Pub Date : 2022-10-01DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2022-03-06
M. Gutenev, A. Sergunin
Arctic science diplomacy (ASD) is both a relatively new topic and an acute issue in Russian academic and political circles. There is neither a clear definition of the concept nor a consensus on the stakeholders, tools, and activities of science diplomacy. This article focuses on the main approaches in Russia in relation to the concept of ASD. The first approach considers ASD as a soft power tool of regional players. Science diplomacy helps to promote a positive image of specific states and to gain access to non-state resources that are usually inaccessible to state actors. A technical/instrumentalist approach to ASD involves the use of academic and scientific-technical cooperation between regions, countries, and societies to create reliable international partnerships on a non-ideological basis and to solve generally significant world problems. The third direction considers ASD as a form of new diplomacy, the strategic goal of which is not only to build friendly relations and cooperation with all Arctic countries, but also to develop international scientific cooperation and improve the international image of Russia. This analysis makes it possible to explain the strategic motives and driving forces of ASD and to identify the stakeholders and key forms of Russia’s ASD. It is established that the majority of the participants of ASD share the idea that international scientific cooperation in order to ensure the sustainable development of the Arctic can become an effective mechanism for solving the most acute problems of the region, as well as for improving the current relations of Western countries with Russia. The authors believe that Russia has largely managed to form the necessary platforms for the implementation of both strategic and tactical goals of its ASD. These platforms include both national platforms (the international forum “The Arctic: The Territory of Dialogue” and “The Arctic: Present and Future”) and the active use of international platforms (“Arctic Frontiers,” “Polar Circle,” and “Arctic Science Summit Week”) and organizations such as the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), the International Arctic Social Sciences Association (IASSA), and the Association of Polar Early Career Scientists (APECS).
{"title":"Russia’s arctic science diplomacy: theory and practice","authors":"M. Gutenev, A. Sergunin","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2022-03-06","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2022-03-06","url":null,"abstract":"Arctic science diplomacy (ASD) is both a relatively new topic and an acute issue in Russian academic and political circles. There is neither a clear definition of the concept nor a consensus on the stakeholders, tools, and activities of science diplomacy. This article focuses on the main approaches in Russia in relation to the concept of ASD. The first approach considers ASD as a soft power tool of regional players. Science diplomacy helps to promote a positive image of specific states and to gain access to non-state resources that are usually inaccessible to state actors. A technical/instrumentalist approach to ASD involves the use of academic and scientific-technical cooperation between regions, countries, and societies to create reliable international partnerships on a non-ideological basis and to solve generally significant world problems. The third direction considers ASD as a form of new diplomacy, the strategic goal of which is not only to build friendly relations and cooperation with all Arctic countries, but also to develop international scientific cooperation and improve the international image of Russia. This analysis makes it possible to explain the strategic motives and driving forces of ASD and to identify the stakeholders and key forms of Russia’s ASD. It is established that the majority of the participants of ASD share the idea that international scientific cooperation in order to ensure the sustainable development of the Arctic can become an effective mechanism for solving the most acute problems of the region, as well as for improving the current relations of Western countries with Russia. The authors believe that Russia has largely managed to form the necessary platforms for the implementation of both strategic and tactical goals of its ASD. These platforms include both national platforms (the international forum “The Arctic: The Territory of Dialogue” and “The Arctic: Present and Future”) and the active use of international platforms (“Arctic Frontiers,” “Polar Circle,” and “Arctic Science Summit Week”) and organizations such as the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), the International Arctic Social Sciences Association (IASSA), and the Association of Polar Early Career Scientists (APECS).","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45542353","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-01DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2022-03-07
L. Zakharova
One of the issues on the national agenda of low-income developing countries is the formulation of their own sustainable development strategies. The United Nations (UN) 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is an important benchmark and road map for achieving this goal. At the same time, local specifics have an impact on the approaches, methods and possibilities for achieving the declared goals in each particular state. This study analyzes the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) Voluntary National Review on the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda, official North Korean statements, and Russian and foreign academic and analytical publications in order to outline North Korea's approach to localizing the sustainable development goals (SDGs), identify problems arising in this process, and highlight prospects for international cooperation. Methods of comparative and content analysis were used in the research. It is maintained that, in search of its own strategy, the DPRK’s leadership is trying to use international experience by integrating the SDGs into national development plans. North Korean specifics lie in reformulating global SDGs according to the national narrative of local-style socialism construction, the decisive role of the state in the development and implementation of actual plans, a formal approach to the implementation of some SDGs, and a focus on economic self-sufficiency as a guarantee of sustainable development. Despite the need for external assistance to achieve the main national SDGs, at present, the possibilities for international cooperation with the DPRK are significantly limited. The implementation of joint initiatives or assistance projects requires both obtaining permission from the UN Security Council 1718 Sanctions Committee and opening the borders of North Korea, which have been closed due to the coronavirus pandemic. However, given the global scope of the tasks set out in the 2030 Agenda, it is highly likely that in the medium and long term the DPRK will resume international cooperation in key areas of sustainable development—agriculture, health care, access to clean drinking water and sanitation, and climate change, as well as energy and transport infrastructure modernization. The main partners in this cooperation can be international organizations and neighbouring Russia and China.
{"title":"A Bumpy Road to Bright Goals: North Korea's Approach to Implementing the 2030 Agenda and Prospects for International Cooperation","authors":"L. Zakharova","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2022-03-07","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2022-03-07","url":null,"abstract":"One of the issues on the national agenda of low-income developing countries is the formulation of their own sustainable development strategies. The United Nations (UN) 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is an important benchmark and road map for achieving this goal. At the same time, local specifics have an impact on the approaches, methods and possibilities for achieving the declared goals in each particular state. This study analyzes the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) Voluntary National Review on the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda, official North Korean statements, and Russian and foreign academic and analytical publications in order to outline North Korea's approach to localizing the sustainable development goals (SDGs), identify problems arising in this process, and highlight prospects for international cooperation. Methods of comparative and content analysis were used in the research. It is maintained that, in search of its own strategy, the DPRK’s leadership is trying to use international experience by integrating the SDGs into national development plans. North Korean specifics lie in reformulating global SDGs according to the national narrative of local-style socialism construction, the decisive role of the state in the development and implementation of actual plans, a formal approach to the implementation of some SDGs, and a focus on economic self-sufficiency as a guarantee of sustainable development. Despite the need for external assistance to achieve the main national SDGs, at present, the possibilities for international cooperation with the DPRK are significantly limited. The implementation of joint initiatives or assistance projects requires both obtaining permission from the UN Security Council 1718 Sanctions Committee and opening the borders of North Korea, which have been closed due to the coronavirus pandemic. However, given the global scope of the tasks set out in the 2030 Agenda, it is highly likely that in the medium and long term the DPRK will resume international cooperation in key areas of sustainable development—agriculture, health care, access to clean drinking water and sanitation, and climate change, as well as energy and transport infrastructure modernization. The main partners in this cooperation can be international organizations and neighbouring Russia and China.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43564539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-01DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2022-03-02
Inna Andronova, A. Sakharov
This article discusses the methodological aspects of comparative research on sustainable development in order to form the BRICS Sustainable Development Index. The index can be considered as a mechanism for assessing the progress of the five BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) in achieving the United Nations’ sustainable development goals (SDGs) in 2015–20. The authors systematize the accumulated experience of international studies, indices, and rankings that address social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainability, highlighting the key research problems of these works and intrinsic issues of the SDG methodological framework in general. The methodology of the BRICS Sustainable Development Index is described in detail, taking into account the conclusions on the applicability of the available experience for the purposes of the current study. The final section presents the interim results of the Index.
{"title":"BRICS Sustainable Development Index: Methodological Aspects","authors":"Inna Andronova, A. Sakharov","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2022-03-02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2022-03-02","url":null,"abstract":"This article discusses the methodological aspects of comparative research on sustainable development in order to form the BRICS Sustainable Development Index. The index can be considered as a mechanism for assessing the progress of the five BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) in achieving the United Nations’ sustainable development goals (SDGs) in 2015–20. The authors systematize the accumulated experience of international studies, indices, and rankings that address social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainability, highlighting the key research problems of these works and intrinsic issues of the SDG methodological framework in general. The methodology of the BRICS Sustainable Development Index is described in detail, taking into account the conclusions on the applicability of the available experience for the purposes of the current study. The final section presents the interim results of the Index.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42726720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-01DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2022-03-03
Eduard Dzhagityan, M. Orekhov
The global financial crisis of 2007–09, followed by sweeping overhaul of international banking regulation, urged financial regulators to apply a tailored supervisory regime to global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). This approach was caused by exacerbation of the G-SIBs’ systemic risks and their transmission during macro level instability. The size of G-SIBs, the extent of their market power, and the heterogeneity of their operating models resulted in their dual role in systemic stress: being a source of systemic risks for the macro level, G-SIBs are at the same time transmitters of crisis developments to the micro level, hence increasing their own exposure to risks. Under these circumstances, the objectives of the post-crisis recovery required a revision of regulatory priorities by shifting them from G-SIBs’ profitability to G-SIBs’ stress resilience through the application to them of more stringent capital adequacy standards and liquidity requirements, which ultimately contributed to G-SIBs’ insusceptibility to external shocks. At the same time, the G-SIBs’ role in exacerbation of systemic stress remains uncertain due to the unresolved issues of the G-SIBs’ systemic importance. Accordingly, the crisis and liquidity dilemmas remain unresolved. Given the high level of G-SIBs interconnectedness in the international financial area, their dysfunction can provoke a domino effect of insolvency and bankruptcies in the international banking sector. Based on 2011–21 statistics for all G-SIBs included in the annual lists of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), we found certain decline in G-SIBs’ systemic risks, which is attributable to further strengthening of their market discipline. This proves that international regulatory policy is on the right track. We also found that the stress resilience of G-SIBs, a product of the application of Basel III capital surcharge buffers and the total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) standard, significantly contributed to financial stability at a level sufficient not only for the integrity of G-SIBs’ performance during the COVID-19 pandemic, but also for minimization of the risk of collapse of the banking systems that prevented the transformation of the related shocks and instability into an economy-wide crisis. Nevertheless, the post-crisis regulatory reform failed to contain the systemic importance of G-SIBs, mostly due to the lack of supervisory tools and techniques in reduction of the negative effects of the G-SIBs’ international interconnectedness.
{"title":"Global Systemically Important Banks: Do They Still Pose Risks for Financial Stability?","authors":"Eduard Dzhagityan, M. Orekhov","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2022-03-03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2022-03-03","url":null,"abstract":"The global financial crisis of 2007–09, followed by sweeping overhaul of international banking regulation, urged financial regulators to apply a tailored supervisory regime to global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). This approach was caused by exacerbation of the G-SIBs’ systemic risks and their transmission during macro level instability. The size of G-SIBs, the extent of their market power, and the heterogeneity of their operating models resulted in their dual role in systemic stress: being a source of systemic risks for the macro level, G-SIBs are at the same time transmitters of crisis developments to the micro level, hence increasing their own exposure to risks. Under these circumstances, the objectives of the post-crisis recovery required a revision of regulatory priorities by shifting them from G-SIBs’ profitability to G-SIBs’ stress resilience through the application to them of more stringent capital adequacy standards and liquidity requirements, which ultimately contributed to G-SIBs’ insusceptibility to external shocks. At the same time, the G-SIBs’ role in exacerbation of systemic stress remains uncertain due to the unresolved issues of the G-SIBs’ systemic importance. Accordingly, the crisis and liquidity dilemmas remain unresolved. Given the high level of G-SIBs interconnectedness in the international financial area, their dysfunction can provoke a domino effect of insolvency and bankruptcies in the international banking sector. Based on 2011–21 statistics for all G-SIBs included in the annual lists of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), we found certain decline in G-SIBs’ systemic risks, which is attributable to further strengthening of their market discipline. This proves that international regulatory policy is on the right track. We also found that the stress resilience of G-SIBs, a product of the application of Basel III capital surcharge buffers and the total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) standard, significantly contributed to financial stability at a level sufficient not only for the integrity of G-SIBs’ performance during the COVID-19 pandemic, but also for minimization of the risk of collapse of the banking systems that prevented the transformation of the related shocks and instability into an economy-wide crisis. Nevertheless, the post-crisis regulatory reform failed to contain the systemic importance of G-SIBs, mostly due to the lack of supervisory tools and techniques in reduction of the negative effects of the G-SIBs’ international interconnectedness.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48934287","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-01DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2022-03-04
D. Kochergin
This article is devoted to the study of the economic nature of cryptoassets, the development of their original classification, and the determination of the main directions of regulation of their turnover. These topics are the objects of modern discourse of international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (MB), the Group of 7 (G7), the Group of 20 (G20), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), and the Financial Stability Board (FSB). The study reviews the modern discourse of international organizations regarding cryptoassets, presents an interpretation of cryptoassets as a new class of financial assets, justifies the classification of cryptoassets, and identifies the main types and economic characteristics of digital assets. The study was conducted using a system-functional and system-structural method. As a result of this study, it is concluded that the activities of international organizations are focused on developing recommendations and principles for regulating transactions with cryptocurrencies and global stablecoins, prudential supervision of their issuers, unifying approaches to taxation, and countering illegal transactions using cryptoassets. The study concluded that crypto-assets are private digital assets that are recorded digitally in a distributed ledger and can be used as a means of exchange and/or investment tool and/or means of access to goods and services of issuer. According to the authorʼs classification crypto-assets are divided into two main types: virtual currencies and digital tokens. Virtual currencies are a means of exchange or payment as well as a means of saving. The two main subtypes of virtual currencies are cryptocurrencies and stablecoins. Digital tokens are issued for specific investment functions or consumer purposes. Tokens can be divided into investment tokens and utility tokens. The study also finds that there is no international regulation of cryptoassets turnover. National regulation is significantly differentiated between countries due to the lack of common interpretation and classification of cryptoassets and different assessments of economic risks of their turnover for national financial systems. In most developed countries: the USA, EU countries, UK, Switzerland, etc. – a flexible approach to regulating various types of cryptoassets and their issuers prevails. In emerging market countries such as China, Turkey, and Russia, regulation is more stringent and characterized by the widespread use of prohibitive measures. The main problem of the legal regulation of cryptoassets in Russia is its fragmentation and the predominance of a prohibitive bias. Modern regime of regulation of cryptoassets in Russia is weakly related to their economic nature and is not equivalent to the risks of turnover of cryptoassets.
{"title":"Crypto-assets: Economic Nature, Classification and Regulation of Turnover","authors":"D. Kochergin","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2022-03-04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2022-03-04","url":null,"abstract":"This article is devoted to the study of the economic nature of cryptoassets, the development of their original classification, and the determination of the main directions of regulation of their turnover. These topics are the objects of modern discourse of international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (MB), the Group of 7 (G7), the Group of 20 (G20), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), and the Financial Stability Board (FSB). The study reviews the modern discourse of international organizations regarding cryptoassets, presents an interpretation of cryptoassets as a new class of financial assets, justifies the classification of cryptoassets, and identifies the main types and economic characteristics of digital assets. The study was conducted using a system-functional and system-structural method. As a result of this study, it is concluded that the activities of international organizations are focused on developing recommendations and principles for regulating transactions with cryptocurrencies and global stablecoins, prudential supervision of their issuers, unifying approaches to taxation, and countering illegal transactions using cryptoassets. The study concluded that crypto-assets are private digital assets that are recorded digitally in a distributed ledger and can be used as a means of exchange and/or investment tool and/or means of access to goods and services of issuer. According to the authorʼs classification crypto-assets are divided into two main types: virtual currencies and digital tokens. Virtual currencies are a means of exchange or payment as well as a means of saving. The two main subtypes of virtual currencies are cryptocurrencies and stablecoins. Digital tokens are issued for specific investment functions or consumer purposes. Tokens can be divided into investment tokens and utility tokens. The study also finds that there is no international regulation of cryptoassets turnover. National regulation is significantly differentiated between countries due to the lack of common interpretation and classification of cryptoassets and different assessments of economic risks of their turnover for national financial systems. In most developed countries: the USA, EU countries, UK, Switzerland, etc. – a flexible approach to regulating various types of cryptoassets and their issuers prevails. In emerging market countries such as China, Turkey, and Russia, regulation is more stringent and characterized by the widespread use of prohibitive measures. The main problem of the legal regulation of cryptoassets in Russia is its fragmentation and the predominance of a prohibitive bias. Modern regime of regulation of cryptoassets in Russia is weakly related to their economic nature and is not equivalent to the risks of turnover of cryptoassets.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44752643","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-01DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2022-08
O. Leonova
The purpose of the AUKUS strategic alliance is to develop cooperation between the member countries (U.S., UK and Australia) in the field of security and defence in the Indo-Pacific region. The agreement provides for the supply of submarines powered by nuclear reactors to Australia. The emergence of this new strategic alliance was caused by the following factors: the increased power of China in the region; the weakening of the U.S. position in the Indo-Pacific; the desire of the UK to implement the “global Britain” strategy in practice; and the need for the U.S. to have reliable allies to contain China. These factors reveal the true purpose of AUKUS—containment of China and opposition to its active policy in the region. In this article, the author uses comparative analysis to reveal the different goals and geopolitical interests of the AUKUS countries. The systematic approach helps to describe the essence of the complex developing geopolitical system of the Indo-Pacific region.The theories of new institutionalism and constructivism make it possible to identify both continuity and gaps in the security policy and foreign policy of regional actors. Australia’s participation in the AUKUS allows it to: strengthen its political ties with influential partners—the United States and Great Britain; receive additional security guarantees from them in the context of increased activity of Chinese policy in the region; raise the country’s status in the regional hierarchy; and strengthen its defence capability. Australia’s entry into the AUKUS means the formation of a new, anti-Chinese strategy in the region. For the UK, membership in the AUKUS allows it to: expand its naval presence in the Indo-Pacific region; strengthen its special relations with the United States; improve its image, which was shaken after the country’s exit from the EU; and restore traditional ties with Australia. For the United States, AUKUS is the implementation of the strategy of “pivot” to Asia and the creation of a new alliance that has greater opportunities for military-strategic cooperation in the face of the threat from China to use the Pacific Ocean to oust the United States from a leading position. There are some possible geopolitical consequences of creating AUKUS for the region. They are escalation of tension and the nuclear arms race of the opposing parties; a new cold war with China; expansion of the club of nuclear powers because of Australia; imbalance of geopolitical forces in the region; undermining transatlantic unity; and a common strategy in the foreign policy of European countries and the United States.
{"title":"The Impact of the Strategic Partnership AUKUS on the Geopolitical Situation in the Indo-Pacific Region","authors":"O. Leonova","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2022-08","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2022-08","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of the AUKUS strategic alliance is to develop cooperation between the member countries (U.S., UK and Australia) in the field of security and defence in the Indo-Pacific region. The agreement provides for the supply of submarines powered by nuclear reactors to Australia. The emergence of this new strategic alliance was caused by the following factors: the increased power of China in the region; the weakening of the U.S. position in the Indo-Pacific; the desire of the UK to implement the “global Britain” strategy in practice; and the need for the U.S. to have reliable allies to contain China. These factors reveal the true purpose of AUKUS—containment of China and opposition to its active policy in the region. In this article, the author uses comparative analysis to reveal the different goals and geopolitical interests of the AUKUS countries. The systematic approach helps to describe the essence of the complex developing geopolitical system of the Indo-Pacific region.The theories of new institutionalism and constructivism make it possible to identify both continuity and gaps in the security policy and foreign policy of regional actors. Australia’s participation in the AUKUS allows it to: strengthen its political ties with influential partners—the United States and Great Britain; receive additional security guarantees from them in the context of increased activity of Chinese policy in the region; raise the country’s status in the regional hierarchy; and strengthen its defence capability. Australia’s entry into the AUKUS means the formation of a new, anti-Chinese strategy in the region. For the UK, membership in the AUKUS allows it to: expand its naval presence in the Indo-Pacific region; strengthen its special relations with the United States; improve its image, which was shaken after the country’s exit from the EU; and restore traditional ties with Australia. For the United States, AUKUS is the implementation of the strategy of “pivot” to Asia and the creation of a new alliance that has greater opportunities for military-strategic cooperation in the face of the threat from China to use the Pacific Ocean to oust the United States from a leading position. There are some possible geopolitical consequences of creating AUKUS for the region. They are escalation of tension and the nuclear arms race of the opposing parties; a new cold war with China; expansion of the club of nuclear powers because of Australia; imbalance of geopolitical forces in the region; undermining transatlantic unity; and a common strategy in the foreign policy of European countries and the United States.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47349107","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-01DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2022-03-05
Svetlana Burmina, K. Nesterova, A. Polbin
The impact of hypothetical restrictions on fossil fuel consumption, implemented through the introduction of a tax on CO2 emissions in the global economy and certain regions, on oil production by Russia, OPEC, and eight other major oil producers is assessed in this article. The first part of this study reviews the current literature on taxation of emissions in the global economy. Approaches to modelling such a policy and the problem of choosing the trajectory of the tax rate are analyzed, as are the main conclusions, consequences, and recommendations for the economic policy of oil exporting countries. Approaches to modelling pricing in the oil market are considered separately. The analysis shows that the premise of oligopolistic strategic interaction of oil exporters plays an important role in modelling the oil market. Subsequently, a model of strategic interaction between countries in the oil market is built according to the Cournot model. This model is calibrated using data on the parameter of demand as well as supply, including the production costs of individual exporting countries according to Rystad. Twelve scenarios for taxation of the industry through the introduction of a tax on CO2 emissions in the amount of $25, $50 and $75 dollars per ton of emissions are built. It is assumed that this tax is converted into a tax on the purchase of oil in proportion to the amount of emissions that are emitted when using each barrel of oil. For each initial value of the tax rate of the tax on emissions, cases are considered when the rate remains unchanged or increases at a constant rate of 1.5% per year. Further, the same options for taxation when applied only by developed countries are also considered. The analysis in this article shows that a gradual increase in the tax rate leads to accelerated oil production. It also reveals the significant role of the spillover effect between markets in the case of the introduction of a tax only in some countries. Thus, with the introduction of a tax of $50 per ton of emissions with an annual growth of 1.5% worldwide, the peak oil price is lower by $29.6 per barrel. With the introduction of such a tax only in developed countries, the fall in oil prices at its peak compared to the baseline scenario without taxation is $18.4 per barrel in the market where a tax was introduced, and $7.8 per barrel in a market that did not impose a tax. It is also indicated that, due to the introduction of the tax, Russia has one of the largest losses in revenue among all oil exporters.
{"title":"Estimating the effect of taxing CO2 emissions on Russian oil industry","authors":"Svetlana Burmina, K. Nesterova, A. Polbin","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2022-03-05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2022-03-05","url":null,"abstract":"The impact of hypothetical restrictions on fossil fuel consumption, implemented through the introduction of a tax on CO2 emissions in the global economy and certain regions, on oil production by Russia, OPEC, and eight other major oil producers is assessed in this article. The first part of this study reviews the current literature on taxation of emissions in the global economy. Approaches to modelling such a policy and the problem of choosing the trajectory of the tax rate are analyzed, as are the main conclusions, consequences, and recommendations for the economic policy of oil exporting countries. Approaches to modelling pricing in the oil market are considered separately. The analysis shows that the premise of oligopolistic strategic interaction of oil exporters plays an important role in modelling the oil market. Subsequently, a model of strategic interaction between countries in the oil market is built according to the Cournot model. This model is calibrated using data on the parameter of demand as well as supply, including the production costs of individual exporting countries according to Rystad. Twelve scenarios for taxation of the industry through the introduction of a tax on CO2 emissions in the amount of $25, $50 and $75 dollars per ton of emissions are built. It is assumed that this tax is converted into a tax on the purchase of oil in proportion to the amount of emissions that are emitted when using each barrel of oil. For each initial value of the tax rate of the tax on emissions, cases are considered when the rate remains unchanged or increases at a constant rate of 1.5% per year. Further, the same options for taxation when applied only by developed countries are also considered. The analysis in this article shows that a gradual increase in the tax rate leads to accelerated oil production. It also reveals the significant role of the spillover effect between markets in the case of the introduction of a tax only in some countries. Thus, with the introduction of a tax of $50 per ton of emissions with an annual growth of 1.5% worldwide, the peak oil price is lower by $29.6 per barrel. With the introduction of such a tax only in developed countries, the fall in oil prices at its peak compared to the baseline scenario without taxation is $18.4 per barrel in the market where a tax was introduced, and $7.8 per barrel in a market that did not impose a tax. It is also indicated that, due to the introduction of the tax, Russia has one of the largest losses in revenue among all oil exporters.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44184324","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2022-02-05
J. Kirton, Brittaney Warren
How and why does the Group of 20 (G20) work, both alone and together with the United Nations (UN), to advance the effective global governance of climate change, especially in 2021 and beyond? G20 summit performance on climate change has increased since 2008 as measured by the six major dimensions of governance, but not by the results in net emissions reduced. G20 efforts to spur performance at subsequent UN climate summits has varied, from substantial at G20 Pittsburgh for UN Copenhagen in 2009, to limited at G20 Antalya for UN Paris in 2015, and to strong at G20 Rome for UN Glasgow in 2021. G20 efforts have been spurred by the physical climate shockactivated vulnerabilities experienced by G20 members in the lead-up to G20 and UN summits, especially from escalating extreme weather events, but have been constrained by diversionary shocks from finance in 2008–09, terrorism and migration in 2015, and COVID-19 in 2020–21. Also important were the personal commitments of, and domestic political support within, G20 and UN summit hosts, especially regarding the G20 and UN summits uniquely chaired by Group of 7 (G7) members Italy and the United Kingdom in 2021. Yet, the unprecedented combined G20-UN supply of global climate governance in 2021 fell even further behind the proliferating global demand to control climate change. To close the gap, the G20 should invite the heads of the major multilateral environmental organizations to participate in G20 summits, hold more environment ministers’ meetings each year, and mount an annual climate-focused summit at the UN General Assembly.
{"title":"Governing Climate Change at the G20 Rome and UN Glasgow Summits and Beyond","authors":"J. Kirton, Brittaney Warren","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2022-02-05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2022-02-05","url":null,"abstract":"How and why does the Group of 20 (G20) work, both alone and together with the United Nations (UN), to advance the effective global governance of climate change, especially in 2021 and beyond? G20 summit performance on climate change has increased since 2008 as measured by the six major dimensions of governance, but not by the results in net emissions reduced. G20 efforts to spur performance at subsequent UN climate summits has varied, from substantial at G20 Pittsburgh for UN Copenhagen in 2009, to limited at G20 Antalya for UN Paris in 2015, and to strong at G20 Rome for UN Glasgow in 2021. G20 efforts have been spurred by the physical climate shockactivated vulnerabilities experienced by G20 members in the lead-up to G20 and UN summits, especially from escalating extreme weather events, but have been constrained by diversionary shocks from finance in 2008–09, terrorism and migration in 2015, and COVID-19 in 2020–21. Also important were the personal commitments of, and domestic political support within, G20 and UN summit hosts, especially regarding the G20 and UN summits uniquely chaired by Group of 7 (G7) members Italy and the United Kingdom in 2021. Yet, the unprecedented combined G20-UN supply of global climate governance in 2021 fell even further behind the proliferating global demand to control climate change. To close the gap, the G20 should invite the heads of the major multilateral environmental organizations to participate in G20 summits, hold more environment ministers’ meetings each year, and mount an annual climate-focused summit at the UN General Assembly.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45166052","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2022-02-10
R. Davydov
In this article, the role of the World Customs Organization (WCO) in the implementation of the Trade Facilitation Agreement (the Agreement, TFA) is examined as an important element in the current multilateral regulation of the international trading system. Based on an article-by-article analysis of the Agreement and the WCO Kyoto Convention, as well as an assessment of the potential and actual impact of the WCO instruments on its implementation, the author finds that there are no methods, nor a system of indicators, to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of such work, or the measures taken. The key to achieving a qualitative shift in the implementation of the Agreement is a detailed diagnosis of the state of affairs in developing and least developed countries and the specification and digitalization of data on the priority areas, the amounts and timing of all types of assistance, and the support provided to them. In conclusion, the importance of adequate self-assessment by countries of their readiness to implement the Agreement, the relevance of developing the necessary capacity to implement the Agreement, and bilateral and multilateral cooperation with donors is justified. Proposals for improving the work of the WCO and the WTO to ensure timely implementation of the Agreement are formulated.
{"title":"The role of the World Customs Organization in the implementation of the World Trade Organization Agreement on trade facilitation","authors":"R. Davydov","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2022-02-10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2022-02-10","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, the role of the World Customs Organization (WCO) in the implementation of the Trade Facilitation Agreement (the Agreement, TFA) is examined as an important element in the current multilateral regulation of the international trading system. Based on an article-by-article analysis of the Agreement and the WCO Kyoto Convention, as well as an assessment of the potential and actual impact of the WCO instruments on its implementation, the author finds that there are no methods, nor a system of indicators, to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of such work, or the measures taken. The key to achieving a qualitative shift in the implementation of the Agreement is a detailed diagnosis of the state of affairs in developing and least developed countries and the specification and digitalization of data on the priority areas, the amounts and timing of all types of assistance, and the support provided to them. In conclusion, the importance of adequate self-assessment by countries of their readiness to implement the Agreement, the relevance of developing the necessary capacity to implement the Agreement, and bilateral and multilateral cooperation with donors is justified. Proposals for improving the work of the WCO and the WTO to ensure timely implementation of the Agreement are formulated.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41399912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2022-02-06
Sang-Chul Park
The concept of the smart city represents the highest level of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (FIR) along with smartphones, smart homes, and smart factories. Therefore, most governments around the world have tried to build smart cities in order to strengthen their urban competitiveness and improve the quality of life for their citizens in the digital economy. North America, the European Union (EU), and Asia have already carried out several pilot projects to build smart cities based on private-led, public-private partnerships, and public-led strategies, respectively. Smart cities can improve overall problems and resolve difficulties by 10–30% on average, which is regarded as an overall benefit of smart cities. At the same time, they can contribute to labour force disruptions, digital discrepancies, and threats to social coherence and inclusiveness, all of which result in socio-economic and political costs. The author examines the roles smart cities can play in the digital economy and in the completion of the FIR and focuses on whether smart cities can contribute to the creation of new opportunities for global economic growth as a new industry in the digital economy. Finally, the author examines the challenges of transforming digitalization and smartness in reality and highlights future perspectives for the FIR in practical terms.
{"title":"Global Megatrend of the Fourth Industrial Revolution in the Digital Economy: How to Realize It with Smart Cities as a Practical Measure?","authors":"Sang-Chul Park","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2022-02-06","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2022-02-06","url":null,"abstract":"The concept of the smart city represents the highest level of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (FIR) along with smartphones, smart homes, and smart factories. Therefore, most governments around the world have tried to build smart cities in order to strengthen their urban competitiveness and improve the quality of life for their citizens in the digital economy. North America, the European Union (EU), and Asia have already carried out several pilot projects to build smart cities based on private-led, public-private partnerships, and public-led strategies, respectively. Smart cities can improve overall problems and resolve difficulties by 10–30% on average, which is regarded as an overall benefit of smart cities. At the same time, they can contribute to labour force disruptions, digital discrepancies, and threats to social coherence and inclusiveness, all of which result in socio-economic and political costs. The author examines the roles smart cities can play in the digital economy and in the completion of the FIR and focuses on whether smart cities can contribute to the creation of new opportunities for global economic growth as a new industry in the digital economy. Finally, the author examines the challenges of transforming digitalization and smartness in reality and highlights future perspectives for the FIR in practical terms.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45493759","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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