Pub Date : 2020-07-29DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0314
Netina Tan
Women’s descriptive representation in East and Southeast Asia remains lower than global average. Apart from Timor-Leste and Taiwan, no country has achieved the 30 percent “critical mass” of women parliamentarians—a number seen as the minimum proportion necessary to influence policies. East and Southeast Asia is a diverse region where, unlike in South Asia, the rise of powerful women leaders came about only in recent decades. With the rise of prominent women leaders, such as Corazon Aquino, Megawati Sukarnoputri, Yingluck Shinawatra, Park Geun-hye, and Aung San Suu Kyi, studies on dynastic or familial ties have become more prominent, and political science and area studies journals now publish frequently on gender and politics in Asia. Previously, qualitative, descriptive work based on historical archives, ethnography, or elite interviews has dominated. With more cross-country and public opinion data sets, however, quantitative studies have flourished. Similar to those dealing with the Global North, theories to explain the supply and demand of women in politics in Asia include: (1) international factors and diffusion theory, (2) women’s activism and mass movements, (3) institutional designs (e.g., quotas, electoral systems, candidate selection, party politics), and (4) culture and religion. Beyond the literature that theorizes how women engage in politics, another body of literature explores the experiences of women in politics. Who wins in elections? What are the experiences of women candidates and politicians? What are the barriers to substantively representing women? Findings demonstrate that highly educated, professional elite women win elections, while women in cabinet tend to hold “soft” and lower profile portfolios. Moreover, many prominent female state and party leaders come to power through their connection with prominent male leaders. The experiences of female politicians also differ depending on the level of politics, namely, local or national level. The status of women’s representation is further impacted by the regime type. A striking anomaly is the higher number of women politicians in authoritarian, one-party states than in established democracies in the region. Yet do authoritarian regimes with high numbers of female representatives better serve women’s interests? What is the relationship between women and democratic revolutions? In the Philippines, Taiwan, and South Korea, women’s activism and women leaders played key roles in democratic revolutions. More research is needed on assessing women’s substantive representation in both regimes. While it is important to examine politics through the lens of gender, it is equally important to understand how gender inequality intersects with ethnic minority and religious identities. Thus far, few researchers have adopted intersectional approaches in examining how women in politics can be disadvantaged by multiple sources of oppression.
{"title":"Women and Politics in East and Southeast Asia","authors":"Netina Tan","doi":"10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0314","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0314","url":null,"abstract":"Women’s descriptive representation in East and Southeast Asia remains lower than global average. Apart from Timor-Leste and Taiwan, no country has achieved the 30 percent “critical mass” of women parliamentarians—a number seen as the minimum proportion necessary to influence policies. East and Southeast Asia is a diverse region where, unlike in South Asia, the rise of powerful women leaders came about only in recent decades. With the rise of prominent women leaders, such as Corazon Aquino, Megawati Sukarnoputri, Yingluck Shinawatra, Park Geun-hye, and Aung San Suu Kyi, studies on dynastic or familial ties have become more prominent, and political science and area studies journals now publish frequently on gender and politics in Asia. Previously, qualitative, descriptive work based on historical archives, ethnography, or elite interviews has dominated. With more cross-country and public opinion data sets, however, quantitative studies have flourished. Similar to those dealing with the Global North, theories to explain the supply and demand of women in politics in Asia include: (1) international factors and diffusion theory, (2) women’s activism and mass movements, (3) institutional designs (e.g., quotas, electoral systems, candidate selection, party politics), and (4) culture and religion. Beyond the literature that theorizes how women engage in politics, another body of literature explores the experiences of women in politics. Who wins in elections? What are the experiences of women candidates and politicians? What are the barriers to substantively representing women? Findings demonstrate that highly educated, professional elite women win elections, while women in cabinet tend to hold “soft” and lower profile portfolios. Moreover, many prominent female state and party leaders come to power through their connection with prominent male leaders. The experiences of female politicians also differ depending on the level of politics, namely, local or national level. The status of women’s representation is further impacted by the regime type. A striking anomaly is the higher number of women politicians in authoritarian, one-party states than in established democracies in the region. Yet do authoritarian regimes with high numbers of female representatives better serve women’s interests? What is the relationship between women and democratic revolutions? In the Philippines, Taiwan, and South Korea, women’s activism and women leaders played key roles in democratic revolutions. More research is needed on assessing women’s substantive representation in both regimes. While it is important to examine politics through the lens of gender, it is equally important to understand how gender inequality intersects with ethnic minority and religious identities. Thus far, few researchers have adopted intersectional approaches in examining how women in politics can be disadvantaged by multiple sources of oppression.","PeriodicalId":20275,"journal":{"name":"Political Science","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61152831","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-27DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0309
Lei Xie
Transboundary water courses abound in Asia, which is experiencing risks with regards to the use of water and the sustainability of water ecology. Many of the Asian states are facing growing pressures to react to global change, with a high level of both poverty and population growth. Asia’s water politics have been explored from a range of perspectives, reflecting the complicated discourses, processes, and narratives when the global South respond to water-related challenges. Within these nations, the low economic development level and the underdevelopment of key democratic institutions as well as limited knowledge in water management have posed challenges to the region to setting up efficient institutional arrangements to promote sustainable development. The geographical conditions make the sharing of international rivers more complicated. Large-scale rivers are often found to run through a number of countries, resulting in each state possessing asymmetric interests in the shared water resources. Vulnerability in the river basin is often unevenly spread among riparian states, adding to the difficulty of countries’ peacefully resolving tensions over the shared water resources. Moreover, regional security in South Asia is considered to be unstable and rapidly changing. Some international rivers run near national borders, complicating the existing border disputes in some places. Questions are raised if the region has developed strong resilience when faced with water-related risks such as water scarcity and degradation.
{"title":"Water Politics in Asia","authors":"Lei Xie","doi":"10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0309","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0309","url":null,"abstract":"Transboundary water courses abound in Asia, which is experiencing risks with regards to the use of water and the sustainability of water ecology. Many of the Asian states are facing growing pressures to react to global change, with a high level of both poverty and population growth. Asia’s water politics have been explored from a range of perspectives, reflecting the complicated discourses, processes, and narratives when the global South respond to water-related challenges. Within these nations, the low economic development level and the underdevelopment of key democratic institutions as well as limited knowledge in water management have posed challenges to the region to setting up efficient institutional arrangements to promote sustainable development. The geographical conditions make the sharing of international rivers more complicated. Large-scale rivers are often found to run through a number of countries, resulting in each state possessing asymmetric interests in the shared water resources. Vulnerability in the river basin is often unevenly spread among riparian states, adding to the difficulty of countries’ peacefully resolving tensions over the shared water resources. Moreover, regional security in South Asia is considered to be unstable and rapidly changing. Some international rivers run near national borders, complicating the existing border disputes in some places. Questions are raised if the region has developed strong resilience when faced with water-related risks such as water scarcity and degradation.","PeriodicalId":20275,"journal":{"name":"Political Science","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45165741","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-03DOI: 10.1080/00323187.2020.1818587
Nicole Satherley, Lara M. Greaves, D. Osborne, C. Sibley
ABSTRACT Voter polarisation, or the widening of differences between supporters of different political parties, is of growing concern in many nations. However, little is known about whether polarisation is on the rise in New Zealand. We address this lacuna by investigating temporal trends in voter polarisation in New Zealand (namely, those voting for the National party, Labour party, the Green party, and New Zealand First) from 2009–2018. Using a large national probability sample (the New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study; Ns = 2,820–39,287), we assessed polarisation across three domains: demographic characteristics, social and policy attitudes, and feelings towards each political party (affective polarisation). Evidence of polarisation was generally limited, with the most notable trends occurring in the public’s perceptions of societal fairness and attitudes towards inequality. These analyses provide insight into the magnitude and type of polarisation occurring across voters in a multi-party context.
{"title":"State of the nation: trends in New Zealand voters’ polarisation from 2009–2018","authors":"Nicole Satherley, Lara M. Greaves, D. Osborne, C. Sibley","doi":"10.1080/00323187.2020.1818587","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00323187.2020.1818587","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Voter polarisation, or the widening of differences between supporters of different political parties, is of growing concern in many nations. However, little is known about whether polarisation is on the rise in New Zealand. We address this lacuna by investigating temporal trends in voter polarisation in New Zealand (namely, those voting for the National party, Labour party, the Green party, and New Zealand First) from 2009–2018. Using a large national probability sample (the New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study; Ns = 2,820–39,287), we assessed polarisation across three domains: demographic characteristics, social and policy attitudes, and feelings towards each political party (affective polarisation). Evidence of polarisation was generally limited, with the most notable trends occurring in the public’s perceptions of societal fairness and attitudes towards inequality. These analyses provide insight into the magnitude and type of polarisation occurring across voters in a multi-party context.","PeriodicalId":20275,"journal":{"name":"Political Science","volume":"72 1","pages":"1 - 23"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/00323187.2020.1818587","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48516281","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-03DOI: 10.1080/00323187.2020.1800414
Samantha K. Stanley, J. Kerr, Marc S. Wilson
ABSTRACT New Zealand’s primary strategy for tackling greenhouse gas emissions is the emissions trading scheme, which puts a price on emissions from all major industries – except animal agriculture. In the decade since the scheme was introduced, conversations about including emissions from animal agriculture have been shrouded in controversy, with a levy on such emissions dubbed a ‘fart tax’. Across two independent samples of New Zealanders, we examined whether support for a charge on farm emissions differed depending on how the charge was framed. We showed that participants were more supportive of including farm emissions in the existing scheme than supporting a ‘fart tax’, and also that the description of the policy that most closely aligned with the Labour Party’s original proposal for the charge (a levy on the agricultural sector to fund research into low carbon farming practices) garnered the most support. Across both samples, support also varied by political affiliation, with support highest among Green voters, followed by Labour voters, and National voters generally opposing the charge, regardless of framing. Frames did not interact with political affiliation in the expected way, suggesting that ‘fart tax’ referencing reaches across the political divide in undermining support for this policy.
{"title":"The influence of politics and labelling on New Zealanders’ attitudes towards animal agriculture emissions policy","authors":"Samantha K. Stanley, J. Kerr, Marc S. Wilson","doi":"10.1080/00323187.2020.1800414","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00323187.2020.1800414","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT New Zealand’s primary strategy for tackling greenhouse gas emissions is the emissions trading scheme, which puts a price on emissions from all major industries – except animal agriculture. In the decade since the scheme was introduced, conversations about including emissions from animal agriculture have been shrouded in controversy, with a levy on such emissions dubbed a ‘fart tax’. Across two independent samples of New Zealanders, we examined whether support for a charge on farm emissions differed depending on how the charge was framed. We showed that participants were more supportive of including farm emissions in the existing scheme than supporting a ‘fart tax’, and also that the description of the policy that most closely aligned with the Labour Party’s original proposal for the charge (a levy on the agricultural sector to fund research into low carbon farming practices) garnered the most support. Across both samples, support also varied by political affiliation, with support highest among Green voters, followed by Labour voters, and National voters generally opposing the charge, regardless of framing. Frames did not interact with political affiliation in the expected way, suggesting that ‘fart tax’ referencing reaches across the political divide in undermining support for this policy.","PeriodicalId":20275,"journal":{"name":"Political Science","volume":"72 1","pages":"24 - 37"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/00323187.2020.1800414","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44798425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-03DOI: 10.1080/00323187.2020.1827960
Lin Liu, Yi Yang
ABSTRACT Is power zero-sum (relative gain/loss) or variable-sum (absolute gain/loss)? The response to this century-old puzzle depends on how power manifests itself during human interactions in diverse contexts. While few theoretical contributions investigating this puzzle seek empirical assistance, this paper utilises two game theoretic experiments for an answer. Consisting of a randomly assigned priming treatment followed by a single round of decision-making in a choice game for three groups of participants, it tests how human subjective understanding of power translates into varied objective power exercises in different situations. Findings reveal that in a ‘power to’ context whereby people mentally value their individual agency more (i.e. freedom from others), they tend to pursue absolute than relative gains, displaying a variable-sum power exercise strategy; in contrast, in a ‘power over’ context whereby people value their ability to affect others more (i.e. interdependence with others), individuals become relative-gain maximisers, thus viewing the sum of each power exercise as zero. Therefore, we conclude that whether power is zero-sum or variable-sum is context-dependent because how power is framed and subjectively understood by agents (i.e., ‘power to’ vs. ‘power over’, as contexts) shape their objective behaviours in power transactions (i.e., ‘zero-sum’ vs. ‘variable-sum’ power exercise).
{"title":"Is power zero-sum or variable-sum? Conceptualizing a context-dependent answer to a century-old debate with two game theoretic experiments","authors":"Lin Liu, Yi Yang","doi":"10.1080/00323187.2020.1827960","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00323187.2020.1827960","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Is power zero-sum (relative gain/loss) or variable-sum (absolute gain/loss)? The response to this century-old puzzle depends on how power manifests itself during human interactions in diverse contexts. While few theoretical contributions investigating this puzzle seek empirical assistance, this paper utilises two game theoretic experiments for an answer. Consisting of a randomly assigned priming treatment followed by a single round of decision-making in a choice game for three groups of participants, it tests how human subjective understanding of power translates into varied objective power exercises in different situations. Findings reveal that in a ‘power to’ context whereby people mentally value their individual agency more (i.e. freedom from others), they tend to pursue absolute than relative gains, displaying a variable-sum power exercise strategy; in contrast, in a ‘power over’ context whereby people value their ability to affect others more (i.e. interdependence with others), individuals become relative-gain maximisers, thus viewing the sum of each power exercise as zero. Therefore, we conclude that whether power is zero-sum or variable-sum is context-dependent because how power is framed and subjectively understood by agents (i.e., ‘power to’ vs. ‘power over’, as contexts) shape their objective behaviours in power transactions (i.e., ‘zero-sum’ vs. ‘variable-sum’ power exercise).","PeriodicalId":20275,"journal":{"name":"Political Science","volume":"72 1","pages":"38 - 57"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/00323187.2020.1827960","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42632303","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-03DOI: 10.1080/00323187.2020.1855992
Todd Donovan
ABSTRACT New Zealand First is occasionally misclassified as a ‘radical right’ and/or ‘right-wing populist party.’ This presents an opportunity to examine how parties might be placed into this family of parties. This paper draws from literature describing parties to propose five criteria to classify a party as radical right/right-wing populist, in part based on views in the electorate. Criteria include: (1) An intersection of populist style and antipathy to immigration; (2) Cultural authoritarianism; (3) Political authoritarianism; (4) Supporters who identify as right-wing; and (5) An electorate that views the party as far right. This study concludes that apart from perhaps two of these criteria, including the least discriminating, New Zealand First was not radical right/right wing populist. More broadly, this study expands on our understanding of ‘radical right’ and/or ‘right-wing populist’ parties by illustrating that the US Republican party, although classified less often with European radical right populist parties than New Zealand First, should be classified as such.
{"title":"Misclassifying parties as radical right / right wing populist: a comparative analysis of New Zealand First","authors":"Todd Donovan","doi":"10.1080/00323187.2020.1855992","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00323187.2020.1855992","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT New Zealand First is occasionally misclassified as a ‘radical right’ and/or ‘right-wing populist party.’ This presents an opportunity to examine how parties might be placed into this family of parties. This paper draws from literature describing parties to propose five criteria to classify a party as radical right/right-wing populist, in part based on views in the electorate. Criteria include: (1) An intersection of populist style and antipathy to immigration; (2) Cultural authoritarianism; (3) Political authoritarianism; (4) Supporters who identify as right-wing; and (5) An electorate that views the party as far right. This study concludes that apart from perhaps two of these criteria, including the least discriminating, New Zealand First was not radical right/right wing populist. More broadly, this study expands on our understanding of ‘radical right’ and/or ‘right-wing populist’ parties by illustrating that the US Republican party, although classified less often with European radical right populist parties than New Zealand First, should be classified as such.","PeriodicalId":20275,"journal":{"name":"Political Science","volume":"72 1","pages":"58 - 76"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/00323187.2020.1855992","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48962070","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-04-22DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0308
David S. Brown, Amy H. Liu
Language is one of the most important markers of a distinct group identity: It brings members together from the inside, and it demarcates boundaries from the outside. Accordingly, it is a common assumption in the literature on the politics of language—whether it is political science, sociology, linguistics, anthropology, or area studies—that minority groups want their languages recognized (or, at a minimum, left alone and not eradicated) by the government. But recognition of minority languages is inherently a political process. It requires the government to acknowledge that the vernacular spoken by the minority group is distinct from that of the majority (i.e., it is a language). When governments dismiss a vernacular as simply a derivative of the majority’s (i.e., it is a dialect), it suggests that speakers of that vernacular are inferior. Moreover, recognition requires some awareness to the differing language ideologies (i.e., how society should be linguistically organized). When the ideology of the politically dominant group is the only ideology in consideration, this influences the type of language policies. And whether governments acknowledge minority language ideologies and minority demands for linguistic recognition depends on a number of factors. One factor is whether the minority group is concentrated in a regional territory. Another factor is whether the political institutions in the country are generally more power sharing (e.g., proportional electoral rules and federalism). How the government accommodates minority languages—if it does, and if so, to what extent—can have far-reaching implications. Failure to accommodate minority demands can lead to intergroup social tensions, if not outright violent conflicts. Moreover, expecting minorities to learn a language that is not native to them—and especially if it is linguistically distant—can have economic ramifications, including higher levels of poverty and lower levels of literacy. However, by recognizing minority languages, governments allow for trust to build. This can manifest between members of different ethnic groups or among minorities toward the state. How governments accommodate minority languages can also affect local attitudes toward immigrants (e.g., when are they more likely to hold nativist viewpoints) and the assimilation of immigrants (e.g., what explains why some immigrant communities struggle to learn the language of the host country).
{"title":"Democracy and Minority Language Recognition","authors":"David S. Brown, Amy H. Liu","doi":"10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0308","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0308","url":null,"abstract":"Language is one of the most important markers of a distinct group identity: It brings members together from the inside, and it demarcates boundaries from the outside. Accordingly, it is a common assumption in the literature on the politics of language—whether it is political science, sociology, linguistics, anthropology, or area studies—that minority groups want their languages recognized (or, at a minimum, left alone and not eradicated) by the government. But recognition of minority languages is inherently a political process. It requires the government to acknowledge that the vernacular spoken by the minority group is distinct from that of the majority (i.e., it is a language). When governments dismiss a vernacular as simply a derivative of the majority’s (i.e., it is a dialect), it suggests that speakers of that vernacular are inferior. Moreover, recognition requires some awareness to the differing language ideologies (i.e., how society should be linguistically organized). When the ideology of the politically dominant group is the only ideology in consideration, this influences the type of language policies. And whether governments acknowledge minority language ideologies and minority demands for linguistic recognition depends on a number of factors. One factor is whether the minority group is concentrated in a regional territory. Another factor is whether the political institutions in the country are generally more power sharing (e.g., proportional electoral rules and federalism). How the government accommodates minority languages—if it does, and if so, to what extent—can have far-reaching implications. Failure to accommodate minority demands can lead to intergroup social tensions, if not outright violent conflicts. Moreover, expecting minorities to learn a language that is not native to them—and especially if it is linguistically distant—can have economic ramifications, including higher levels of poverty and lower levels of literacy. However, by recognizing minority languages, governments allow for trust to build. This can manifest between members of different ethnic groups or among minorities toward the state. How governments accommodate minority languages can also affect local attitudes toward immigrants (e.g., when are they more likely to hold nativist viewpoints) and the assimilation of immigrants (e.g., what explains why some immigrant communities struggle to learn the language of the host country).","PeriodicalId":20275,"journal":{"name":"Political Science","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43765451","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-04-22DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0305
Farida Jalalzai
This article focuses on trends in women’s inclusion in executive cabinet positions. It discusses the factors facilitating women’s selection to these positions, the quality of portfolios held, and the benefits that gender diversity offers in the cabinet. The percentage of women cabinet ministers has increased worldwide since the 1990s. Moreover, women have started to obtain positions affording more power that are less traditional. At the same time, women still represent a very small portion of cabinet ministers. Conditions that help promote women to power include leftist governments, higher percentages of women in the legislature, and growing international norms valuing gender diversity. Only 21 percent of cabinet ministers are women, but that constitutes record levels. Increasingly, countries have women in at least 50 percent of cabinet positions. This article is organized as follows: It first provides an overview of theoretical foundations related to cabinet selection; it then assesses facilitating conditions related to women’s cabinet incorporation, focusing first on global findings, followed by regional findings. It then addresses types of positions held as well as gender differences in backgrounds. Finally, it outlines the benefits of diverse cabinets.
{"title":"Women’s Inclusion in Executive Cabinets","authors":"Farida Jalalzai","doi":"10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0305","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0305","url":null,"abstract":"This article focuses on trends in women’s inclusion in executive cabinet positions. It discusses the factors facilitating women’s selection to these positions, the quality of portfolios held, and the benefits that gender diversity offers in the cabinet. The percentage of women cabinet ministers has increased worldwide since the 1990s. Moreover, women have started to obtain positions affording more power that are less traditional. At the same time, women still represent a very small portion of cabinet ministers. Conditions that help promote women to power include leftist governments, higher percentages of women in the legislature, and growing international norms valuing gender diversity. Only 21 percent of cabinet ministers are women, but that constitutes record levels. Increasingly, countries have women in at least 50 percent of cabinet positions. This article is organized as follows: It first provides an overview of theoretical foundations related to cabinet selection; it then assesses facilitating conditions related to women’s cabinet incorporation, focusing first on global findings, followed by regional findings. It then addresses types of positions held as well as gender differences in backgrounds. Finally, it outlines the benefits of diverse cabinets.","PeriodicalId":20275,"journal":{"name":"Political Science","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42563836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-04-22DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0307
Rosalyn Cooperman
Voter support for women candidates in American politics may best be summed up by the often-repeated phrase, “when women run, women win.” This statement indicates that when compared to male candidates running in a similar capacity, such as candidates for open seats in which no incumbent is present, female candidates are equally likely to win elected office. Voters, therefore, seem equally likely at face value to support female candidates. However, the literature on voter support for women candidates suggests that this voter support may be more conditional in nature. A central research thread on voters and women candidates is how voters perceive women candidates and, in turn, their electability. Research on gender stereotypes and candidates examines voter perceptions of the traits they typically associate with men and women, candidates, and officeholders and the circumstances under which these traits make gender and political candidacy more or less attractive. The literature on political party and voter support for women candidates explores how gender and party affect levels of voter support and is offered as one explanation for the party imbalance in women’s representation with female Democrats significantly outnumbering female Republicans as candidates and officeholders. Researchers have also examined how voters evaluate other components of women’s candidacies, including their party affiliation, race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation. In addition to personal characteristics, scholars have explored how the type or level of office impacts voter support of women candidates with certain types of elected positions often considered more or less well suited for women candidates. More recently, a thread of research on voter support for women candidates has focused on women’s absence from the nation’s highest elected position—the US presidency. Scholars, and the candidate herself, have assessed voter support for or opposition to Hillary Clinton’s unsuccessful presidential bids in 2008 and 2016. This line of research includes public opinion polling that measures both the abstract idea of electing a woman president as well as electing a specific woman president, namely Clinton.
{"title":"Voter Support for Women Candidates","authors":"Rosalyn Cooperman","doi":"10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0307","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0307","url":null,"abstract":"Voter support for women candidates in American politics may best be summed up by the often-repeated phrase, “when women run, women win.” This statement indicates that when compared to male candidates running in a similar capacity, such as candidates for open seats in which no incumbent is present, female candidates are equally likely to win elected office. Voters, therefore, seem equally likely at face value to support female candidates. However, the literature on voter support for women candidates suggests that this voter support may be more conditional in nature. A central research thread on voters and women candidates is how voters perceive women candidates and, in turn, their electability. Research on gender stereotypes and candidates examines voter perceptions of the traits they typically associate with men and women, candidates, and officeholders and the circumstances under which these traits make gender and political candidacy more or less attractive. The literature on political party and voter support for women candidates explores how gender and party affect levels of voter support and is offered as one explanation for the party imbalance in women’s representation with female Democrats significantly outnumbering female Republicans as candidates and officeholders. Researchers have also examined how voters evaluate other components of women’s candidacies, including their party affiliation, race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation. In addition to personal characteristics, scholars have explored how the type or level of office impacts voter support of women candidates with certain types of elected positions often considered more or less well suited for women candidates. More recently, a thread of research on voter support for women candidates has focused on women’s absence from the nation’s highest elected position—the US presidency. Scholars, and the candidate herself, have assessed voter support for or opposition to Hillary Clinton’s unsuccessful presidential bids in 2008 and 2016. This line of research includes public opinion polling that measures both the abstract idea of electing a woman president as well as electing a specific woman president, namely Clinton.","PeriodicalId":20275,"journal":{"name":"Political Science","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46868071","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-03-25DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0304
Jill S. Greenlee, Elizabeth A. Sharrow
As the rhetoric around parenthood has increased in the political world, so too has the scholarly focus on parenthood within political science and related fields. This article attempts to account for the many ways in which parenthood is political and has implications for the study of politics. In this article, we consider parenthood as a role, identity, and life event that has the potential to shape the attitudes and behaviors of individuals. We also review literature on the constitutive roles that public policies and political institutions play in structuring the meanings and practices of parenthood. In this survey, the unit and topics of analysis differ across areas of study, varying from parent, child, candidate, officeholder, historical era, or policy domain. The literature is also characterized by the use of different data sources, methodologies, and research designs, all of which vary in their ability to isolate the independent effect of parenthood on the outcome of interest and which we acknowledge is largely focused on heterosexual partnerships and two-parent households. The scholarship here is organized around four major themes: 1) Parenthood and political socialization, 2) Parenthood and political attitudes and behavior in the mass public, 3) Parenthood and political behavior among elites, and 4) Parenthood as terrain for state-building and public policies. In this structure, we first review some central works within the literature on parents as primary socializing agents of their children’s early political orientations, while also discussing the smaller literature on children as socializing agents onto parents. Second, we examine research on how parenthood shapes the political lives of adults in the mass public. We consider literature regarding how parenthood shapes the policy stances of political elites and literature examining the political attitudes and behaviors of voters and activists. We also review research on how parenthood shapes how voters evaluate political candidates. We then consider how parenthood operates as a landscape for state-building through public policy and political institutions, and how parenthood functions as a social arrangement around which public policies are built. While scholarship outside of political science examines aspects of parenthood with implications for politics, this review covers primarily research within political science. Moreover, we touch only lightly upon topics that have generated vast amounts of scholarship, such as the politics of women’s fertility and reproductive rights. Finally, we are mindful that approaches to the study of parenthood that examine how gender, gender identity, race, sexuality, disability, and class converge to shape distinct parenting experiences, identities, vulnerabilities, and policy needs are unfortunately uncommon within political science—we hope this bibliography might underscore the need for such research in the near future. While we primarily focus on work from
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