Pub Date : 2020-10-28DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0325
E. Tsang
This article explores why the younger generation of China’s emergent middle class embraces conspicuous consumption but is not interested in politics. Collectively, this behavior is motivated by the quest for social recognition and status, but there are also signs the behavior is sanctioned—if not subtly guided—by the ruling Communist party’s logic of governing. Using the Foucauldian concept of “governmentality,” this article posits that the authoritarian Chinese regime tacitly utilizes noncoercive means to direct the middle class away from activism toward conspicuous consumption. Specifically, through tactics like real name registration (RNR) and value-laden mass media ads and programs, an environment is created that encourages conspicuous consumption as a form of calculated “pastoral” control. This allows government to guide without confrontation. Consequently, the emergent middle class is confronted with the pressure to navigate their own consumption patterns to align with the government’s quasi-veiled preferences that the citizenry should engage with materialist consumption rather than politics. China uses governmentality to orient the new middle-class citizen to consume and to steer away from political engagement that poses a possible threat to the communist regime. Despite insightful arguments about both consumption and governmentality and a growing scholarly interest in the rise of the middle class in China few studies examine the relationship between the conspicuous consumption habits of the Chinese middle class and the governmentality of the ruling party, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Mass media and consumer culture reinforce each other to create a stable climate based upon market rationality and consumerism. The CCP has two roles in indoctrinating the new middle class through noncoercive ways. The mobilization of mass media in terms of real name registration and traditional media outlets such as newspapers reflect a way of life that allows middle class citizens to maintain their good life and status to pursue their dreams under Xi’s regime. This status persists through consumption for the self and others (as a practice of gift giving) alongside apolitical involvement. The CCP focuses on entrepreneurs’ success stories as the epitome of good citizenship. Participation in political activities is discouraged by removing it from even being mentioned, discussed, or even shown in any of these accounts. This indirectly positions apolitical involvement as a lifestyle that allows citizens to be cosmopolitan individuals and quality (suzhi素質) citizens in post-Reform China.
{"title":"Political Economy of China","authors":"E. Tsang","doi":"10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0325","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0325","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores why the younger generation of China’s emergent middle class embraces conspicuous consumption but is not interested in politics. Collectively, this behavior is motivated by the quest for social recognition and status, but there are also signs the behavior is sanctioned—if not subtly guided—by the ruling Communist party’s logic of governing. Using the Foucauldian concept of “governmentality,” this article posits that the authoritarian Chinese regime tacitly utilizes noncoercive means to direct the middle class away from activism toward conspicuous consumption. Specifically, through tactics like real name registration (RNR) and value-laden mass media ads and programs, an environment is created that encourages conspicuous consumption as a form of calculated “pastoral” control. This allows government to guide without confrontation. Consequently, the emergent middle class is confronted with the pressure to navigate their own consumption patterns to align with the government’s quasi-veiled preferences that the citizenry should engage with materialist consumption rather than politics. China uses governmentality to orient the new middle-class citizen to consume and to steer away from political engagement that poses a possible threat to the communist regime. Despite insightful arguments about both consumption and governmentality and a growing scholarly interest in the rise of the middle class in China few studies examine the relationship between the conspicuous consumption habits of the Chinese middle class and the governmentality of the ruling party, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Mass media and consumer culture reinforce each other to create a stable climate based upon market rationality and consumerism. The CCP has two roles in indoctrinating the new middle class through noncoercive ways. The mobilization of mass media in terms of real name registration and traditional media outlets such as newspapers reflect a way of life that allows middle class citizens to maintain their good life and status to pursue their dreams under Xi’s regime. This status persists through consumption for the self and others (as a practice of gift giving) alongside apolitical involvement. The CCP focuses on entrepreneurs’ success stories as the epitome of good citizenship. Participation in political activities is discouraged by removing it from even being mentioned, discussed, or even shown in any of these accounts. This indirectly positions apolitical involvement as a lifestyle that allows citizens to be cosmopolitan individuals and quality (suzhi素質) citizens in post-Reform China.","PeriodicalId":20275,"journal":{"name":"Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41331994","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-28DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0324
Shaul R. Shenhav
One may plausibly assume that the current academic interest in narrative research stems from a growing awareness that human beings are by their very nature storytellers, and that the stories we make become part of who we are, be it as individuals or groups. Indeed, narrative analysis has gained wide ground in many fields of the humanities and social sciences. This bibliography article is intended primarily for students and scholars of politics, but it can be of use for readers and researchers from other disciplinary backgrounds in the social sciences. While political scholars may not be among the pioneers that embraced “the narrative turn,” the connection between politics and narratives is of very long standing. A common reference in this regard is Plato’s discussion on the education of the guardians in the third book of his Republic. For all that, scholars and students of politics who wish to get acquainted with seminal works in narrative research should venture beyond political science into literature studies, sociology, communication, linguistics, historiography, psychology, and many other fields. In fact, the leading approach to systematic study of narratives, known as “narratology,” was developed mainly by literary scholars and is yet to be adapted to questions salient to politics. Therefore it is only right that scholars who wish to engage in narrative study should be able to familiarize themselves with works outside their particular field of expertise. Even a cursory overview of the use of narratives in political science reveals a wide diversity of epistemological and ontological trajectories. The reason is that narrative analysis in political science does not emanate from a preexisting tradition or stream of research, but rather is based on an adaptation of various narrative elements to address an array of questions related to that discipline. Moreover, the variety of assumptions regarding the concept of narrative, manifested in other disciplines, is typical of political studies as well. Such a plurality of definitions and concepts makes the review of selected narrative studies a veritably daunting task. Given the rich, broad, and diverse contents, issues, and methodologies addressed and utilized by scholars who apply narrative analysis in political science, organizing the body of narrative research into clear-cut sections and avoiding overlaps is not always feasible. It is possible, however, to map main trends in the study of narrative analysis in political science. This bibliography begins with a General Overviews and Methodological Sources section. The next several sections largely proceed from studies that emphasize individual perspectives, to research targeting groups and national states, to examinations of the international arena. Several subsequent sections cite mainly investigations concerned with theoretical issues regarding the use of narrative approaches in the political domain. The concluding section comprises a list of fundam
{"title":"Narrative Analysis","authors":"Shaul R. Shenhav","doi":"10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0324","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0324","url":null,"abstract":"One may plausibly assume that the current academic interest in narrative research stems from a growing awareness that human beings are by their very nature storytellers, and that the stories we make become part of who we are, be it as individuals or groups. Indeed, narrative analysis has gained wide ground in many fields of the humanities and social sciences. This bibliography article is intended primarily for students and scholars of politics, but it can be of use for readers and researchers from other disciplinary backgrounds in the social sciences. While political scholars may not be among the pioneers that embraced “the narrative turn,” the connection between politics and narratives is of very long standing. A common reference in this regard is Plato’s discussion on the education of the guardians in the third book of his Republic. For all that, scholars and students of politics who wish to get acquainted with seminal works in narrative research should venture beyond political science into literature studies, sociology, communication, linguistics, historiography, psychology, and many other fields. In fact, the leading approach to systematic study of narratives, known as “narratology,” was developed mainly by literary scholars and is yet to be adapted to questions salient to politics. Therefore it is only right that scholars who wish to engage in narrative study should be able to familiarize themselves with works outside their particular field of expertise. Even a cursory overview of the use of narratives in political science reveals a wide diversity of epistemological and ontological trajectories. The reason is that narrative analysis in political science does not emanate from a preexisting tradition or stream of research, but rather is based on an adaptation of various narrative elements to address an array of questions related to that discipline. Moreover, the variety of assumptions regarding the concept of narrative, manifested in other disciplines, is typical of political studies as well. Such a plurality of definitions and concepts makes the review of selected narrative studies a veritably daunting task. Given the rich, broad, and diverse contents, issues, and methodologies addressed and utilized by scholars who apply narrative analysis in political science, organizing the body of narrative research into clear-cut sections and avoiding overlaps is not always feasible. It is possible, however, to map main trends in the study of narrative analysis in political science. This bibliography begins with a General Overviews and Methodological Sources section. The next several sections largely proceed from studies that emphasize individual perspectives, to research targeting groups and national states, to examinations of the international arena. Several subsequent sections cite mainly investigations concerned with theoretical issues regarding the use of narrative approaches in the political domain. The concluding section comprises a list of fundam","PeriodicalId":20275,"journal":{"name":"Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48951772","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-28DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0321
Louise K. Davidson-Schmich
Due to Germany’s prior history of foreign aggression, its important role in the contemporary global economy, and its unique social market economy, the post–World War II German political system has been widely studied by both German- and English-speaking scholars. This article begins by outlining some general overviews of German politics and history as well as textbooks and academic journals covering the subject. It also includes links to leading German-language news sources. It then turns its attention to German political institutions and depicts treatments of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government followed by studies of multilevel governance at the European, state, and local levels. The subsequent section delves into the important role played by political parties in Germany; this section also explores treatments of individual parties. Then the bibliography covers the German electoral system, voting behavior, and specific national elections. It then covers scholarly treatments of the political elites. The discussion then turns away from formal political institutions and leaders toward the societal influences on them. This portion of the article begins by examining literature on political culture, immigration, and social movements in Germany. The final portion of the bibliography focuses on interest groups and policy making in a number of areas, including economic and foreign policy.
{"title":"German Politics and Government","authors":"Louise K. Davidson-Schmich","doi":"10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0321","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0321","url":null,"abstract":"Due to Germany’s prior history of foreign aggression, its important role in the contemporary global economy, and its unique social market economy, the post–World War II German political system has been widely studied by both German- and English-speaking scholars. This article begins by outlining some general overviews of German politics and history as well as textbooks and academic journals covering the subject. It also includes links to leading German-language news sources. It then turns its attention to German political institutions and depicts treatments of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government followed by studies of multilevel governance at the European, state, and local levels. The subsequent section delves into the important role played by political parties in Germany; this section also explores treatments of individual parties. Then the bibliography covers the German electoral system, voting behavior, and specific national elections. It then covers scholarly treatments of the political elites. The discussion then turns away from formal political institutions and leaders toward the societal influences on them. This portion of the article begins by examining literature on political culture, immigration, and social movements in Germany. The final portion of the bibliography focuses on interest groups and policy making in a number of areas, including economic and foreign policy.","PeriodicalId":20275,"journal":{"name":"Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47381862","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-28DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0323
M. Qvortrup
Referendums have been defined as popular votes on bills before they become laws. However, referendums can also be held on existing laws or constitutions (as in the cases of the British referendum on membership in the European Union in 2016 or the Irish vote on abortion in 2017). In addition to these types, there are initiatives, defined as popular votes on laws proposed by the citizens, and plebiscites, which are votes by the whole population in authoritarian states. Scholars have sometimes disagreed as to the definition of referendums. Some have adopted the general umbrella term MDD (Mechanisms of Direct Democracy) to cover all these different types of institutionalized direct or semidirect democracy. But the word referendum has been used as the general signifier.
{"title":"Referendums and Direct Democracy","authors":"M. Qvortrup","doi":"10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0323","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0323","url":null,"abstract":"Referendums have been defined as popular votes on bills before they become laws. However, referendums can also be held on existing laws or constitutions (as in the cases of the British referendum on membership in the European Union in 2016 or the Irish vote on abortion in 2017). In addition to these types, there are initiatives, defined as popular votes on laws proposed by the citizens, and plebiscites, which are votes by the whole population in authoritarian states. Scholars have sometimes disagreed as to the definition of referendums. Some have adopted the general umbrella term MDD (Mechanisms of Direct Democracy) to cover all these different types of institutionalized direct or semidirect democracy. But the word referendum has been used as the general signifier.","PeriodicalId":20275,"journal":{"name":"Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48411923","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-24DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0318
Jeffrey Conroy-Krutz
Projects to measure public opinion in Africa have increased considerably in the last two decades. Earlier data-collection efforts focused on health and economic development, with limited attempts to gauge public opinion before the late 1990s. Possibilities expanded as a wave of political liberalizations swept the continent after the Cold War, and as government limitations on speech freedoms and survey research loosened. Knowledge about public opinion remains uneven, however; more surveys are conducted in wealthier, more stable, and more democratic countries. Various actors are leading these efforts. Academic and research organizations have been at the forefront, with Afrobarometer, which has conducted surveys in about two-thirds of African countries since 1999, the most prominent. The majority of studies are conducted by for-profit companies, media houses, and political campaigns, and many results are never publicly released. The growth in surveys of public opinion in Africa has had important ramifications across a number of realms. Academics have developed and tested new theories on how Africans respond to and shape their political and economic systems, and some long-standing theories have been challenged with newly available empirical evidence. Candidates and parties attempt to measure public opinion as they develop mobilizational and persuasive campaign strategies. Election observers have used survey data collected before and after voting to assess whether official results comport with citizens’ preferences. And international and domestic policymakers have increasingly used public opinion data from Africa to determine economic and political development priorities, and to assess the effectiveness of various programs. However, there is evidence that the survey enterprise in Africa is becoming increasingly politicized, with some officials attempting to block the release of potentially embarrassing results, or preventing surveys from being conducted altogether, and other political actors attacking survey organizations when they do not like what the data show. As organizations conducting public opinion surveys in Africa modify their strategies in the face of new technologies and changing political contexts, the ever-increasing availability of data on what Africans think about how their countries are and should be governed continues to fundamentally change academic understanding, policymaking, and actual political competition.
{"title":"Public Opinion in Africa","authors":"Jeffrey Conroy-Krutz","doi":"10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0318","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0318","url":null,"abstract":"Projects to measure public opinion in Africa have increased considerably in the last two decades. Earlier data-collection efforts focused on health and economic development, with limited attempts to gauge public opinion before the late 1990s. Possibilities expanded as a wave of political liberalizations swept the continent after the Cold War, and as government limitations on speech freedoms and survey research loosened. Knowledge about public opinion remains uneven, however; more surveys are conducted in wealthier, more stable, and more democratic countries. Various actors are leading these efforts. Academic and research organizations have been at the forefront, with Afrobarometer, which has conducted surveys in about two-thirds of African countries since 1999, the most prominent. The majority of studies are conducted by for-profit companies, media houses, and political campaigns, and many results are never publicly released. The growth in surveys of public opinion in Africa has had important ramifications across a number of realms. Academics have developed and tested new theories on how Africans respond to and shape their political and economic systems, and some long-standing theories have been challenged with newly available empirical evidence. Candidates and parties attempt to measure public opinion as they develop mobilizational and persuasive campaign strategies. Election observers have used survey data collected before and after voting to assess whether official results comport with citizens’ preferences. And international and domestic policymakers have increasingly used public opinion data from Africa to determine economic and political development priorities, and to assess the effectiveness of various programs. However, there is evidence that the survey enterprise in Africa is becoming increasingly politicized, with some officials attempting to block the release of potentially embarrassing results, or preventing surveys from being conducted altogether, and other political actors attacking survey organizations when they do not like what the data show. As organizations conducting public opinion surveys in Africa modify their strategies in the face of new technologies and changing political contexts, the ever-increasing availability of data on what Africans think about how their countries are and should be governed continues to fundamentally change academic understanding, policymaking, and actual political competition.","PeriodicalId":20275,"journal":{"name":"Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49546773","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-24DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0317
Lisa Anderson
Over the last century, thanks to the greater number of independent countries and longer human life spans, there is a larger pool of former presidents and prime ministers than at any time in history. The existence of this unusual collection of political figures—at once publicly renowned and potentially influential yet technically powerless—has triggered several lines of academic research. Scholars have asked whether the prospect of life-after-office shapes policy choices of leaders while they are in office, and if so how. This line of inquiry includes studies of both dictators and democratically elected presidents and prime ministers. In addition, scholars have examined what political leaders who retire, are term-limited, or are defeated in running for reelection—that is, democratic politicians—actually do after they are out of office. Three issues are thought to be uppermost in their minds: the mundane personal question of how to support themselves and their families; the somewhat loftier reputational issue of how to secure their standing and place in history; and the delicate political matter of how to deploy their accumulated skill and experience usefully and tactfully, without causing trouble to themselves or their political allies and enterprises. Finally, an emerging line of research examines how the increasingly large number of ex-presidents and former prime ministers in the world contribute to shaping global policy debates and institutions. In fact, however, all of this together does not constitute a large body of research and the student in this field is obliged to resort very quickly to primary sources, from self-serving memoirs and fawning mission statements to hostile investigative reporting and unfriendly partisan journalism; the compensatory reward is much livelier prose than the conventional academic treatise.
{"title":"Political Roles and Activities of Former Presidents and Prime Ministers","authors":"Lisa Anderson","doi":"10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0317","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0317","url":null,"abstract":"Over the last century, thanks to the greater number of independent countries and longer human life spans, there is a larger pool of former presidents and prime ministers than at any time in history. The existence of this unusual collection of political figures—at once publicly renowned and potentially influential yet technically powerless—has triggered several lines of academic research. Scholars have asked whether the prospect of life-after-office shapes policy choices of leaders while they are in office, and if so how. This line of inquiry includes studies of both dictators and democratically elected presidents and prime ministers. In addition, scholars have examined what political leaders who retire, are term-limited, or are defeated in running for reelection—that is, democratic politicians—actually do after they are out of office. Three issues are thought to be uppermost in their minds: the mundane personal question of how to support themselves and their families; the somewhat loftier reputational issue of how to secure their standing and place in history; and the delicate political matter of how to deploy their accumulated skill and experience usefully and tactfully, without causing trouble to themselves or their political allies and enterprises. Finally, an emerging line of research examines how the increasingly large number of ex-presidents and former prime ministers in the world contribute to shaping global policy debates and institutions. In fact, however, all of this together does not constitute a large body of research and the student in this field is obliged to resort very quickly to primary sources, from self-serving memoirs and fawning mission statements to hostile investigative reporting and unfriendly partisan journalism; the compensatory reward is much livelier prose than the conventional academic treatise.","PeriodicalId":20275,"journal":{"name":"Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42075699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/00323187.2021.1931373
Ching-Hsing Wang, D. Weng
ABSTRACT Election polls have been widely used to probe and understand the public’s political attitudes and behaviour. However, they might simultaneously motivate people to seek information about the questions they do not know when they are asked in the polls. Given that past studies have ignored the role of polls in motivating individual information seeking, this study aims to examine the effect of polls on individual knowledge of the electoral system. Specifically, this study addresses whether individuals’ participation in the election poll would increase their understanding of the electoral system of the legislative election in Taiwan. Using survey data from Taiwan’s Election and Democratisation Study (TEDS) 2016 presidential and legislative elections, this study finds that people who are asked questions about the legislative election in the first survey are more likely to provide correct answers in the second survey compared to their counterparts. The findings imply that election polls are not only tools for understanding public opinion on competing parties or candidates and policy issues, but also for stimulating individuals to understand politics.
{"title":"Do election polls increase individual understanding of politics?","authors":"Ching-Hsing Wang, D. Weng","doi":"10.1080/00323187.2021.1931373","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00323187.2021.1931373","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Election polls have been widely used to probe and understand the public’s political attitudes and behaviour. However, they might simultaneously motivate people to seek information about the questions they do not know when they are asked in the polls. Given that past studies have ignored the role of polls in motivating individual information seeking, this study aims to examine the effect of polls on individual knowledge of the electoral system. Specifically, this study addresses whether individuals’ participation in the election poll would increase their understanding of the electoral system of the legislative election in Taiwan. Using survey data from Taiwan’s Election and Democratisation Study (TEDS) 2016 presidential and legislative elections, this study finds that people who are asked questions about the legislative election in the first survey are more likely to provide correct answers in the second survey compared to their counterparts. The findings imply that election polls are not only tools for understanding public opinion on competing parties or candidates and policy issues, but also for stimulating individuals to understand politics.","PeriodicalId":20275,"journal":{"name":"Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/00323187.2021.1931373","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43002750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/00323187.2021.1948344
Hiroyuki Hoshiro
Do diplomatic visits by political leaders of recipient countries to donors influence the amount of bilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA) granted by donors? Some might argue that as aid allocation is already determined by a donor’s cost and benefit calculation, diplomatic visits do not affect the donor’s aid allocation behaviour. Despite the importance of answering such questions regarding the determinants of aid allocation, no research has been conducted on this topic. Focusing on the case of Japan, this study explores the relationship between diplomatic visits from recipients and aid allocation. Since the 1960s, Japan has been one of the top five aid-giving countries of the world; however, its motives have been criticised as self-interested and solely in pursuit of ulterior economic interests. Through an analysis of panel data measuring ODA given by Japan to 179 recipient countries between 1969 and 2015, this paper reached the following conclusions. First, diplomatic visits to Japan by political leaders from aid recipient countries resulted in said countries receiving increased bilateral ODA from Japan in cases where countries were already receiving aid from Japan. The more diplomatic visits made to Japan, the greater the increase in aid. This result can be explained by three mechanisms: (1) diplomatic visits are a costly signal of developing countries’ need for aid, (2) visits to donor countries would create domestic political pressure in donor countries when visitors openly require financial assistance, and (3) face-to-face talks are likely to provide opportunities for leaders of a donor to gain greater knowledge of recipients’ needs. This result was verified using different models and several robustness checks such as an instrumental variables approach that accounts for reverse causality and endogeneity, error-correction model (ECM), which can control for temporal dependence and the problem of co-integration. Second, diplomatic visits were shown to have no relation with the initiation of new aid agreements in cases of developing countries that have not received aid from Japan in the past. This is because, there are only few countries such as North Korea that do not receive ODA from Japan when their leaders visit Japan for the first time. This result implies that aid initiation has other causes rather than diplomatic visits. This study makes two contributions to the study of aid allocation and international relations. Although a considerable amount of quantitative research on aid allocation
{"title":"Do diplomatic visits promote official development aid? Evidence from Japan","authors":"Hiroyuki Hoshiro","doi":"10.1080/00323187.2021.1948344","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00323187.2021.1948344","url":null,"abstract":"Do diplomatic visits by political leaders of recipient countries to donors influence the amount of bilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA) granted by donors? Some might argue that as aid allocation is already determined by a donor’s cost and benefit calculation, diplomatic visits do not affect the donor’s aid allocation behaviour. Despite the importance of answering such questions regarding the determinants of aid allocation, no research has been conducted on this topic. Focusing on the case of Japan, this study explores the relationship between diplomatic visits from recipients and aid allocation. Since the 1960s, Japan has been one of the top five aid-giving countries of the world; however, its motives have been criticised as self-interested and solely in pursuit of ulterior economic interests. Through an analysis of panel data measuring ODA given by Japan to 179 recipient countries between 1969 and 2015, this paper reached the following conclusions. First, diplomatic visits to Japan by political leaders from aid recipient countries resulted in said countries receiving increased bilateral ODA from Japan in cases where countries were already receiving aid from Japan. The more diplomatic visits made to Japan, the greater the increase in aid. This result can be explained by three mechanisms: (1) diplomatic visits are a costly signal of developing countries’ need for aid, (2) visits to donor countries would create domestic political pressure in donor countries when visitors openly require financial assistance, and (3) face-to-face talks are likely to provide opportunities for leaders of a donor to gain greater knowledge of recipients’ needs. This result was verified using different models and several robustness checks such as an instrumental variables approach that accounts for reverse causality and endogeneity, error-correction model (ECM), which can control for temporal dependence and the problem of co-integration. Second, diplomatic visits were shown to have no relation with the initiation of new aid agreements in cases of developing countries that have not received aid from Japan in the past. This is because, there are only few countries such as North Korea that do not receive ODA from Japan when their leaders visit Japan for the first time. This result implies that aid initiation has other causes rather than diplomatic visits. This study makes two contributions to the study of aid allocation and international relations. Although a considerable amount of quantitative research on aid allocation","PeriodicalId":20275,"journal":{"name":"Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47943629","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/00323187.2021.1948345
Christina Lai
ABSTRACT China’s improved diplomatic relations with Asian countries have been characterised by positive engagement with regional organisations. However, cross-nation opinion surveys show that China’s approval in the region has declined significantly since2013. Why does this gap exist, and what can China do to close it? More importantly, how can Beijing effectively align its policy objectives with its soft-power tools to gain more support among its Asian neighbours?This article argues that reconciliation between China’s core interests and its soft power discourse is possible and desirable, as China’s self-restraint, assuring, and leadership practices are crucial sources of China’s policy practices. First, it claims that China’s soft power discourse matters greatly, as a rising country needs to express its good intentions to others in avoiding an anti-China alliance. Secondly, it proposes a feasible framework to reconcile China’s core interests and its soft power policy, in which Beijing could be firm in its official stances and flexible in its execution.It offers an in-depth analysis of three case studies: China’s North Korea policy, its handling in the South China Sea disputes, and its governance in Hong Kong. Finally, it concludes with substantive implications for East Asian politics.
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Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/00323187.2021.1898995
Lara M. Greaves, Luke D. Oldfield, Martin von Randow, C. Sibley, B. Milne
ABSTRACT Quality survey research relies on the willingness of the public to participate, but survey response rates are decreasing over time. This research note explores response rate data from several national probability sample mail surveys drawn from a consistent sampling frame (the New Zealand electoral roll) over the past 30 years. The aim of this work is to document the scale of the response rate decline problem in mail survey studies, predict future response rates, and track nonresponse bias through comparing self-reported voter turnout in surveys to official turnout. We use data from the New Zealand Election Study, the International Social Survey Programme, the New Zealand edition of the World Values Survey, and the New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study. Our findings demonstrate that there has been a consistent downward trend in response rates and an increase in nonresponse bias for self-reported voter turnout. Response rates in the early 1990s were as high as 72%, before dropping to the 60% range around the year 2000, with response rates effectively halving from their early 1990s rates by 2015. We comment on the implications for future surveys, voter enrolment, local government turnout, and political polling. Ultimately, these results leave us with the question of how long traditional mail survey research will be able to continue.
{"title":"How low can we go? Declining survey response rates to new zealand electoral roll mail surveys over three decades","authors":"Lara M. Greaves, Luke D. Oldfield, Martin von Randow, C. Sibley, B. Milne","doi":"10.1080/00323187.2021.1898995","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00323187.2021.1898995","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Quality survey research relies on the willingness of the public to participate, but survey response rates are decreasing over time. This research note explores response rate data from several national probability sample mail surveys drawn from a consistent sampling frame (the New Zealand electoral roll) over the past 30 years. The aim of this work is to document the scale of the response rate decline problem in mail survey studies, predict future response rates, and track nonresponse bias through comparing self-reported voter turnout in surveys to official turnout. We use data from the New Zealand Election Study, the International Social Survey Programme, the New Zealand edition of the World Values Survey, and the New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study. Our findings demonstrate that there has been a consistent downward trend in response rates and an increase in nonresponse bias for self-reported voter turnout. Response rates in the early 1990s were as high as 72%, before dropping to the 60% range around the year 2000, with response rates effectively halving from their early 1990s rates by 2015. We comment on the implications for future surveys, voter enrolment, local government turnout, and political polling. Ultimately, these results leave us with the question of how long traditional mail survey research will be able to continue.","PeriodicalId":20275,"journal":{"name":"Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/00323187.2021.1898995","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46408620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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