The prospect of population decline in Europe is commonly understood to be an important policy problem. Discussions and research typically focus on the level and the trend of demographic indicators. Can policies be designed which, by targeting the constrained optimisation of rational individuals, cause the indicators to change in the right direction? In this intervention, I argue that like a surrogate marker in medicine, a demographic indicator is not a meaningful endpoint: something that is a direct measure of health or, analogously, a healthy society. Treating population indicators as meaningful endpoints can, as history has shown, lead to great harm. In my view, it is this misconception that makes population decline a truly serious and terrifying problem. So yes, population decline is a problem, but not in the way you, or the people who pose this sort of question, might think.
{"title":"Like high cholesterol, population decline is a problem, but not in the way you might think...","authors":"W. Sigle","doi":"10.1553/p-jm9f-3jdm","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1553/p-jm9f-3jdm","url":null,"abstract":"The prospect of population decline in Europe is commonly understood to be an important policy problem. Discussions and research typically focus on the level and the trend of demographic indicators. Can policies be designed which, by targeting the constrained optimisation of rational individuals, cause the indicators to change in the right direction? In this intervention, I argue that like a surrogate marker in medicine, a demographic indicator is not a meaningful endpoint: something that is a direct measure of health or, analogously, a healthy society. Treating population indicators as meaningful endpoints can, as history has shown, lead to great harm. In my view, it is this misconception that makes population decline a truly serious and terrifying problem. So yes, population decline is a problem, but not in the way you, or the people who pose this sort of question, might think.","PeriodicalId":34968,"journal":{"name":"Vienna Yearbook of Population Research","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67364743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Scientists are well aware of the major social, economic and cultural challenges brought about by population decline. However, we can often underestimate the more extreme interpretations of both the causes and the consequences of population decline in the popular discourse. In this commentary, I explore some of these toxic narratives, and speculate about how they may be linked to what appears to be a prevailing populist/ethno-nationalist view of population grounded in political tropes, rather than in scientific reality. Using Armitage’s (2021) concept of “demographic imaginaries”, I argue that much of this public discourse serves several vital purposes: to try to simplify a complex issue; to try to “unify”; to try to blame and scapegoat; and, ultimately, to try to negate the obligation to make tough, complex political and policy decisions. I also argue that scientists working in the field of population decline need to be more aware of these tropes, and should make more active efforts to ground the discourse of population decline in science and reality. I conclude that a bottom-up approach to responding to population decline may be the most fruitful avenue for progress in the future.
{"title":"Depopulation or population decline? Demographic nightmares and imaginaries","authors":"Stuart A. Gietel-Basten","doi":"10.1553/p-ak37-74ha","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1553/p-ak37-74ha","url":null,"abstract":"Scientists are well aware of the major social, economic and cultural challenges brought about by population decline. However, we can often underestimate the more extreme interpretations of both the causes and the consequences of population decline in the popular discourse. In this commentary, I explore some of these toxic narratives, and speculate about how they may be linked to what appears to be a prevailing populist/ethno-nationalist view of population grounded in political tropes, rather than in scientific reality. Using Armitage’s (2021) concept of “demographic imaginaries”, I argue that much of this public discourse serves several vital purposes: to try to simplify a complex issue; to try to “unify”; to try to blame and scapegoat; and, ultimately, to try to negate the obligation to make tough, complex political and policy decisions. I also argue that scientists working in the field of population decline need to be more aware of these tropes, and should make more active efforts to ground the discourse of population decline in science and reality. I conclude that a bottom-up approach to responding to population decline may be the most fruitful avenue for progress in the future.","PeriodicalId":34968,"journal":{"name":"Vienna Yearbook of Population Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41913858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Much of East Central Europe today faces the double challenge of having a population that is both ageing fast and shrinking steadily. Elderly-oriented political dynamics and myopic governance are part of this predicament, and are also among the reasons why future prospects are not rosy. Having started the post-communist transition with younger populations, successive governments in this region have comprehensively squandered a decades-long window of opportunity to adapt their policies to the predicted ageing ahead (Vanhuysse and Perek-Bialas, 2021). Especially in Hungary, Poland, Czechia, the Slovak Republic, Romania and Bulgaria, this failure is reflected in low active ageing and child well-being index rankings, low levels of social investment and mediocre educational outcomes, and family policies that reinforce traditional motherhood roles or barely support parents at all. Poland, Romania, Croatia, Hungary and, especially, the Baltic states also experienced large-scale emigration (‘young exit’). Slovenia and the Visegrad Four, but not the Baltics, became premature pensioners‘ democracies characterised by unusually high levels of pro-elderly policy bias (‘lopsided loyalty’). While the salience of family policies increased around the time the demographic window closed, this shift was driven by pro-natalist, neo-familialist and gender-regressive political ideologies, rather than by a concerted effort to boost human capabilities or reward social reproduction. But by then, elderly voter power (‘grey voice’) in East Central Europe was among the highest in the world. Politics strongly constrains the likelihood of appropriate human capital-boosting policy responses to the region’s population predicament. Alarm bells thus ring for a generational contract under pressure and for longer-term societal resilience.
{"title":"A governance perspective on East Central Europe’s population predicament: Young exit, grey voice and lopsided loyalty","authors":"P. Vanhuysse","doi":"10.1553/p-5gkf-6kn3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1553/p-5gkf-6kn3","url":null,"abstract":"Much of East Central Europe today faces the double challenge of having a population that is both ageing fast and shrinking steadily. Elderly-oriented political dynamics and myopic governance are part of this predicament, and are also among the reasons why future prospects are not rosy. Having started the post-communist transition with younger populations, successive governments in this region have comprehensively squandered a decades-long window of opportunity to adapt their policies to the predicted ageing ahead (Vanhuysse and Perek-Bialas, 2021). Especially in Hungary, Poland, Czechia, the Slovak Republic, Romania and Bulgaria, this failure is reflected in low active ageing and child well-being index rankings, low levels of social investment and mediocre educational outcomes, and family policies that reinforce traditional motherhood roles or barely support parents at all. Poland, Romania, Croatia, Hungary and, especially, the Baltic states also experienced large-scale emigration (‘young exit’). Slovenia and the Visegrad Four, but not the Baltics, became premature pensioners‘ democracies characterised by unusually high levels of pro-elderly policy bias (‘lopsided loyalty’). While the salience of family policies increased around the time the demographic window closed, this shift was driven by pro-natalist, neo-familialist and gender-regressive political ideologies, rather than by a concerted effort to boost human capabilities or reward social reproduction. But by then, elderly voter power (‘grey voice’) in East Central Europe was among the highest in the world. Politics strongly constrains the likelihood of appropriate human capital-boosting policy responses to the region’s population predicament. Alarm bells thus ring for a generational contract under pressure and for longer-term societal resilience.","PeriodicalId":34968,"journal":{"name":"Vienna Yearbook of Population Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43457195","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-15DOI: 10.1553/10.1553/p-5pn2-fmn8
Patrizio Vanella, Timon Hellwagner, Philipp Deschermeier
Substantiated knowledge of future demographic changes that is derived from sound statistical and mathematical methods is a crucial determinant of regional planning. Of the components of demographic developments, migration shapes regional demographics the most over the short term. However, despite its importance, existing approaches model future regional migration based on deterministic assumptions that do not sufficiently account for its highly probabilistic nature. In response to this shortcoming in the literature, our paper uses age- and gender-specific migration data for German NUTS-3 regions over the 1995–2019 period and compares the performance of a variety of forecasting models in backtests. Using the bestperforming model specification and drawing on Monte Carlo simulations, we present a stochastic forecast of regional migration dynamics across German regions until 2040 and analyze their role in regional depopulation. The results provide evidence that well-known age-specific migration patterns across the urban-rural continuum of regions, such as the education-induced migration of young adults, are very likely to persist, and to continue to shape future regional (de)population dynamics.
{"title":"Parsimonious stochastic forecasting of international and internal migration on the NUTS-3 level – an outlook of regional depopulation trends in Germany","authors":"Patrizio Vanella, Timon Hellwagner, Philipp Deschermeier","doi":"10.1553/10.1553/p-5pn2-fmn8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1553/10.1553/p-5pn2-fmn8","url":null,"abstract":"Substantiated knowledge of future demographic changes that is derived from sound statistical and mathematical methods is a crucial determinant of regional planning. Of the components of demographic developments, migration shapes regional demographics the most over the short term. However, despite its importance, existing approaches model future regional migration based on deterministic assumptions that do not sufficiently account for its highly probabilistic nature. In response to this shortcoming in the literature, our paper uses age- and gender-specific migration data for German NUTS-3 regions over the 1995–2019 period and compares the performance of a variety of forecasting models in backtests. Using the bestperforming model specification and drawing on Monte Carlo simulations, we present a stochastic forecast of regional migration dynamics across German regions until 2040 and analyze their role in regional depopulation. The results provide evidence that well-known age-specific migration patterns across the urban-rural continuum of regions, such as the education-induced migration of young adults, are very likely to persist, and to continue to shape future regional (de)population dynamics.","PeriodicalId":34968,"journal":{"name":"Vienna Yearbook of Population Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47199711","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The human enterprise is in overshoot, depleting essential ecosystems faster than they can regenerate and polluting the ecosphere beyond nature’s assimilative capacity. Overshoot is a meta-problem that is the cause of most symptoms of eco-crisis, including climate change, landscape degradation and biodiversity loss. The proximate driver of overshoot is excessive energy and material ‘throughput’ to serve the global economy. Both rising incomes (consumption) and population growth contribute to the growing human eco-footprint, but increasing throughput due to population growth is the larger factor at the margin. (Egregious and widening inequality is a separate socio-political problem.) Mainstream approaches to alleviating various symptoms of overshoot merely reinforce the status quo. This is counter-productive, as overshoot is ultimately a terminal condition. The continuity of civilisation will require a cooperative, planned contraction of both the material economy and human populations, beginning with a personal to civilisational transformation of the fundamental values, beliefs, assumptions and attitudes underpinning neoliberal/capitalist industrial society.
{"title":"The human eco-predicament: Overshoot and the population conundrum","authors":"W. Rees","doi":"10.1553/p-eznb-ekgc","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1553/p-eznb-ekgc","url":null,"abstract":"The human enterprise is in overshoot, depleting essential ecosystems faster than they can regenerate and polluting the ecosphere beyond nature’s assimilative capacity. Overshoot is a meta-problem that is the cause of most symptoms of eco-crisis, including climate change, landscape degradation and biodiversity loss. The proximate driver of overshoot is excessive energy and material ‘throughput’ to serve the global economy. Both rising incomes (consumption) and population growth contribute to the growing human eco-footprint, but increasing throughput due to population growth is the larger factor at the margin. (Egregious and widening inequality is a separate socio-political problem.) Mainstream approaches to alleviating various symptoms of overshoot merely reinforce the status quo. This is counter-productive, as overshoot is ultimately a terminal condition. The continuity of civilisation will require a cooperative, planned contraction of both the material economy and human populations, beginning with a personal to civilisational transformation of the fundamental values, beliefs, assumptions and attitudes underpinning neoliberal/capitalist industrial society.","PeriodicalId":34968,"journal":{"name":"Vienna Yearbook of Population Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41929875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Between 2009 and 2018, the total fertility rate fell in most European countries. In 2018, fertility was below the replacement level throughout Europe. Net migration was positive for two-thirds of European countries. This paper illustrates the implications for long-run population growth of observed net migration-fertilitymortality combinations in 20 European countries over the 2009–18 period by comparing the observed net migration to a zero population growth-related ‘replacement level’ for net migration. The results show that in several northern and north-western European countries, the net migration level has been consistently above this replacement level: if the net migration level and fertility and mortality rates remain constant, the population would increase. However, the findings also indicate that in all of the eastern European countries covered, the net migration level has been consistently below the net migration replacement level. The results further show that in Finland, Norway and Switzerland, the long-run implications of having constant fertility-mortality-net migration levels change from leading to population growth to leading to population decline. The opposite pattern is observed in Germany. The feasibility of preventing long-run population decreases through changes in net migration levels is discussed in light of the results.
{"title":"Immigration and the prospects for long-run population decreases in European countries","authors":"N. Parr","doi":"10.1553/p-8jf5-7cdc","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1553/p-8jf5-7cdc","url":null,"abstract":"Between 2009 and 2018, the total fertility rate fell in most European countries. In 2018, fertility was below the replacement level throughout Europe. Net migration was positive for two-thirds of European countries. This paper illustrates the implications for long-run population growth of observed net migration-fertilitymortality combinations in 20 European countries over the 2009–18 period by comparing the observed net migration to a zero population growth-related ‘replacement level’ for net migration. The results show that in several northern and north-western European countries, the net migration level has been consistently above this replacement level: if the net migration level and fertility and mortality rates remain constant, the population would increase. However, the findings also indicate that in all of the eastern European countries covered, the net migration level has been consistently below the net migration replacement level. The results further show that in Finland, Norway and Switzerland, the long-run implications of having constant fertility-mortality-net migration levels change from leading to population growth to leading to population decline. The opposite pattern is observed in Germany. The feasibility of preventing long-run population decreases through changes in net migration levels is discussed in light of the results.","PeriodicalId":34968,"journal":{"name":"Vienna Yearbook of Population Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46985677","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-28DOI: 10.1553/populationyearbook2022.per01
K. Mayer
Over the course of the COVID-19 pandemic, the contributions of the social sciences to discussions about pandemic management have become more visible and more significant. In this essay, I review major aspects of a sociology of the pandemic. After providing an overview of the potential contributions of the different fields of sociology (the “toolbox” of sociology), I discuss two main domains: first, social inequalities and how they relate to the process of the spread of COVID-19 from exposure and infection, and to the consequences of the pandemic in the wider population; and, second, the potential long-term effects of the pandemic on the life course.
{"title":"Aspects of a sociology of the pandemic: Inequalities and the life course","authors":"K. Mayer","doi":"10.1553/populationyearbook2022.per01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1553/populationyearbook2022.per01","url":null,"abstract":"Over the course of the COVID-19 pandemic, the contributions of the social sciences to discussions about pandemic management have become more visible and more significant. In this essay, I review major aspects of a sociology of the pandemic. After providing an overview of the potential contributions of the different fields of sociology (the “toolbox” of sociology), I discuss two main domains: first, social inequalities and how they relate to the process of the spread of COVID-19 from exposure and infection, and to the consequences of the pandemic in the wider population; and, second, the potential long-term effects of the pandemic on the life course.","PeriodicalId":34968,"journal":{"name":"Vienna Yearbook of Population Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42834116","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-28DOI: 10.1553/populationyearbook2022.dat.5
Lydia Xourafi, P. Sardi, A. Kostaki
This study explores the psychosocial impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the population in Greece during the general lockdown period. Specifically, depression, anxiety and stress scores, as well as the factors associated with vulnerability to developing mental health conditions during this period, were investigated. A total of 911 adults participated in an online survey by completing a self-reporting questionnaire that included demographic questions, DASS-42 items (anxiety, stress and depression scales) and other questions related to personal experience. Regression modelling uncovered a significant relationship between gender and DASS scores, with women having significantly higher scores than men for all mental health problems. Participants aged 20–39 years were especially vulnerable to experiencing poor mental health. Unemployed participants reported having worse mental health than others. Having more perceived psychosocial support during the pandemic was associated with lower overall scores. Thus, women, young adults and the unemployed exhibited particularly high levels of vulnerability, while individuals who received social support from relatives and friends during the lockdown were more resilient to the effects of social isolation.
{"title":"Exploring psychological vulnerability and responses to the COVID-19 lockdown in Greece","authors":"Lydia Xourafi, P. Sardi, A. Kostaki","doi":"10.1553/populationyearbook2022.dat.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1553/populationyearbook2022.dat.5","url":null,"abstract":"This study explores the psychosocial impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the population in Greece during the general lockdown period. Specifically, depression, anxiety and stress scores, as well as the factors associated with vulnerability to developing mental health conditions during this period, were investigated. A total of 911 adults participated in an online survey by completing a self-reporting questionnaire that included demographic questions, DASS-42 items (anxiety, stress and depression scales) and other questions related to personal experience. Regression modelling uncovered a significant relationship between gender and DASS scores, with women having significantly higher scores than men for all mental health problems. Participants aged 20–39 years were especially vulnerable to experiencing poor mental health. Unemployed participants reported having worse mental health than others. Having more perceived psychosocial support during the pandemic was associated with lower overall scores. Thus, women, young adults and the unemployed exhibited particularly high levels of vulnerability, while individuals who received social support from relatives and friends during the lockdown were more resilient to the effects of social isolation.","PeriodicalId":34968,"journal":{"name":"Vienna Yearbook of Population Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44180201","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-16DOI: 10.1553/populationyearbook2022.per02
F. Mackellar
The global sustainable development project as currently conceived is foundering, and the twin crises of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russo-Ukrainian War have driven a stake through its heart. Some of the reasons for this failure are fundamental design flaws, while others are practical. The resources to bring the project – or its successor, and any other global sustainable development project of similar design and ambition that might emerge – to a successful conclusion do not exist, and never did. What lessons are we learning, and how can they inform post-2030 sustainable development goals? In this essay, the effects of the catastrophes of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine on the global sustainable development project are enumerated, SDG by SDG, with special attention being paid to the implications for demography. In closing, recommendations for reforms of the project are presented, as are some suggestions for the field of demography in the changed global context. The most concrete, feasible immediate recommendations are to make up recently lost ground, specifically in the areas of vaccination and education; and to reform the profoundly flawed international asylum and refugee system.
{"title":"COVID-19, the Russo-Ukrainian War, the global sustainable development project and post-crises demography","authors":"F. Mackellar","doi":"10.1553/populationyearbook2022.per02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1553/populationyearbook2022.per02","url":null,"abstract":"The global sustainable development project as currently conceived is foundering, and the twin crises of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russo-Ukrainian War have driven a stake through its heart. Some of the reasons for this failure are fundamental design flaws, while others are practical. The resources to bring the project – or its successor, and any other global sustainable development project of similar design and ambition that might emerge – to a successful conclusion do not exist, and never did. What lessons are we learning, and how can they inform post-2030 sustainable development goals? In this essay, the effects of the catastrophes of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine on the global sustainable development project are enumerated, SDG by SDG, with special attention being paid to the implications for demography. In closing, recommendations for reforms of the project are presented, as are some suggestions for the field of demography in the changed global context. The most concrete, feasible immediate recommendations are to make up recently lost ground, specifically in the areas of vaccination and education; and to reform the profoundly flawed international asylum and refugee system.","PeriodicalId":34968,"journal":{"name":"Vienna Yearbook of Population Research","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41362089","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-16DOI: 10.1553/populationyearbook2022.res1.5
Daniela Bellani, Daniele Vignoli
This study contributes to the growing literature on the repercussions of the COVID- 19 pandemic for family functioning, with a special focus on couples’ relationship quality. We advance an analytical model that emphasizes the role of three main stressors of relationship quality during the pandemic: namely, emotional, paid work-related and organizational stressors. To outline such an approach, we analyze whether the onset of the pandemic – and the home confinement that followed – has reduced relationship quality in France, Italy and Spain using survey data collected in April 2020.We show that relationship quality decreased for a non-negligible part of the population, and that this result was driven mostly by the emotional stressor. These negative effects on relationship quality appeared to be relatively stable across genders, different levels of network support and countries; which suggests that the severity of the lockdown measures outweighed the traditional moderating factors usually accounted for in family research.
{"title":"COVID-19 and relationship quality: Emotional, paid work and organizational spheres","authors":"Daniela Bellani, Daniele Vignoli","doi":"10.1553/populationyearbook2022.res1.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1553/populationyearbook2022.res1.5","url":null,"abstract":"This study contributes to the growing literature on the repercussions of the COVID- 19 pandemic for family functioning, with a special focus on couples’ relationship quality. We advance an analytical model that emphasizes the role of three main stressors of relationship quality during the pandemic: namely, emotional, paid work-related and organizational stressors. To outline such an approach, we analyze whether the onset of the pandemic – and the home confinement that followed – has reduced relationship quality in France, Italy and Spain using survey data collected in April 2020.We show that relationship quality decreased for a non-negligible part of the population, and that this result was driven mostly by the emotional stressor. These negative effects on relationship quality appeared to be relatively stable across genders, different levels of network support and countries; which suggests that the severity of the lockdown measures outweighed the traditional moderating factors usually accounted for in family research.","PeriodicalId":34968,"journal":{"name":"Vienna Yearbook of Population Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49268663","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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