In this paper, we study a family of sales-based rebate mechanisms as an effective tool to implement price discrimination across a population of buyers with correlated heterogeneous valuations on indivisible goods and services. In order to implement such sales-based rebate mechanisms, the seller charges each buyer a fixed price at the time of purchase contingent on a rebate that is a function of the ex post sales volume to be realized at the end of the sales period. The seller declares both a price and a menu of rebates as a function of sales. We show that, when there is a common component of uncertainty in consumers’ valuations (to which we refer as the quality of the product), such rebates enable a seller to effectively induce different expected net prices at different valuations. Importantly, this effective price discrimination over valuations is achieved keeping both the base price and the rebate uniform across all buyers. This uniformity of price and rebate across buyers is a key advantage of our proposed rebate mechanism, thereby providing a new mechanism for price discrimination in crowd-based markets. We use tools and techniques from game theory and variational optimization to provide insight into the economics of such mechanisms. In particular, we identify two mechanisms that are monotone functions of the sales volume that are easy to implement in practice and perform well when compared with the much more complex optimal mechanism. We provide a rigorous analysis of the optimal mechanism and discuss practical limitations in implementing the globally optimal design, further demonstrating the efficacy of our proposed monotone mechanisms. This paper was accepted by Gabriel Weintraub, revenue management and market analytics. Funding: This research was supported by a Vannevar Bush Fellowship from the Office of Secretary of State and Army Research Office [MURI Project W911NF-19-1-0217]. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4691 .
在本文中，我们研究了一组基于销售的回扣机制，作为一种有效的工具，在对不可分割的商品和服务具有相关异质性估值的购买者群体中实施价格歧视。为了实施这种基于销售的回扣机制，卖方在购买时向每个买方收取固定价格，该价格取决于回扣，回扣是销售期结束时要实现的售后销售量的函数。卖方声明价格和折扣菜单作为销售额的函数。我们表明，当消费者的估值(我们称之为产品质量)中存在一个共同的不确定性成分时，这种回扣使卖家能够有效地在不同的估值下诱导不同的预期净价格。重要的是，这种有效的价格歧视在所有买家中实现了基本价格和回扣的统一。这种价格和回扣在购买者之间的一致性是我们提出的回扣机制的一个关键优势，从而为群体市场中的价格歧视提供了一种新的机制。我们使用博弈论和变分优化的工具和技术来深入了解这种机制的经济学。特别是，我们确定了两种机制，它们是销售量的单调函数，在实践中易于实现，并且与更复杂的最优机制相比表现良好。我们对最优机制进行了严格的分析，并讨论了实施全局最优设计的实际限制，进一步证明了我们提出的单调机制的有效性。本文被收益管理和市场分析专业的Gabriel Weintraub接受。资助:本研究由美国国务卿办公室和陆军研究办公室Vannevar Bush Fellowship资助[MURI Project W911NF-19-1-0217]。补充资料:数据文件可从https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4691获取。
{"title":"Sales-Based Rebate Design","authors":"A. Ajorlou, A. Jadbabaie","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3348692","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3348692","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we study a family of sales-based rebate mechanisms as an effective tool to implement price discrimination across a population of buyers with correlated heterogeneous valuations on indivisible goods and services. In order to implement such sales-based rebate mechanisms, the seller charges each buyer a fixed price at the time of purchase contingent on a rebate that is a function of the ex post sales volume to be realized at the end of the sales period. The seller declares both a price and a menu of rebates as a function of sales. We show that, when there is a common component of uncertainty in consumers’ valuations (to which we refer as the quality of the product), such rebates enable a seller to effectively induce different expected net prices at different valuations. Importantly, this effective price discrimination over valuations is achieved keeping both the base price and the rebate uniform across all buyers. This uniformity of price and rebate across buyers is a key advantage of our proposed rebate mechanism, thereby providing a new mechanism for price discrimination in crowd-based markets. We use tools and techniques from game theory and variational optimization to provide insight into the economics of such mechanisms. In particular, we identify two mechanisms that are monotone functions of the sales volume that are easy to implement in practice and perform well when compared with the much more complex optimal mechanism. We provide a rigorous analysis of the optimal mechanism and discuss practical limitations in implementing the globally optimal design, further demonstrating the efficacy of our proposed monotone mechanisms. This paper was accepted by Gabriel Weintraub, revenue management and market analytics. Funding: This research was supported by a Vannevar Bush Fellowship from the Office of Secretary of State and Army Research Office [MURI Project W911NF-19-1-0217]. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4691 .","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123143902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A. Bensoussan, Shaokuan Chen, Anshuman Chutani, S. Sethi, Chi Chung Siu, S. Yam
In this paper we characterize the feedback equilibrium of a general infinite-horizon Stackelberg--Nash differential game where the roles of the players are mixed. By mixed we mean that one player i...
{"title":"Feedback Stackelberg-Nash Equilibria in Mixed Leadership Games with an Application to Cooperative Advertising","authors":"A. Bensoussan, Shaokuan Chen, Anshuman Chutani, S. Sethi, Chi Chung Siu, S. Yam","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3493916","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3493916","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we characterize the feedback equilibrium of a general infinite-horizon Stackelberg--Nash differential game where the roles of the players are mixed. By mixed we mean that one player i...","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121423423","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Feng and Sabarwal (2018) show that there is additional scope to study strategic complements in extensive form games, by investigating in detail the case of two stage, 2×2 games. We show the same for two stage, 2 × 2 games with strategic substitutes and with strategic heterogeneity. We characterize strategic substitutes and strategic heterogeneity in such games, and show that the set of each class of games has infinite Lebesgue measure. Our conditions are easy to apply and yield uncountably many examples of such games, indicating greater possibilities for the manifestation and study of these types of interactions. In contrast to the case for strategic complements, we show that generically, the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in both classes of games is totally unordered (no two equilibria are comparable). Consequently, with multiple equilibria, some nice features of strategic complements that depend on the complete lattice structure of the equilibrium set may not transfer to the case of strategic substitutes or strategic heterogeneity.
{"title":"Two Stage 2x2 Games with Strategic Substitutes and Strategic Heterogeneity","authors":"Tarun Sabarwal, H. VuXuan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3322176","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3322176","url":null,"abstract":"Feng and Sabarwal (2018) show that there is additional scope to study strategic complements in extensive form games, by investigating in detail the case of two stage, 2×2 games. We show the same for two stage, 2 × 2 games with strategic substitutes and with strategic heterogeneity. We characterize strategic substitutes and strategic heterogeneity in such games, and show that the set of each class of games has infinite Lebesgue measure. Our conditions are easy to apply and yield uncountably many examples of such games, indicating greater possibilities for the manifestation and study of these types of interactions. In contrast to the case for strategic complements, we show that generically, the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in both classes of games is totally unordered (no two equilibria are comparable). Consequently, with multiple equilibria, some nice features of strategic complements that depend on the complete lattice structure of the equilibrium set may not transfer to the case of strategic substitutes or strategic heterogeneity.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132589553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
J. Bouma, T.T.B. Nguyen, Eline van der Heijden, J. Dijk
This paper presents the results of a threshold public goods game experiment with heterogeneous players. The experiment is designed in close collaboration with the Dutch association of agri-environmental farmer collectives. Subjects are recruited at a university (“the lab”) and a farm management training centre (“lab-in-the-field”). The treatments have two different distribution rules which are varied in a within-subjects manner. After subjects have experienced both, they can vote for one of the two rules: either a differentiated bonus that results in equal payoff for all, or an undifferentiated, equal share of the group bonus. In a between-subjects manner, subjects can vote for a (minimum or average) threshold or are faced with an exogenous threshold. The results indicate that exogenous thresholds perform better, possibly because the focal point they provide facilitates coordination. With regard to the two distribution rules, the results are mixed: average contributions and payoffs are higher in the lab under the ‘equal-payoff’ rule, but there is no significant difference between the two in the lab-in-the-field, possibly because contributions in the lab-in-the-field are much less efficient. Overall, our results suggest that environmental payment schemes should not only consider farmer heterogeneity in the design of group contracts, but pay explicit attention to coordination problems as well.
{"title":"Analysing Group Contract Design Using a Lab and a Lab-in-The-Field Threshold Public Good Experiment","authors":"J. Bouma, T.T.B. Nguyen, Eline van der Heijden, J. Dijk","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3289072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3289072","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents the results of a threshold public goods game experiment with heterogeneous players. The experiment is designed in close collaboration with the Dutch association of agri-environmental farmer collectives. Subjects are recruited at a university (“the lab”) and a farm management training centre (“lab-in-the-field”). The treatments have two different distribution rules which are varied in a within-subjects manner. After subjects have experienced both, they can vote for one of the two rules: either a differentiated bonus that results in equal payoff for all, or an undifferentiated, equal share of the group bonus. In a between-subjects manner, subjects can vote for a (minimum or average) threshold or are faced with an exogenous threshold. The results indicate that exogenous thresholds perform better, possibly because the focal point they provide facilitates coordination. With regard to the two distribution rules, the results are mixed: average contributions and payoffs are higher in the lab under the ‘equal-payoff’ rule, but there is no significant difference between the two in the lab-in-the-field, possibly because contributions in the lab-in-the-field are much less efficient. Overall, our results suggest that environmental payment schemes should not only consider farmer heterogeneity in the design of group contracts, but pay explicit attention to coordination problems as well.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133387887","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I study reputation effects under uncertain monitoring. I examine a repeated game between a long-run player and a series of short-run opponents. The long-run player can either be a strategic type or a commitment type that plays the same action in every period. The modeling innovation is that the short-run player is unsure about the monitoring structure. The uncertainty about the monitoring structure introduces new challenges to reputation building because there may not be a direct relationship between the distribution of signals and the long-run player's strategy. Thus the long-run player may not have the ability to establish a reputation for commitment. I show that, when the short-run players cannot statistically distinguish commitment action from a bad action, the standard reputation results break down. I also provide sufficient conditions under which reputation effects on long-run player’s payoffs can be extended to the current framework. When the commitment payoff is the highest payoff he can get, the conditions can be relaxed.
{"title":"Robustness of Reputation Effects under Uncertain Monitoring","authors":"Geyu Yang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3266235","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3266235","url":null,"abstract":"I study reputation effects under uncertain monitoring. I examine a repeated game between a long-run player and a series of short-run opponents. The long-run player can either be a strategic type or a commitment type that plays the same action in every period. The modeling innovation is that the short-run player is unsure about the monitoring structure. The uncertainty about the monitoring structure introduces new challenges to reputation building because there may not be a direct relationship between the distribution of signals and the long-run player's strategy. Thus the long-run player may not have the ability to establish a reputation for commitment. I show that, when the short-run players cannot statistically distinguish commitment action from a bad action, the standard reputation results break down. I also provide sufficient conditions under which reputation effects on long-run player’s payoffs can be extended to the current framework. When the commitment payoff is the highest payoff he can get, the conditions can be relaxed.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128327627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
V. Benndorf, Ismael Martínez-Martínez, Hans-Theo Normann
We propose a model of coupled population games where intra- and intergroup interactions overlap. We analyze the general class of symmetric 2x2 games with coupled replicator dynamics. Standard one- and two-population predictions extend to a total of ten regions with different sets of attractors, among them novel hybrid points where one population randomizes and the other plays a pure strategy. Building on the theoretical analysis, we run continuous-time laboratory experiments using 48 different variants of coupled games. Observations confirm the theory to a large extent, but we also find a number of systematic deviations. When the attractors' eigenvalues are smaller (in absolute terms), play converges to steady states located further from the prediction.
{"title":"Games With Coupled Populations: An Experiment in Continuous Time","authors":"V. Benndorf, Ismael Martínez-Martínez, Hans-Theo Normann","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3272936","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3272936","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a model of coupled population games where intra- and intergroup interactions overlap. We analyze the general class of symmetric 2x2 games with coupled replicator dynamics. Standard one- and two-population predictions extend to a total of ten regions with different sets of attractors, among them novel hybrid points where one population randomizes and the other plays a pure strategy. Building on the theoretical analysis, we run continuous-time laboratory experiments using 48 different variants of coupled games. Observations confirm the theory to a large extent, but we also find a number of systematic deviations. When the attractors' eigenvalues are smaller (in absolute terms), play converges to steady states located further from the prediction.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114436846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nowadays most firms compete for multiple separate markets as opposed to a single market. Extant IO works mainly focus on these firms' cooperative behavior, assuming away their capacity constraints and studying the effect of potential multi-market retaliation upon these firms' collusive incentive. With the assumption that the firms have a single capacity constraint, which applies to the multiple separate markets they compete for, this paper sheds light on the effects of the capacity constraint and demand linkages across different markets in the context of a non-cooperative duopoly model. Different from the classical single market capacity-constrained price competition theory, which has three regions divided by three different types of price equilibria as we adjust the firms' capacity constraints, two asymmetric markets capacity-constrained price competition has five regions divided by five different types of price equilibria as we adjust the firms' capacity constraints. An interesting result is that the firms do not always set higher price in the big or rich market than the small or poor market. When the capacities are endogenously determined, we find that the classical single market result (Kreps and Scheinkman 1983) that the Cournot-Nash quantity is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium cannot hold for the two asymmetric markets competition model. In sum, the results of the asymmetric markets capacity-constrained price competition may yield different implications on merger, price leadership, and collusive behavior.
现在大多数公司都在多个独立的市场竞争，而不是单一的市场。现有的IO研究主要关注企业的合作行为，假设企业的产能约束，研究潜在的多市场报复对企业合谋激励的影响。假设企业在竞争的多个独立市场中存在单一的产能约束，本文揭示了在非合作双寡头模型的背景下，产能约束和需求联系对不同市场的影响。与传统的单一市场产能约束价格竞争理论不同的是，当我们调整企业的产能约束时，三个区域被三种不同类型的价格均衡所划分，而两个非对称市场的产能约束价格竞争在调整企业的产能约束时，有五个区域被五种不同类型的价格均衡所划分。一个有趣的结果是，公司并不总是在大市场或富裕市场设定比小市场或贫穷市场更高的价格。当产能是内生决定时，我们发现经典单一市场结果(Kreps and Scheinkman 1983)关于库尔诺-纳什量是子博弈的完全纳什均衡的结论在两个不对称市场竞争模型中不成立。综上所述，不对称市场的价格竞争可能对并购、价格领导和共谋行为产生不同的影响。
{"title":"Bertrand-Edgeworth Duopoly: Multi-Market","authors":"Jun Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3304415","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3304415","url":null,"abstract":"Nowadays most firms compete for multiple separate markets as opposed to a single market. Extant IO works mainly focus on these firms' cooperative behavior, assuming away their capacity constraints and studying the effect of potential multi-market retaliation upon these firms' collusive incentive. With the assumption that the firms have a single capacity constraint, which applies to the multiple separate markets they compete for, this paper sheds light on the effects of the capacity constraint and demand linkages across different markets in the context of a non-cooperative duopoly model. Different from the classical single market capacity-constrained price competition theory, which has three regions divided by three different types of price equilibria as we adjust the firms' capacity constraints, two asymmetric markets capacity-constrained price competition has five regions divided by five different types of price equilibria as we adjust the firms' capacity constraints. An interesting result is that the firms do not always set higher price in the big or rich market than the small or poor market. When the capacities are endogenously determined, we find that the classical single market result (Kreps and Scheinkman 1983) that the Cournot-Nash quantity is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium cannot hold for the two asymmetric markets competition model. In sum, the results of the asymmetric markets capacity-constrained price competition may yield different implications on merger, price leadership, and collusive behavior.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130318085","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Are individuals always better off when their preferences can be represented by expected utility? I study this question in a bargaining game where individuals bargain over a pie of fixed size, and I contrast the share received in the long-run by expected utility maximisers with the share they would receive if their preferences were described by prospect theory preferences instead when, in either case, they bargain with expected utility maximisers. I present a necessary and sufficient condition for individuals to obtain a higher share of the pie if their preferences obey prospect theory rather than expected utility. I decompose the effect that the three features that characterise prospect theory preferences -- reference point dependence, loss-aversion and probability weighting -- have on the bargaining outcome, and show that loss-aversion does not have any effect on the outcome of the bargaining process, reference-point dependent preference confers an unambiguous advantage and probability weighting is unambiguously disadvantageous. This ties in with the main result outlined earlier: if the upward pull of reference point dependence is relatively stronger than the downward push of probability weighting, then individuals are better off with prospect theory preferences than with expected utility preferences, and vice-versa.
{"title":"Expected Utility Preferences versus Prospect Theory Preferences in Bargaining","authors":"Abhimanyu Khan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3261837","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3261837","url":null,"abstract":"Are individuals always better off when their preferences can be represented by expected utility? I study this question in a bargaining game where individuals bargain over a pie of fixed size, and I contrast the share received in the long-run by expected utility maximisers with the share they would receive if their preferences were described by prospect theory preferences instead when, in either case, they bargain with expected utility maximisers. I present a necessary and sufficient condition for individuals to obtain a higher share of the pie if their preferences obey prospect theory rather than expected utility. I decompose the effect that the three features that characterise prospect theory preferences -- reference point dependence, loss-aversion and probability weighting -- have on the bargaining outcome, and show that loss-aversion does not have any effect on the outcome of the bargaining process, reference-point dependent preference confers an unambiguous advantage and probability weighting is unambiguously disadvantageous. \u0000This ties in with the main result outlined earlier: if the upward pull of reference point dependence is relatively stronger than the downward push of probability weighting, then individuals are better off with prospect theory preferences than with expected utility preferences, and vice-versa.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130596717","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We propose a multiplex interdependent durations model and study its empirical content. The model considers an empirical stopping game of multiple agents making optimal timing decisions with incomplete information. We characterize the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the stopping game in a system of simultaneous equations involving the conditional distribution of each duration with a moderate strategic interaction condition. The system of nonlinear simultaneous equations allows us to obtain constructive identification results of the interaction effects and other nonparametric model primitives. We propose two consistent semiparametric estimation methods based on different parameterizations of modeling components with right-censored duration data.
{"title":"A Multiplex Interdependent Durations Model","authors":"Zhongjian Lin, Ruixuan Liu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2923778","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2923778","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a multiplex interdependent durations model and study its empirical content. The model considers an empirical stopping game of multiple agents making optimal timing decisions with incomplete information. We characterize the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the stopping game in a system of simultaneous equations involving the conditional distribution of each duration with a moderate strategic interaction condition. The system of nonlinear simultaneous equations allows us to obtain constructive identification results of the interaction effects and other nonparametric model primitives. We propose two consistent semiparametric estimation methods based on different parameterizations of modeling components with right-censored duration data.\u0000","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114525514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We characterize the Nash equilibria of a class of two-player contests with "lumpy" effort. Our main result shows that under quite reasonable conditions, constraints on the players' choice sets heighten competition. This stands in sharp contrast to the conventional wisdom that regulation decreases competition, but appears to be consistent with anecdotal evidence. Examples of this phenomenon include arms control, rules and regulations in sports, and drug wars. We also show that a constraint on available strategies can benefit a player.
{"title":"Contests with a Non-Convex Strategy Space","authors":"Doron Klunover, J. Morgan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3248730","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3248730","url":null,"abstract":"We characterize the Nash equilibria of a class of two-player contests with \"lumpy\" effort. Our main result shows that under quite reasonable conditions, constraints on the players' choice sets heighten competition. This stands in sharp contrast to the conventional wisdom that regulation decreases competition, but appears to be consistent with anecdotal evidence. Examples of this phenomenon include arms control, rules and regulations in sports, and drug wars. We also show that a constraint on available strategies can benefit a player.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123551691","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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