Pub Date : 2019-04-01DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2019.1594783
N. Leveringhaus
ABSTRACT Review of : Jeffrey Lewis, The 2020 Commission report on the North Korean Nuclear Attacks against the United States: a speculative novel (Mariner: New York, 2018); Van Jackson, On the Brink, Trump, Kim and the Threat of Nuclear War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018); Sung Chull Kim and Michael D. Cohen, eds., Entering the new era of deterrence, North Korea and nuclear weapons (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017); and Victor D. Cha, and David C. Kang, Nuclear North Korea, a debate on engagement strategies, second edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018).
杰弗里·刘易斯:《2020年朝鲜核攻击美国委员会报告:一部投机小说》(水手出版社，纽约，2018);范·杰克逊，《边缘，特朗普，金正恩和核战争的威胁》(剑桥:剑桥大学出版社，2018);金成喆、迈克尔·d·科恩编。《进入威慑、朝鲜和核武器的新时代》(华盛顿特区:乔治城大学出版社，2017年);Victor D. Cha和David C. Kang，《核朝鲜:关于接触策略的辩论》，第二版(纽约:哥伦比亚大学出版社，2018年)。
{"title":"Beyond de-nuclearization: debating deterrence and North Korea in Asia’s new nuclear age","authors":"N. Leveringhaus","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2019.1594783","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2019.1594783","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Review of : Jeffrey Lewis, The 2020 Commission report on the North Korean Nuclear Attacks against the United States: a speculative novel (Mariner: New York, 2018); Van Jackson, On the Brink, Trump, Kim and the Threat of Nuclear War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018); Sung Chull Kim and Michael D. Cohen, eds., Entering the new era of deterrence, North Korea and nuclear weapons (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017); and Victor D. Cha, and David C. Kang, Nuclear North Korea, a debate on engagement strategies, second edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018).","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"100 1","pages":"365 - 369"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80580742","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-03-14DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2019.1582522
S. Joshi
ABSTRACT This article expands on the current research on nuclear terrorism by investigating how terrorist actors seek to capitalize on the nuclear weapons discourse in a country to gain domestic political influence. Existing research on nuclear terrorism has focused on operational aspects – attacks using nuclear materials and weapons, or attacks on nuclear facilities. This article focuses on the rhetorical use of nuclear weapons issues using the case of Pakistan, which has a substantial nuclear weapons complex, widespread domestic support for nuclear weapons, and numerous jihadist terrorist groups. It argues that some terrorist groups (Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the Pakistani Taliban) are increasingly participating in the nuclear discourse for political influence and to transform themselves as mainstream political actors. They portray themselves as the champions of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons against perceived threats from external actors, especially the United States, and aim to push Pakistani nuclear policy toward an Islamist and jihadist ideological framework.
{"title":"How terrorist actors in Pakistan use nuclear weapons for political influence","authors":"S. Joshi","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2019.1582522","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2019.1582522","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article expands on the current research on nuclear terrorism by investigating how terrorist actors seek to capitalize on the nuclear weapons discourse in a country to gain domestic political influence. Existing research on nuclear terrorism has focused on operational aspects – attacks using nuclear materials and weapons, or attacks on nuclear facilities. This article focuses on the rhetorical use of nuclear weapons issues using the case of Pakistan, which has a substantial nuclear weapons complex, widespread domestic support for nuclear weapons, and numerous jihadist terrorist groups. It argues that some terrorist groups (Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the Pakistani Taliban) are increasingly participating in the nuclear discourse for political influence and to transform themselves as mainstream political actors. They portray themselves as the champions of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons against perceived threats from external actors, especially the United States, and aim to push Pakistani nuclear policy toward an Islamist and jihadist ideological framework.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"17 1","pages":"221 - 242"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86839454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-12DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2019.1567493
Andrew Taffer
ABSTRACT This paper provides the first systematic analysis of China’s conduct in its offshore territorial conflict with Japan to contend that Beijing has adopted a wedging strategy aimed at weakening the U.S.-Japan alliance. Building on previous scholarship, the article demonstrates that over the post-Cold War era China has consistently subordinated its territorial interests in the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute to help advance broader political and strategic goals. Drawing on Chinese writings, I argue that since 2010 Beijing has viewed U.S. and Japanese strategy in the conflict to be intended to contain it and that the empirical record suggests China’s conduct has, in turn, sought to counter this perceived threat by weakening the alliance at its core. Beijing, it is argued, has aimed to sow discord in the U.S.-Japan alliance by “making use of contradictions” perceived to afflict U.S. strategy.
{"title":"Threat and opportunity: Chinese wedging in the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute","authors":"Andrew Taffer","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2019.1567493","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2019.1567493","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper provides the first systematic analysis of China’s conduct in its offshore territorial conflict with Japan to contend that Beijing has adopted a wedging strategy aimed at weakening the U.S.-Japan alliance. Building on previous scholarship, the article demonstrates that over the post-Cold War era China has consistently subordinated its territorial interests in the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute to help advance broader political and strategic goals. Drawing on Chinese writings, I argue that since 2010 Beijing has viewed U.S. and Japanese strategy in the conflict to be intended to contain it and that the empirical record suggests China’s conduct has, in turn, sought to counter this perceived threat by weakening the alliance at its core. Beijing, it is argued, has aimed to sow discord in the U.S.-Japan alliance by “making use of contradictions” perceived to afflict U.S. strategy.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"45 1","pages":"157 - 178"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90904930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-10DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2018.1551883
Audrye Wong
ABSTRACT What explains variation in how a patron manages its existing alliance with a client state when improving relations with an adversary? I theorize that the patron’s alliance management strategy is influenced by the client’s degree of bargaining power over its patron. Bargaining power derives from the availability of an outside option. Using archival and interview evidence, I show variation in alliance bargaining dynamics during US–China rapprochement. While the United States was dismissive toward South Korea, China was highly placating toward North Korea, making concessions and providing compensation. However, China became more dismissive during Sino-South Korean normalization, when North Korea’s bargaining power decreased. The findings have important policy implications for understanding how a patron could simultaneously manage alliance and adversary relationships.
{"title":"Managing Small Allies Amidst Patron–Adversary Rapprochement: A Tale of Two Koreas","authors":"Audrye Wong","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2018.1551883","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2018.1551883","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT What explains variation in how a patron manages its existing alliance with a client state when improving relations with an adversary? I theorize that the patron’s alliance management strategy is influenced by the client’s degree of bargaining power over its patron. Bargaining power derives from the availability of an outside option. Using archival and interview evidence, I show variation in alliance bargaining dynamics during US–China rapprochement. While the United States was dismissive toward South Korea, China was highly placating toward North Korea, making concessions and providing compensation. However, China became more dismissive during Sino-South Korean normalization, when North Korea’s bargaining power decreased. The findings have important policy implications for understanding how a patron could simultaneously manage alliance and adversary relationships.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"24 1","pages":"107 - 126"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86783839","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-05DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2018.1551884
Avinash Paliwal
ABSTRACT Ostensibly driven by concerns over a military standoff with China similar to Doklam, India increased military deployment at the Myanmar tri-junction. This article assesses the inevitability of systemic factors such as rivalry with China in determining India’s approach on border issues. It asks why India sought formalization of its boundary with Burma in 1967. Given its territorial disputes with China, resolving the Burma boundary should have been high priority. Still, it took India two decades after independence to broach the subject. Based on fresh archival and interview data, this article answers the question by examining the India–Burma Boundary Agreement. A three-party territorial dispute, the making of this agreement witnessed simultaneous interplay between states with visible power differentials, and various stakeholders within India’s polity and bureaucracy. The article argues that even when inter-state competition is apparent, domestic factors may be more important in triggering foreign policy change.
{"title":"“A Cat’s Paw of Indian Reactionaries”? Strategic Rivalry and Domestic Politics at the India–China–Myanmar Tri-Junction","authors":"Avinash Paliwal","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2018.1551884","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2018.1551884","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Ostensibly driven by concerns over a military standoff with China similar to Doklam, India increased military deployment at the Myanmar tri-junction. This article assesses the inevitability of systemic factors such as rivalry with China in determining India’s approach on border issues. It asks why India sought formalization of its boundary with Burma in 1967. Given its territorial disputes with China, resolving the Burma boundary should have been high priority. Still, it took India two decades after independence to broach the subject. Based on fresh archival and interview data, this article answers the question by examining the India–Burma Boundary Agreement. A three-party territorial dispute, the making of this agreement witnessed simultaneous interplay between states with visible power differentials, and various stakeholders within India’s polity and bureaucracy. The article argues that even when inter-state competition is apparent, domestic factors may be more important in triggering foreign policy change.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"37 1","pages":"73 - 89"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90126770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-11-23DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2018.1547709
Yukiko Nishikawa
ABSTRACT This article explores the applicability of the notion of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in reference to the crisis faced by the Rohingya in Myanmar, and it discusses why the R2P has limited usefulness in certain cases. Since R2P came to be recognized by ASEAN, ongoing community-building activities within the ASEAN led to optimism that member countries would give increased attention to human rights, despite the organization’s historic practice of non-intervention in individual states’ internal affairs. However, the ASEAN’s stance regarding the Rohingya crisis can be described as all talk and no action. While recognizing the value of the R2P in protecting people from mass atrocities in certain contexts, the article points out the critical flaw that R2P rests on a particular discourse of sovereignty. Thus, it argues that the R2P not only has limited usefulness in the case of the Rohingya (whom Myanmar treats as stateless non-citizens) but could even exacerbate the situation.
{"title":"The Reality of Protecting the Rohingya: An Inherent Limitation of the Responsibility to Protect","authors":"Yukiko Nishikawa","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2018.1547709","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2018.1547709","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article explores the applicability of the notion of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in reference to the crisis faced by the Rohingya in Myanmar, and it discusses why the R2P has limited usefulness in certain cases. Since R2P came to be recognized by ASEAN, ongoing community-building activities within the ASEAN led to optimism that member countries would give increased attention to human rights, despite the organization’s historic practice of non-intervention in individual states’ internal affairs. However, the ASEAN’s stance regarding the Rohingya crisis can be described as all talk and no action. While recognizing the value of the R2P in protecting people from mass atrocities in certain contexts, the article points out the critical flaw that R2P rests on a particular discourse of sovereignty. Thus, it argues that the R2P not only has limited usefulness in the case of the Rohingya (whom Myanmar treats as stateless non-citizens) but could even exacerbate the situation.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"18 1","pages":"106 - 90"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86139492","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-11-15DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2019.1539821
R. Basrur, A. Mukherjee, T. V. Paul
ABSTRACT This introduction explains the rationale for this special issue of Asian Security. It begins with a short discussion about the relevance and the utility of the term “security dilemma” in international relations. The concept, which emerged during the Cold War, has since been used extensively to describe India-China relations. This special issue attempts to add to our understanding of the India–China relationship as well as to contribute to enriching the theoretical literature in a number of ways. First, it represents the first detailed effort to present a set of analyses that encompasses theory, history, and the full spectrum of strategic issue areas to explain the dynamics of a key contemporary inter-state relationship involving China and India. Second, the analysis reveals the complexity of security dilemma politics by highlighting how states respond to their predicament in different ways. Third, this special issue draws attention to an area that has been largely neglected in the literature: the relationship between the security dilemma as a concept and domestic politics. Finally, a case can be made that a security dilemma-type response in a situation that does not demand it may actually create a dilemma where none existed before. These and other complexities are abundant in this collection of articles. The chapter concludes by summarizing the main arguments presented by the contributors to this special issue.
{"title":"Introduction: Revisiting the security dilemma through the lens of India–China relations","authors":"R. Basrur, A. Mukherjee, T. V. Paul","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2019.1539821","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2019.1539821","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This introduction explains the rationale for this special issue of Asian Security. It begins with a short discussion about the relevance and the utility of the term “security dilemma” in international relations. The concept, which emerged during the Cold War, has since been used extensively to describe India-China relations. This special issue attempts to add to our understanding of the India–China relationship as well as to contribute to enriching the theoretical literature in a number of ways. First, it represents the first detailed effort to present a set of analyses that encompasses theory, history, and the full spectrum of strategic issue areas to explain the dynamics of a key contemporary inter-state relationship involving China and India. Second, the analysis reveals the complexity of security dilemma politics by highlighting how states respond to their predicament in different ways. Third, this special issue draws attention to an area that has been largely neglected in the literature: the relationship between the security dilemma as a concept and domestic politics. Finally, a case can be made that a security dilemma-type response in a situation that does not demand it may actually create a dilemma where none existed before. These and other complexities are abundant in this collection of articles. The chapter concludes by summarizing the main arguments presented by the contributors to this special issue.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"5 4","pages":"1 - 4"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14799855.2019.1539821","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72461680","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-11-13DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2019.1539819
Sinderpal Singh
ABSTRACT This article examines contemporary perceptions and the corresponding responses of Southeast Asian states vis-à-vis India–China maritime competition. Specifically, it examines the cases of Singapore, Vietnam, and the Philippines. These countries provide useful cross-comparisons as, bilaterally, all three states relate uniquely to China and the maritime disputes in the South China Sea on the basis of two structural conditions – their formal security relationship with the US and whether they are a claimant state in the South China Sea dispute. The link between the range afforded by these three cases and the manner in which it drives their perceptions towards India–China maritime competition forms the core of this article. These three countries perceive differing levels of threat from China and have chosen a range of external balancing strategies to deal with these perceived threats. The nature of US–China and India–China security competition, the latter specifically in the maritime realm, structures the external balancing strategies they have pursued. There are, this article argues, important links between US–China and India–China strategic competition in structuring the external balancing strategies these countries pursue.
{"title":"The dilemmas of regional states: How Southeast Asian states view and respond to India–China maritime competition","authors":"Sinderpal Singh","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2019.1539819","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2019.1539819","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article examines contemporary perceptions and the corresponding responses of Southeast Asian states vis-à-vis India–China maritime competition. Specifically, it examines the cases of Singapore, Vietnam, and the Philippines. These countries provide useful cross-comparisons as, bilaterally, all three states relate uniquely to China and the maritime disputes in the South China Sea on the basis of two structural conditions – their formal security relationship with the US and whether they are a claimant state in the South China Sea dispute. The link between the range afforded by these three cases and the manner in which it drives their perceptions towards India–China maritime competition forms the core of this article. These three countries perceive differing levels of threat from China and have chosen a range of external balancing strategies to deal with these perceived threats. The nature of US–China and India–China security competition, the latter specifically in the maritime realm, structures the external balancing strategies they have pursued. There are, this article argues, important links between US–China and India–China strategic competition in structuring the external balancing strategies these countries pursue.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"9 1","pages":"44 - 59"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73866068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-11-09DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2019.1539817
Yogesh Joshi, A. Mukherjee
ABSTRACT This article argues that China’s rise and its growing military power have intensified the Sino-Indian security dilemma. For a long time after the 1962 war, India’s military posture along the India–China border was mostly defensive in nature and could be characterized as imposing “deterrence by denial.” However, over the last decade, China’s growth trajectory coupled with rapid modernization of its military called into question the efficacy of this approach. India now feels much more vulnerable to China’s increasing military power both on the land frontier as well as in the maritime domain. The increasing intensity of this security dilemma has informed a consequent shift in India’s military strategy vis-à-vis China to one of “deterrence by punishment.” Theoretically, this article examines how changes in the severity of a security dilemma can lead to changes in military strategy. While doing so it explains India’s current military strategy to deal with the challenge posed by China.
{"title":"From Denial to Punishment: The Security Dilemma and Changes in India’s Military Strategy towards China","authors":"Yogesh Joshi, A. Mukherjee","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2019.1539817","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2019.1539817","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article argues that China’s rise and its growing military power have intensified the Sino-Indian security dilemma. For a long time after the 1962 war, India’s military posture along the India–China border was mostly defensive in nature and could be characterized as imposing “deterrence by denial.” However, over the last decade, China’s growth trajectory coupled with rapid modernization of its military called into question the efficacy of this approach. India now feels much more vulnerable to China’s increasing military power both on the land frontier as well as in the maritime domain. The increasing intensity of this security dilemma has informed a consequent shift in India’s military strategy vis-à-vis China to one of “deterrence by punishment.” Theoretically, this article examines how changes in the severity of a security dilemma can lead to changes in military strategy. While doing so it explains India’s current military strategy to deal with the challenge posed by China.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"95 1","pages":"25 - 43"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80951115","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-11-05DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2018.1540468
Krista E. Wiegand, Erik Beuck
ABSTRACT East Asian states infrequently seek peaceful dispute resolution through binding methods of international law. What is puzzling is why states seek one particular dispute resolution method or another, and in the specific case of the Philippines, why the government chose to pursue arbitration against China regarding the maritime boundaries of the disputed Spratly Islands, knowing that China would not agree to participate. In this article, we theorize that the Philippine government chose to pursue arbitration against China for three strategic reasons: 1) to counterbalance China’s military actions in the South China Sea, 2) because of the strong benefits to the state resulting from using arbitration, and 3) the probability of winning the case using arbitration was perceived by the Philippines as strong. To test our hypotheses, we use interviews and process tracing, through which we find evidence for our suppositions, primarily the last hypothesis.
{"title":"Strategic Selection: Philippine Arbitration in the South China Sea Dispute","authors":"Krista E. Wiegand, Erik Beuck","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2018.1540468","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2018.1540468","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT East Asian states infrequently seek peaceful dispute resolution through binding methods of international law. What is puzzling is why states seek one particular dispute resolution method or another, and in the specific case of the Philippines, why the government chose to pursue arbitration against China regarding the maritime boundaries of the disputed Spratly Islands, knowing that China would not agree to participate. In this article, we theorize that the Philippine government chose to pursue arbitration against China for three strategic reasons: 1) to counterbalance China’s military actions in the South China Sea, 2) because of the strong benefits to the state resulting from using arbitration, and 3) the probability of winning the case using arbitration was perceived by the Philippines as strong. To test our hypotheses, we use interviews and process tracing, through which we find evidence for our suppositions, primarily the last hypothesis.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"89 1","pages":"141 - 156"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76298110","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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