Pub Date : 2021-05-04DOI: 10.1080/00323187.2021.2019592
V. Dinica
ABSTRACT This article explores how key political parties have operationalised the only three economic models discussed politically in New Zealand, since 2009: green growth (GG); circular economy (CE), bioeconomy (BE). For the later, two approaches are distinguished, given the different sustainability performance expected: a ‘natural bioeconomy’ (BE-1) and a ‘genetic engineering bioeconomy’ (BE-2). Findings indicate that all parties and governments have predominantly supported weak and partial sustainability operationalisations of these models. The conservative National Party conflates resource-intensive capitalism with GG and BE-2. The Labour Party’s approaches to CE and BE-1 are fragmented and narrow, with no overarching national strategies; since retaking power in 2017, governmental initiatives remain dominated by the timid GG approach of the past. Labour is mildly open towards several types of high-risk genetic-engineering, consistent with BE-2. The National Party supports BE-2 transitions as wholeheartedly as the Green Party opposes them. Surprisingly, Labour’s interest in BE-1 and CBE-1 innovations is limited, framed only by climate mitigation goals. It is unclear whether any political party New Zealand currently understands or wishes to implement contemporary conceptualisations of an innovative, ecologically-sound circular natural bioeconomy (CBE-1).
{"title":"New Zealand’s transition attempts to a more sustainable economy: political statements and governance realities","authors":"V. Dinica","doi":"10.1080/00323187.2021.2019592","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00323187.2021.2019592","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article explores how key political parties have operationalised the only three economic models discussed politically in New Zealand, since 2009: green growth (GG); circular economy (CE), bioeconomy (BE). For the later, two approaches are distinguished, given the different sustainability performance expected: a ‘natural bioeconomy’ (BE-1) and a ‘genetic engineering bioeconomy’ (BE-2). Findings indicate that all parties and governments have predominantly supported weak and partial sustainability operationalisations of these models. The conservative National Party conflates resource-intensive capitalism with GG and BE-2. The Labour Party’s approaches to CE and BE-1 are fragmented and narrow, with no overarching national strategies; since retaking power in 2017, governmental initiatives remain dominated by the timid GG approach of the past. Labour is mildly open towards several types of high-risk genetic-engineering, consistent with BE-2. The National Party supports BE-2 transitions as wholeheartedly as the Green Party opposes them. Surprisingly, Labour’s interest in BE-1 and CBE-1 innovations is limited, framed only by climate mitigation goals. It is unclear whether any political party New Zealand currently understands or wishes to implement contemporary conceptualisations of an innovative, ecologically-sound circular natural bioeconomy (CBE-1).","PeriodicalId":20275,"journal":{"name":"Political Science","volume":"73 1","pages":"181 - 214"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"58932213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-04DOI: 10.1080/00323187.2022.2037440
Sam Crawley, V. Dinica
ABSTRACT Politics is critical to understanding the pathways to a sustainable future. In recent years, a scholarly field has emerged, seeking to understand whether transitions towards more sustainable societies and economies occur and, if so, how they unfold. However, this field has not always fully incorporated the role of politics in shaping discourses, institutions and economic visions, or considered regions outside of Europe and North America. In this introduction to the special issue, we briefly review the field of sustainability transitions, highlighting the need to better capture the role played by political factors, institutions and (debates on) economic innovations in these transitions. We explain that sustainability is a contested concept, with two dominant conceptualisations: weak and strong sustainability. The framework of sustainability transitions allows us to position the contributions of the articles included in this special issue, which examine governance and institutions, media discourses, the role of industry and alternative economic models. The special issue focuses on two jurisdictions infrequently discussed in the literature on sustainability transitions: New Zealand and Australia. The special issue thus contributes new theoretical and empirical perspectives on the role of politics, political institutions and economic visions in sustainability transitions in the South Pacific.
{"title":"Institutionalising environmental sustainability transitions in New Zealand and Australia: Introduction to the special issue","authors":"Sam Crawley, V. Dinica","doi":"10.1080/00323187.2022.2037440","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00323187.2022.2037440","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Politics is critical to understanding the pathways to a sustainable future. In recent years, a scholarly field has emerged, seeking to understand whether transitions towards more sustainable societies and economies occur and, if so, how they unfold. However, this field has not always fully incorporated the role of politics in shaping discourses, institutions and economic visions, or considered regions outside of Europe and North America. In this introduction to the special issue, we briefly review the field of sustainability transitions, highlighting the need to better capture the role played by political factors, institutions and (debates on) economic innovations in these transitions. We explain that sustainability is a contested concept, with two dominant conceptualisations: weak and strong sustainability. The framework of sustainability transitions allows us to position the contributions of the articles included in this special issue, which examine governance and institutions, media discourses, the role of industry and alternative economic models. The special issue focuses on two jurisdictions infrequently discussed in the literature on sustainability transitions: New Zealand and Australia. The special issue thus contributes new theoretical and empirical perspectives on the role of politics, political institutions and economic visions in sustainability transitions in the South Pacific.","PeriodicalId":20275,"journal":{"name":"Political Science","volume":"73 1","pages":"85 - 102"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46825727","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-24DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0328
Robert Browning
In 1979, a new US cable television network was created. It was called C-SPAN, an acronym reflecting its origin. The Cable Satellite Public Affairs Network was created to record public affairs programming and deliver it by cable and satellite into US homes. Cable was a nascent industry at that time. It began mostly as a retransmission of broadcast signals into areas that had poor terrestrial reception. The satellite revolution of the 1970s known as “Open Skies” made it possible for new networks to deliver their signals to home satellite dishes, but more importantly, to cable operators who were offered new exclusive, nonbroadcast networks that they could sell to the local subscribers. Home Box Office, or HBO, was successful delivering movies this way, which allowed commercial-free content offered for a premium. Cable operators were thus interested in this new satellite-delivered content that would distinguish cable and give customers reasons to subscribe. Brian Lamb was one of these network entrepreneurs, who with a background in radio, broadcast television, public affairs, satellite policy, and cable television, envisioned a cable satellite network that would bring unedited, Washington, DC–based public affairs programming delivered over cable television systems to American homes. He convinced some cable television executives, with a complementary entrepreneur spirit, to invest in his idea. The result was a nonprofit network dedicated to public affairs events in their entirety. It would be paid for by monthly, per-home license fees paid by the cable operators to the network in exchange for receiving the television signal. This, however, was just half of the story of the origin of C-SPAN. While Brian Lamb was developing his idea and thinking of how content from Washington, DC, events could be delivered via satellite to cable systems, another group was also working on a similar idea. The year was 1977 and the group was the United States House of Representatives. The mid-1970s were a heady time for the US Congress. President Nixon resigned in 1974 after congressional investigations of the 1972 Watergate break in. Congress passed the far-reaching War Powers Act and Congressional Budget Impoundment Act over presidential vetoes to strengthen Congress over what noted historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. wrote was the “Imperial Presidency.” When the US House of Representatives first televised its proceedings on 19 March 1979, C-SPAN began transmitting the signal via satellite and the new network was available.
{"title":"Impact of C-SPAN on US Democracy","authors":"Robert Browning","doi":"10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0328","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0328","url":null,"abstract":"In 1979, a new US cable television network was created. It was called C-SPAN, an acronym reflecting its origin. The Cable Satellite Public Affairs Network was created to record public affairs programming and deliver it by cable and satellite into US homes. Cable was a nascent industry at that time. It began mostly as a retransmission of broadcast signals into areas that had poor terrestrial reception. The satellite revolution of the 1970s known as “Open Skies” made it possible for new networks to deliver their signals to home satellite dishes, but more importantly, to cable operators who were offered new exclusive, nonbroadcast networks that they could sell to the local subscribers. Home Box Office, or HBO, was successful delivering movies this way, which allowed commercial-free content offered for a premium. Cable operators were thus interested in this new satellite-delivered content that would distinguish cable and give customers reasons to subscribe. Brian Lamb was one of these network entrepreneurs, who with a background in radio, broadcast television, public affairs, satellite policy, and cable television, envisioned a cable satellite network that would bring unedited, Washington, DC–based public affairs programming delivered over cable television systems to American homes. He convinced some cable television executives, with a complementary entrepreneur spirit, to invest in his idea. The result was a nonprofit network dedicated to public affairs events in their entirety. It would be paid for by monthly, per-home license fees paid by the cable operators to the network in exchange for receiving the television signal. This, however, was just half of the story of the origin of C-SPAN. While Brian Lamb was developing his idea and thinking of how content from Washington, DC, events could be delivered via satellite to cable systems, another group was also working on a similar idea. The year was 1977 and the group was the United States House of Representatives. The mid-1970s were a heady time for the US Congress. President Nixon resigned in 1974 after congressional investigations of the 1972 Watergate break in. Congress passed the far-reaching War Powers Act and Congressional Budget Impoundment Act over presidential vetoes to strengthen Congress over what noted historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. wrote was the “Imperial Presidency.” When the US House of Representatives first televised its proceedings on 19 March 1979, C-SPAN began transmitting the signal via satellite and the new network was available.","PeriodicalId":20275,"journal":{"name":"Political Science","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47247409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-12DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0327
Nadia E. Brown, G. Caballero, S. Gershon
At its heart, intersectionality is a study of relative power. As such, political scientists have employed this approach as both a theory and method to examine political behavior and the state’s interaction with social groups as citizens and noncitizens. Intersectionality is a framework that recognizes the interconnectedness of sociopolitical categories that overlap with systems of discrimination or disadvantage. The study of intersectionality is interdisciplinary and does not have one academic home. As such, we compiled a list of texts that have used this concept, methodological framework, or theoretical approach to answer questions using a political science lens with the goal of providing a broad summary of contemporary research in this field. Furthermore, we made an effort to represent research that highlights the variation among social groups, regions, and issues as a way to illustrate the diversity within intersectional research projects. In political science, intersectionality has been used as a normative theoretical argument and a methodological approach to empirical research. Rooted in Black feminist theory and praxis, intersectionality has been employed as an analytical tool to bring to light issues of marginalization and systematic oppression that were previously invisible by using a single axis approach. Much of political science research seeks to understand the experiences of those with one or more marginalized identities as political actors. The research in this field is diverse in the populations and questions examined as well as the methods employed. Contemporary research on intersectionality includes comparative and international research on nations around the world. It explores the role of institutions, culture, and context as well as individual political identities, attitudes, and behavior. This scholarship also examines the differences of experiences within populations—such as women and racial, ethnic, or religious minorities often grouped for analysis in other fields. In applying an intersectional analysis to political experiences of these populations, this research often highlights the ways in which different identities are associated with distinct attitudes, behavior, and political outcomes. As a result, intersectionality research in political science offers deeper insights into political phenomena that were previously examined with a single axis approach. For example, studies of women’s political involvement that did not account for difference among groups of women failed to account for how ethno-racial, sexual orientation, nativity, disability, or religion may have influenced women’s political experiences and political outcomes. Among the debates engaged by this literature are questions revolving around the political experiences associated with multiple marginalized identities. Specifically, do groups, candidates, or public officials who possess multiple marginalized identities experience a so-called double disadvantage? So
{"title":"Intersectionality in Political Science","authors":"Nadia E. Brown, G. Caballero, S. Gershon","doi":"10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0327","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0327","url":null,"abstract":"At its heart, intersectionality is a study of relative power. As such, political scientists have employed this approach as both a theory and method to examine political behavior and the state’s interaction with social groups as citizens and noncitizens. Intersectionality is a framework that recognizes the interconnectedness of sociopolitical categories that overlap with systems of discrimination or disadvantage. The study of intersectionality is interdisciplinary and does not have one academic home. As such, we compiled a list of texts that have used this concept, methodological framework, or theoretical approach to answer questions using a political science lens with the goal of providing a broad summary of contemporary research in this field. Furthermore, we made an effort to represent research that highlights the variation among social groups, regions, and issues as a way to illustrate the diversity within intersectional research projects. In political science, intersectionality has been used as a normative theoretical argument and a methodological approach to empirical research. Rooted in Black feminist theory and praxis, intersectionality has been employed as an analytical tool to bring to light issues of marginalization and systematic oppression that were previously invisible by using a single axis approach. Much of political science research seeks to understand the experiences of those with one or more marginalized identities as political actors. The research in this field is diverse in the populations and questions examined as well as the methods employed. Contemporary research on intersectionality includes comparative and international research on nations around the world. It explores the role of institutions, culture, and context as well as individual political identities, attitudes, and behavior. This scholarship also examines the differences of experiences within populations—such as women and racial, ethnic, or religious minorities often grouped for analysis in other fields. In applying an intersectional analysis to political experiences of these populations, this research often highlights the ways in which different identities are associated with distinct attitudes, behavior, and political outcomes. As a result, intersectionality research in political science offers deeper insights into political phenomena that were previously examined with a single axis approach. For example, studies of women’s political involvement that did not account for difference among groups of women failed to account for how ethno-racial, sexual orientation, nativity, disability, or religion may have influenced women’s political experiences and political outcomes. Among the debates engaged by this literature are questions revolving around the political experiences associated with multiple marginalized identities. Specifically, do groups, candidates, or public officials who possess multiple marginalized identities experience a so-called double disadvantage? So","PeriodicalId":20275,"journal":{"name":"Political Science","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47748892","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/00323187.2021.1967766
A. C. Tan, Jason Young
This special issue explores great power rivalry in the Indo-Pacific by moving the analytical focus away from the great powers and onto those they seek to influence. It asks what strategies states and international organisations employ to maintain their economic and security interests, how they push back on competing great power demands and avoid stark choices or being dragged into the United States (US)–China strategic competition. Articles in this special issue present a complex picture of competing domestic interest groups and positions and show how maintaining autonomy and an independent foreign policy in the age of US–China strategic competition has become a more precarious challenge. Nearly half a century ago, ‘the week that changed the world’ vastly improved the strategic position of countries in Asia. The meeting between Richard Nixon and an ageing Mao Zedong helped turn a tense and confrontational Cold War stand-off towards open commerce and relative strategic stability. In hindsight, this shift was a prerequisite for China’s opening to the world creating the environment for countries across the region allied or partnered with the US to develop their then limited political, economic and social relations. Strategic stability and open economics spurred unprecedented economic growth and rising prosperity. Fast-forward nearly 50 years and countries across the region now have deep linkages with China, especially commercially, that in most instances and across many sectors outweigh those with the US. This marks the closure of that period of strategic stability. China’s economic growth is being translated into political and strategic influence and a more assertive foreign policy (Yan 2014), eliciting a strong US response. Political observers in the US have slowly but surely noted China’s rise as its economic growth rate began to pick up in the early 1990s (Bernstein and Munro 1997). Without explicitly targeting China, American policymakers began to tweak its Asia policy by adjusting the US–Japan alliance as well as the level of security and military cooperation with South Korea and Southeast Asian states. The ‘China challenge’ began to be debated in earnest as the Obama administration announced a US ‘pivot to Asia’. Since then, a general bi-partisan agreement has emerged that US policy failed to prevent the emergence of an authoritarian peer competitor but little if any consensus on what strategies would achieve better results has been reached (Harding 2015). As China’s power and influence across each domain increased, US policymakers and academics increasingly viewed Chinese actions as a challenge to US interests, particularly in Asia.
{"title":"Falling in and falling out: Indo-Pacific in the midst of US–China tensions in the post-COVID world: introduction to the special issue","authors":"A. C. Tan, Jason Young","doi":"10.1080/00323187.2021.1967766","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00323187.2021.1967766","url":null,"abstract":"This special issue explores great power rivalry in the Indo-Pacific by moving the analytical focus away from the great powers and onto those they seek to influence. It asks what strategies states and international organisations employ to maintain their economic and security interests, how they push back on competing great power demands and avoid stark choices or being dragged into the United States (US)–China strategic competition. Articles in this special issue present a complex picture of competing domestic interest groups and positions and show how maintaining autonomy and an independent foreign policy in the age of US–China strategic competition has become a more precarious challenge. Nearly half a century ago, ‘the week that changed the world’ vastly improved the strategic position of countries in Asia. The meeting between Richard Nixon and an ageing Mao Zedong helped turn a tense and confrontational Cold War stand-off towards open commerce and relative strategic stability. In hindsight, this shift was a prerequisite for China’s opening to the world creating the environment for countries across the region allied or partnered with the US to develop their then limited political, economic and social relations. Strategic stability and open economics spurred unprecedented economic growth and rising prosperity. Fast-forward nearly 50 years and countries across the region now have deep linkages with China, especially commercially, that in most instances and across many sectors outweigh those with the US. This marks the closure of that period of strategic stability. China’s economic growth is being translated into political and strategic influence and a more assertive foreign policy (Yan 2014), eliciting a strong US response. Political observers in the US have slowly but surely noted China’s rise as its economic growth rate began to pick up in the early 1990s (Bernstein and Munro 1997). Without explicitly targeting China, American policymakers began to tweak its Asia policy by adjusting the US–Japan alliance as well as the level of security and military cooperation with South Korea and Southeast Asian states. The ‘China challenge’ began to be debated in earnest as the Obama administration announced a US ‘pivot to Asia’. Since then, a general bi-partisan agreement has emerged that US policy failed to prevent the emergence of an authoritarian peer competitor but little if any consensus on what strategies would achieve better results has been reached (Harding 2015). As China’s power and influence across each domain increased, US policymakers and academics increasingly viewed Chinese actions as a challenge to US interests, particularly in Asia.","PeriodicalId":20275,"journal":{"name":"Political Science","volume":"73 1","pages":"1 - 5"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44071520","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/00323187.2021.1967765
T.Y. Wang, A. C. Tan
ABSTRACT Small states have three strategic options when they are confronted by a rising power: balancing, bandwagoning, and hedging. With an increasingly powerful and assertive China as its neighbour, Taiwan, as a small state, is in such a conundrum. Employing survey data collected during the past two decades, this study examines how Taipei’s cross-Strait policy has been closely associated with the public’s preferences. Because Taiwan citizens reject a unification under Beijing’s terms, the bandwagoning policy has never been considered as an acceptable strategy. A ‘pure’ balancing policy is also unpalatable due to the enormous costs and associated risks. Instead, the island citizens are generally supportive of setting aside the sovereignty dispute with a rapprochement approach towards China. Hedging has thus become a preferred strategic option for most Taiwan citizens. The public’s support for a hedging policy has shifted recently due to China’s aggressive conduct and America’s supportive policy towards Taiwan. Because Beijing’s assertive behaviour is expected to persist and the Biden administration will remain supportive of Taiwan, Taipei’s strategic choice is likely to have a stronger balancing component. The cold and tense cross-Strait relationship since 2016 is expected to continue beyond the tenure of Taiwan’s pro-independence incumbent government.
{"title":"Balancing, bandwagoning or hedging: Taiwan’s strategic choices in the era of a rising China","authors":"T.Y. Wang, A. C. Tan","doi":"10.1080/00323187.2021.1967765","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00323187.2021.1967765","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Small states have three strategic options when they are confronted by a rising power: balancing, bandwagoning, and hedging. With an increasingly powerful and assertive China as its neighbour, Taiwan, as a small state, is in such a conundrum. Employing survey data collected during the past two decades, this study examines how Taipei’s cross-Strait policy has been closely associated with the public’s preferences. Because Taiwan citizens reject a unification under Beijing’s terms, the bandwagoning policy has never been considered as an acceptable strategy. A ‘pure’ balancing policy is also unpalatable due to the enormous costs and associated risks. Instead, the island citizens are generally supportive of setting aside the sovereignty dispute with a rapprochement approach towards China. Hedging has thus become a preferred strategic option for most Taiwan citizens. The public’s support for a hedging policy has shifted recently due to China’s aggressive conduct and America’s supportive policy towards Taiwan. Because Beijing’s assertive behaviour is expected to persist and the Biden administration will remain supportive of Taiwan, Taipei’s strategic choice is likely to have a stronger balancing component. The cold and tense cross-Strait relationship since 2016 is expected to continue beyond the tenure of Taiwan’s pro-independence incumbent government.","PeriodicalId":20275,"journal":{"name":"Political Science","volume":"73 1","pages":"66 - 84"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43888416","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/00323187.2021.1967762
L. Southgate
ABSTRACT The Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) pursuit for a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) first began during the Cold War, at a time of intense superpower rivalry in Southeast Asia. ASEAN reaffirmed the importance of this principle in 2020, amid growing concerns of instability in the Asia-Pacific region as a result of increasing tensions between the United States (US) and China. Through an examination of the ZOPFAN principle, this paper seeks to develop a greater understanding of ASEAN’s ability to respond to periods of geopolitical crisis and Great Power rivalry. It asks whether a ZOPFAN in Southeast Asia has ever been successfully realised, and what is the likelihood of one being achieved in the future. As analysis of recent security challenges will show, ZOPFAN falls short as both a framework for regional security and as an expression of regional autonomy. This raises serious questions about ASEAN’s coherence in the post-Cold War era, and its ability to uphold regional order in light of renewed Great Power security competition.
{"title":"ASEAN: still the zone of peace, freedom and neutrality?","authors":"L. Southgate","doi":"10.1080/00323187.2021.1967762","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00323187.2021.1967762","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) pursuit for a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) first began during the Cold War, at a time of intense superpower rivalry in Southeast Asia. ASEAN reaffirmed the importance of this principle in 2020, amid growing concerns of instability in the Asia-Pacific region as a result of increasing tensions between the United States (US) and China. Through an examination of the ZOPFAN principle, this paper seeks to develop a greater understanding of ASEAN’s ability to respond to periods of geopolitical crisis and Great Power rivalry. It asks whether a ZOPFAN in Southeast Asia has ever been successfully realised, and what is the likelihood of one being achieved in the future. As analysis of recent security challenges will show, ZOPFAN falls short as both a framework for regional security and as an expression of regional autonomy. This raises serious questions about ASEAN’s coherence in the post-Cold War era, and its ability to uphold regional order in light of renewed Great Power security competition.","PeriodicalId":20275,"journal":{"name":"Political Science","volume":"73 1","pages":"31 - 47"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44007126","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/00323187.2021.1967763
Jason Young
ABSTRACT Increasing strategic competition between the United States (US) and China creates challenges for small liberal democracies like New Zealand because competing powers place competing demands on foreign policy preferences. This article asks how ‘the less powerful states’ are responding to US-China great power competition and employs a liberal analysis of state preferences to ascertain that response. It finds that great power demands are mediated by national identity, interests and institutional settings that shape the formation of state preferences in a small liberal democracy. It concludes the cognitive dissonance brought on by competing powers vying to shape New Zealand preferences has forced a more acute competition between domestic interest groups leading to a clearer articulation of New Zealand foreign policy preferences. This has edged the country away from the comfortable strategic ambiguity that characterised much of its post-Cold War era and questions whether New Zealand can maintain an independent foreign policy or will be dragged into a broader strategic competition.
{"title":"US–China competition and small liberal democracies: New Zealand and the limits of hegemony","authors":"Jason Young","doi":"10.1080/00323187.2021.1967763","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00323187.2021.1967763","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Increasing strategic competition between the United States (US) and China creates challenges for small liberal democracies like New Zealand because competing powers place competing demands on foreign policy preferences. This article asks how ‘the less powerful states’ are responding to US-China great power competition and employs a liberal analysis of state preferences to ascertain that response. It finds that great power demands are mediated by national identity, interests and institutional settings that shape the formation of state preferences in a small liberal democracy. It concludes the cognitive dissonance brought on by competing powers vying to shape New Zealand preferences has forced a more acute competition between domestic interest groups leading to a clearer articulation of New Zealand foreign policy preferences. This has edged the country away from the comfortable strategic ambiguity that characterised much of its post-Cold War era and questions whether New Zealand can maintain an independent foreign policy or will be dragged into a broader strategic competition.","PeriodicalId":20275,"journal":{"name":"Political Science","volume":"73 1","pages":"48 - 65"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45665160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/00323187.2021.1967764
Michael Magcamit
ABSTRACT The ongoing shifts in the global distribution of material and normative powers, particularly between the United States and China, have significant repercussions on the foreign policy strategies of smaller, weaker actors in the international system. Due to their limited capacity for dictating international politics in ways that could guarantee their survival, many in IR have argued that they usually prefer to operate within the prevailing status quo rather than attempting to revise it. Nevertheless, the Philippines, under the leadership of President Rodrigo Duterte, seems to disprove this observation by dramatically pivoting towards Beijing and away from Washington, at least rhetorically. This paper moves beyond the commonly cited systemic factors and domestic intervening variables affecting the states’ foreign policies by examining the neglected emotions and emotional beliefs that help shape these instruments. My investigation of these unseen, albeit existing mechanisms, reveals the centrality of Duterte’s emotionally constituted and strengthened beliefs in providing a more complete and realistic explanation to his China-centric (as opposed to US-centric) foreign policy stance. As I argue and demonstrate throughout the paper, because emotions and emotional beliefs are powerful engines of human behaviour, they exert enormous influence on any state leader’s foreign policy motivations, decisions, and actions.
{"title":"To feel is to believe: China, United States, and the emotional beliefs of Philippines’ Rodrigo Duterte","authors":"Michael Magcamit","doi":"10.1080/00323187.2021.1967764","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00323187.2021.1967764","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The ongoing shifts in the global distribution of material and normative powers, particularly between the United States and China, have significant repercussions on the foreign policy strategies of smaller, weaker actors in the international system. Due to their limited capacity for dictating international politics in ways that could guarantee their survival, many in IR have argued that they usually prefer to operate within the prevailing status quo rather than attempting to revise it. Nevertheless, the Philippines, under the leadership of President Rodrigo Duterte, seems to disprove this observation by dramatically pivoting towards Beijing and away from Washington, at least rhetorically. This paper moves beyond the commonly cited systemic factors and domestic intervening variables affecting the states’ foreign policies by examining the neglected emotions and emotional beliefs that help shape these instruments. My investigation of these unseen, albeit existing mechanisms, reveals the centrality of Duterte’s emotionally constituted and strengthened beliefs in providing a more complete and realistic explanation to his China-centric (as opposed to US-centric) foreign policy stance. As I argue and demonstrate throughout the paper, because emotions and emotional beliefs are powerful engines of human behaviour, they exert enormous influence on any state leader’s foreign policy motivations, decisions, and actions.","PeriodicalId":20275,"journal":{"name":"Political Science","volume":"73 1","pages":"6 - 30"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47685580","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-24DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0326
Sara Sadhwani, Jane Junn
Immigrants from Asia have been a defining feature of demographic change over the last quarter century in the United States. The 2000 US Census identified Asian Americans as the fastest growing immigrant group in the nation and the Pew Research Center estimates that Asian Americans will become the largest immigrant group in the country by 2055. With that growth has come the development of a vibrant scholarly literature examining Asian American political participation in the United States. This article is designed to provide an overview of the major foundational studies that explore Asian American political behavior, including mobilization and participation in American politics. The earliest research began in the fields of political science and sociology and consider the viability of a panethnic Asian American identity as a unit of analysis for group-based behavior and political interests. Numerous scholars have considered the circumstances under which panethnic Asian American identity can be activated toward group behavior, and how differences in national origin can lead to variations in behavioral outcomes. Participation in American politics, however, is rooted in many other factors such as socioeconomics, one’s experience as an immigrant, ties to the home country, and structural barriers to activism. Individual resources have long been considered an essential component to understanding political participation. Yet, Asian Americans present a puzzle in American politics, evincing higher education and income while participating in politics at a more modest rate. In response to this puzzle, scholars have theorized that structural conditions and the experience faced by Asian immigrants are powerful mechanisms in understanding the determinants of Asian American political participation. Once considered to have relatively weak partisan attachment and little interaction with the two major parties in the United States, studies that examine the development of partisan attachment among Asian Americans are explored which, more recently, find that a growing majority of Asian Americans have shown a preference for the Democratic Party. Finally, we detail studies examining the conditions under which Asian American candidates emerge and are successful, the co-ethnic electorate who supports them, and conclude by detailing the opportunities and constraints for cross-racial collaboration and conflict.
{"title":"Asian American Mobilization and Political Identities","authors":"Sara Sadhwani, Jane Junn","doi":"10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0326","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0326","url":null,"abstract":"Immigrants from Asia have been a defining feature of demographic change over the last quarter century in the United States. The 2000 US Census identified Asian Americans as the fastest growing immigrant group in the nation and the Pew Research Center estimates that Asian Americans will become the largest immigrant group in the country by 2055. With that growth has come the development of a vibrant scholarly literature examining Asian American political participation in the United States. This article is designed to provide an overview of the major foundational studies that explore Asian American political behavior, including mobilization and participation in American politics. The earliest research began in the fields of political science and sociology and consider the viability of a panethnic Asian American identity as a unit of analysis for group-based behavior and political interests. Numerous scholars have considered the circumstances under which panethnic Asian American identity can be activated toward group behavior, and how differences in national origin can lead to variations in behavioral outcomes. Participation in American politics, however, is rooted in many other factors such as socioeconomics, one’s experience as an immigrant, ties to the home country, and structural barriers to activism. Individual resources have long been considered an essential component to understanding political participation. Yet, Asian Americans present a puzzle in American politics, evincing higher education and income while participating in politics at a more modest rate. In response to this puzzle, scholars have theorized that structural conditions and the experience faced by Asian immigrants are powerful mechanisms in understanding the determinants of Asian American political participation. Once considered to have relatively weak partisan attachment and little interaction with the two major parties in the United States, studies that examine the development of partisan attachment among Asian Americans are explored which, more recently, find that a growing majority of Asian Americans have shown a preference for the Democratic Party. Finally, we detail studies examining the conditions under which Asian American candidates emerge and are successful, the co-ethnic electorate who supports them, and conclude by detailing the opportunities and constraints for cross-racial collaboration and conflict.","PeriodicalId":20275,"journal":{"name":"Political Science","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43119623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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