Is the labor supply of individuals influenced by their perception of how their income taxes will reflow to them or be wasted in administrative expenditures? We examine this issue experimentally by comparing three different treatments of a real-effort game that vary in the degree of redistribution. At one extreme, the Leviathan scenario, where no tax revenue is redistributed to the taxpayers, is compared to the situation where public expenditures are direct transfer payments. In-between, we investigate a situation where tax revenue is used to finance a public good that provides neither direct nor immediate monetary benefits to the taxpayers. We ran this experiment in three different countries, Canada, France, and Germany, to test whether there may exist any country differences in attitude toward taxation and redistribution. We find that effort is significantly higher in the redistribution treatment than the Leviathan treatment. Tax revenue is the highest in the redistribution treatment, followed by the global public good and the Leviathan treatment. On average, the effort is higher in France than in Canada and Germany.
{"title":"Labor Supply, Taxation and the Use of the Tax Revenues. A Real-Effort Experiment in Canada, France, and Germany","authors":"C. Keser, David Masclet, C. Montmarquette","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3430304","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3430304","url":null,"abstract":"Is the labor supply of individuals influenced by their perception of how their income taxes will reflow to them or be wasted in administrative expenditures? We examine this issue experimentally by comparing three different treatments of a real-effort game that vary in the degree of redistribution. At one extreme, the Leviathan scenario, where no tax revenue is redistributed to the taxpayers, is compared to the situation where public expenditures are direct transfer payments. In-between, we investigate a situation where tax revenue is used to finance a public good that provides neither direct nor immediate monetary benefits to the taxpayers. We ran this experiment in three different countries, Canada, France, and Germany, to test whether there may exist any country differences in attitude toward taxation and redistribution. We find that effort is significantly higher in the redistribution treatment than the Leviathan treatment. Tax revenue is the highest in the redistribution treatment, followed by the global public good and the Leviathan treatment. On average, the effort is higher in France than in Canada and Germany.","PeriodicalId":431495,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Taxation","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127149560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How do small versus large firms respond to tax cuts? Using new narrative measures of exogenous variation in corporate marginal tax rates and a unique dataset from U.S. firms, we show that the investment response of large firms to a tax cut is almost twice the response of small firms. Furthermore, small firms finance their new investment almost entirely by debt, whereas large firms use cash and debt. Following the tax cut, the tax advantage of debt-financing falls relative to cash-financing. This substitution effect is more pronounced for unconstrained firms and contributes to the greater cash financing of large firms.
{"title":"Heterogeneous Responses to Corporate Marginal Tax Rates: Evidence from Small and Large Firms","authors":"R. Eskandari, Morteza Zamanian","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3392479","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3392479","url":null,"abstract":"How do small versus large firms respond to tax cuts? Using new narrative measures of exogenous variation in corporate marginal tax rates and a unique dataset from U.S. firms, we show that the investment response of large firms to a tax cut is almost twice the response of small firms. Furthermore, small firms finance their new investment almost entirely by debt, whereas large firms use cash and debt. Following the tax cut, the tax advantage of debt-financing falls relative to cash-financing. This substitution effect is more pronounced for unconstrained firms and contributes to the greater cash financing of large firms.","PeriodicalId":431495,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Taxation","volume":"125 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116029807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How to promote capital account liberalization while preventing financial crises is a challenging task for policymakers. This study proposes a nonlinear (progressive) capital flow tax as a solution. We first demonstrate that the collateral requirement of international borrowing can give rise to multiple equilibria and self‐fulfilling financial crises. We then show that the crisis equilibrium characterized by large exchange rate depreciation, capital flight and welfare loss can be eliminated by imposing a nonlinear (progressive) tax scheme on capital outflows with the marginal tax rate increasing with the size of individual capital outflows. The implementation of such a tax scheme in China is also discussed.
{"title":"Nonlinear Capital Flow Tax: Capital Flow Management and Financial Crisis Prevention in China","authors":"Jiandong Ju, Li Li, Guangyu Nie, K. Shi, S. Wei","doi":"10.1111/cwe.12284","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/cwe.12284","url":null,"abstract":"How to promote capital account liberalization while preventing financial crises is a challenging task for policymakers. This study proposes a nonlinear (progressive) capital flow tax as a solution. We first demonstrate that the collateral requirement of international borrowing can give rise to multiple equilibria and self‐fulfilling financial crises. We then show that the crisis equilibrium characterized by large exchange rate depreciation, capital flight and welfare loss can be eliminated by imposing a nonlinear (progressive) tax scheme on capital outflows with the marginal tax rate increasing with the size of individual capital outflows. The implementation of such a tax scheme in China is also discussed.","PeriodicalId":431495,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Taxation","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"118029919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-28DOI: 10.32591/COAS.E-CONF.03.03023R
E. Ryabova
Understanding of public finance as a sphere of social relationships by scholars is no single. It develops depending on increasing role of a state government. In Russia public finance is still understood as a set of economic relations aimed at generation and spending of public funds. This concept of public finance reflects in the current legislature. For example, according to the Russian Federation Budgeting Code, a budget is a form of generation and spending of money aimed at funding of functions and goals of a government unit. The mentioned concept of public finance reflects in the RF Tax Code, too. But in the Anglo-Saxon legal and economic doctrine public finance is understood as a sphere of social relations for resource allocation on a par with private finance. And taxes aren’t considered as payments for government services.
{"title":"Concept of Public Finance in Economic and Legal Doctrines in the Russian Federation and Other Countries","authors":"E. Ryabova","doi":"10.32591/COAS.E-CONF.03.03023R","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.32591/COAS.E-CONF.03.03023R","url":null,"abstract":"Understanding of public finance as a sphere of social relationships by scholars is no single. It develops depending on increasing role of a state government. In Russia public finance is still understood as a set of economic relations aimed at generation and spending of public funds. This concept of public finance reflects in the current legislature. For example, according to the Russian Federation Budgeting Code, a budget is a form of generation and spending of money aimed at funding of functions and goals of a government unit. The mentioned concept of public finance reflects in the RF Tax Code, too. But in the Anglo-Saxon legal and economic doctrine public finance is understood as a sphere of social relations for resource allocation on a par with private finance. And taxes aren’t considered as payments for government services.","PeriodicalId":431495,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Taxation","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129971752","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The U.S. Supreme Court ruling in South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. that states may require sellers without a physical presence to collect use taxes has generated much enthusiasm and dread among observers. We present new data on revenues from the state use tax between 2010 and 2017. We also present a unique monthly series of remote vendor use tax collections for Indiana before and after the Wayfair ruling and use the synthetic control method to derive a treatment effect of the policy change. While remote vendor registrations have tripled, we find there have been relatively modest impacts on state revenue.
{"title":"After Wayfair: What Are State Use Taxes Worth?","authors":"J. Mikesell, J. Ross","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3397342","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3397342","url":null,"abstract":"The U.S. Supreme Court ruling in South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. that states may require sellers without a physical presence to collect use taxes has generated much enthusiasm and dread among observers. We present new data on revenues from the state use tax between 2010 and 2017. We also present a unique monthly series of remote vendor use tax collections for Indiana before and after the Wayfair ruling and use the synthetic control method to derive a treatment effect of the policy change. While remote vendor registrations have tripled, we find there have been relatively modest impacts on state revenue.","PeriodicalId":431495,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Taxation","volume":"112 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122509649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Russian Abstract: В российском нефтяном секторе за последние годы был проведен ряд преобразований в системе налогообложения, которые, в частности, были нацелены на увеличение инвестиций в добычу нефти, повышение загрузки мощностей по ее переработке, увеличение глубины переработки. Тем не менее, на сегодня конфигурация системы налогообложения предполагает фактическое субсидирование экономики заниженными (относительно мировых) ценами на нефть. Причем только меньшая часть субсидии доходит до конечного потребителя, большая остается в нефтяной отрасли (около 1,7% ВВП остается в нефтепереработке) Механизм не работает, потому что он не учитывает изменения в структуре рынка. Согласно ФЗ 301 и ФЗ 305 от 03.08.2018 c 1 января 2019 г. вступили в силу изменения, призванные закончить формирование налоговой системы в нефтяной отрасли, устраняющей субсидирование неэффективности отечественной нефтепереработки (завершающий налоговый маневр). Интерес представляет: сравнение двух вариантов расчета итогового эффекта от проведения налогового маневра в нефтяной отрасли, где первый, не учитывает программы модернизации нефтеперерабатывающих заводов и распределение затрат вертикально-интегрированных нефтяных компаний по всей их производственно-сбытовой цепочке, а второй – учитывает данные характеристики. Предполагается, что второй вариант более эффективен с точки зрения соотношения выгод и издержек государства. В качестве основы была выбрана многопериодная, многопродуктовая модель для оптимизации цепочки создания стоимости в нефтяной промышленности. N. Moradi Nasab et al (2016). Она был упрощен из-за ограничения общедоступных данных: рассматривается только трубопроводный транспорт; нефтеперерабатывающие заводы производят только светлое топливо и мазут; нет возможности хранить резервы и наращивать мощности. В работе получены результаты расчетов оптимизационной задачи для производственно-сбытовой цепочки компании Лукойл, которые показали, что учет модернизации производственных мощностей и прибыли (издержек), генерируемых компанией на прошлых (последующих) этапах производства приводит к более эффективным с точки зрения государственного бюджета расходам на субсидирование нефтеперерабатывающей отрасли. Рассчитываемая субсидия, не учитывающая изменение производственной корзины и оптимизацию всей цепочки производства, может быть уменьшена примерно на 15% по сравнению с расчетами, включающими данные улучшения. Апробированный алгоритм расчета необходимой субсидии на компании Лукойла может быть применен на всю отрасль при наличие более детализированных данных по другим компаниям, что позволит более эффективно адаптировать параметры налоговой системы к изменяющейся структуре рынка, не создавая условий для субсидирования неэффективности.
English Abstract: Over the past few years, a number of changes in the tax system have been carried out in the Russian oil sector. Its main goal was to increase investment in oil production, increase the utilization of refining c
{"title":"Разработка численных методов оценки последствий реформирования нефтегазового сектора (Development of Numerical Methods for Assessing the Impact of the Reform of the Oil and Gas Sector)","authors":"A. Kaukin, E. Miller","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3392428","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3392428","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Russian Abstract:</b> В российском нефтяном секторе за последние годы был проведен ряд преобразований в системе налогообложения, которые, в частности, были нацелены на увеличение инвестиций в добычу нефти, повышение загрузки мощностей по ее переработке, увеличение глубины переработки. Тем не менее, на сегодня конфигурация системы налогообложения предполагает фактическое субсидирование экономики заниженными (относительно мировых) ценами на нефть. Причем только меньшая часть субсидии доходит до конечного потребителя, большая остается в нефтяной отрасли (около 1,7% ВВП остается в нефтепереработке) Механизм не работает, потому что он не учитывает изменения в структуре рынка. Согласно ФЗ 301 и ФЗ 305 от 03.08.2018 c 1 января 2019 г. вступили в силу изменения, призванные закончить формирование налоговой системы в нефтяной отрасли, устраняющей субсидирование неэффективности отечественной нефтепереработки (завершающий налоговый маневр). Интерес представляет: сравнение двух вариантов расчета итогового эффекта от проведения налогового маневра в нефтяной отрасли, где первый, не учитывает программы модернизации нефтеперерабатывающих заводов и распределение затрат вертикально-интегрированных нефтяных компаний по всей их производственно-сбытовой цепочке, а второй – учитывает данные характеристики. Предполагается, что второй вариант более эффективен с точки зрения соотношения выгод и издержек государства. В качестве основы была выбрана многопериодная, многопродуктовая модель для оптимизации цепочки создания стоимости в нефтяной промышленности. N. Moradi Nasab et al (2016). Она был упрощен из-за ограничения общедоступных данных: рассматривается только трубопроводный транспорт; нефтеперерабатывающие заводы производят только светлое топливо и мазут; нет возможности хранить резервы и наращивать мощности. В работе получены результаты расчетов оптимизационной задачи для производственно-сбытовой цепочки компании Лукойл, которые показали, что учет модернизации производственных мощностей и прибыли (издержек), генерируемых компанией на прошлых (последующих) этапах производства приводит к более эффективным с точки зрения государственного бюджета расходам на субсидирование нефтеперерабатывающей отрасли. Рассчитываемая субсидия, не учитывающая изменение производственной корзины и оптимизацию всей цепочки производства, может быть уменьшена примерно на 15% по сравнению с расчетами, включающими данные улучшения. Апробированный алгоритм расчета необходимой субсидии на компании Лукойла может быть применен на всю отрасль при наличие более детализированных данных по другим компаниям, что позволит более эффективно адаптировать параметры налоговой системы к изменяющейся структуре рынка, не создавая условий для субсидирования неэффективности.<br><br><b>English Abstract:</b> Over the past few years, a number of changes in the tax system have been carried out in the Russian oil sector. Its main goal was to increase investment in oil production, increase the utilization of refining c","PeriodicalId":431495,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Taxation","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132159363","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A free market economy is characterized by an unequal distribution of income, wealth, and opportunities, to the extent that a considerable part of the population does not enjoy the wellbeing which an affluent society can offer. Recent studies have shown that excessive inequality is bad not only for moral reasons but for economic reasons as well. According to the International Monetary Fund, excessive inequality can erode social cohesion, cause political polarization, and lower economic growth due to the shrinking spending power of consumers. According to some estimations, rising inequality in the United States from 1990 to 2010 cut about five percent off the GDP per capita. Economists, such as Anthony Atkinson and Thomas Piketty, have regarded the growing inequality as one of the most serious economic problems of the modern world. In 2015, half of world's wealth was in hands of 1% of the population, and by 2030 the richest 1% may own two-thirds of the wealth. One reason for the increasing inequality is the accumulation of inherited wealth, which causes the economy to be dominated by a few rich families. Another reason is the very high salaries of some sectors, such as top executives of large firms. A third reason is the ability of the rich to pay very low tax rates on their real incomes. Steps to reduce inequality include conventional measures, such as high marginal tax rates on high incomes, a progressive property tax and taxes on inheritance, as well as more radical measures, such as nationalization and an upper limit on wages. Steps to reduce the gap from the lower end include strengthening work unions, improving public education and health systems, and legislating a minimum wage (or a universal basic income) that allows decent living. However, there is no magic formula which fits all. Each country should choose the appropriate combination of steps which fit its economy at a given time, and find the delicate balance between economic equity and free market tenets.
{"title":"Inequality in Prosperous Societies: Economic and Moral Aspects","authors":"Y. Kirsh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3388483","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3388483","url":null,"abstract":"A free market economy is characterized by an unequal distribution of income, wealth, and opportunities, to the extent that a considerable part of the population does not enjoy the wellbeing which an affluent society can offer. Recent studies have shown that excessive inequality is bad not only for moral reasons but for economic reasons as well. According to the International Monetary Fund, excessive inequality can erode social cohesion, cause political polarization, and lower economic growth due to the shrinking spending power of consumers. According to some estimations, rising inequality in the United States from 1990 to 2010 cut about five percent off the GDP per capita. Economists, such as Anthony Atkinson and Thomas Piketty, have regarded the growing inequality as one of the most serious economic problems of the modern world. In 2015, half of world's wealth was in hands of 1% of the population, and by 2030 the richest 1% may own two-thirds of the wealth. One reason for the increasing inequality is the accumulation of inherited wealth, which causes the economy to be dominated by a few rich families. Another reason is the very high salaries of some sectors, such as top executives of large firms. A third reason is the ability of the rich to pay very low tax rates on their real incomes. Steps to reduce inequality include conventional measures, such as high marginal tax rates on high incomes, a progressive property tax and taxes on inheritance, as well as more radical measures, such as nationalization and an upper limit on wages. Steps to reduce the gap from the lower end include strengthening work unions, improving public education and health systems, and legislating a minimum wage (or a universal basic income) that allows decent living. However, there is no magic formula which fits all. Each country should choose the appropriate combination of steps which fit its economy at a given time, and find the delicate balance between economic equity and free market tenets.","PeriodicalId":431495,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Taxation","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133124866","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we investigate whether partial tax coordination is beneficial to countries within and outside a tax union, in which countries are supposed to compete in taxes and infrastructure. Our results demonstrate that, a subgroup of countries agreeing on a common tax rate, can harm both member and nonmember states. This is in contrast to the classical findings that partial tax harmonization is Pareto improving. When a minimum tax rate is imposed within a tax union, we demonstrate that it does not necessarily improve the welfare of the member countries. Moreover, both the high tax and low tax countries can be worse off. This is at odds with a classical result that a high tax country benefits from the imposition of a lower tax bound.
{"title":"Who Benefits from Partial Tax Coordination?","authors":"Yutao Han","doi":"10.1111/twec.12762","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.12762","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we investigate whether partial tax coordination is beneficial to countries within and outside a tax union, in which countries are supposed to compete in taxes and infrastructure. Our results demonstrate that, a subgroup of countries agreeing on a common tax rate, can harm both member and nonmember states. This is in contrast to the classical findings that partial tax harmonization is Pareto improving. When a minimum tax rate is imposed within a tax union, we demonstrate that it does not necessarily improve the welfare of the member countries. Moreover, both the high tax and low tax countries can be worse off. This is at odds with a classical result that a high tax country benefits from the imposition of a lower tax bound.","PeriodicalId":431495,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Taxation","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123243686","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We exploit the abundance of tax changes in the airline industry after the DOT's full-disclosure rule. We determine the "effective" tax rate and analyze how passengers reacted to the tax changes. Hausman-type instruments are used to address the problems arising from endogenously determined prices. We show that passengers react more strongly to taxes than to price changes. In addition, this response is stronger if the airport (of origin) is close to a nearby airport with more connections available. This over-optimization parameter decreases as the passenger level increases. Significant differentials in the parameter are found for different carrier types. Hub status also appears to be a factor in shaping salience, particularly at the origin airport. Neither market structures nor competition seem to generate significant differentials. We extend the literature by examining the salience of air travel taxes and providing potential explanations for sources of over-optimization.
{"title":"Salient or Not? The U.S. Air Travel Taxes","authors":"Shih-Hsien Chuang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3349767","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3349767","url":null,"abstract":"We exploit the abundance of tax changes in the airline industry after the DOT's full-disclosure rule. We determine the \"effective\" tax rate and analyze how passengers reacted to the tax changes. Hausman-type instruments are used to address the problems arising from endogenously determined prices. We show that passengers react more strongly to taxes than to price changes. In addition, this response is stronger if the airport (of origin) is close to a nearby airport with more connections available. This over-optimization parameter decreases as the passenger level increases. Significant differentials in the parameter are found for different carrier types. Hub status also appears to be a factor in shaping salience, particularly at the origin airport. Neither market structures nor competition seem to generate significant differentials. We extend the literature by examining the salience of air travel taxes and providing potential explanations for sources of over-optimization.","PeriodicalId":431495,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Taxation","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122495257","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Duty-Free Zero Incentive Approach (DFZI) for measuring errors in trade discrepancies draws from the assumption that in the absence of taxes, there should be no incentive to evade taxes. Assuming there were zero taxes on goods, that is, duty-free, then there would be zero-incentive to evade (hence the term “duty-free zero incentive”) such that any discrepancy in trade data would solely be on account of errors in measurement only. This approach is useful for ascribing the errors arising from missing imports and is very useful in the estimation of smuggling.
{"title":"A New Approach to Measurement of Errors from Bilateral Trade Discrepancies: The Duty-free Zero Incentive Approach (DFZI)","authors":"Michael Masiya","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3710638","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3710638","url":null,"abstract":"The Duty-Free Zero Incentive Approach (DFZI) for measuring errors in trade discrepancies draws from the assumption that in the absence of taxes, there should be no incentive to evade taxes. Assuming there were zero taxes on goods, that is, duty-free, then there would be zero-incentive to evade (hence the term “duty-free zero incentive”) such that any discrepancy in trade data would solely be on account of errors in measurement only. This approach is useful for ascribing the errors arising from missing imports and is very useful in the estimation of smuggling.","PeriodicalId":431495,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Taxation","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121388680","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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