This article uses evolutionary game theory to reveal the interpersonal and geographic characteristics of a society that make it vulnerable to a conquest from within by terrorist organizations and genocide architects. Under conditions identified in the space-less version of the model, entrepreneurs of violence can create the social metamorphosis of a peaceful people group into one that supports or does not resist violence against an out-group. The model is extended into geographic space by analyzing interactions among peaceful and aggressive phenotypes in Moore and von Neumann neighborhoods. The model also reveals policy interventions in which the social evolution of aggression never gets started or comes to a halt if already underway.
{"title":"The Social Evolution of Terror and Genocide across Time and Geographic Space: Perspectives from Evolutionary Game Theory","authors":"Charles H. Anderton","doi":"10.15355/EPSJ.10.2.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15355/EPSJ.10.2.5","url":null,"abstract":"This article uses evolutionary game theory to reveal the interpersonal and geographic characteristics of a society that make it vulnerable to a conquest from within by terrorist organizations and genocide architects. Under conditions identified in the space-less version of the model, entrepreneurs of violence can create the social metamorphosis of a peaceful people group into one that supports or does not resist violence against an out-group. The model is extended into geographic space by analyzing interactions among peaceful and aggressive phenotypes in Moore and von Neumann neighborhoods. The model also reveals policy interventions in which the social evolution of aggression never gets started or comes to a halt if already underway.","PeriodicalId":43334,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Peace and Security Journal","volume":"10 1","pages":"5-20"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2015-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66908353","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article explores warring groups’ intentional targeting behavior against civilians, a strictly prohibited war strategy by international norms. Using dynamic panel regressions run on a comprehensive dataset of contemporary warfare which covers 22 years (1989-2010), I find that warring actors, both sovereign states and formally organized armed groups, behave systematically in terms of civilian targeting when they are involved in prolonged armed conflict (15-22 years). Warring actors’ lethal behavior against civilians tends to be intensified if targeting is repeated in prolonged armed conflict although this hysteresis effect persists only for one year. It is hypothesized that the mounting war cost of prolonged conflict inclines warring groups toward the presumably cheaper targeting of noncombatant civilians rather than battling combatant military or other armed personnel.
{"title":"Hysteresis of targeting civilians in armed conflicts","authors":"Uih Ran Lee","doi":"10.15355/EPSJ.10.2.31","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15355/EPSJ.10.2.31","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores warring groups’ intentional targeting behavior against civilians, a strictly prohibited war strategy by international norms. Using dynamic panel regressions run on a comprehensive dataset of contemporary warfare which covers 22 years (1989-2010), I find that warring actors, both sovereign states and formally organized armed groups, behave systematically in terms of civilian targeting when they are involved in prolonged armed conflict (15-22 years). Warring actors’ lethal behavior against civilians tends to be intensified if targeting is repeated in prolonged armed conflict although this hysteresis effect persists only for one year. It is hypothesized that the mounting war cost of prolonged conflict inclines warring groups toward the presumably cheaper targeting of noncombatant civilians rather than battling combatant military or other armed personnel.","PeriodicalId":43334,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Peace and Security Journal","volume":"10 1","pages":"31-40"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2015-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66908299","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
J. Koehler, Kristóf Gosztonyi, Basir Feda, K. Child
We introduce a mixed-methods approach to assess the impact of a complex development program on stability and present a selection of relevant results on stabilization dynamics and possible program-related impacts. The program is implemented by an international nongovernmental organization and combines capacity building with infrastructure development at the district level in North Afghanistan. We develop a working definition of stability and define context-relevant stabilization indicators. We then analyze how various stabilization indicators relate to each other and observe how they change over time. Finally, we analyze how proxies for program activity relate to the stabilization dynamics observed. At this stage, the data analysis is exploratory, and the results are illustrative rather than definite in regard to the success or failure of the stabilization program.
{"title":"Toward mixed-methods impact evaluation: Making stabilization assessments work for development cooperation","authors":"J. Koehler, Kristóf Gosztonyi, Basir Feda, K. Child","doi":"10.15355/EPSJ.10.2.61","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15355/EPSJ.10.2.61","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce a mixed-methods approach to assess the impact of a complex development program on stability and present a selection of relevant results on stabilization dynamics and possible program-related impacts. The program is implemented by an international nongovernmental organization and combines capacity building with infrastructure development at the district level in North Afghanistan. We develop a working definition of stability and define context-relevant stabilization indicators. We then analyze how various stabilization indicators relate to each other and observe how they change over time. Finally, we analyze how proxies for program activity relate to the stabilization dynamics observed. At this stage, the data analysis is exploratory, and the results are illustrative rather than definite in regard to the success or failure of the stabilization program.","PeriodicalId":43334,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Peace and Security Journal","volume":"10 1","pages":"61-74"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2015-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66907932","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Using a newer and expanded dataset as well as a survey of practitioner perceptions, this article adds to a recent body of literature on reconstruction and violence in Afghanistan. Data are taken from military-led development projects by way of the United States military’s Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) and, to measure violence, from U.S. military Significant Activities (SIGACTs) reports. The results suggest that, at great cost, large-budget CERP efforts (those in excess of USD50,000 per project) may be associated with an increase in violence and thus counter-productive to military stability goals. In contrast, small projects (below USD50,000), which comprise a smaller proportion of total CERP allocations, are associated in statistically significant ways with reductions in violence. To explore why CERP projects may have these effects, the article also examines administrative modalities for CERP spending. The results suggest that timely, flexible expenditure of CERP funds are most effective at reducing violence.
{"title":"Honing the proper edge: CERP and the two-sided potential of military-led development in Afghanistan","authors":"G. Adams","doi":"10.15355/EPSJ.10.2.53","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15355/EPSJ.10.2.53","url":null,"abstract":"Using a newer and expanded dataset as well as a survey of practitioner perceptions, this article adds to a recent body of literature on reconstruction and violence in Afghanistan. Data are taken from military-led development projects by way of the United States military’s Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) and, to measure violence, from U.S. military Significant Activities (SIGACTs) reports. The results suggest that, at great cost, large-budget CERP efforts (those in excess of USD50,000 per project) may be associated with an increase in violence and thus counter-productive to military stability goals. In contrast, small projects (below USD50,000), which comprise a smaller proportion of total CERP allocations, are associated in statistically significant ways with reductions in violence. To explore why CERP projects may have these effects, the article also examines administrative modalities for CERP spending. The results suggest that timely, flexible expenditure of CERP funds are most effective at reducing violence.","PeriodicalId":43334,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Peace and Security Journal","volume":"10 1","pages":"53-60"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2015-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66908361","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This note introduces a four-article symposium on stability and reconstruction across Afghanistan. The contributors are experienced practitioners and/or field researchers drawn from a spectrum of the social sciences. Each of them has established a physical presence in Afghanistan for a significant period of time. Consequently, this symposium elucidates some critical aspects of the conflict and development phenomena which have thus far been overlooked.
{"title":"On the ground: Field research from Afghanistan","authors":"T. Child","doi":"10.15355/EPSJ.10.2.41","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15355/EPSJ.10.2.41","url":null,"abstract":"This note introduces a four-article symposium on stability and reconstruction across Afghanistan. The contributors are experienced practitioners and/or field researchers drawn from a spectrum of the social sciences. Each of them has established a physical presence in Afghanistan for a significant period of time. Consequently, this symposium elucidates some critical aspects of the conflict and development phenomena which have thus far been overlooked.","PeriodicalId":43334,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Peace and Security Journal","volume":"10 1","pages":"41-42"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2015-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66908314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This is an online supplement for Jerry Hinois. “Nonparasitic warlords and geographic distance.” Economics of Peace and Security Journal. Vol. 10, No. 1 (2015). doi:10.15355/epsj.10.1.5
{"title":"Online supplement: Nonparasitic warlords and geographic distance","authors":"Jerry Hionis","doi":"10.15355/EPSJ.10.1.5S","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15355/EPSJ.10.1.5S","url":null,"abstract":"This is an online supplement for Jerry Hinois. “Nonparasitic warlords and geographic distance.” Economics of Peace and Security Journal. Vol. 10, No. 1 (2015). doi:10.15355/epsj.10.1.5","PeriodicalId":43334,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Peace and Security Journal","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2015-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66908227","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The explicit consideration of geography in the conflict theory literature is still relatively rare. In this article, two warlords are modeled as being located at opposing ends of a hypothetical line. The model includes variables denoting distance and difficulty of terrain. Each warlord allocates resources to the extraction of natural resources, to the production of goods and services (hence, nonparasitic), and to conflict with the opposing warlord. Two forms of a contest success function, a primary tool in the literature, are used to show that the warlord closer to the point of conflict will invest less into the hiring of warriors and more into the production of goods and services, yet will win a larger proportion of total goods and services produced within the economy.
{"title":"Nonparasitic warlords and geographic distance","authors":"Jerry Hionis","doi":"10.15355/epsj.10.1.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15355/epsj.10.1.5","url":null,"abstract":"The explicit consideration of geography in the conflict theory literature is still relatively rare. In this article, two warlords are modeled as being located at opposing ends of a hypothetical line. The model includes variables denoting distance and difficulty of terrain. Each warlord allocates resources to the extraction of natural resources, to the production of goods and services (hence, nonparasitic), and to conflict with the opposing warlord. Two forms of a contest success function, a primary tool in the literature, are used to show that the warlord closer to the point of conflict will invest less into the hiring of warriors and more into the production of goods and services, yet will win a larger proportion of total goods and services produced within the economy.","PeriodicalId":43334,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Peace and Security Journal","volume":"10 1","pages":"5-12"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2015-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66908180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Topher L. McDougal, Talia Hagerty, Lisa Inks, Claire-Lorentz Ugo-Ike, C. Dowd, S. Conroy, Daniel Ogabiela
This study estimates the relationship between violent conflict and household income in four states of Nigeria’s Middle Belt region (Benue, Kaduna, Nasarawa, and Plateau) where farmers and pastoralists routinely clash over access to farmland, grazing areas, stock routes, and water points for animals and households. Although relatively low in intensity, this form of violence is widespread, persistent, and arguably increasing in its incidence. We obtained data on income and household-level violence exposure from an original household survey administered in September 2014. Employing a negative binomial instrumental variables model, we find an inverse relation between violence and household incomes. Incomes could be increased by between 64 to 210 percent of current levels if violence related to farmer-pastoralist conflict in the four study states were reduced to near-zero. Cumulatively, we find that forgone income represents 10.2 percent of the combined official state domestic product in the study area. This is high when compared to the costs of conflict measured in other studies, even as our study takes account only of microeconomic costs. After incorporating an estimate of the size of the informal economy, the microeconomic cost of farmer-pastoralist conflict to the total economy is approximately 2.9 percent.
{"title":"The Effect of Farmer-Pastoralist Violence on Income: New Survey Evidence from Nigeria’s Middle Belt States","authors":"Topher L. McDougal, Talia Hagerty, Lisa Inks, Claire-Lorentz Ugo-Ike, C. Dowd, S. Conroy, Daniel Ogabiela","doi":"10.15355/EPSJ.10.1.54","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15355/EPSJ.10.1.54","url":null,"abstract":"This study estimates the relationship between violent conflict and household income in four states of Nigeria’s Middle Belt region (Benue, Kaduna, Nasarawa, and Plateau) where farmers and pastoralists routinely clash over access to farmland, grazing areas, stock routes, and water points for animals and households. Although relatively low in intensity, this form of violence is widespread, persistent, and arguably increasing in its incidence. We obtained data on income and household-level violence exposure from an original household survey administered in September 2014. Employing a negative binomial instrumental variables model, we find an inverse relation between violence and household incomes. Incomes could be increased by between 64 to 210 percent of current levels if violence related to farmer-pastoralist conflict in the four study states were reduced to near-zero. Cumulatively, we find that forgone income represents 10.2 percent of the combined official state domestic product in the study area. This is high when compared to the costs of conflict measured in other studies, even as our study takes account only of microeconomic costs. After incorporating an estimate of the size of the informal economy, the microeconomic cost of farmer-pastoralist conflict to the total economy is approximately 2.9 percent.","PeriodicalId":43334,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Peace and Security Journal","volume":"10 1","pages":"54-65"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2015-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66908196","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Since the abduction in 2014 of 276 high school girls in a remote village, Chibok, in Borno state, Nigeria, the activities of the proscribed group Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad, popularly known as Boko Haram, has received elevated domestic and international attention, as has the Nigerian government’s strategy to deal with the group. Criticisms of the government’s ineffective handling of the situation have been made by a number of foreign governments, and several of them have offered military, intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement assistance to Nigeria. From a political economy perspective, this article presents a critical reading and analysis of the local and international response to Boko Haram. It finds that an interest in the “securitization” of development prevails over a genuine peace and security agenda.
{"title":"The political economy of securitization: The case of Boko Haram, Nigeria","authors":"M. Nwankpa","doi":"10.15355/EPSJ.10.1.32","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15355/EPSJ.10.1.32","url":null,"abstract":"Since the abduction in 2014 of 276 high school girls in a remote village, Chibok, in Borno state, Nigeria, the activities of the proscribed group Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad, popularly known as Boko Haram, has received elevated domestic and international attention, as has the Nigerian government’s strategy to deal with the group. Criticisms of the government’s ineffective handling of the situation have been made by a number of foreign governments, and several of them have offered military, intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement assistance to Nigeria. From a political economy perspective, this article presents a critical reading and analysis of the local and international response to Boko Haram. It finds that an interest in the “securitization” of development prevails over a genuine peace and security agenda.","PeriodicalId":43334,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Peace and Security Journal","volume":"10 1","pages":"32-39"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2015-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66907442","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article examines the wage impact of Israel’s constraints on economic activities and infrastructure development in the West Bank’s Area C. We provide evidence to show that Area C workers suffer a wage penalty of about 8 percent relative to workers in Areas A and B. The results also show that when controlling for worker characteristics, the magnitude of the Area C wage differential drops by about half. We then extend our analysis to compare average wages between Area C workers and other rural workers and show that the wage difference is statistically insignificant. This indicates that the Area C wage differential we observe can be attributed primarily to a rural environment effect rather than to Israeli economic restrictions placed on Area C per se. This result indicates that the effect of Israeli restrictions on Area C wages is neutralized. We show that negative labor supply shocks (commuting) serve as a potential transmission mechanism. Specifically, we show that Area C residents are more likely to commute than their peers in other rural areas. [JEL codes: R11, J30, J61, J01]
{"title":"Wage differentials and economic restrictions: Evidence from the Occupied Palestinian Territories","authors":"Belal N. Fallah, Yousef Daoud","doi":"10.15355/EPSJ.10.1.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15355/EPSJ.10.1.13","url":null,"abstract":"The article examines the wage impact of Israel’s constraints on economic activities and infrastructure development in the West Bank’s Area C. We provide evidence to show that Area C workers suffer a wage penalty of about 8 percent relative to workers in Areas A and B. The results also show that when controlling for worker characteristics, the magnitude of the Area C wage differential drops by about half. We then extend our analysis to compare average wages between Area C workers and other rural workers and show that the wage difference is statistically insignificant. This indicates that the Area C wage differential we observe can be attributed primarily to a rural environment effect rather than to Israeli economic restrictions placed on Area C per se. This result indicates that the effect of Israeli restrictions on Area C wages is neutralized. We show that negative labor supply shocks (commuting) serve as a potential transmission mechanism. Specifically, we show that Area C residents are more likely to commute than their peers in other rural areas. [JEL codes: R11, J30, J61, J01]","PeriodicalId":43334,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Peace and Security Journal","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2015-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66907421","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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