Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/00323187.2021.1967766
A. C. Tan, Jason Young
This special issue explores great power rivalry in the Indo-Pacific by moving the analytical focus away from the great powers and onto those they seek to influence. It asks what strategies states and international organisations employ to maintain their economic and security interests, how they push back on competing great power demands and avoid stark choices or being dragged into the United States (US)–China strategic competition. Articles in this special issue present a complex picture of competing domestic interest groups and positions and show how maintaining autonomy and an independent foreign policy in the age of US–China strategic competition has become a more precarious challenge. Nearly half a century ago, ‘the week that changed the world’ vastly improved the strategic position of countries in Asia. The meeting between Richard Nixon and an ageing Mao Zedong helped turn a tense and confrontational Cold War stand-off towards open commerce and relative strategic stability. In hindsight, this shift was a prerequisite for China’s opening to the world creating the environment for countries across the region allied or partnered with the US to develop their then limited political, economic and social relations. Strategic stability and open economics spurred unprecedented economic growth and rising prosperity. Fast-forward nearly 50 years and countries across the region now have deep linkages with China, especially commercially, that in most instances and across many sectors outweigh those with the US. This marks the closure of that period of strategic stability. China’s economic growth is being translated into political and strategic influence and a more assertive foreign policy (Yan 2014), eliciting a strong US response. Political observers in the US have slowly but surely noted China’s rise as its economic growth rate began to pick up in the early 1990s (Bernstein and Munro 1997). Without explicitly targeting China, American policymakers began to tweak its Asia policy by adjusting the US–Japan alliance as well as the level of security and military cooperation with South Korea and Southeast Asian states. The ‘China challenge’ began to be debated in earnest as the Obama administration announced a US ‘pivot to Asia’. Since then, a general bi-partisan agreement has emerged that US policy failed to prevent the emergence of an authoritarian peer competitor but little if any consensus on what strategies would achieve better results has been reached (Harding 2015). As China’s power and influence across each domain increased, US policymakers and academics increasingly viewed Chinese actions as a challenge to US interests, particularly in Asia.
{"title":"Falling in and falling out: Indo-Pacific in the midst of US–China tensions in the post-COVID world: introduction to the special issue","authors":"A. C. Tan, Jason Young","doi":"10.1080/00323187.2021.1967766","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00323187.2021.1967766","url":null,"abstract":"This special issue explores great power rivalry in the Indo-Pacific by moving the analytical focus away from the great powers and onto those they seek to influence. It asks what strategies states and international organisations employ to maintain their economic and security interests, how they push back on competing great power demands and avoid stark choices or being dragged into the United States (US)–China strategic competition. Articles in this special issue present a complex picture of competing domestic interest groups and positions and show how maintaining autonomy and an independent foreign policy in the age of US–China strategic competition has become a more precarious challenge. Nearly half a century ago, ‘the week that changed the world’ vastly improved the strategic position of countries in Asia. The meeting between Richard Nixon and an ageing Mao Zedong helped turn a tense and confrontational Cold War stand-off towards open commerce and relative strategic stability. In hindsight, this shift was a prerequisite for China’s opening to the world creating the environment for countries across the region allied or partnered with the US to develop their then limited political, economic and social relations. Strategic stability and open economics spurred unprecedented economic growth and rising prosperity. Fast-forward nearly 50 years and countries across the region now have deep linkages with China, especially commercially, that in most instances and across many sectors outweigh those with the US. This marks the closure of that period of strategic stability. China’s economic growth is being translated into political and strategic influence and a more assertive foreign policy (Yan 2014), eliciting a strong US response. Political observers in the US have slowly but surely noted China’s rise as its economic growth rate began to pick up in the early 1990s (Bernstein and Munro 1997). Without explicitly targeting China, American policymakers began to tweak its Asia policy by adjusting the US–Japan alliance as well as the level of security and military cooperation with South Korea and Southeast Asian states. The ‘China challenge’ began to be debated in earnest as the Obama administration announced a US ‘pivot to Asia’. Since then, a general bi-partisan agreement has emerged that US policy failed to prevent the emergence of an authoritarian peer competitor but little if any consensus on what strategies would achieve better results has been reached (Harding 2015). As China’s power and influence across each domain increased, US policymakers and academics increasingly viewed Chinese actions as a challenge to US interests, particularly in Asia.","PeriodicalId":20275,"journal":{"name":"Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44071520","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/00323187.2021.1967765
T.Y. Wang, A. C. Tan
ABSTRACT Small states have three strategic options when they are confronted by a rising power: balancing, bandwagoning, and hedging. With an increasingly powerful and assertive China as its neighbour, Taiwan, as a small state, is in such a conundrum. Employing survey data collected during the past two decades, this study examines how Taipei’s cross-Strait policy has been closely associated with the public’s preferences. Because Taiwan citizens reject a unification under Beijing’s terms, the bandwagoning policy has never been considered as an acceptable strategy. A ‘pure’ balancing policy is also unpalatable due to the enormous costs and associated risks. Instead, the island citizens are generally supportive of setting aside the sovereignty dispute with a rapprochement approach towards China. Hedging has thus become a preferred strategic option for most Taiwan citizens. The public’s support for a hedging policy has shifted recently due to China’s aggressive conduct and America’s supportive policy towards Taiwan. Because Beijing’s assertive behaviour is expected to persist and the Biden administration will remain supportive of Taiwan, Taipei’s strategic choice is likely to have a stronger balancing component. The cold and tense cross-Strait relationship since 2016 is expected to continue beyond the tenure of Taiwan’s pro-independence incumbent government.
{"title":"Balancing, bandwagoning or hedging: Taiwan’s strategic choices in the era of a rising China","authors":"T.Y. Wang, A. C. Tan","doi":"10.1080/00323187.2021.1967765","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00323187.2021.1967765","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Small states have three strategic options when they are confronted by a rising power: balancing, bandwagoning, and hedging. With an increasingly powerful and assertive China as its neighbour, Taiwan, as a small state, is in such a conundrum. Employing survey data collected during the past two decades, this study examines how Taipei’s cross-Strait policy has been closely associated with the public’s preferences. Because Taiwan citizens reject a unification under Beijing’s terms, the bandwagoning policy has never been considered as an acceptable strategy. A ‘pure’ balancing policy is also unpalatable due to the enormous costs and associated risks. Instead, the island citizens are generally supportive of setting aside the sovereignty dispute with a rapprochement approach towards China. Hedging has thus become a preferred strategic option for most Taiwan citizens. The public’s support for a hedging policy has shifted recently due to China’s aggressive conduct and America’s supportive policy towards Taiwan. Because Beijing’s assertive behaviour is expected to persist and the Biden administration will remain supportive of Taiwan, Taipei’s strategic choice is likely to have a stronger balancing component. The cold and tense cross-Strait relationship since 2016 is expected to continue beyond the tenure of Taiwan’s pro-independence incumbent government.","PeriodicalId":20275,"journal":{"name":"Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43888416","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/00323187.2021.1967763
Jason Young
ABSTRACT Increasing strategic competition between the United States (US) and China creates challenges for small liberal democracies like New Zealand because competing powers place competing demands on foreign policy preferences. This article asks how ‘the less powerful states’ are responding to US-China great power competition and employs a liberal analysis of state preferences to ascertain that response. It finds that great power demands are mediated by national identity, interests and institutional settings that shape the formation of state preferences in a small liberal democracy. It concludes the cognitive dissonance brought on by competing powers vying to shape New Zealand preferences has forced a more acute competition between domestic interest groups leading to a clearer articulation of New Zealand foreign policy preferences. This has edged the country away from the comfortable strategic ambiguity that characterised much of its post-Cold War era and questions whether New Zealand can maintain an independent foreign policy or will be dragged into a broader strategic competition.
{"title":"US–China competition and small liberal democracies: New Zealand and the limits of hegemony","authors":"Jason Young","doi":"10.1080/00323187.2021.1967763","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00323187.2021.1967763","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Increasing strategic competition between the United States (US) and China creates challenges for small liberal democracies like New Zealand because competing powers place competing demands on foreign policy preferences. This article asks how ‘the less powerful states’ are responding to US-China great power competition and employs a liberal analysis of state preferences to ascertain that response. It finds that great power demands are mediated by national identity, interests and institutional settings that shape the formation of state preferences in a small liberal democracy. It concludes the cognitive dissonance brought on by competing powers vying to shape New Zealand preferences has forced a more acute competition between domestic interest groups leading to a clearer articulation of New Zealand foreign policy preferences. This has edged the country away from the comfortable strategic ambiguity that characterised much of its post-Cold War era and questions whether New Zealand can maintain an independent foreign policy or will be dragged into a broader strategic competition.","PeriodicalId":20275,"journal":{"name":"Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45665160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/00323187.2021.1967762
L. Southgate
ABSTRACT The Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) pursuit for a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) first began during the Cold War, at a time of intense superpower rivalry in Southeast Asia. ASEAN reaffirmed the importance of this principle in 2020, amid growing concerns of instability in the Asia-Pacific region as a result of increasing tensions between the United States (US) and China. Through an examination of the ZOPFAN principle, this paper seeks to develop a greater understanding of ASEAN’s ability to respond to periods of geopolitical crisis and Great Power rivalry. It asks whether a ZOPFAN in Southeast Asia has ever been successfully realised, and what is the likelihood of one being achieved in the future. As analysis of recent security challenges will show, ZOPFAN falls short as both a framework for regional security and as an expression of regional autonomy. This raises serious questions about ASEAN’s coherence in the post-Cold War era, and its ability to uphold regional order in light of renewed Great Power security competition.
{"title":"ASEAN: still the zone of peace, freedom and neutrality?","authors":"L. Southgate","doi":"10.1080/00323187.2021.1967762","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00323187.2021.1967762","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) pursuit for a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) first began during the Cold War, at a time of intense superpower rivalry in Southeast Asia. ASEAN reaffirmed the importance of this principle in 2020, amid growing concerns of instability in the Asia-Pacific region as a result of increasing tensions between the United States (US) and China. Through an examination of the ZOPFAN principle, this paper seeks to develop a greater understanding of ASEAN’s ability to respond to periods of geopolitical crisis and Great Power rivalry. It asks whether a ZOPFAN in Southeast Asia has ever been successfully realised, and what is the likelihood of one being achieved in the future. As analysis of recent security challenges will show, ZOPFAN falls short as both a framework for regional security and as an expression of regional autonomy. This raises serious questions about ASEAN’s coherence in the post-Cold War era, and its ability to uphold regional order in light of renewed Great Power security competition.","PeriodicalId":20275,"journal":{"name":"Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44007126","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/00323187.2021.1967764
Michael Magcamit
ABSTRACT The ongoing shifts in the global distribution of material and normative powers, particularly between the United States and China, have significant repercussions on the foreign policy strategies of smaller, weaker actors in the international system. Due to their limited capacity for dictating international politics in ways that could guarantee their survival, many in IR have argued that they usually prefer to operate within the prevailing status quo rather than attempting to revise it. Nevertheless, the Philippines, under the leadership of President Rodrigo Duterte, seems to disprove this observation by dramatically pivoting towards Beijing and away from Washington, at least rhetorically. This paper moves beyond the commonly cited systemic factors and domestic intervening variables affecting the states’ foreign policies by examining the neglected emotions and emotional beliefs that help shape these instruments. My investigation of these unseen, albeit existing mechanisms, reveals the centrality of Duterte’s emotionally constituted and strengthened beliefs in providing a more complete and realistic explanation to his China-centric (as opposed to US-centric) foreign policy stance. As I argue and demonstrate throughout the paper, because emotions and emotional beliefs are powerful engines of human behaviour, they exert enormous influence on any state leader’s foreign policy motivations, decisions, and actions.
{"title":"To feel is to believe: China, United States, and the emotional beliefs of Philippines’ Rodrigo Duterte","authors":"Michael Magcamit","doi":"10.1080/00323187.2021.1967764","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00323187.2021.1967764","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The ongoing shifts in the global distribution of material and normative powers, particularly between the United States and China, have significant repercussions on the foreign policy strategies of smaller, weaker actors in the international system. Due to their limited capacity for dictating international politics in ways that could guarantee their survival, many in IR have argued that they usually prefer to operate within the prevailing status quo rather than attempting to revise it. Nevertheless, the Philippines, under the leadership of President Rodrigo Duterte, seems to disprove this observation by dramatically pivoting towards Beijing and away from Washington, at least rhetorically. This paper moves beyond the commonly cited systemic factors and domestic intervening variables affecting the states’ foreign policies by examining the neglected emotions and emotional beliefs that help shape these instruments. My investigation of these unseen, albeit existing mechanisms, reveals the centrality of Duterte’s emotionally constituted and strengthened beliefs in providing a more complete and realistic explanation to his China-centric (as opposed to US-centric) foreign policy stance. As I argue and demonstrate throughout the paper, because emotions and emotional beliefs are powerful engines of human behaviour, they exert enormous influence on any state leader’s foreign policy motivations, decisions, and actions.","PeriodicalId":20275,"journal":{"name":"Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47685580","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-24DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0326
Sara Sadhwani, Jane Junn
Immigrants from Asia have been a defining feature of demographic change over the last quarter century in the United States. The 2000 US Census identified Asian Americans as the fastest growing immigrant group in the nation and the Pew Research Center estimates that Asian Americans will become the largest immigrant group in the country by 2055. With that growth has come the development of a vibrant scholarly literature examining Asian American political participation in the United States. This article is designed to provide an overview of the major foundational studies that explore Asian American political behavior, including mobilization and participation in American politics. The earliest research began in the fields of political science and sociology and consider the viability of a panethnic Asian American identity as a unit of analysis for group-based behavior and political interests. Numerous scholars have considered the circumstances under which panethnic Asian American identity can be activated toward group behavior, and how differences in national origin can lead to variations in behavioral outcomes. Participation in American politics, however, is rooted in many other factors such as socioeconomics, one’s experience as an immigrant, ties to the home country, and structural barriers to activism. Individual resources have long been considered an essential component to understanding political participation. Yet, Asian Americans present a puzzle in American politics, evincing higher education and income while participating in politics at a more modest rate. In response to this puzzle, scholars have theorized that structural conditions and the experience faced by Asian immigrants are powerful mechanisms in understanding the determinants of Asian American political participation. Once considered to have relatively weak partisan attachment and little interaction with the two major parties in the United States, studies that examine the development of partisan attachment among Asian Americans are explored which, more recently, find that a growing majority of Asian Americans have shown a preference for the Democratic Party. Finally, we detail studies examining the conditions under which Asian American candidates emerge and are successful, the co-ethnic electorate who supports them, and conclude by detailing the opportunities and constraints for cross-racial collaboration and conflict.
{"title":"Asian American Mobilization and Political Identities","authors":"Sara Sadhwani, Jane Junn","doi":"10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0326","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0326","url":null,"abstract":"Immigrants from Asia have been a defining feature of demographic change over the last quarter century in the United States. The 2000 US Census identified Asian Americans as the fastest growing immigrant group in the nation and the Pew Research Center estimates that Asian Americans will become the largest immigrant group in the country by 2055. With that growth has come the development of a vibrant scholarly literature examining Asian American political participation in the United States. This article is designed to provide an overview of the major foundational studies that explore Asian American political behavior, including mobilization and participation in American politics. The earliest research began in the fields of political science and sociology and consider the viability of a panethnic Asian American identity as a unit of analysis for group-based behavior and political interests. Numerous scholars have considered the circumstances under which panethnic Asian American identity can be activated toward group behavior, and how differences in national origin can lead to variations in behavioral outcomes. Participation in American politics, however, is rooted in many other factors such as socioeconomics, one’s experience as an immigrant, ties to the home country, and structural barriers to activism. Individual resources have long been considered an essential component to understanding political participation. Yet, Asian Americans present a puzzle in American politics, evincing higher education and income while participating in politics at a more modest rate. In response to this puzzle, scholars have theorized that structural conditions and the experience faced by Asian immigrants are powerful mechanisms in understanding the determinants of Asian American political participation. Once considered to have relatively weak partisan attachment and little interaction with the two major parties in the United States, studies that examine the development of partisan attachment among Asian Americans are explored which, more recently, find that a growing majority of Asian Americans have shown a preference for the Democratic Party. Finally, we detail studies examining the conditions under which Asian American candidates emerge and are successful, the co-ethnic electorate who supports them, and conclude by detailing the opportunities and constraints for cross-racial collaboration and conflict.","PeriodicalId":20275,"journal":{"name":"Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43119623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-28DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0316
S. Mirza
Waste studies is premised on the understanding that waste is not essentially dirty or invaluable, but rather an arena through which classification, social boundaries, and state-making takes place. Mary Douglas’s structural approach in Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (2002) forms the cornerstone of waste studies by seeing waste as “matter out of place.” It explores the social function of waste as posing a problem of the unknown, disorderly and disturbing. The terming of something as “disorderly,” “risky,” “insanitary,” or “polluted,” Douglas argues, constitutes dominant power structures of states and scientific and religious institutions that determine the drawing of individual, social, and cultural boundaries. Douglas’s insights are used to recognize the ways the categories of value-non-value, norm-exception, structure-deviation, nature-culture, and object-subject get made. As a constructed category, waste in the context of Indian cities is seen to exacerbate existing class inequalities as well as to express and reify caste structures, together constituting a distinct postcolonial urbanism. Urban waste practices lay bare disjunctures of India’s postcolonial modernity in the everyday functioning of the state, labor, and economy for urban sanitation, which deploy caste-community labor of the former untouchable castes for waste-work. At the same time, colonially constituted sanitary science and advanced waste technology adopted by municipalities frame a circular relationship between poverty and disease, deeming the urban poor, their dwellings in crowded slums, and the work of sanitation as the cause of filth, squalor, and the contamination of cities. The prevalence and dominance of particular cultures of sanitation can be linked to social location, including an intersection of caste, class, minority, linguistic, and gender identities, requiring a political understanding of social interests within urban governance and the science of sanitation. In describing these disjunctures at the heart of India’s urbanism, this review will outline five conceptual tropes through which waste in Indian cities has been viewed: (1) as a common resource in a fluid terrain of property rights; (2) as informal and enabling the right to the city; (3) in terms of the colonial making of waste infrastructure, as highly unequal and differentiated; (4) as socially reproducing stigmatized caste labor through a social division of purity and pollution; and (5) as involving multiple stakeholders, including private initiatives, neoliberal policies, international networks, and global circuits.
废物研究的前提是，废物本质上不是肮脏或宝贵的，而是一个进行分类、社会边界和国家制定的舞台。玛丽·道格拉斯（Mary Douglas）在《纯粹与危险：污染与禁忌概念分析》（Purity and Danger:An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo，2002）一书中采用的结构性方法，将废物视为“不合时宜的物质”，构成了废物研究的基石。该书探讨了废物的社会功能，即构成未知、无序和令人不安的问题。道格拉斯认为，将某些东西称为“无序”、“危险”、“不卫生”或“污染”，构成了国家、科学和宗教机构的主导权力结构，决定了个人、社会和文化边界的划定。道格拉斯的见解被用来识别价值非价值、规范例外、结构偏差、自然文化和客体主体类别的形成方式。作为一种构建的类别，印度城市中的废物被视为加剧了现有的阶级不平等，并表达和具体化了种姓结构，共同构成了一种独特的后殖民城市主义。城市垃圾处理的做法暴露了印度后殖民现代性在国家、劳动力和经济的日常运作中对城市卫生的脱节，城市卫生利用了前贱民种姓的种姓社区劳动力进行垃圾处理。与此同时，殖民地建立的卫生科学和市政当局采用的先进废物技术在贫困和疾病之间建立了循环关系，认为城市穷人、他们在拥挤的贫民窟中的住所以及卫生工作是城市肮脏、肮脏和污染的原因。特定卫生文化的盛行和主导可能与社会位置有关，包括种姓、阶级、少数民族、语言和性别身份的交叉，这需要对城市治理和卫生科学中的社会利益有政治理解。在描述印度城市主义核心的这些脱节时，这篇综述将概述五个概念比喻，通过这些比喻，人们可以看待印度城市中的废物：（1）作为产权流动地带的共同资源；（2） 作为非正式的和有利于城市权利的；（3） 就殖民地制造废物基础设施而言，这是高度不平等和有区别的；（4） 通过纯洁和污染的社会划分，在社会上复制被污名化的种姓劳动；以及（5）涉及多个利益攸关方，包括私人倡议、新自由主义政策、国际网络和全球电路。
{"title":"The Politics of Waste and Social Inequalities in Indian Cities","authors":"S. Mirza","doi":"10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0316","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0316","url":null,"abstract":"Waste studies is premised on the understanding that waste is not essentially dirty or invaluable, but rather an arena through which classification, social boundaries, and state-making takes place. Mary Douglas’s structural approach in Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (2002) forms the cornerstone of waste studies by seeing waste as “matter out of place.” It explores the social function of waste as posing a problem of the unknown, disorderly and disturbing. The terming of something as “disorderly,” “risky,” “insanitary,” or “polluted,” Douglas argues, constitutes dominant power structures of states and scientific and religious institutions that determine the drawing of individual, social, and cultural boundaries. Douglas’s insights are used to recognize the ways the categories of value-non-value, norm-exception, structure-deviation, nature-culture, and object-subject get made. As a constructed category, waste in the context of Indian cities is seen to exacerbate existing class inequalities as well as to express and reify caste structures, together constituting a distinct postcolonial urbanism. Urban waste practices lay bare disjunctures of India’s postcolonial modernity in the everyday functioning of the state, labor, and economy for urban sanitation, which deploy caste-community labor of the former untouchable castes for waste-work. At the same time, colonially constituted sanitary science and advanced waste technology adopted by municipalities frame a circular relationship between poverty and disease, deeming the urban poor, their dwellings in crowded slums, and the work of sanitation as the cause of filth, squalor, and the contamination of cities. The prevalence and dominance of particular cultures of sanitation can be linked to social location, including an intersection of caste, class, minority, linguistic, and gender identities, requiring a political understanding of social interests within urban governance and the science of sanitation. In describing these disjunctures at the heart of India’s urbanism, this review will outline five conceptual tropes through which waste in Indian cities has been viewed: (1) as a common resource in a fluid terrain of property rights; (2) as informal and enabling the right to the city; (3) in terms of the colonial making of waste infrastructure, as highly unequal and differentiated; (4) as socially reproducing stigmatized caste labor through a social division of purity and pollution; and (5) as involving multiple stakeholders, including private initiatives, neoliberal policies, international networks, and global circuits.","PeriodicalId":20275,"journal":{"name":"Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44041451","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-28DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0320
Lauren Peterson, C. Grogan
Comparative studies of health care in the United States and peer nations often highlight a number of distinct features of the American system including high costs, fragmentation, and health inequities. While unique political factors and institutions in the United States are prominent reasons for these disparities, there are also distinct interactions between American politics and cultural, economic, racial, and social factors. Many comprehensive overviews of American health politics and policy begin in the 20th century highlighting the important influence of global and national historical events, such as World Wars I and II, and social movements, including the civil rights movement. Yet, health-care politics in the United States also continues to be shaped by early American history, government institutions, and systems. To understand health-care policy in the United States, it is also necessary to consider the legacy of other non-health factors and their intersections with health politics, including slavery and ongoing racism, early Protestant notions of mortality and self-reliance, the localized nature of private charity and volunteerism, federalism, a public distrust of federal government, and the evolution of health professions, among other factors. Often these historical events and other cultural, economic, or social factors significantly shape public opinion, political participation, and health-care inequities, and in some cases, provide a window of opportunity to advance important health-care reforms. The structure of American government institutions, political parties and growing polarization, unique attributes of elected leaders or policy entrepreneurs, and the power of interest groups, particularly private actors in the health care delivery system, are all significant factors that shape health-care politics in the United States. Contemporary American public health policy literature focuses on efforts to reduce health inequities and improve access to health care as well as the politics of recent reform ideas that promote government regulation and investments in non-health factors such as the environment and social services to reduce population health inequities.
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Pub Date : 2020-10-28DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0322
M. Haddad
Civil society in East Asia emerged from two community-generated needs: Rural villages relying primarily on rice farming had to work together to manage collective water supplies, and urban residents in densely packed housing similarly required neighborhood-based associations to fight fire, promote public health, and alleviate intense poverty. Mutual aid organizations rooted in these premodern traditions have not died off and continue to thrive across the region in the form of neighborhood associations, volunteer fire departments, and the like. With the introduction of Christian churches, democratic thought, and the increasingly diverse and complex lifestyles associated with capitalist development, the region has also seen the introduction of other forms of civil society organizations emerge, such as charity groups, reading circles, hobby groups, nonprofit welfare service organizations, ethnic and identity-based mutual aid groups, and advocacy organizations. Because East Asia did not experience the European Enlightenment, with its ideas of separating the public sphere from private interests, and has continued to be strongly influenced by Confucian traditions that emphasize the importance of self-cultivation and social order, civil society in East Asia has tended to be less confrontational toward the state than in other parts of the world. Laws across the region often require that nonprofit organizations register with a “supervising” government ministry, there are strict limits on political lobbying, and personal and corporate donations are often not tax-free. As with other parts of the world, individual citizens and communities do organize and engage in protests, demanding government accountability after corruption scandals, cleaner air and water, and increased protection for ethnic and social minorities, as well as organizing to promote specific policy outcomes. These grassroots movements have sometimes been successful, and both South Korea and Taiwan experienced peaceful transitions to democracy directly as a result of democratic social movements. In East Asia today, we find the same range of civil society organizations that exist across all advanced capitalist societies. As with counterparts elsewhere, civil society in the region is constantly evolving, combining the unique culture of the place in which it operates with influences from abroad.
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Pub Date : 2020-10-28DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0319
Zuzana Ringlerova
The European Union (EU) is a supranational political system that unites more than twenty-five European countries. European integration began to facilitate economic cooperation. Over time, it evolved into both an economic and political union. The progress in European integration accelerated in the 1980s and the 1990s. As a result, the European Union was established in 1993 and assumed more political power. The process of establishing the European Union was slowed by the results of a referendum in Denmark, which at first did not approve the treaty establishing the EU. This referendum made it clear that public support for European integration could no longer be taken for granted and that public attitudes toward the EU are crucial for the European Union’s future development. In other words, the era of permissive consensus ended and it became clear that public opinion has become a powerful force in the development of European integration. Since then, public opinion has had a clear influence on the direction of European integration in a number of ways. Examples of this influence include the rejection of the single European currency in Sweden, the failure of the Constitution for Europe, and, most notably, the United Kingdom’s decision to exit the EU. Public opinion has influenced European politics in other ways as well. For example, national political elites, acting at the European level, are constrained in their decisions by public opinion at home. The importance of understanding public opinion toward the EU has given rise to a lively research program. In their quest to understand citizens’ attitudes toward the EU, researchers first had to conceptualize the key concepts in this field, in particular the meaning of public support for the EU. Following this, scholars began to investigate why people support or oppose the European Union, which became the most widely studied topic in this field. In addition, studies have examined public support for specific European policies, determinants of voting in EU-related referendums, public support for EU membership in countries outside the EU, and the extent to which public opinion matters for policymaking in the EU. All these topics are included in this annotated bibliography. The section devoted to General Introductions and Review Articles lists review articles and textbook chapters that provide a quick overview of the topic as a whole. The next section, What Is Public Support for the EU and How Do We Explain It?, digs deeper into the concept of public support for the EU, asking how the concept is defined and what explains support for the EU. The following three sections deal with public opinion toward specific EU policies (Public Opinion toward Specific EU Policies), public support for the EU in nonmember states (Public Support for the EU in Candidate Countries and Other Nonmember States), and the question of public opinion’s influence on policymaking in the EU (Does Public Opinion Matter for Policymaking in the
{"title":"Public Opinion in Europe toward the European Union","authors":"Zuzana Ringlerova","doi":"10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0319","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0319","url":null,"abstract":"The European Union (EU) is a supranational political system that unites more than twenty-five European countries. European integration began to facilitate economic cooperation. Over time, it evolved into both an economic and political union. The progress in European integration accelerated in the 1980s and the 1990s. As a result, the European Union was established in 1993 and assumed more political power. The process of establishing the European Union was slowed by the results of a referendum in Denmark, which at first did not approve the treaty establishing the EU. This referendum made it clear that public support for European integration could no longer be taken for granted and that public attitudes toward the EU are crucial for the European Union’s future development. In other words, the era of permissive consensus ended and it became clear that public opinion has become a powerful force in the development of European integration. Since then, public opinion has had a clear influence on the direction of European integration in a number of ways. Examples of this influence include the rejection of the single European currency in Sweden, the failure of the Constitution for Europe, and, most notably, the United Kingdom’s decision to exit the EU. Public opinion has influenced European politics in other ways as well. For example, national political elites, acting at the European level, are constrained in their decisions by public opinion at home. The importance of understanding public opinion toward the EU has given rise to a lively research program. In their quest to understand citizens’ attitudes toward the EU, researchers first had to conceptualize the key concepts in this field, in particular the meaning of public support for the EU. Following this, scholars began to investigate why people support or oppose the European Union, which became the most widely studied topic in this field. In addition, studies have examined public support for specific European policies, determinants of voting in EU-related referendums, public support for EU membership in countries outside the EU, and the extent to which public opinion matters for policymaking in the EU. All these topics are included in this annotated bibliography. The section devoted to General Introductions and Review Articles lists review articles and textbook chapters that provide a quick overview of the topic as a whole. The next section, What Is Public Support for the EU and How Do We Explain It?, digs deeper into the concept of public support for the EU, asking how the concept is defined and what explains support for the EU. The following three sections deal with public opinion toward specific EU policies (Public Opinion toward Specific EU Policies), public support for the EU in nonmember states (Public Support for the EU in Candidate Countries and Other Nonmember States), and the question of public opinion’s influence on policymaking in the EU (Does Public Opinion Matter for Policymaking in the ","PeriodicalId":20275,"journal":{"name":"Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43563382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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