Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology最新文献

Perceived contingency of a single cue and outcome is based on the relative exposure to four types of events: Cue-outcome pairings (A events), cue-alone presentations (B events), outcome-alone presentations (C events), and events in which neither the cue nor the outcome is presented (D events). Previous experiments found increases in the frequency of event-affected ratings of the perceived contingency between the cue and outcome, even compared to conditions with proportional decreases in the duration of trials (i.e., adjusted frequency conditions). The present experiments tested the generality and boundaries of this adjusted frequency effect by examining whether it generalizes to ratings of multiple cue-outcome dyads, to a cued-recall test, and to both sequential and simultaneous cue-outcome presentations. Experiment 1 revealed a strong effect of frequency but no effect of duration after training with a single cue-outcome dyad; however, a duration effect emerged when training consisted of five cue-outcome dyads. Experiment 2 showed an effect of duration as well as an adjusted frequency effect in contingency ratings after training with five dyads. Experiment 3 extended these observations to a cued-recall test after training with 10 cue-outcome dyads. Experiment 4 used five dyads and found a within-experiment effect of duration on both contingency ratings and cued-recall scores. Whereas Experiments 1 to 4 varied the A events, Experiment 5 varied frequency and duration of the D events with 10 cue-outcome dyads and revealed effects of duration as well as frequency on both cued-recall and cue-outcome contingency ratings. In summary, these experiments detected an increase in the importance of event duration with increases in the number of dyads. Moreover, subject ratings of contingency closely tracked results in a cued-recall test, suggesting that a common mechanism underlies these two measures.

People often hesitate to rely on algorithmic advice, even when it is objectively more accurate than human input-a phenomenon known as algorithm aversion. In two experiments, we investigated the cognitive mechanisms underlying this effect in a clinical decision-making context. Participants evaluated X-rays for bone fractures, with each image accompanied by advice purportedly from either an algorithm or a human source. Across experiments, we observed longer response times for algorithmic advice, indicating increased deliberation. Evidence accumulation modeling revealed that participants set higher decision thresholds when evaluating algorithmic advice, reflecting a more cautious decision strategy. This hesitancy, observed when the human advice was attributed to lay participants (Experiment 1), persisted when the human advice was attributed to expert radiologists (Experiment 2). Accumulation rates and prior preferences did not differ across advisor types, suggesting that algorithm aversion stems specifically from increased caution rather than reduced perceived reliability. These findings demonstrate that algorithm aversion manifests as a strategic shift in decision-making and highlight the value of formal cognitive models for understanding trust in artificial intelligence. Our findings advance the theoretical understanding of algorithm aversion by identifying response caution as a core mechanism. More broadly, the results demonstrate how formal models of decision-making can clarify the cognitive architecture of trust in automated systems, offering a foundation for future work on optimizing human-algorithm collaboration.

Whenever we work towards completing a task, such as learning some information, we are susceptible to attentional lapses where our thoughts stray from the demands of the current task to something unrelated (i.e., mind-wandering). Although prior work indicates that the presence of mind-wandering probes (used to measure task-unrelated thoughts) in a cognitive task may not impact the measurement of abilities like processing speed, there could be reactive effects involving memory. We examined whether mind-wandering probes can impact memory by having participants study lists of words to remember for later tests; at pseudo-random intervals during encoding, participants either responded to mind-wandering probes, answered math problems, had unfilled interstimulus intervals, or studied the lists without any interruptions. Results revealed that mind-wandering probes (or other interruptions) do not significantly impact overall memory performance (though there may be some impact on items immediately preceding or following a probe) or the temporal dynamics of episodic memory. Thus, the present study suggests that using mind-wandering probes introduces minimal unexpected bias into research designs such that these interruptions do not adversely affect or benefit memory performance, consistent with prior research focused primarily on other cognitive domains.

Models of human face recognition rely on the notion of representation, but rarely describe this in detail. Here, I will argue that our conception of face representations is often 'essentialist' - assuming that there is some fixed set of values that captures a particular person's face. However, this conception is inadequate for the purpose of familiar face recognition, and I will suggest that representations instead need to incorporate the statistical properties of our exposure to all the faces we know, including variability and sampling. I will review findings from empirical and simulation research suggesting that the idiosyncratic properties of each perceiver result in a unique set of representations, which can be difficult to understand using traditional experimental approaches. Methodological diversity seems to offer the best route for understanding face recognition - a problem that remains stubbornly unsolved.

Practicing two simultaneous tasks in an extensive manner reduces the performance impairments (i.e., dual-task costs) that occur in dual-task situations compared to single-task situations. The present study provides empirical tests of the latent bottleneck model to explain this reduction and thus the practice-related improvement in dual-task performance. To do so, in three experiments, participants practiced a visual-manual and an auditory-verbal task in single-task and dual-task trials for several sessions. In these experiments, we changed the duration of the response selection stages of the two tasks after practice and analyzed the resulting effects on the reaction times (RTs) during subsequent transfer. The results showed a pattern of selective prolongations of the RTs in the two tasks, which depends on the location of the manipulated process relative to a presumed latent processing bottleneck. The manipulation of the time at bottleneck stages in the longer (auditory-verbal) task did not propagate into the RTs of the shorter task, while prolongations of bottleneck stages of a shorter (visual-manual) task propagated into longer task RTs after practice. These results are consistent with a latent bottleneck model of dual-task practice.

Prior research suggests that people who believe in and spread conspiracy theories are often viewed negatively, yet investigations systematically disentangling both factors are scarce. The present research addressed this gap through two pre-registered experiments with representative samples from the United States. In Study 1, 418 participants evaluated eight fictional individuals across 3,344 trials, presented as (a) believing in and/or (b) spreading conspiracy theories in a 2 × 2 within-subjects design. Analyses revealed that both characters who believed in conspiracy theories and those who spread them were perceived as less competent, moral, and warm, and as more narcissistic, Machiavellian, and psychopathic. Moreover, both believers and spreaders were perceived as likely to engage in conspiratorial actions themselves, and participants reported lower willingness to interact with them. However, significant interactions for all variables showed that these effects were particularly pronounced for characters who spread conspiracy theories without believing in them. Notably, participants' own conspiracy beliefs and, to some extent, their right-wing political orientation attenuated several effects and reversed some. In Study 2, we employed the reverse-correlation technique to model 412 participants' mental representations of individuals who varied in belief and/or spread of conspiracy theories using a 2 × 2 between-subjects design. Results were directionally consistent with Study 1-both believers and spreaders of conspiracy theories were mentally represented less favorably-but no interactions or moderations were observed. Moreover, believing had significantly stronger effects than spreading on the rating dimensions. We discuss the social implications of these results and outline future directions.

The visual system may perceptually process conspecifics more efficiently when they are interacting, versus not, to support social cognitive functions such as group detection. In three experiments, young adult university students were briefly shown dyads (upright or inverted) and made speeded judgments of whether they attended the same location (joint attention) or different locations (non-joint attention). Participants performed worse with inverted stimuli, but this inversion effect was smaller in joint attention conditions. These findings indicate perceptual grouping of joint attention dyads into a single perceptual unit. This joint attention grouping effect was evident when dyads looked towards spatial locations (Experiment 1), towards objects (Experiment 2), and for asymmetrically composed stimuli (Experiment 3). The effect was weaker for non-social directional stimuli (Experiment 1). These data support the idea that two interacting individuals are coded as one socially bound perceptual unit, supporting efficient and rapid social cognitive computations.

Swearing has been linked to increased strength performance, and state disinhibition may be the mechanism linking swearing and strength. Error-related negativity (ERN) is a neural signal associated with response monitoring. Its reduction has been proposed as neural marker for state disinhibition, and therefore, we predicted that swearing would lead to a decreased ERN compared with neutral word repetition, indicating state disinhibition. The study (N = 52) used a within-subjects experimental design with two conditions. Participants repeated either a swear or neutral word aloud for 10 s before engaging in an arrowhead flanker task, a grip strength task, and several questionnaires. ERN was measured continually using electroencephalography (EEG). The study replicated previously found effects of swearing on strength, humour, positive emotion, and distraction. In addition, swearing was found to have a significant effect on state behavioural activation (BAS drive). However, results indicated no significant difference between conditions on ERN amplitude. This pre-registered study has confirmed that, relative to a neutral word, repeating a swear word leads to increased performance on a grip strength task while also confirming effects of swearing on positive emotion, humour, and distraction. Its novel contribution is confirming that swearing raises state behavioural activation. This supports application of Hirsh et al.'s state disinhibition theory to swearing to some extent, although the absence of any effect of swearing on ERN limits this interpretation.

Decision perseveration is consistently observed in recognition tests, such that judgements tend to repeat (e.g., "old" responses tend to follow "old" responses) across trials. This effect has been found across a range of testing styles, including old/new judgements, judgements of frequency, and confidence, and has been interpreted as reflecting the transfer of mnemonic information between trials. However, an alternative explanation that response repetition is rather the product of motor action perseveration has not yet been fully evaluated. Despite the range of response styles used across studies, repeat decisions have consistently been confounded with repeat motor responses. Across three experiments, the present study divorces decision repetition from motor priming, to determine whether decision perseveration maintains. Experiments 1 and 2 found that when participants switch hands between trials, decisions are still more likely to repeat than switch. Similarly, Experiment 3 found no difference in the influence of Previous Decision when mouse paths were able to repeat between trials compared with when they could not. In addition, all experiments show a speed advantage for repeating decisions that cannot be attributed to motor priming. We conclude that decision carryover during recognition tests is ultimately a decision-based effect. The results are discussed in terms of mnemonic models of information transfer.

Previous research has shown that eye movements can serve as an indirect indicator of relational memory. The goal of the current research was to assess how eye movements coincide with different forms of spatial and associative memory. Young adults encoded object-scene combinations and were subsequently presented with repeated, novel, and manipulated scenes. The manipulated object-scene combinations included object additions and deletions (Experiment 1), a change in the location of the object (Experiment 2), or a change in object-scene combinations (Experiment 3). In Experiment 1, participants allocated more fixations to the critical region of a scene when a novel object was added to a scene versus previously presented within the scene; this effect could be supported by either item or relational memory. By contrast, participants did not preferentially view the region of the scene that an object previously occupied when objects were removed from the scene. For Experiments 2 and 3, participants allocated proportionally more fixations towards the critical region of manipulated than repeated scenes when the location of the object or object-scene combination was changed. These findings provide further support for eye movements reflecting relational memory and highlight the importance of data disaggregation for future studies of relational memory.