Pub Date : 2019-06-10DOI: 10.31132/2412-5717-2019-47-2-48-67
B. Oyeniyi
This paper, using the case of Boko Haram in Nigeria, examines the impact of technology on future armed conflicts and violent extremism in Nigeria and West Africa. As Africa enters the new digital age, characterized by increasing access to mobile telephoning, internet penetration, 3D printing and the Internet of Things; networking between and among groups with similar ideologies will improve. Results from the author’s recent fieldwork in north-eastern Nigeria are used to shed light on Boko Haram’s activities across border communities in that region where Nigeria’s borders meet those of Niger and Cameroon. Those activities include tactical efforts like mobilizing crowds, disseminating ideologies, recruiting strategic assets, and sharing technical know-how, and have facilitated the transformation of Boko Haram from a dagger-wielding, arrow-shooting group into a deployer of mobile-phone-triggered IEDs, coordinating simultaneous attacks on multiple targets. Undoubtedly, the new digital age guarantees cultural cohesiveness and a more robust outside support that will serve in recruitment, financing, logistics and training. With mobile telephony and internet access providing (dangerous) information and resources to aspiring insurgents, what future awaits Nigeria, West Africa and Africa should Boko Haram gain access to remote controlled flying drones, quadcopters, and other ‘toys’ fitted with homemade bombs and IEDs? What new level of domestic terror would emerge if Boko Haram develops a capacity for cyberterrorism, especially since cyberterrorism affects data and cash, guarantees no risk of personal bodily harm, involves minimal resources commitment, and affords opportunities to inflict a higher level of damage? This study examines these issues and type of responses available to government in dealing with a technology-driven armed conflict and terrorism.
{"title":"Technology: Negotiating Tomorrow’s Armed Conflict and Terrorism in West Africa","authors":"B. Oyeniyi","doi":"10.31132/2412-5717-2019-47-2-48-67","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31132/2412-5717-2019-47-2-48-67","url":null,"abstract":"This paper, using the case of Boko Haram in Nigeria, examines the impact of technology on future armed conflicts and violent extremism in Nigeria and West Africa. As Africa enters the new digital age, characterized by increasing access to mobile telephoning, internet penetration, 3D printing and the Internet of Things; networking between and among groups with similar ideologies will improve. Results from the author’s recent fieldwork in north-eastern Nigeria are used to shed light on Boko Haram’s activities across border communities in that region where Nigeria’s borders meet those of Niger and Cameroon. Those activities include tactical efforts like mobilizing crowds, disseminating ideologies, recruiting strategic assets, and sharing technical know-how, and have facilitated the transformation of Boko Haram from a dagger-wielding, arrow-shooting group into a deployer of mobile-phone-triggered IEDs, coordinating simultaneous attacks on multiple targets. Undoubtedly, the new digital age guarantees cultural cohesiveness and a more robust outside support that will serve in recruitment, financing, logistics and training. With mobile telephony and internet access providing (dangerous) information and resources to aspiring insurgents, what future awaits Nigeria, West Africa and Africa should Boko Haram gain access to remote controlled flying drones, quadcopters, and other ‘toys’ fitted with homemade bombs and IEDs? What new level of domestic terror would emerge if Boko Haram develops a capacity for cyberterrorism, especially since cyberterrorism affects data and cash, guarantees no risk of personal bodily harm, involves minimal resources commitment, and affords opportunities to inflict a higher level of damage? This study examines these issues and type of responses available to government in dealing with a technology-driven armed conflict and terrorism.","PeriodicalId":286957,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Institute for African Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130195454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-10DOI: 10.31132/2412-5717-2019-47-2-86-99
Madia Thomson
Drought and famine have been long been important events in Moroccan history and the second-half of the nineteenth century was no different. A series of such crises occurred from the 1860’s to the 1880’s, at a time when Morocco was already feeling the pressure of European expansion and the subsequent strain on its traditional trade networks. The disruption of trade networks as well as local food shortages resulting from these climatic disturbances often pushed people to migrate to major cities in search of relief. Often unable to migrate as families, individuals might leave their children in the care of others with the hope of collecting them after the crisis. An unfortunate choice but one that might just allow someone to survive. Environmental crises resulting in famine have long been a cause of global concern. In his seminal work Poverty and Famines: an essay on entitlement, Amartya Sen explains the critical role of entitlement in mitigating the effects of famine on a given population (1981). For the purposes of this article, we will focus primarily on his concept of ‘own labour’ and “production- based” entitlement. In its discussion of nineteenth-century Morocco, the article lends an historical perspective to the modern system of national and international cooperation during environmental crises. That one no longer hears of people dying from such crises in Morocco suggests that death and famine are not necessary consequences of environmental disaster but rather the result of a lack of ideas and infrastructure.
{"title":"A Morbid Affair: Epidemics and Famine in Morocco, 1860–1888","authors":"Madia Thomson","doi":"10.31132/2412-5717-2019-47-2-86-99","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31132/2412-5717-2019-47-2-86-99","url":null,"abstract":"Drought and famine have been long been important events in Moroccan history and the second-half of the nineteenth century was no different. A series of such crises occurred from the 1860’s to the 1880’s, at a time when Morocco was already feeling the pressure of European expansion and the subsequent strain on its traditional trade networks. The disruption of trade networks as well as local food shortages resulting from these climatic disturbances often pushed people to migrate to major cities in search of relief. Often unable to migrate as families, individuals might leave their children in the care of others with the hope of collecting them after the crisis. An unfortunate choice but one that might just allow someone to survive. Environmental crises resulting in famine have long been a cause of global concern. In his seminal work Poverty and Famines: an essay on entitlement, Amartya Sen explains the critical role of entitlement in mitigating the effects of famine on a given population (1981). For the purposes of this article, we will focus primarily on his concept of ‘own labour’ and “production- based” entitlement. In its discussion of nineteenth-century Morocco, the article lends an historical perspective to the modern system of national and international cooperation during environmental crises. That one no longer hears of people dying from such crises in Morocco suggests that death and famine are not necessary consequences of environmental disaster but rather the result of a lack of ideas and infrastructure.","PeriodicalId":286957,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Institute for African Studies","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116473490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-10DOI: 10.31132/2412-5717-2019-47-2-100-114
Jean-claude Meledje
This article argues that the root causes of the conflict can be traced back to the leadership of Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the first President of the independent, post-colonial nation. Houphouët-Boigny failed to successfully manage a leadership transition from his generation to the next. During his three decades of rule, there were no plans made for his succession. When he ultimately died in office, the result was political, economic, and social instability. Consequently, the country was plunged into ongoing crises and conflicts. President Houphouët-Boigny had been the dominant political force of Côte d’Ivoire. His political skills made the country one of the most stable in the continent. Despite the rise of opposition from students, teachers, trade unionists and northern ethnic groups – all of whom were resentful of the southerner’s dominance of government, Houphouët-Boigny was able to restore calm through political dialogue. In 1987, Houphouët-Boigny’s advanced age – he was at least 81- contributed to the succession issue’s centrality in Ivorian politics. However, Houphouët-Boigny manipulated the Constitution. This caused frustration and set the stage for Houphouet-Boigny to remain in his role for the remainder of his life, despite a massive demonstration in Abidjan on May 31st, 1991, where 20,000 protesters chanted for ‘Houphouët-Boigny to resign.’ Consequently, a public leadership contest after Houphouët-Boigny’s passing reopened old wounds among interest groups which sought more economic and political power. This triggered the country’s ongoing crisis.
{"title":"The Ongoing Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire: The Historic Responsibility of Félix Houphouët-Boigny","authors":"Jean-claude Meledje","doi":"10.31132/2412-5717-2019-47-2-100-114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31132/2412-5717-2019-47-2-100-114","url":null,"abstract":"This article argues that the root causes of the conflict can be traced back to the leadership of Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the first President of the independent, post-colonial nation. Houphouët-Boigny failed to successfully manage a leadership transition from his generation to the next. During his three decades of rule, there were no plans made for his succession. When he ultimately died in office, the result was political, economic, and social instability. Consequently, the country was plunged into ongoing crises and conflicts. President Houphouët-Boigny had been the dominant political force of Côte d’Ivoire. His political skills made the country one of the most stable in the continent. Despite the rise of opposition from students, teachers, trade unionists and northern ethnic groups – all of whom were resentful of the southerner’s dominance of government, Houphouët-Boigny was able to restore calm through political dialogue. In 1987, Houphouët-Boigny’s advanced age – he was at least 81- contributed to the succession issue’s centrality in Ivorian politics. However, Houphouët-Boigny manipulated the Constitution. This caused frustration and set the stage for Houphouet-Boigny to remain in his role for the remainder of his life, despite a massive demonstration in Abidjan on May 31st, 1991, where 20,000 protesters chanted for ‘Houphouët-Boigny to resign.’ Consequently, a public leadership contest after Houphouët-Boigny’s passing reopened old wounds among interest groups which sought more economic and political power. This triggered the country’s ongoing crisis.","PeriodicalId":286957,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Institute for African Studies","volume":"98 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124187595","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-10DOI: 10.31132/2412-5717-2019-47-2-36-47
I. Tarrósy, Z. Vörös
This paper takes a multi-dimensional look at the theme of African futures. The plural nature of those futures comes out of the numerous differences that African states enjoy in terms of their comparative advantages and disadvantages. The primary angle of investigation, which highlights those differences, is the presence and engagement of the People’s Republic of China across the continent. The case of Rwanda in particular, is one through which many of the challenges and opportunities of future, Chinese-related, African scenarios may be analysed. First, the issue of partnership is touched upon in a post-colonial context, while referencing back to colonial rule and the continent’s inherited status in the world system. Second, the putative threat of ‘recolonization’ is examined with a focus on China’s Africa-policy. Third, Rwanda’s “home-grown” solutions to these and other problems are dealt with, shedding light on the landlocked East-Central African country’s investment policy, approach to external actors, including China, and it’s vision for its own future – the lessons of which are not confined to Rwanda alone.
{"title":"A Possible African Dream with some Asian Characters – The Case of Rwanda","authors":"I. Tarrósy, Z. Vörös","doi":"10.31132/2412-5717-2019-47-2-36-47","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31132/2412-5717-2019-47-2-36-47","url":null,"abstract":"This paper takes a multi-dimensional look at the theme of African futures. The plural nature of those futures comes out of the numerous differences that African states enjoy in terms of their comparative advantages and disadvantages. The primary angle of investigation, which highlights those differences, is the presence and engagement of the People’s Republic of China across the continent. The case of Rwanda in particular, is one through which many of the challenges and opportunities of future, Chinese-related, African scenarios may be analysed. First, the issue of partnership is touched upon in a post-colonial context, while referencing back to colonial rule and the continent’s inherited status in the world system. Second, the putative threat of ‘recolonization’ is examined with a focus on China’s Africa-policy. Third, Rwanda’s “home-grown” solutions to these and other problems are dealt with, shedding light on the landlocked East-Central African country’s investment policy, approach to external actors, including China, and it’s vision for its own future – the lessons of which are not confined to Rwanda alone.","PeriodicalId":286957,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Institute for African Studies","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127537509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-20DOI: 10.31132/2412-5717-2019-46-1-17-35
A. Frolov
The article discusses the modern tools used in local conflicts and wars, which are largely based on war strategy, and tactics, military thought and art as well as experience accumulated in military-political and other related fields. These tools include support for revolutionary movements, the organization of coups, destabilization of the situation, waging coalition wars, proxy wars, hybrid and information wars, humanitarian interventions, cyberwars, no-fly zones. This set of tools is used selectively or is fully utilized, and tends to expand taking into account the technological innovations that have become firmly established in the life of mankind and allowing to qualitatively update the military arsenals of the world’s states. Today’s due to globalization local conflicts are rapidly gaining wide international resonance, leading to the involvement of third parties. The United States of America plays a special role in them. They are gradually losing ground in the world and do not want to put up with it. The article discusses the ways of conducting local wars and recent conflicts in relation to the countries of Europe, the Middle East and Africa.
{"title":"Local Conflict: Modern Tools","authors":"A. Frolov","doi":"10.31132/2412-5717-2019-46-1-17-35","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31132/2412-5717-2019-46-1-17-35","url":null,"abstract":"The article discusses the modern tools used in local conflicts and wars, which are largely based on war strategy, and tactics, military thought and art as well as experience accumulated in military-political and other related fields. These tools include support for revolutionary movements, the organization of coups, destabilization of the situation, waging coalition wars, proxy wars, hybrid and information wars, humanitarian interventions, cyberwars, no-fly zones. This set of tools is used selectively or is fully utilized, and tends to expand taking into account the technological innovations that have become firmly established in the life of mankind and allowing to qualitatively update the military arsenals of the world’s states. Today’s due to globalization local conflicts are rapidly gaining wide international resonance, leading to the involvement of third parties. The United States of America plays a special role in them. They are gradually losing ground in the world and do not want to put up with it. The article discusses the ways of conducting local wars and recent conflicts in relation to the countries of Europe, the Middle East and Africa.","PeriodicalId":286957,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Institute for African Studies","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127442732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-20DOI: 10.31132/2412-5717-2019-46-1-5-16
L. Prokopenko
The article shows the dynamics of the development of the 55-year-long cooperation between the USSR/Russia and Zambia, as well as the characteristics of the first stage of the cooperation between our countries during the period when the United Party of National Independence (UNIP) led by Kenneth Kaunda was in power, and later in the 1990s when contacts were limited. The bilateral cooperation of our countries at the present stage is based on our common international interests. The partnership between Russia and the Republic of South Africa in the framework of the BRICS has not only been a new stage in the development of our relations, but has also opened up additional opportunities for cooperation with the neighbors of South Africa related to it politically and economically, including Zambia. Consultations are regularly held on topical international and regional problems at the level of foreign ministries, inter-parliamentary ties have been established. In the last decade there have been talks of foreign ministers, as well as top-level negotiations at the meetings of the Russian President V.V. Putin and the Zambian President E. Lungu at the 10th BRICS Summit (Johannesburg, South Africa, July 2018). Since the beginning of the 2010s bilateral trade has shown a certain dynamics, although the second stage of cooperation between our countries is characterized by the prevalence of political contacts. The political leadership of Russia understands and takes into account that many African development problems have to be tackled in the context of a low standard of living. The cancellation by Russia in 2001 of more than 80% of the Zambian debt created additional conditions for the development of business relations between our countries. The interest of Russian business to the Zambian market has increased. Nevertheless, the trade turnover between the Russian Federation and Zambia is still having a low and unstable volume, mutual deliveries are still fragmentary. Cooperation in the field of education continues. The quota for Zambian students sent to study in the Russian Federation is growing. There are new areas of cooperation, for example, in the field of telemedicine. Russia is helping Zambia to solve the problem of energy resources. In May 2018, Rosatom and Zambia signed a contract to build a Center for Nuclear Science and Technology. This is the first joint project of Russia and Zambia in the field of nuclear technologies.
{"title":"Russia-Zambia: stages and horizons of cooperation","authors":"L. Prokopenko","doi":"10.31132/2412-5717-2019-46-1-5-16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31132/2412-5717-2019-46-1-5-16","url":null,"abstract":"The article shows the dynamics of the development of the 55-year-long cooperation between the USSR/Russia and Zambia, as well as the characteristics of the first stage of the cooperation between our countries during the period when the United Party of National Independence (UNIP) led by Kenneth Kaunda was in power, and later in the 1990s when contacts were limited.\u0000\u0000The bilateral cooperation of our countries at the present stage is based on our common international interests. The partnership between Russia and the Republic of South Africa in the framework of the BRICS has not only been a new stage in the development of our relations, but has also opened up additional opportunities for cooperation with the neighbors of South Africa related to it politically and economically, including Zambia.\u0000\u0000Consultations are regularly held on topical international and regional problems at the level of foreign ministries, inter-parliamentary ties have been established. In the last decade there have been talks of foreign ministers, as well as top-level negotiations at the meetings of the Russian President V.V. Putin and the Zambian President E. Lungu at the 10th BRICS Summit (Johannesburg, South Africa, July 2018). Since the beginning of the 2010s bilateral trade has shown a certain dynamics, although the second stage of cooperation between our countries is characterized by the prevalence of political contacts.\u0000\u0000The political leadership of Russia understands and takes into account that many African development problems have to be tackled in the context of a low standard of living. The cancellation by Russia in 2001 of more than 80% of the Zambian debt created additional conditions for the development of business relations between our countries. The interest of Russian business to the Zambian market has increased. Nevertheless, the trade turnover between the Russian Federation and Zambia is still having a low and unstable volume, mutual deliveries are still fragmentary.\u0000\u0000Cooperation in the field of education continues. The quota for Zambian students sent to study in the Russian Federation is growing. There are new areas of cooperation, for example, in the field of telemedicine. Russia is helping Zambia to solve the problem of energy resources. In May 2018, Rosatom and Zambia signed a contract to build a Center for Nuclear Science and Technology. This is the first joint project of Russia and Zambia in the field of nuclear technologies.","PeriodicalId":286957,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Institute for African Studies","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130711206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-20DOI: 10.31132/2412-5717-2019-46-1-120-128
T. Kochanova
{"title":"From Early Man to Mature Citizen. Review of the Book by A.P. Pozdnyakova «The History of Malawi»","authors":"T. Kochanova","doi":"10.31132/2412-5717-2019-46-1-120-128","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31132/2412-5717-2019-46-1-120-128","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":286957,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Institute for African Studies","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129311769","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-20DOI: 10.31132/2412-5717-2019-46-1-99-114
S. Ivanov
The demographic transition is a global phenomenon but sub-Saharan Africa is several decades late. The quantitative characteristics of the region are well known, but they are insufficient to explain the lags even though sub-Saharan Africa is rightly taken as a synonym of a least developed region. The author revisits – within the African context – the concept of fundamental restructuring of reproductive behavior in response to improvements in child survival. Improved survival makes the outcome of reproductive behavior predictable and therefore makes rational family planning. Family planning assumes the form of insurance and replacement strategies, which have different fertility outcomes. In sub-Saharan Africa the threshold of saturation of child survival beyond which fertility starts to decline appear to be higher than elsewhere. Besides, as fertility does not respond automatically to improved survival, there are no rigid proportions that would have determined fertility outcome of a given decline of child mortality. Instead, there are always universal socioeconomic mechanisms that translate improvements in child survival into fertility reduction and these mechanisms function in tend in culture- or country-specific ways. Education is the main translator: its universal valuation coupled with substantive price tag leads to quantity–quality conflict; the opportunity cost of working time lost to childrearing is higher among better educated women; formal education is the most effective and the most durable instrument of diffusion of the modern way of life, which necessarily includes small family size. African nets of values and mechanisms of their transmission weaken these channels. The demographics of Africa operate with billions, and they are so specific that they often carry cognitive rejection. The demographics are scary; by itself this is a sufficient reason for denial. In addition, there is a longstanding political and intellectual tradition to deny or minimize the differences that separate Africa from other regions. Finally, apart from a narrow circle of scholars who concentrate on the issues of population growth and development, there is an overwhelming alignment with anti-malthusianism which is considered as a presumption rather than outcome of scientific debate. In fact, specific features of population reproduction in Africa, its enormous demographic potential coupled with economic stagnation should move to the forefront of research and quest for appropriate policy responses.
{"title":"Demographic Transition in Sub-Saharan Africa","authors":"S. Ivanov","doi":"10.31132/2412-5717-2019-46-1-99-114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31132/2412-5717-2019-46-1-99-114","url":null,"abstract":"The demographic transition is a global phenomenon but sub-Saharan Africa is several decades late. The quantitative characteristics of the region are well known, but they are insufficient to explain the lags even though sub-Saharan Africa is rightly taken as a synonym of a least developed region. The author revisits – within the African context – the concept of fundamental restructuring of reproductive behavior in response to improvements in child survival. Improved survival makes the outcome of reproductive behavior predictable and therefore makes rational family planning. Family planning assumes the form of insurance and replacement strategies, which have different fertility outcomes. In sub-Saharan Africa the threshold of saturation of child survival beyond which fertility starts to decline appear to be higher than elsewhere. Besides, as fertility does not respond automatically to improved survival, there are no rigid proportions that would have determined fertility outcome of a given decline of child mortality. Instead, there are always universal socioeconomic mechanisms that translate improvements in child survival into fertility reduction and these mechanisms function in tend in culture- or country-specific ways. Education is the main translator: its universal valuation coupled with substantive price tag leads to quantity–quality conflict; the opportunity cost of working time lost to childrearing is higher among better educated women; formal education is the most effective and the most durable instrument of diffusion of the modern way of life, which necessarily includes small family size. African nets of values and mechanisms of their transmission weaken these channels. The demographics of Africa operate with billions, and they are so specific that they often carry cognitive rejection. The demographics are scary; by itself this is a sufficient reason for denial. In addition, there is a longstanding political and intellectual tradition to deny or minimize the differences that separate Africa from other regions. Finally, apart from a narrow circle of scholars who concentrate on the issues of population growth and development, there is an overwhelming alignment with anti-malthusianism which is considered as a presumption rather than outcome of scientific debate. In fact, specific features of population reproduction in Africa, its enormous demographic potential coupled with economic stagnation should move to the forefront of research and quest for appropriate policy responses.","PeriodicalId":286957,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Institute for African Studies","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127257174","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-20DOI: 10.31132/2412-5717-2019-46-1-50-57
Y. Skubko
The author presents a vision of the main factors of the water resource crisis in two BRICS countries, South Africa and Russia, concretely in Cape Town and Crimea. Although Russia, contrary to South Africa and many other countries, disposes abundant water resources, there are areas of scarcity and arid lands, Crimea among them. In both cases under consideration poor management and planning, lack of funding, worn out infrastructure and factors of mismanagement and corruption added to natural or geopolitical causes of resent hardships. Besides improvements in above mentioned fields and general modernization of infrastructure, also desalination, complex wastewater recycling and turnover to drip irrigation are among proposals discussed.
{"title":"Cape Town and Crimean Water Resources Crisis: Some Similar Problems and Possible Solutions","authors":"Y. Skubko","doi":"10.31132/2412-5717-2019-46-1-50-57","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31132/2412-5717-2019-46-1-50-57","url":null,"abstract":"The author presents a vision of the main factors of the water resource crisis in two BRICS countries, South Africa and Russia, concretely in Cape Town and Crimea. Although Russia, contrary to South Africa and many other countries, disposes abundant water resources, there are areas of scarcity and arid lands, Crimea among them. In both cases under consideration poor management and planning, lack of funding, worn out infrastructure and factors of mismanagement and corruption added to natural or geopolitical causes of resent hardships. Besides improvements in above mentioned fields and general modernization of infrastructure, also desalination, complex wastewater recycling and turnover to drip irrigation are among proposals discussed.","PeriodicalId":286957,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Institute for African Studies","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116673655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-20DOI: 10.31132/2412-5717-2019-46-1-115-119
V. Shubin
The article is a rejoinder to the work of Yury S. Skubko, previously published in the Journal of the Institute for African Studies, on Moscow’s relations with De Beers. It is based not only on the available literature but also on the author’s personal experience. The author shows that under the monopoly of this South African company in the field of diamond sales, Soviet organizations, even in the conditions of a South African boycott, were forced to deal with its subordinate structures and the attempts to sideline them were in vain. In particular the article analyses the attitude to a controversial agreement signed by the Soviet state-owned “Glavalmalmazzoloto” and De Beers Centenary in 1990, when, like in many other cases in the “Gorbachev’s era” Moscow’s principle stand was eroded for short-term results even personal gains. The author comes to the conclusion that the responsibility for Moscow’s dealings with De Beers must be borne not by our country, but above all by the United Kingdom, which allowed De Beers have the headquarters of its Central Selling Organisation (CСO) in London.
这篇文章是对尤里·s·斯库布科(Yury S. Skubko)先前发表在《非洲研究所杂志》(Journal of The Institute for African Studies)上的关于莫斯科与戴比尔斯关系的文章的回应。它不仅以现有文献为基础，而且以作者的个人经历为基础。作者指出，在这家南非公司在钻石销售领域的垄断下，即使在南非抵制的情况下，苏联组织也被迫同它的下属机构打交道，把它们排除在外的企图是徒劳的。这篇文章特别分析了苏联国有企业“Glavalmalmazzoloto”与戴比尔斯百年纪念公司(De Beers Centenary)在1990年签署的一项有争议的协议，当时，就像“戈尔巴乔夫时代”的许多其他案例一样，莫斯科的原则立场被短期结果甚至个人利益所侵蚀。作者得出结论，莫斯科与戴比尔斯交易的责任不应由我国承担，而应首先由英国承担，因为英国允许戴比尔斯将其中央销售组织(CСO)的总部设在伦敦。
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