Not so long ago, an alternative to American hegemony and progressive isolationism was elaborated by non-aligned segments of the international left. In the search for potentially usable models from the past, this paper will shed light on the New International Economic Order (NIEO). Promulgated as a United Nations resolution in 1974, and drafted by leaders in the Global South, the NIEO was one of the most widely discussed transnational governance reforms of the twentieth century. This paper will argue that the NIEO was an exercise in utopian realism that fundamentally depended on foregrounding the global security dilemma and defending the legitimacy and lasting utility nation-state. As a result of these commitments, the NIEO's proponents unwittingly self-limited their chances for long-term success on the international stage.
{"title":"The New International Economic Order, Utopian Realism, and the Recovery of an Alternative Vision for Global Governance","authors":"Giuliana Chamedes","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3448694","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3448694","url":null,"abstract":"Not so long ago, an alternative to American hegemony and progressive isolationism was elaborated by non-aligned segments of the international left. In the search for potentially usable models from the past, this paper will shed light on the New International Economic Order (NIEO). Promulgated as a United Nations resolution in 1974, and drafted by leaders in the Global South, the NIEO was one of the most widely discussed transnational governance reforms of the twentieth century. This paper will argue that the NIEO was an exercise in utopian realism that fundamentally depended on foregrounding the global security dilemma and defending the legitimacy and lasting utility nation-state. As a result of these commitments, the NIEO's proponents unwittingly self-limited their chances for long-term success on the international stage.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131020143","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How did political dynasties fare in the 2019 midterm elections? This paper extends and analyzes the Ateneo Policy Center’s political dynasties dataset, covering the period from 1988 to 2019. It finds evidence that over the past 30 years (or 10 election periods), political dynasties have become fatter. Covering all local positions, the percentage of fat dynasties has increased from 19% in 1988 to 29% in 2017, growing at about 1%, or around 170 positions, per election period. In 2001, there were 1303 political clans with 2 family members, 257 political clans with 3 family members, and 157 political clans with 4 or more family members. These numbers have risen to 1443, 335 and 189, respectively, in 2010, and to 1548, 339, and 217, respectively in 2019. It is clear that fat political dynasties continue their domination and expansion in the Philippine political landscape; and this has serious implications on the state of competition in Philippine politics, governance and ultimately development outcomes.
{"title":"From Fat to Obese: Political Dynasties after the 2019 Midterm Elections","authors":"R. Mendoza, Leonardo M. Jaminola, Jurel K. Yap","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3449201","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3449201","url":null,"abstract":"How did political dynasties fare in the 2019 midterm elections? This paper extends and analyzes the Ateneo Policy Center’s political dynasties dataset, covering the period from 1988 to 2019. It finds evidence that over the past 30 years (or 10 election periods), political dynasties have become fatter. Covering all local positions, the percentage of fat dynasties has increased from 19% in 1988 to 29% in 2017, growing at about 1%, or around 170 positions, per election period. In 2001, there were 1303 political clans with 2 family members, 257 political clans with 3 family members, and 157 political clans with 4 or more family members. These numbers have risen to 1443, 335 and 189, respectively, in 2010, and to 1548, 339, and 217, respectively in 2019. It is clear that fat political dynasties continue their domination and expansion in the Philippine political landscape; and this has serious implications on the state of competition in Philippine politics, governance and ultimately development outcomes.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121341759","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This research examines the role of fundamental beliefs in the environment, anthropocentrism, and the economy in public preferences toward policies aimed at mitigating the risks of climate change as well as the heterogeneity in those beliefs. We argue that citizens hold multiple considerations toward policies related to global warming and that rather than making policy choices more difficult leading to attitudinal ambivalence, these various beliefs reduce the response variability around individual preferences. Further, we argue that individuals with more knowledge about the causes and consequences of global warming should have more variance around their policy preferences. The analysis of a national telephone survey related to climate change reveals that 1) many people are generally supportive of policies to reduce the risks of global warming 2) the amount of support varies according to specific policy proposals 3) policy preferences are mostly of function of beliefs toward the environment and the economy and subjective risk perceptions and 4) the variation around individual policy preferences decreases among individuals that simultaneously hold competing values and expectations toward the environment, the economy, and human dominance over nature. These results indicate that multiple considerations do not necessarily lead to ambivalence among public preferences for policies to reduce the risks of climate change. In addition, the results show that individuals with more knowledge about the causes and consequences of climate change are generally more supportive of policies to limit the risks of global warming, but also have more variation around those preferences.
{"title":"Climate Change Preferences and Values","authors":"Kim Conrad","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3446417","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3446417","url":null,"abstract":"This research examines the role of fundamental beliefs in the environment, anthropocentrism, and the economy in public preferences toward policies aimed at mitigating the risks of climate change as well as the heterogeneity in those beliefs. We argue that citizens hold multiple considerations toward policies related to global warming and that rather than making policy choices more difficult leading to attitudinal ambivalence, these various beliefs reduce the response variability around individual preferences. Further, we argue that individuals with more knowledge about the causes and consequences of global warming should have more variance around their policy preferences. The analysis of a national telephone survey related to climate change reveals that 1) many people are generally supportive of policies to reduce the risks of global warming 2) the amount of support varies according to specific policy proposals 3) policy preferences are mostly of function of beliefs toward the environment and the economy and subjective risk perceptions and 4) the variation around individual policy preferences decreases among individuals that simultaneously hold competing values and expectations toward the environment, the economy, and human dominance over nature. These results indicate that multiple considerations do not necessarily lead to ambivalence among public preferences for policies to reduce the risks of climate change. In addition, the results show that individuals with more knowledge about the causes and consequences of climate change are generally more supportive of policies to limit the risks of global warming, but also have more variation around those preferences.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125029534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Much of what we know about the alignment of voters with parties comes from mass surveys of the electorate in the postwar period or from aggregate electoral data. Using individual elector level panel data from 19th-century United Kingdom poll books, we reassess the development of a party-centred electorate. We show that (i) the electorate was party-centred by the time of the extension of the franchise in 1867; (ii) a decline in candidate-centred voting is largely attributable to changes in the behaviour of the working class; and (iii) the enfranchised working class aligned with the Liberal left. This early alignment of the working class with the left cannot entirely be explained by a decrease in vote buying. The evidence suggests instead that the alignment was based on the programmatic appeal of the Liberals. We argue that these facts can plausibly explain the subsequent development of the party system.
{"title":"Victorian Voting: The Origins of Party Orientation and Class Alignment","authors":"Torun Dewan, Jaakko Meriläinen, Janne Tukiainen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3112208","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3112208","url":null,"abstract":"Much of what we know about the alignment of voters with parties comes from mass surveys of the electorate in the postwar period or from aggregate electoral data. Using individual elector level panel data from 19th-century United Kingdom poll books, we reassess the development of a party-centred electorate. We show that (i) the electorate was party-centred by the time of the extension of the franchise in 1867; (ii) a decline in candidate-centred voting is largely attributable to changes in the behaviour of the working class; and (iii) the enfranchised working class aligned with the Liberal left. This early alignment of the working class with the left cannot entirely be explained by a decrease in vote buying. The evidence suggests instead that the alignment was based on the programmatic appeal of the Liberals. We argue that these facts can plausibly explain the subsequent development of the party system.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124081568","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study the optimal intervention policy to stop projects in a relational contract between a principal and a policymaker. The policymaker is privately informed about his ability and privately chooses how much effort to exert. Before a project is completed, the principal receives a signal about its outcome and can intervene to stop it. Intervention may prevent a bad outcome, but no intervention leads to better learning about the policymaker’s ability. In the benchmarks with observable effort or observable ability, optimal intervention follows a threshold rule. With unobservable effort and ability, the optimal policy switches between intervention and no intervention. (JEL D78, D82, D86)
{"title":"Wait-and-See or Step In? Dynamics of Interventions","authors":"Dana Foarta, Takuo Sugaya","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3243123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3243123","url":null,"abstract":"We study the optimal intervention policy to stop projects in a relational contract between a principal and a policymaker. The policymaker is privately informed about his ability and privately chooses how much effort to exert. Before a project is completed, the principal receives a signal about its outcome and can intervene to stop it. Intervention may prevent a bad outcome, but no intervention leads to better learning about the policymaker’s ability. In the benchmarks with observable effort or observable ability, optimal intervention follows a threshold rule. With unobservable effort and ability, the optimal policy switches between intervention and no intervention. (JEL D78, D82, D86)","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128660542","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
From signaling trends in nationalization and partisanship to clarifying preferences for divided government, split-ticket voting has received copious attention in political science. Important insights often rely on survey data, as they do among practitioners searching for persuadable voters. Yet it is unknown whether surveys accurately capture this behavior. We take advantage of a novel source of data to validate survey-based estimates of split-ticket voting. Cast vote records in South Carolina (2010-18) and Maryland (2016-18) provide anonymized individual level choices in all races on the ballot for every voter in each election, serving as the ground truth. We collect an array of public and private survey data to execute the comparison and calculate survey error. Despite expectations about partisan consistency pressures leading to survey underestimates, we find that surveys generally come close to the true split-ticket voting rates in our set of races. Accuracy varies, but notably is more consistent for split-ticket voting in a given dyad of national races (e.g., President vs. U.S. House) than in one with state races, as the former is often of greater interest in research and practice.
{"title":"Ground Truth Validation of Survey Estimates of Split-Ticket Voting with Cast Vote Records Data","authors":"A. Agadjanian, Jonathan Robinson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3443722","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3443722","url":null,"abstract":"From signaling trends in nationalization and partisanship to clarifying preferences for divided government, split-ticket voting has received copious attention in political science. Important insights often rely on survey data, as they do among practitioners searching for persuadable voters. Yet it is unknown whether surveys accurately capture this behavior. We take advantage of a novel source of data to validate survey-based estimates of split-ticket voting. Cast vote records in South Carolina (2010-18) and Maryland (2016-18) provide anonymized individual level choices in all races on the ballot for every voter in each election, serving as the ground truth. We collect an array of public and private survey data to execute the comparison and calculate survey error. Despite expectations about partisan consistency pressures leading to survey underestimates, we find that surveys generally come close to the true split-ticket voting rates in our set of races. Accuracy varies, but notably is more consistent for split-ticket voting in a given dyad of national races (e.g., President vs. U.S. House) than in one with state races, as the former is often of greater interest in research and practice.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133899029","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Under the UK government’s policy of "reformulation", food products are subject to government targets for the reduction of salt, sugar, and calories. This empowers Public Health England to monitor and regulate the composition of virtually every part of the prepared food supply, including both ready-meals and supermarket biscuits and the recipes of cafés and restaurants. It represents the largest extension of state control over the British diet since rationing. The reformulation scheme is highly bureaucratic. Since 2017, there have been 220 different active salt and sugar targets. Proposals for new calorie reduction targets include a baffling range of food products, which most people would not consider unhealthy. Many of the targets are surreal, with the guideline for sugar content in nut butters being less than that naturally occurring in cashew nuts. Reformulation has been driven less by nutritional science than by the concerns of an out-of-touch state bureaucracy.
Food reformulation is an irrational bureaucratic standard, which will detach the food market from the tastes, preferences, and nutritional goals of consumers. Food products will end up being designed, not primarily to please the public, but to meet the arbitrary targets set by health bureaucrats.
{"title":"Cooking for Bureaucrats: Why the Policy of Food Reformulation is Hard to Stomach","authors":"J. Appleton","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3852609","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3852609","url":null,"abstract":"Under the UK government’s policy of \"reformulation\", food products are subject to government targets for the reduction of salt, sugar, and calories. This empowers Public Health England to monitor and regulate the composition of virtually every part of the prepared food supply, including both ready-meals and supermarket biscuits and the recipes of cafés and restaurants. It represents the largest extension of state control over the British diet since rationing. The reformulation scheme is highly bureaucratic. Since 2017, there have been 220 different active salt and sugar targets. Proposals for new calorie reduction targets include a baffling range of food products, which most people would not consider unhealthy. Many of the targets are surreal, with the guideline for sugar content in nut butters being less than that naturally occurring in cashew nuts. Reformulation has been driven less by nutritional science than by the concerns of an out-of-touch state bureaucracy. <br><br>Food reformulation is an irrational bureaucratic standard, which will detach the food market from the tastes, preferences, and nutritional goals of consumers. Food products will end up being designed, not primarily to please the public, but to meet the arbitrary targets set by health bureaucrats.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114126755","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Statistical methods are developed for assessing the likelihood of prejudicial bias in agent-assigned permutations, such as the ordering of candidates on an election ballot. The null hypothesis of an unbiased order assignment is represented by several forms of probabilistic exchangeability of the random orderings, while bias is represented either by compatibility with an assumed ranking of the items with respect to a hypothesized preference criterion (PC) or by linear concordance with assumed scores of the items on a PC scale. A power analysis indicates the superiority of these methods to a neutral alternative when appropriate a priori information is available; their usefulness is affirmed in an application to the ordering of candidates on 2014 Texas Republican primary election ballots. Significant evidence of bias is found in three of the five races studied, a finding that does not obtain using currently available tests.
{"title":"Targeted Testing for Bias in Order Assignment, with an Application to Texas Election Ballots","authors":"Sheridan Grant, M. Perlman, D. Grant","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3436471","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3436471","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Statistical methods are developed for assessing the likelihood of prejudicial bias in agent-assigned permutations, such as the ordering of candidates on an election ballot. The null hypothesis of an unbiased order assignment is represented by several forms of probabilistic exchangeability of the random orderings, while bias is represented either by compatibility with an assumed ranking of the items with respect to a hypothesized preference criterion (PC) or by linear concordance with assumed scores of the items on a PC scale. A power analysis indicates the superiority of these methods to a neutral alternative when appropriate a priori information is available; their usefulness is affirmed in an application to the ordering of candidates on 2014 Texas Republican primary election ballots. Significant evidence of bias is found in three of the five races studied, a finding that does not obtain using currently available tests.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129371787","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Research Summary The emerging practice of “impact investing” optimizes both financial and social outcomes, and thus promises to support hybrid organizations that simultaneously pursue financial and social goals. We argue, however, that impact investing decisions may be prone to behavioral factors that limit their outcome efficiency. In a portfolio allocation task designed to reflect the essential features of an impact investing decision, we find across a range of scenarios that individuals systematically fail to choose investment portfolios that achieve financial and social outcomes efficiently and thereby waste opportunities for value creation. We further show in online and in‐person experiments that outcome inefficiency is related to “categorical cognition”: suppression of categorical labels on investment options increases efficiency. Managerial Summary The “impact investing” approach promises to encourage greater financial investments in hybrid organizations that pursue a combination of financial and social goals. We experimentally demonstrate a challenge of this approach: People struggle to identify portfolios of investments that simultaneously optimize across financial and social outcomes. This is partly due to “categorical cognition”: a natural tendency to view investments in terms of known categories rather than the actual outcomes they produce. Our experiments show that removing the labels “for‐profit company,” “charity,” and “social enterprise” from investment options—thus making it more difficult to think about them categorically—increases outcome‐efficient allocations. We therefore show that realizing the full potential of impact investing will require that investors transcend conventional thinking about business and charity as separate domains.
{"title":"Categorical Cognition and Outcome Efficiency in Impact Investing Decisions","authors":"Matthew K. O. Lee, A. Adbi, Jasjit Singh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3236194","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3236194","url":null,"abstract":"Research Summary The emerging practice of “impact investing” optimizes both financial and social outcomes, and thus promises to support hybrid organizations that simultaneously pursue financial and social goals. We argue, however, that impact investing decisions may be prone to behavioral factors that limit their outcome efficiency. In a portfolio allocation task designed to reflect the essential features of an impact investing decision, we find across a range of scenarios that individuals systematically fail to choose investment portfolios that achieve financial and social outcomes efficiently and thereby waste opportunities for value creation. We further show in online and in‐person experiments that outcome inefficiency is related to “categorical cognition”: suppression of categorical labels on investment options increases efficiency. Managerial Summary The “impact investing” approach promises to encourage greater financial investments in hybrid organizations that pursue a combination of financial and social goals. We experimentally demonstrate a challenge of this approach: People struggle to identify portfolios of investments that simultaneously optimize across financial and social outcomes. This is partly due to “categorical cognition”: a natural tendency to view investments in terms of known categories rather than the actual outcomes they produce. Our experiments show that removing the labels “for‐profit company,” “charity,” and “social enterprise” from investment options—thus making it more difficult to think about them categorically—increases outcome‐efficient allocations. We therefore show that realizing the full potential of impact investing will require that investors transcend conventional thinking about business and charity as separate domains.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113971207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I develop a formal model of political campaigns in which candidates choose how to distribute their resources over two different policy issues. I assume that campaigning on an issue has two simultaneous effects, both rooted in social and cognitive psychology: It increases the perceived quality of the advertising candidate in that issue and it makes the issue more salient, thereby increasing the issue's perceived importance to the voters. Whether a candidate can increase his vote share during the contest depends on the interplay of strategic issue selection, which depends on candidates' comparative advantages, and the aggregate resource allocation to the issues. The aggregate resource allocation---or campaign agenda---depends on an issue's importance, the firmness of voters' conviction regarding candidates' relative quality, and the divisiveness of this issue. A candidate increases his vote share during the campaign contest if he has a comparative advantage on the issue that receives more aggregate spending. Consequently, the contest may be biased in one candidate's favor and an a priori less popular candidate might be the actual odds on favorite. I show that a relatively unimportant issue might receive most aggregate spending and thus could decide the election.
{"title":"Campaign Contests","authors":"Philipp Denter","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3495106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3495106","url":null,"abstract":"I develop a formal model of political campaigns in which candidates choose how to distribute their resources over two different policy issues. I assume that campaigning on an issue has two simultaneous effects, both rooted in social and cognitive psychology: It increases the perceived quality of the advertising candidate in that issue and it makes the issue more salient, thereby increasing the issue's perceived importance to the voters. Whether a candidate can increase his vote share during the contest depends on the interplay of strategic issue selection, which depends on candidates' comparative advantages, and the aggregate resource allocation to the issues. The aggregate resource allocation---or campaign agenda---depends on an issue's importance, the firmness of voters' conviction regarding candidates' relative quality, and the divisiveness of this issue. A candidate increases his vote share during the campaign contest if he has a comparative advantage on the issue that receives more aggregate spending. Consequently, the contest may be biased in one candidate's favor and an a priori less popular candidate might be the actual odds on favorite. I show that a relatively unimportant issue might receive most aggregate spending and thus could decide the election.<br>","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133934842","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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