Many scholars deploy a deep-rooted perception that the participation of countries in the European Union (EU) involves a loss, or at least a limitation, of national sovereignty. The argument has widespread acceptance among Eurosceptic and Europhile sectors (but not only). This essay aims at, firstly, finding out whether the modernisation of political science (of which European integration studies is an emanation) lies at the heart of the deconstruction of national sovereignty as a concept. Pegging to this non-mainstream approach, the essay challenges the monolithic perception of sovereignty, searching for new avenues that bring fresh blood to the analysis and trigger the re-conceptualisation of sovereignty. Secondly, the essay borrows on the analytical tools of European integration critics to challenge mainstream thinking, trying to measure the effects of European integration on national sovereignty. The core argument is that sovereignty needs to be deconstructed and then re-constructed. To that purpose, the concept of sovereignty must consider the current political-economic context at the worldwide level.
{"title":"European Integration and Sovereignty: A Proposal of Re-conceptualisation","authors":"Paulo Vila Maior","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3419012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3419012","url":null,"abstract":"Many scholars deploy a deep-rooted perception that the participation of countries in the European Union (EU) involves a loss, or at least a limitation, of national sovereignty. The argument has widespread acceptance among Eurosceptic and Europhile sectors (but not only). This essay aims at, firstly, finding out whether the modernisation of political science (of which European integration studies is an emanation) lies at the heart of the deconstruction of national sovereignty as a concept. Pegging to this non-mainstream approach, the essay challenges the monolithic perception of sovereignty, searching for new avenues that bring fresh blood to the analysis and trigger the re-conceptualisation of sovereignty. Secondly, the essay borrows on the analytical tools of European integration critics to challenge mainstream thinking, trying to measure the effects of European integration on national sovereignty. The core argument is that sovereignty needs to be deconstructed and then re-constructed. To that purpose, the concept of sovereignty must consider the current political-economic context at the worldwide level.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122522798","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We investigate the impact of robot adoption on electoral outcomes in 14 Western European countries, between 1993 and 2016. We employ both official election results at the district level and individual-level voting data, combined with party ideology scores from the Manifesto Project. We measure exposure to automation both at the regional level, based on the ex-ante industry specialization of each region, and at the individual level, based on individual characteristics and pre-sample employment patterns in the region of residence. We instrument robot adoption in each country using the pace of robot adoption in other countries. Higher exposure to robot adoption is found to increase support for nationalist and radicalright parties. Unveiling some potential transmission channels, higher robot exposure at the individual level leads to poorer perceived economic conditions andwell-being, lower satisfaction with the government and democracy, and a reduction in perceived political self-efficacy.
{"title":"We Were the Robots: Automation and Voting Behavior in Western Europe","authors":"M. Anelli, Italo Colantone, Piero Stanig","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3419966","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3419966","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the impact of robot adoption on electoral outcomes in 14 Western European countries, between 1993 and 2016. We employ both official election results at the district level and individual-level voting data, combined with party ideology scores from the Manifesto Project. We measure exposure to automation both at the regional level, based on the ex-ante industry specialization of each region, and at the individual level, based on individual characteristics and pre-sample employment patterns in the region of residence. We instrument robot adoption in each country using the pace of robot adoption in other countries. Higher exposure to robot adoption is found to increase support for nationalist and radicalright parties. Unveiling some potential transmission channels, higher robot exposure at the individual level leads to poorer perceived economic conditions andwell-being, lower satisfaction with the government and democracy, and a reduction in perceived political self-efficacy.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122533542","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This report provides a methodology for defining and identifying true swing states in US presidential elections. After these states are identified by cross-tabulating high-performing states under the categories of battleground (states with the lowest margin between competitors), shift (states with the highest frequency of flipping from Republican to Democrat or vice-versa), and bellwether (the accuracy of a state to vote concurrently with the winner of the electoral college) during the US presidential elections from 1992 through 2016, an examination is completed to determine any similarities among these states in terms of median household income, population density, racial demographics, political party affiliation, voter behavior, and voter registration. These states are then compared to national averages to determine if the “average swing state†can be identified. Hecht and Schultz utilize a four-point method for identifying swing states. This report attempts to utilize less arbitrary data, using a three-point methodology: battleground, shift, and bellwether.
{"title":"What Makes a State Swing?","authors":"Jonathan L. Clayton","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3434071","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3434071","url":null,"abstract":"This report provides a methodology for defining and identifying true swing states in US presidential elections. After these states are identified by cross-tabulating high-performing states under the categories of battleground (states with the lowest margin between competitors), shift (states with the highest frequency of flipping from Republican to Democrat or vice-versa), and bellwether (the accuracy of a state to vote concurrently with the winner of the electoral college) during the US presidential elections from 1992 through 2016, an examination is completed to determine any similarities among these states in terms of median household income, population density, racial demographics, political party affiliation, voter behavior, and voter registration. These states are then compared to national averages to determine if the “average swing state†can be identified. Hecht and Schultz utilize a four-point method for identifying swing states. This report attempts to utilize less arbitrary data, using a three-point methodology: battleground, shift, and bellwether.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129742924","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When property rights are poorly secured, crony relations i.e. the tight connection between the owners of major firms and the government are the primary informal mechanism securing the property. However, this institutional framework creates high entry barriers on markets. We propose a theory that explains why in a democracy the majority of voters may prefer this type of institutions. This paper develops a simple voting model with heterogeneous agents, which differ in their skills and wealth endowment. We show that if the policy space is two-dimensional, the wealthy elite and low-skilled workers may form a majority coalition, supporting the regime with high-entry barriers. In this case, the wealthy elite agrees on a higher level of redistribution, preferred by the least skilled agents. We compare the possibility of this outcome for different voting rules, and prove that the electoral support of crony capitalism is more likely for countries with a low level of human capital and high income and skill inequality. The model is also able to explain different effects of democratization process on the institutional structure of the society.
{"title":"Crony Capitalism as An Electoral Outcome","authors":"D. Veselov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3409834","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3409834","url":null,"abstract":"When property rights are poorly secured, crony relations i.e. the tight connection between the owners of major firms and the government are the primary informal mechanism securing the property. However, this institutional framework creates high entry barriers on markets. We propose a theory that explains why in a democracy the majority of voters may prefer this type of institutions. This paper develops a simple voting model with heterogeneous agents, which differ in their skills and wealth endowment. We show that if the policy space is two-dimensional, the wealthy elite and low-skilled workers may form a majority coalition, supporting the regime with high-entry barriers. In this case, the wealthy elite agrees on a higher level of redistribution, preferred by the least skilled agents. We compare the possibility of this outcome for different voting rules, and prove that the electoral support of crony capitalism is more likely for countries with a low level of human capital and high income and skill inequality. The model is also able to explain different effects of democratization process on the institutional structure of the society.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129732864","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Solidarity in teamwork situations is important for the success and longevity of teams. This paper studies how helping group members is affected when groups are randomly merged and increase in size. Group mergers put social norms that are prevailing in previously small groups to the test as new team members may not share the same norms and values. I present results from an experiment in which subjects interact in groups and face the decision to help a group member who is in need of help due to an exogenous shock. Subjects interact in small groups in the first part of the experiment and groups are randomly merged to form big groups in the second part of the experiment. Helping rates are higher in merged groups compared with big groups that stay in the same constellation throughout the experiment. Moreover, in merged groups, high helping norms are more influential compared with low helping norms.
{"title":"When Two Become One: How Group Mergers Affect Solidarity","authors":"J. Schmitz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3121054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3121054","url":null,"abstract":"Solidarity in teamwork situations is important for the success and longevity of teams. This paper studies how helping group members is affected when groups are randomly merged and increase in size. Group mergers put social norms that are prevailing in previously small groups to the test as new team members may not share the same norms and values. I present results from an experiment in which subjects interact in groups and face the decision to help a group member who is in need of help due to an exogenous shock. Subjects interact in small groups in the first part of the experiment and groups are randomly merged to form big groups in the second part of the experiment. Helping rates are higher in merged groups compared with big groups that stay in the same constellation throughout the experiment. Moreover, in merged groups, high helping norms are more influential compared with low helping norms.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133553432","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What explains voters’ negative attitudes toward immigration? Self-interested voters care about their personal economic and social circumstances. Sociotropic voters display in-group bias and perceive migrants as threats to their customs and culture. We study the electoral effects of forced internal and international migration in Colombia to provide evidence on the relative importance of these two hypotheses. We exploit the fact that migrants disproportionally locate in places with earlier settlements of people from their place of origin. In line with the sociotropic hypothesis, we find that only international migration inflows increase political participation and shift votes from left- to right-wing ideologies. Also consistent with the sociotropic hypothesis, we show that these results are not accounted for by the observed changes caused by migration inflows on socioeconomic variables.
{"title":"Brothers or Invaders? How Crisis-Driven Migrants Shape Voting Behavior","authors":"S. Rozo, Juan F. Vargas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3401036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3401036","url":null,"abstract":"What explains voters’ negative attitudes toward immigration? Self-interested voters care about their personal economic and social circumstances. Sociotropic voters display in-group bias and perceive migrants as threats to their customs and culture. We study the electoral effects of forced internal and international migration in Colombia to provide evidence on the relative importance of these two hypotheses. We exploit the fact that migrants disproportionally locate in places with earlier settlements of people from their place of origin. In line with the sociotropic hypothesis, we find that only international migration inflows increase political participation and shift votes from left- to right-wing ideologies. Also consistent with the sociotropic hypothesis, we show that these results are not accounted for by the observed changes caused by migration inflows on socioeconomic variables.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125477067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
M. Battaglini, Eleonora Patacchini, Edoardo Rainone
We present a model of the U.S. Congress in which social connections among Congress members are endogenous and matter for their legislative activity. We propose a novel equilibrium concept for the network formation game that allows for a sharp characterization of equilibrium behavior and that yields a unique prediction under testable conditions. While the equilibrium is characterized by a large number of nonlinear equations, we show that the model can be structurally estimated by an appropriately designed Approximate Bayesian Computation method. Estimating the model using data from the 109th to 113th U.S. Congresses, we show that social connections are important for legislators' productivities and we identify some of the key determinants of social centralities in Congress.
{"title":"Endogenous Social Connections in Legislatures","authors":"M. Battaglini, Eleonora Patacchini, Edoardo Rainone","doi":"10.3386/W25988","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W25988","url":null,"abstract":"We present a model of the U.S. Congress in which social connections among Congress members are endogenous and matter for their legislative activity. We propose a novel equilibrium concept for the network formation game that allows for a sharp characterization of equilibrium behavior and that yields a unique prediction under testable conditions. While the equilibrium is characterized by a large number of nonlinear equations, we show that the model can be structurally estimated by an appropriately designed Approximate Bayesian Computation method. Estimating the model using data from the 109th to 113th U.S. Congresses, we show that social connections are important for legislators' productivities and we identify some of the key determinants of social centralities in Congress.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121486531","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Although researchers have explored policy attitudes in domains that require expertise (e.g., medicine), less research has explored policy attitudes related to economic policies that also require expertise to understand. This paper examines public opinion about a balanced budget amendment (BBA) to the U.S. Constitution. Using data from 38 national public opinion polls conducted over 36 years, we find that support for a BBA is related to respondent and contextual factors. Support for a BBA has become more polarized along party and ideological lines over time, and implications of a BBA for other policies affect people's support for an amendment.
{"title":"Public Support for a Balanced Budget Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Trends and Predictors","authors":"A. Crosby, Allyson Holbrook","doi":"10.1111/pbaf.12213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pbaf.12213","url":null,"abstract":"Although researchers have explored policy attitudes in domains that require expertise (e.g., medicine), less research has explored policy attitudes related to economic policies that also require expertise to understand. This paper examines public opinion about a balanced budget amendment (BBA) to the U.S. Constitution. Using data from 38 national public opinion polls conducted over 36 years, we find that support for a BBA is related to respondent and contextual factors. Support for a BBA has become more polarized along party and ideological lines over time, and implications of a BBA for other policies affect people's support for an amendment.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124376818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Laurent Bouton, Jorge Gallego, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, R. Morton
We study experimentally the properties of the majority runoff system and compare them to those of plurality rule. Our focus is on Duverger’s famous prediction that the plurality rule leads to higher coordination of votes on a limited number of candidates than the majority runoff rule. We find strong coordination forces under both systems. However, as predicted by the theory, in some cases these forces are stronger under plurality. Despite these differences in voting behavior, we find small and mostly not significant differences in electoral outcomes and hence voters’ welfare.
{"title":"Runoff Elections in the Laboratory","authors":"Laurent Bouton, Jorge Gallego, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, R. Morton","doi":"10.3386/W25949","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W25949","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We study experimentally the properties of the majority runoff system and compare them to those of plurality rule. Our focus is on Duverger’s famous prediction that the plurality rule leads to higher coordination of votes on a limited number of candidates than the majority runoff rule. We find strong coordination forces under both systems. However, as predicted by the theory, in some cases these forces are stronger under plurality. Despite these differences in voting behavior, we find small and mostly not significant differences in electoral outcomes and hence voters’ welfare.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121368296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We suggest that flexible majority rules for currency issuance decisions foster the stability of a cryptocurrency. With flexible majority rules, the voteshare needed to approve a particular currency issuance growth is increasing with this growth rate. By choosing suitable parameters for these flexible majority rules, we show that optimal growth rates can be achieved in simple settings. Moreover, with flexible majority rules, changes in the composition of growth-friendly and growth-adverse agents only have a comparatively moderate impact on growth rates, and extreme growth rates are avoided. Finally, we show that optimal money growth rates are realized if agents entering financial contracts anticipate ensuing inflation rates determined by these flexible majority rules.
{"title":"Democratic Currency Issuance","authors":"H. Gersbach","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3406656","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3406656","url":null,"abstract":"We suggest that flexible majority rules for currency issuance decisions foster the stability of a cryptocurrency. With flexible majority rules, the voteshare needed to approve a particular currency issuance growth is increasing with this growth rate. By choosing suitable parameters for these flexible majority rules, we show that optimal growth rates can be achieved in simple settings. Moreover, with flexible majority rules, changes in the composition of growth-friendly and growth-adverse agents only have a comparatively moderate impact on growth rates, and extreme growth rates are avoided. Finally, we show that optimal money growth rates are realized if agents entering financial contracts anticipate ensuing inflation rates determined by these flexible majority rules.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121407643","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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