30.91","url":null,"abstract":"The region called ‘Eastern Europe’ in Korea lies between three European seas - the Adriatic Sea, the Baltic Sea, and the Black Sea. In the Polish academic world, this region was called Central Europe, Central-Eastern Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, Central and Southern Europe, or several other ways, depending on time and conditions. And each of these names had justification to be called that. In this paper, the authors will focus on the use of the term ‘Central Europe’ and make the argument. Based on the research achievements of the Institute of Political Studies, the Polish Academy of Sciences, the current discourse in Polish academic world is the subject of this thesis. Numerous attempts have been made to define the concept of Central Europe in Polish literature on international relations. In this process, controversy often arose over which countries should be included in the Central European region. In this paper, while developing the thesis on Central European terminology, it was divided into four stages by period. With the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian War in 2022, the concept of ‘Central-Eastern Europe’, which was widely used in Polish academic world, began to lose its reason for existence. In the authors’ opinion, it seems logical to refer to the territory of the Three Seas Initiative as Central Europe. In other words, we conclude that it is reasonable to call Central Europe the group of 12 countries of the Three Seas Initiative, which are members of the European Union.","PeriodicalId":167194,"journal":{"name":"Korean Society for European Integration","volume":"119 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123477971","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-31DOI: 10.32625/kjei.2023.30.175
S. Yang
In the ‘Gorbachev-Baker talks’ held in Moscow on February 9, 1990, J. Baker's statement to Gorbachev that NATO would not expand “one inch to the east” has sparked controversy. Researchers who evaluate NATO's eastward expansion as a policy failure interpret Baker's statement as a diplomatic commitment not to expand NATO into Eastern Europe, which NATO violated by expanding into Eastern Europe. However, such interpretations are closer to a “myth” when examining the situation at the time of the “Gorbachev-Baker talks”. In fact, this “talk” was part of the overall process in which the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France continued to contact and negotiate over the acceptance, process, and international and military nature of a unified Germany. In the process of making the “one inch” statement, Baker first restricted NATO's deployment to “West Germany”, from which we can see that the “one inch to the east” that NATO would not enter refers to “East Germany”, not “Eastern Europe”. At the time, the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact was still intact in Eastern Europe, and Soviet troops were stationed in East Germany, so it was not a situation where Baker could throw out NATO's Eastward expansion as a concession to Gorbachev. In this sense, it is appropriate to see the “East” in the “Gorbachev-Baker talks” as referring to “East Germany”, as confirmed by Gorbachev in a clear tone.
{"title":"A Broken Promise?: ‘The Gorbachev-Baker Conversation’ and the Meaning of NATO’s “one inch to the east”","authors":"S. Yang","doi":"10.32625/kjei.2023.30.175","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.32625/kjei.2023.30.175","url":null,"abstract":"In the ‘Gorbachev-Baker talks’ held in Moscow on February 9, 1990, J. Baker's statement to Gorbachev that NATO would not expand “one inch to the east” has sparked controversy. Researchers who evaluate NATO's eastward expansion as a policy failure interpret Baker's statement as a diplomatic commitment not to expand NATO into Eastern Europe, which NATO violated by expanding into Eastern Europe. However, such interpretations are closer to a “myth” when examining the situation at the time of the “Gorbachev-Baker talks”. In fact, this “talk” was part of the overall process in which the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France continued to contact and negotiate over the acceptance, process, and international and military nature of a unified Germany. In the process of making the “one inch” statement, Baker first restricted NATO's deployment to “West Germany”, from which we can see that the “one inch to the east” that NATO would not enter refers to “East Germany”, not “Eastern Europe”. At the time, the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact was still intact in Eastern Europe, and Soviet troops were stationed in East Germany, so it was not a situation where Baker could throw out NATO's Eastward expansion as a concession to Gorbachev. In this sense, it is appropriate to see the “East” in the “Gorbachev-Baker talks” as referring to “East Germany”, as confirmed by Gorbachev in a clear tone.","PeriodicalId":167194,"journal":{"name":"Korean Society for European Integration","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131225006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-31DOI: 10.32625/kjei.2023.30.33
O. Lee
Wrocław is the first city that earned the title in Poland, ‘European Capital of Culture(ECoC)’. Wrocław is a city with a dynamic history. From the Middle Ages to the Modern, Wrocław experienced the destruction of multicultural city after World War II, the migration and exchange of Polish and German residents, the communist era, and the process of the transition. Wrocław, as the ECoC tried to deliver the unique and tragic historical aspects at the level of beginning and the citizens endeavored to consider the identity of the city they shared own history and identity. Thanks to the various program of the ECoC, Wrocław had a chance to contemplate the changes in its culture from the past through the present to the future. Also, through the opportunity of the project, Wrocław could scrutinize the European cultural identity that its have. Not only residents in Wrocław and Lower Silesian Voivodeship but also all Poles fulfilled their substantial cultural benefits with the ECoC Projects. In addition, the program provided a chance for Poland and Wrocław to declare that they were part of Europe clearly. The project was useful to Wrocław. Wrocław has experienced the creation of jobs and vitalization of the service industry as well as the economic effect followed by attracting tourists to urban development. Also, the program supported numerous artists in Wrocław, thus they could expand their activity area from Poland to the whole Europe continent.
{"title":"European Capital of Culture Wrocław and European Cultural Identity","authors":"O. Lee","doi":"10.32625/kjei.2023.30.33","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.32625/kjei.2023.30.33","url":null,"abstract":"Wrocław is the first city that earned the title in Poland, ‘European Capital of Culture(ECoC)’. Wrocław is a city with a dynamic history. From the Middle Ages to the Modern, Wrocław experienced the destruction of multicultural city after World War II, the migration and exchange of Polish and German residents, the communist era, and the process of the transition. Wrocław, as the ECoC tried to deliver the unique and tragic historical aspects at the level of beginning and the citizens endeavored to consider the identity of the city they shared own history and identity. Thanks to the various program of the ECoC, Wrocław had a chance to contemplate the changes in its culture from the past through the present to the future. Also, through the opportunity of the project, Wrocław could scrutinize the European cultural identity that its have. Not only residents in Wrocław and Lower Silesian Voivodeship but also all Poles fulfilled their substantial cultural benefits with the ECoC Projects. In addition, the program provided a chance for Poland and Wrocław to declare that they were part of Europe clearly. The project was useful to Wrocław. Wrocław has experienced the creation of jobs and vitalization of the service industry as well as the economic effect followed by attracting tourists to urban development. Also, the program supported numerous artists in Wrocław, thus they could expand their activity area from Poland to the whole Europe continent.","PeriodicalId":167194,"journal":{"name":"Korean Society for European Integration","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125429858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-31DOI: 10.32625/kjei.2023.30.211
H. Cho
Recently, the Covid-19 crisis and the war in Ukraine have emphasized the question of the ‘raison d’ê̂tre’ of the European Union. These two crises have been the catalyzing processes revealing the nature of European integration through the shock waves and pressures on Europe. This research aims at analyzing the theoretical question of the relationship between crisis and integration – “Does crisis bring about integration?” - through a concrete case study. The covid-19 crisis seems to have so far strengthened European integration. However the European reaction to covid-19 crisis has not automatically and mechanically led to integration like the often cited formula of Jean Monnet. The first impact of the covid-19 crisis was rather the destruction of one of the most substantial achievements of European integration; Not only the freedom of movement had to be suspended to prevent disease expansion, but member-states also demonstrated non cooperative behaviour. It is only in a second step that Europe reacted cooperatively through policy integration on both health and financial sectors, with strong potential for further structural reinforcement. The main focus of this article is to describe those factors which form the basis of the macro-linkage between the covid-19 crisis and European integration in the period 2020-2023. I conclude by raising the need to compare this European covid-19 crisis study with other regions or/and other European crises.
{"title":"Covid-19 Crisis and European Integration","authors":"H. Cho","doi":"10.32625/kjei.2023.30.211","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.32625/kjei.2023.30.211","url":null,"abstract":"Recently, the Covid-19 crisis and the war in Ukraine have emphasized the question of the ‘raison d’ê̂tre’ of the European Union. These two crises have been the catalyzing processes revealing the nature of European integration through the shock waves and pressures on Europe. This research aims at analyzing the theoretical question of the relationship between crisis and integration – “Does crisis bring about integration?” - through a concrete case study. The covid-19 crisis seems to have so far strengthened European integration. However the European reaction to covid-19 crisis has not automatically and mechanically led to integration like the often cited formula of Jean Monnet. The first impact of the covid-19 crisis was rather the destruction of one of the most substantial achievements of European integration; Not only the freedom of movement had to be suspended to prevent disease expansion, but member-states also demonstrated non cooperative behaviour. It is only in a second step that Europe reacted cooperatively through policy integration on both health and financial sectors, with strong potential for further structural reinforcement. The main focus of this article is to describe those factors which form the basis of the macro-linkage between the covid-19 crisis and European integration in the period 2020-2023. I conclude by raising the need to compare this European covid-19 crisis study with other regions or/and other European crises.","PeriodicalId":167194,"journal":{"name":"Korean Society for European Integration","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117219323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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