Abstract A corpus of 360 distinct early modern printed editions (from 1472 to 1650) containing Johannes de Sacrobosco’s Tractatus de sphaera is “dissected” into a corpus of 540 text-parts, 241 of them re-occurring at least once. Through the exploration of the data, we recognized a relevant position for four anonymous authors in their social network. We demonstrate that the text-parts originally assigned to the anonymous authors were authored or edited by Georg Rheticus. By means of data analysis, we conclusively establish that Rheticus profoundly impacted the content of such textbooks for the introductory class in geocentric astronomy all over Europe between 1538 and 1629.
包含Johannes de Sacrobosco的《球体论》(Tractatus de sphaera)的360个不同的早期现代印刷版本的语料库(从1472年到1650年)被“解剖”成540个文本部分的语料库，其中241个至少重复出现一次。通过对数据的探索，我们发现了四位匿名作者在他们的社交网络中的相关位置。我们证明了最初分配给匿名作者的文本部分是由Georg Rheticus撰写或编辑的。通过数据分析，我们最终确定，Rheticus深刻地影响了1538年至1629年间整个欧洲的地心说天文学入门类教科书的内容。
{"title":"The Hidden Praeceptor: How Georg Rheticus Taught Geocentric Cosmology to Europe","authors":"M. Valleriani, Beate Federau, Olya Nicolaeva","doi":"10.1162/posc_a_00421","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/posc_a_00421","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A corpus of 360 distinct early modern printed editions (from 1472 to 1650) containing Johannes de Sacrobosco’s Tractatus de sphaera is “dissected” into a corpus of 540 text-parts, 241 of them re-occurring at least once. Through the exploration of the data, we recognized a relevant position for four anonymous authors in their social network. We demonstrate that the text-parts originally assigned to the anonymous authors were authored or edited by Georg Rheticus. By means of data analysis, we conclusively establish that Rheticus profoundly impacted the content of such textbooks for the introductory class in geocentric astronomy all over Europe between 1538 and 1629.","PeriodicalId":19867,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Science","volume":"65 1","pages":"407-436"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73464323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Questions about how closure is achieved in disputes involving new observational or experimental claims have highlighted the role of bodily knowledge possibly irreducible to written experimental protocols and instructions how to build and operate instruments. This essay asks similar questions about a scenario that is both related and significantly different: the replication of an invention, not of an observation or the instrument through which it produced. Furthermore, the machine considered here—Galileo’s compass or sector—was not a typical industrial invention (like a spinning jenny), but a mathematical invention (a calculator), that is, a machine that produces numbers, not yarn. This case study describes some of the similarities and differences between replicating experiments, traditional machines producing material outputs, and mathematical inventions yielding calculations or information. This comparison indicates that, as in other kinds of replication, the replication of mathematical inventions involves texts (the calculator’s instructions) but that in this case bodily knowledge cannot be properly described as either tacit or explicit. It rather takes the shape of memory—muscle memory—that may be recalled from reading the instructions.
{"title":"Replicating Mathematical Inventions: Galileo’s Compass, Its Instructions, Its Students","authors":"M. Biagioli","doi":"10.1162/posc_a_00422","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/posc_a_00422","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Questions about how closure is achieved in disputes involving new observational or experimental claims have highlighted the role of bodily knowledge possibly irreducible to written experimental protocols and instructions how to build and operate instruments. This essay asks similar questions about a scenario that is both related and significantly different: the replication of an invention, not of an observation or the instrument through which it produced. Furthermore, the machine considered here—Galileo’s compass or sector—was not a typical industrial invention (like a spinning jenny), but a mathematical invention (a calculator), that is, a machine that produces numbers, not yarn. This case study describes some of the similarities and differences between replicating experiments, traditional machines producing material outputs, and mathematical inventions yielding calculations or information. This comparison indicates that, as in other kinds of replication, the replication of mathematical inventions involves texts (the calculator’s instructions) but that in this case bodily knowledge cannot be properly described as either tacit or explicit. It rather takes the shape of memory—muscle memory—that may be recalled from reading the instructions.","PeriodicalId":19867,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Science","volume":"274 1","pages":"437-462"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77575542","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ever since its foundation in 1540, the Society of Jesus had had one mission—to restore order where Luther, Calvin and the other instigators of the Reformation had brought chaos. To stop the hemorrhage of believers, the Jesuits needed to form a united front. No signs of internal disagreement could to be shown to the outside world, lest the congregation lose its credibility. But in 1570s two prominent Jesuits, Cristophorus Clavius and Benito Perera, had engaged in a bitter controversy. The issue at stake had apparently nothing to do with the values on which Ignazio of Loyola had built the Society of Jesus. And yet the dispute between Clavius and Perera was matter of concern for the entire Jesuit community. They were arguing over the certitude of mathematics. There are many ways of telling the stories of Renaissance mathematics. Starting with the Quaestio de certitudine mathematicarum—the dispute that involved Clavius and Perera—is just an example. One may, as Carl Boyer does in his A History of Mathematics (Merzbach and Boyer 2011), begin by outlining the conditions that allowed mathematics to reach new heights in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Chief among these conditions were the rediscovery of Greek geometry—in particular the works of Euclid and Apollonius—and the Latin translations of Arabic algebraic and arithmetic treatises. Or, following the example of Klein (1968), one may trace the transformations undergone by ancient concepts such as that of arithmos (number in Greek) during Renaissance times. But, I believe, no event epitomizes the spirit of Renaissance mathematics better than the Quaestio.
自1540年成立以来，耶稣会一直肩负着一个使命——在路德、加尔文和其他宗教改革的发起者带来混乱的地方恢复秩序。为了阻止信徒的流失，耶稣会需要形成一个统一战线。任何内部分歧的迹象都不能向外界展示，以免教会失去信誉。但在1570年代，两位著名的耶稣会士，克里斯托夫鲁斯·克拉维斯和贝尼托·佩雷拉，进行了一场激烈的争论。这个问题显然与罗耀拉的伊格纳齐奥建立耶稣会的价值观无关。然而，克拉维斯和佩雷拉之间的争论是整个耶稣会社区关注的问题。他们在争论数学的确定性。讲述文艺复兴时期数学的故事有很多种方式。从克拉维乌斯和佩雷拉之间的数学确定性问题开始，就是一个例子。正如卡尔·博耶(Carl Boyer)在他的《数学史》(Merzbach and Boyer 2011)中所做的那样，人们可以从概述16和17世纪数学达到新高度的条件开始。在这些条件中，最主要的是希腊几何学的重新发现——特别是欧几里得和阿波罗尼的著作——以及阿拉伯代数和算术论文的拉丁文翻译。或者，以克莱因(1968)为例，我们可以追溯文艺复兴时期算术(希腊语中的数字)等古代概念所经历的转变。但是，我相信，没有什么事件比《问题》更能体现文艺复兴时期的数学精神了。
{"title":"Introduction: The Idiosyncratic Nature of Renaissance Mathematics","authors":"P. Rossini","doi":"10.1162/posc_e_00419","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/posc_e_00419","url":null,"abstract":"Ever since its foundation in 1540, the Society of Jesus had had one mission—to restore order where Luther, Calvin and the other instigators of the Reformation had brought chaos. To stop the hemorrhage of believers, the Jesuits needed to form a united front. No signs of internal disagreement could to be shown to the outside world, lest the congregation lose its credibility. But in 1570s two prominent Jesuits, Cristophorus Clavius and Benito Perera, had engaged in a bitter controversy. The issue at stake had apparently nothing to do with the values on which Ignazio of Loyola had built the Society of Jesus. And yet the dispute between Clavius and Perera was matter of concern for the entire Jesuit community. They were arguing over the certitude of mathematics. There are many ways of telling the stories of Renaissance mathematics. Starting with the Quaestio de certitudine mathematicarum—the dispute that involved Clavius and Perera—is just an example. One may, as Carl Boyer does in his A History of Mathematics (Merzbach and Boyer 2011), begin by outlining the conditions that allowed mathematics to reach new heights in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Chief among these conditions were the rediscovery of Greek geometry—in particular the works of Euclid and Apollonius—and the Latin translations of Arabic algebraic and arithmetic treatises. Or, following the example of Klein (1968), one may trace the transformations undergone by ancient concepts such as that of arithmos (number in Greek) during Renaissance times. But, I believe, no event epitomizes the spirit of Renaissance mathematics better than the Quaestio.","PeriodicalId":19867,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Science","volume":"62 1","pages":"353-357"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75292905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The gods that guard the poles have been assigned the function of assembling the separate and unifying the manifold members of the whole, while those appointed to the axes keep the circuits in everlasting revolution around and around. And if I may add my own conceit, the centers and poles of all the spheres symbolize the wry-necked gods (τῶν ίυγγικῶν θεῶν) by imitating the mysterious union and synthesis which they effect; the axes represent the connectors (συνοχάς) of all the cosmic orders … and the very spheres are likenesses of the perfecting divinities (τῶν τελεσιουργῶν θεῶν) … (Proclus 1992a, pp. 74–5; 1873, pp. 90–91)1 Proclus’s Commentary on the First Book of Euclid’s Elements contains one of the most important discussions of the nature of mathematical objects and preserves a wealth of historical information about mathematics from antiquity. However, large sections of the text have been neglected by scholars since the text’s first publication in the sixteenth century. Proclus expounds at length on correspondences between mathematical objects and the gods. At times he uses the language of “theurgy,” the ritual practices that later Neoplatonists insisted were necessary for the human soul to ascend to the intelligibles. The contention of this article is that the Commentary, taken as a whole, concerns the practice of “inner theurgy,” mental rituals used by advanced students to raise the soul beyond its assigned bounds. This practice can be traced back to Plotinus and the very beginnings of Neoplatonism; however, the particular methods presented by Proclus are his own development. This interpretation of the Commentary is supported by Proclus’s works Commentary on the Parmenides and Platonic Theology. Parts of the Commentary that have been studied carefully by modern scholars, especially the theory of the mathematical phantasia or imagination, will be shown to be crucial elements in Proclus’s theory and practice of inner theurgy.
{"title":"Geometry and the Gods: Theurgy in Proclus’s Commentary on the First Book of Euclid’s Elements","authors":"Robert Goulding","doi":"10.1162/posc_a_00420","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/posc_a_00420","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The gods that guard the poles have been assigned the function of assembling the separate and unifying the manifold members of the whole, while those appointed to the axes keep the circuits in everlasting revolution around and around. And if I may add my own conceit, the centers and poles of all the spheres symbolize the wry-necked gods (τῶν ίυγγικῶν θεῶν) by imitating the mysterious union and synthesis which they effect; the axes represent the connectors (συνοχάς) of all the cosmic orders … and the very spheres are likenesses of the perfecting divinities (τῶν τελεσιουργῶν θεῶν) … (Proclus 1992a, pp. 74–5; 1873, pp. 90–91)1 Proclus’s Commentary on the First Book of Euclid’s Elements contains one of the most important discussions of the nature of mathematical objects and preserves a wealth of historical information about mathematics from antiquity. However, large sections of the text have been neglected by scholars since the text’s first publication in the sixteenth century. Proclus expounds at length on correspondences between mathematical objects and the gods. At times he uses the language of “theurgy,” the ritual practices that later Neoplatonists insisted were necessary for the human soul to ascend to the intelligibles. The contention of this article is that the Commentary, taken as a whole, concerns the practice of “inner theurgy,” mental rituals used by advanced students to raise the soul beyond its assigned bounds. This practice can be traced back to Plotinus and the very beginnings of Neoplatonism; however, the particular methods presented by Proclus are his own development. This interpretation of the Commentary is supported by Proclus’s works Commentary on the Parmenides and Platonic Theology. Parts of the Commentary that have been studied carefully by modern scholars, especially the theory of the mathematical phantasia or imagination, will be shown to be crucial elements in Proclus’s theory and practice of inner theurgy.","PeriodicalId":19867,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Science","volume":"4 1","pages":"358-406"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83476629","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In this paper I analyze the physical content of the main information concepts in the history of physics of the last seven decades. I argue that this physical character should be evaluated not by appealing to analytical-linguistic confusion (Timpson 2013) or to the usefulness of its applicability (Lombardi et al. 2016a), but properly from its capacity to allow us to acquire significant knowledge about the physical world. After systematically employing this epistemic criterion of physical significance I will conclude by rejecting the main strategies of ontological inflation and physical content of the main information concepts in the classical thermal physics literature.
本文分析了近70年来物理史上主要信息概念的物理内容。我认为，不应该通过分析语言混淆(Timpson 2013)或其适用性的有用性(Lombardi et al. 2016a)来评估这种物理特性，而应该从它允许我们获得关于物理世界的重要知识的能力来评估。在系统地采用这种物理意义的认知标准之后，我将通过拒绝经典热物理文献中主要信息概念的本体论膨胀和物理内容的主要策略来结束。
{"title":"Can Information Concepts Have Physical Content?","authors":"Javier Anta","doi":"10.1162/posc_a_00424","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/posc_a_00424","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper I analyze the physical content of the main information concepts in the history of physics of the last seven decades. I argue that this physical character should be evaluated not by appealing to analytical-linguistic confusion (Timpson 2013) or to the usefulness of its applicability (Lombardi et al. 2016a), but properly from its capacity to allow us to acquire significant knowledge about the physical world. After systematically employing this epistemic criterion of physical significance I will conclude by rejecting the main strategies of ontological inflation and physical content of the main information concepts in the classical thermal physics literature.","PeriodicalId":19867,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Science","volume":"46 1","pages":"207-232"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85328025","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Anthropologist Tim Ingold promotes Indigenous animism as a salve for perceived failures in modern science; failures he claims also hobbled his own early work. In fact, both Ingold’s early and later work rely on modern scientific ideas and images. His turn to animism marks not an exit from the history of European science, but an entrance into, and imaginative elaboration of, distinctly Neoplatonic themes within that history. This turn marks, too, a clear but unacknowledged departure from systematic social analysis. By re-embracing social analysis, Ingold would overcome the obscurity that now hobbles his later work.
{"title":"Ingold’s Animism and European Science","authors":"Jeff Kochan","doi":"10.1162/posc_a_00425","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/posc_a_00425","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Anthropologist Tim Ingold promotes Indigenous animism as a salve for perceived failures in modern science; failures he claims also hobbled his own early work. In fact, both Ingold’s early and later work rely on modern scientific ideas and images. His turn to animism marks not an exit from the history of European science, but an entrance into, and imaginative elaboration of, distinctly Neoplatonic themes within that history. This turn marks, too, a clear but unacknowledged departure from systematic social analysis. By re-embracing social analysis, Ingold would overcome the obscurity that now hobbles his later work.","PeriodicalId":19867,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Science","volume":"35 1","pages":"783-817"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78392961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The increasing success of the evidence-based policy movement is raising the demand of empirically informed decision making. As arguably any policy decision happens under conditions of uncertainty, following our best available evidence to reduce the uncertainty seems a requirement of good decision making. However, not all the uncertainty faced by decision makers can be resolved by evidence. In this paper, we build on a philosophical analysis of uncertainty to identify the boundaries of scientific advice in policy decision making. We start by introducing a distinction between empirical and non-empirical types of uncertainty, and we explore the role of two non-empirical uncertainties in the context of policy making. We argue that the authority of scientific advisors is limited to empirical uncertainty and cannot extend beyond it. While the appeal of evidence-based policy rests on a view of scientific advice as limited to empirical uncertainty, in practice there is a risk of over reliance on experts beyond the legitimate scope of their authority. We conclude by applying our framework to a real-world case of evidence-based policy, where experts have overstepped their boundaries by ignoring non-empirical types of uncertainty.
{"title":"Non-Empirical Uncertainties in Evidence-Based Decision Making","authors":"Malvina Ongaro, M. Andreoletti","doi":"10.1162/posc_a_00416","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/posc_a_00416","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The increasing success of the evidence-based policy movement is raising the demand of empirically informed decision making. As arguably any policy decision happens under conditions of uncertainty, following our best available evidence to reduce the uncertainty seems a requirement of good decision making. However, not all the uncertainty faced by decision makers can be resolved by evidence. In this paper, we build on a philosophical analysis of uncertainty to identify the boundaries of scientific advice in policy decision making. We start by introducing a distinction between empirical and non-empirical types of uncertainty, and we explore the role of two non-empirical uncertainties in the context of policy making. We argue that the authority of scientific advisors is limited to empirical uncertainty and cannot extend beyond it. While the appeal of evidence-based policy rests on a view of scientific advice as limited to empirical uncertainty, in practice there is a risk of over reliance on experts beyond the legitimate scope of their authority. We conclude by applying our framework to a real-world case of evidence-based policy, where experts have overstepped their boundaries by ignoring non-empirical types of uncertainty.","PeriodicalId":19867,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Science","volume":"68 2 1","pages":"305-320"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85576624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper presents a case of severe uncertainty in the development of autonomous and intelligent systems in Artificial Intelligence and autonomous robotics. After discussing how uncertainty emerges from the complexity of the systems and their interaction with unknown environments, the paper describes the novel framework of explorative experiments. This framework presents a suitable context in which many of the issues relative to uncertainty, both at the epistemological level and at the ethical one, in this field should be reframed. The case of autonomous robot systems for search and rescue is used to make the discussion more concrete.
{"title":"Explorative Experiments: A Paradigm Shift to Deal with Severe Uncertainty in Autonomous Robotics","authors":"V. Schiaffonati","doi":"10.1162/posc_a_00415","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/posc_a_00415","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper presents a case of severe uncertainty in the development of autonomous and intelligent systems in Artificial Intelligence and autonomous robotics. After discussing how uncertainty emerges from the complexity of the systems and their interaction with unknown environments, the paper describes the novel framework of explorative experiments. This framework presents a suitable context in which many of the issues relative to uncertainty, both at the epistemological level and at the ethical one, in this field should be reframed. The case of autonomous robot systems for search and rescue is used to make the discussion more concrete.","PeriodicalId":19867,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Science","volume":"39 1","pages":"284-304"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83524900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Integrated assessment models (IAMs) play a major role in the science and policy of climate change. Similarly to other widely used computational tools for addressing socially relevant problems, IAMs need to account for the key uncertainties characterizing processes and socio-economic responses. In the case of climate change, these are particularly complex given the very long-term nature of climate and the deep uncertainty characterizing technological and human systems. Here we draw from philosophical discussion of mathematical modeling of social problems and review the role of uncertainty in climate-economic modeling. In agreement with the literature, we highlight the crucial role of epistemic uncertainty in IAMs. We posit that the normative components of models, more than the physical and socio-techno-economic ones, are the most fraught by uncertainty and yet the least understood. We suggest a research agenda to explore uncertainties of evaluation frameworks, transcending the current implicit normativity of IAMs.
{"title":"Uncertainty in Integrated Assessment Modeling of Climate Change","authors":"M. Tavoni, Giovanni Valente","doi":"10.1162/posc_a_00417","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/posc_a_00417","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Integrated assessment models (IAMs) play a major role in the science and policy of climate change. Similarly to other widely used computational tools for addressing socially relevant problems, IAMs need to account for the key uncertainties characterizing processes and socio-economic responses. In the case of climate change, these are particularly complex given the very long-term nature of climate and the deep uncertainty characterizing technological and human systems. Here we draw from philosophical discussion of mathematical modeling of social problems and review the role of uncertainty in climate-economic modeling. In agreement with the literature, we highlight the crucial role of epistemic uncertainty in IAMs. We posit that the normative components of models, more than the physical and socio-techno-economic ones, are the most fraught by uncertainty and yet the least understood. We suggest a research agenda to explore uncertainties of evaluation frameworks, transcending the current implicit normativity of IAMs.","PeriodicalId":19867,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Science","volume":"3 1","pages":"321-351"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80943348","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Introduction: Severe Uncertainty in Science, Medicine, and Technology","authors":"M. Andreoletti, D. Chiffi, B. Taebi","doi":"10.1162/posc_e_00411","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/posc_e_00411","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":19867,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Science","volume":"27 1","pages":"201-209"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82437341","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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