Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.26913/avant.2020.01.02
Maja Białek
The aim of my paper is to define three key problems concerning depression and to show how phenomenological and 4E theories of depression can be used to help us with them. I employ the Sellarsian concept of a synoptic view—a good synoptic view of depression should bring together the manifest image (“folk psychiatry”) and the scientific image. The first problem is that currently there exist serious gaps in both images—our mainstream conceptions of depression are lacking and their reception by the general public is oversimplified and overoptimistic. The second problem is that the explanatory needs of the general public regarding depression could not ever be satisfied by the current scientific image— as I show using the case-study of the enthusiastic reception of Mira Marcinów’s 2017 book presenting the often outlandish 19th century Polish theories of depression. It turns out that certain outdated but vivid terms and ideas concerning melancholy actually may be more helpful in many ways than what current biomedical psychiatry has to offer. The third problem is how to rectify the first problem given the existence of the second problem—that is, how to make space for a less biomedical and reductionist approach to depression without risking an overly skeptical, anti-scientific turn within folk-psychiatry. I conclude that although phenomenological and embodied theories could not ever directly influence the manifest image of depression, they need to be included within the scientific image—and then they could become the perfect basis for a truly synoptic view.
{"title":"Depression, Folk Psychiatry and the Task for 4E Philosophy of Psychiatry","authors":"Maja Białek","doi":"10.26913/avant.2020.01.02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26913/avant.2020.01.02","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of my paper is to define three key problems concerning depression and to show how phenomenological and 4E theories of depression can be used to help us with them. I employ the Sellarsian concept of a synoptic view—a good synoptic view of depression should bring together the manifest image (“folk psychiatry”) and the scientific image. The first problem is that currently there exist serious gaps in both images—our mainstream conceptions of depression are lacking and their reception by the general public is oversimplified and overoptimistic. The second problem is that the explanatory needs of the general public regarding depression could not ever be satisfied by the current scientific image— as I show using the case-study of the enthusiastic reception of Mira Marcinów’s 2017 book presenting the often outlandish 19th century Polish theories of depression. It turns out that certain outdated but vivid terms and ideas concerning melancholy actually may be more helpful in many ways than what current biomedical psychiatry has to offer. The third problem is how to rectify the first problem given the existence of the second problem—that is, how to make space for a less biomedical and reductionist approach to depression without risking an overly skeptical, anti-scientific turn within folk-psychiatry. I conclude that although phenomenological and embodied theories could not ever directly influence the manifest image of depression, they need to be included within the scientific image—and then they could become the perfect basis for a truly synoptic view.","PeriodicalId":43453,"journal":{"name":"Avant","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87464302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.26913/avant.2020.02.06
Matthew E. Gladden
In this text it is argued that immersion in virtual reality (VR) with the aid of contemporary VR equipment may offer access to novel types of virtual worlds that differ qualitatively from the “real” world and from other types of fictional worlds. The text begins by (a) distinguishing between VR systems, virtual environments, and virtual worlds; (b) showing how the virtual worlds facilitated by VR systems resemble and differ from the “virtual worlds” created in one’s mind when, for example, reading a novel or watching a film; and (c) identifying necessary and optional elements of a VR-facilitated virtual world. Employing a phenomenological approach that draws on the thought of Ingarden and Norberg-Schulz, it is shown that a visitor to a VR-facilitated virtual world can (and frequently does) shift his or her conscious attention along three different “axes”. First, one’s attention can move “horizontally” between the media that disclose the virtual world through different senses. Second, one’s attention can shift “vertically” between the virtual world’s different ontological strata, including its layers of myriad atomic stimuli; distinguishable elements that possess spatiotemporal extension; assemblages of elements that have a context and relations but lack individual meaning; glimpses that build up a lattice of meaning and contribute to one’s knowledge of the world; and the virtual world envisioned as a coherent mentally concretized whole. Third, one’s attention can shift “interspatially” between the many different overlapping constituent spaces of the virtual world, including its perceptual, concrete, natural, built, identifiable, technological, emotional, social, economic, political, cultural, ecological, and possibility spaces. This triaxial phenomenological framework can shed new light on the rich and diverse ways in which VR-facilitated virtual worlds manifest themselves as emergent wholes constituted within human consciousness; also, it suggests approaches by which visitors might more proactively mentally explore and come to inhabit such virtual worlds.
{"title":"The Self-Revelation and Cognition of VR-Facilitated Virtual Worlds: Towards a Phenomenology of Virtual Habitation","authors":"Matthew E. Gladden","doi":"10.26913/avant.2020.02.06","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26913/avant.2020.02.06","url":null,"abstract":"In this text it is argued that immersion in virtual reality (VR) with the aid of contemporary VR equipment may offer access to novel types of virtual worlds that differ qualitatively from the “real” world and from other types of fictional worlds. The text begins by (a) distinguishing between VR systems, virtual environments, and virtual worlds; (b) showing how the virtual worlds facilitated by VR systems resemble and differ from the “virtual worlds” created in one’s mind when, for example, reading a novel or watching a film; and (c) identifying necessary and optional elements of a VR-facilitated virtual world. Employing a phenomenological approach that draws on the thought of Ingarden and Norberg-Schulz, it is shown that a visitor to a VR-facilitated virtual world can (and frequently does) shift his or her conscious attention along three different “axes”. First, one’s attention can move “horizontally” between the media that disclose the virtual world through different senses. Second, one’s attention can shift “vertically” between the virtual world’s different ontological strata, including its layers of myriad atomic stimuli; distinguishable elements that possess spatiotemporal extension; assemblages of elements that have a context and relations but lack individual meaning; glimpses that build up a lattice of meaning and contribute to one’s knowledge of the world; and the virtual world envisioned as a coherent mentally concretized whole. Third, one’s attention can shift “interspatially” between the many different overlapping constituent spaces of the virtual world, including its perceptual, concrete, natural, built, identifiable, technological, emotional, social, economic, political, cultural, ecological, and possibility spaces. This triaxial phenomenological framework can shed new light on the rich and diverse ways in which VR-facilitated virtual worlds manifest themselves as emergent wholes constituted within human consciousness; also, it suggests approaches by which visitors might more proactively mentally explore and come to inhabit such virtual worlds.","PeriodicalId":43453,"journal":{"name":"Avant","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87338579","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.26913/avant.2020.03.17
B. Mann, Monika Rogowska-Stangret
Czy fenomenologia feministyczna jest po prostu fenomenologicznym badaniem konkretnego fenomenu – „kobiety”, czy też badaniem prowadzonym ze szczególnego punktu widzenia kobiety? Innymi słowy, czy stanowi ona rodzaj fenomenologii stosowanej, gdzie metodę i praktykę fenomenologiczną – uważane za kompletne i właściwe – stosuje nowy podmiot, czy jest ona aplikowana do nowego przedmiotu? Stąd upłciowione ucieleśnienie może zostać ukazane jako źródło znaczeń oraz wartości, których wcześniej brakowało fenomenologicznemu opisowi – takie rozpoznanie daje nam już ustanowiona wersja praktyki fenomenologicznej. Feministyczne fenomenolożki podejmujące ten sposób myślenia o tym, czym jest feministyczna fenomenologia, znajdą wszystkie niezbędne dla uprawiania feministycznej fenomenologii zasoby u Edmunda Husserla, Emmanuela Lévinasa czy Maurice’a MerleauPonty’ego, które tylko czekają, by ich użyć do badania fenomenu kobiety. Czy jednak w tym procesie ów fenomen nie ucierpi?
{"title":"Specyfika feministycznej fenomenologii. Przypadek wstydu","authors":"B. Mann, Monika Rogowska-Stangret","doi":"10.26913/avant.2020.03.17","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26913/avant.2020.03.17","url":null,"abstract":"Czy fenomenologia feministyczna jest po prostu fenomenologicznym badaniem konkretnego fenomenu – „kobiety”, czy też badaniem prowadzonym ze szczególnego punktu widzenia kobiety? Innymi słowy, czy stanowi ona rodzaj fenomenologii stosowanej, gdzie metodę i praktykę fenomenologiczną – uważane za kompletne i właściwe – stosuje nowy podmiot, czy jest ona aplikowana do nowego przedmiotu? Stąd upłciowione ucieleśnienie może zostać ukazane jako źródło znaczeń oraz wartości, których wcześniej brakowało fenomenologicznemu opisowi – takie rozpoznanie daje nam już ustanowiona wersja praktyki fenomenologicznej. Feministyczne fenomenolożki podejmujące ten sposób myślenia o tym, czym jest feministyczna fenomenologia, znajdą wszystkie niezbędne dla uprawiania feministycznej fenomenologii zasoby u Edmunda Husserla, Emmanuela Lévinasa czy Maurice’a MerleauPonty’ego, które tylko czekają, by ich użyć do badania fenomenu kobiety. Czy jednak w tym procesie ów fenomen nie ucierpi?","PeriodicalId":43453,"journal":{"name":"Avant","volume":"72 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84352647","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.26913/avant.2020.02.02
Zsuzsanna Kondor
In the present paper, I will investigate how consciousness studies and theories of social cognition relate to each other, and suggest that despite the results of scientific research, both social cognition and consciousness can be better understood within a wider framework, i.e., not exclusively in terms of intra-cranial processes. I will attempt to illuminate the advantages of embracing embodied cognition in contrast with focusing exclusively on neural and/or representational mechanisms when consciousness and cognition are in question. In my argumentation, I will first show the divergence of consciousnessand cognitive-theories on the one hand, and delineate attempts to reconcile these two branches of investigation, on the other hand. Then I will relate the model of cognitive phylogeny, as regards social cognition, and the models of the evolution of consciousness as it emerged in scientific literature. In conclusion, I will attempt to expose the advantages of widening the horizon of investigation towards embodied and enacted cognition.
{"title":"Neural-based vs. Enactive Approaches to Consciousness and Social Cognition","authors":"Zsuzsanna Kondor","doi":"10.26913/avant.2020.02.02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26913/avant.2020.02.02","url":null,"abstract":"In the present paper, I will investigate how consciousness studies and theories of social cognition relate to each other, and suggest that despite the results of scientific research, both social cognition and consciousness can be better understood within a wider framework, i.e., not exclusively in terms of intra-cranial processes. I will attempt to illuminate the advantages of embracing embodied cognition in contrast with focusing exclusively on neural and/or representational mechanisms when consciousness and cognition are in question. In my argumentation, I will first show the divergence of consciousnessand cognitive-theories on the one hand, and delineate attempts to reconcile these two branches of investigation, on the other hand. Then I will relate the model of cognitive phylogeny, as regards social cognition, and the models of the evolution of consciousness as it emerged in scientific literature. In conclusion, I will attempt to expose the advantages of widening the horizon of investigation towards embodied and enacted cognition.","PeriodicalId":43453,"journal":{"name":"Avant","volume":"112 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75263180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.26913/avant.2020.02.04
Aireen Grace T. Andal
This article aims to put into dialogue Philosophy for Children (P4C) and education rights. Whereas rights have robust conceptualizations and have been the topic of many scholarly discussions, scholarship on P4C still has a lot to unpack for a more expansive understanding, especially when scaled up to the level of rights. This work asks whether or not the rhetoric of “rights” can be used to discuss if P4C has a rightful place to be a mandatory part of school curriculum. Thus the article explores how P4C is positioned between children education and rights discourses. The range of views on P4C is broad enough to prevent the concentration of discursive power in a single source or authority in terms of scale of discussion. P4C is therefore subject to both scrutiny and praise in the same way that other human rights ideologies have been. In conclusion, this work hopes to speak and contribute to the literature on P4C by problematizing children’s discursive positions as learners and citizens with rights.
{"title":"Discourses of Educational Rights in Philosophy for Children: On the Theoretical and Practical Merits of Philosophical Education for Children","authors":"Aireen Grace T. Andal","doi":"10.26913/avant.2020.02.04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26913/avant.2020.02.04","url":null,"abstract":"This article aims to put into dialogue Philosophy for Children (P4C) and education rights. Whereas rights have robust conceptualizations and have been the topic of many scholarly discussions, scholarship on P4C still has a lot to unpack for a more expansive understanding, especially when scaled up to the level of rights. This work asks whether or not the rhetoric of “rights” can be used to discuss if P4C has a rightful place to be a mandatory part of school curriculum. Thus the article explores how P4C is positioned between children education and rights discourses. The range of views on P4C is broad enough to prevent the concentration of discursive power in a single source or authority in terms of scale of discussion. P4C is therefore subject to both scrutiny and praise in the same way that other human rights ideologies have been. In conclusion, this work hopes to speak and contribute to the literature on P4C by problematizing children’s discursive positions as learners and citizens with rights.","PeriodicalId":43453,"journal":{"name":"Avant","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75293212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.26913/avant.2020.03.06
Adrianna Zabrzewska
{"title":"Gender w literaturze dla dzieci. Feministyczna metodologia: Ciało, Głos, Opowieść","authors":"Adrianna Zabrzewska","doi":"10.26913/avant.2020.03.06","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26913/avant.2020.03.06","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43453,"journal":{"name":"Avant","volume":"9 12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88809941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.26913/avant.2020.03.31
M. Butler
{"title":"Sonic Maps: On the Acoustic (Trans)Formation of Urban Space in Straight Outta Compton (2015) and Grand Theft Auto (1997-2013)","authors":"M. Butler","doi":"10.26913/avant.2020.03.31","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26913/avant.2020.03.31","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43453,"journal":{"name":"Avant","volume":"104 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75168961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.26913/avant.2020.01.04
A. Kapusta
The purpose of this article is to indicate the specificity and difficulties of the project of writing the History of Polish Madness presented by Mira Marcinów. Marcinów goes beyond the area of the traditional history of psychiatry and notices in the material she researched the chance to trace the genealogy of Polish madness. The task of the genealogical approach is to make history that will challenge the obviousness and validity of our understanding of a specific area of human experience, in this place of madness. The author of the article wonders to what extent the project of genealogy of madness is a successful project.
{"title":"Genealogy of Polish Melancholy. Commentary to Mira Marcinów’s Book The History of Polish Madness","authors":"A. Kapusta","doi":"10.26913/avant.2020.01.04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26913/avant.2020.01.04","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this article is to indicate the specificity and difficulties of the project of writing the History of Polish Madness presented by Mira Marcinów. Marcinów goes beyond the area of the traditional history of psychiatry and notices in the material she researched the chance to trace the genealogy of Polish madness. The task of the genealogical approach is to make history that will challenge the obviousness and validity of our understanding of a specific area of human experience, in this place of madness. The author of the article wonders to what extent the project of genealogy of madness is a successful project.","PeriodicalId":43453,"journal":{"name":"Avant","volume":"121 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77383404","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.26913/avant.2020.03.18
Krystyna Dzwonkowska-Godula
: In the 1990s, a group of feminists of colour in the United States, recognising that the actions taken so far to promote women's rights represented the interests of white rich mid-dle-class Americans, proposed a concept of “reproductive justice” and fought for the reproductive rights of marginalized social groups (including women from ethnic minorities, women with low social status and transgender people). This concept was created by combining the idea of reproductive rights with social justice. It advocates equality and the abolition of divisions between the privileged and the disadvantaged in deciding about their own bodies, pro-creation and family life. “Reproductive justice” means the right and conditions to have children or not, control over the conditions of childbirth, as well as parenting children in safe and sustainable communities. The aim of the article is to consider how the concept of reproductive justice can be applied in the scientific description and study of social reality. It seems that several different dimensions of its scientific ”usefulness” can be discussed. Firstly, the article points to reproductive rights as significant for the social status of individuals. It raises questions of what reproductive rights are granted and to whom and what social consequences derive from their possession/non-pos-session for individuals and entire social categories. Secondly, as an intersectional approach, it inspires the analysis of social inequalities and discriminatory practices in the field of reproductive rights in order to study the impact of different social characteristics of individuals on their access to these rights. Thirdly, this concept encourages research into the relationship between experiences of individuals, their social affiliation, the macro-social context and issues of subjectivity and agency in the area of reproduction. Fourthly, by pointing to the problem of privilege and discrimination in the field of reproduction, the concept inspires us to ask questions about who, why and how creates these social divisions and who benefs from reproductive injustice.
{"title":"Sprawiedliwość reprodukcyjna – od feministycznego postulatu do naukowej koncepcji","authors":"Krystyna Dzwonkowska-Godula","doi":"10.26913/avant.2020.03.18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26913/avant.2020.03.18","url":null,"abstract":": In the 1990s, a group of feminists of colour in the United States, recognising that the actions taken so far to promote women's rights represented the interests of white rich mid-dle-class Americans, proposed a concept of “reproductive justice” and fought for the reproductive rights of marginalized social groups (including women from ethnic minorities, women with low social status and transgender people). This concept was created by combining the idea of reproductive rights with social justice. It advocates equality and the abolition of divisions between the privileged and the disadvantaged in deciding about their own bodies, pro-creation and family life. “Reproductive justice” means the right and conditions to have children or not, control over the conditions of childbirth, as well as parenting children in safe and sustainable communities. The aim of the article is to consider how the concept of reproductive justice can be applied in the scientific description and study of social reality. It seems that several different dimensions of its scientific ”usefulness” can be discussed. Firstly, the article points to reproductive rights as significant for the social status of individuals. It raises questions of what reproductive rights are granted and to whom and what social consequences derive from their possession/non-pos-session for individuals and entire social categories. Secondly, as an intersectional approach, it inspires the analysis of social inequalities and discriminatory practices in the field of reproductive rights in order to study the impact of different social characteristics of individuals on their access to these rights. Thirdly, this concept encourages research into the relationship between experiences of individuals, their social affiliation, the macro-social context and issues of subjectivity and agency in the area of reproduction. Fourthly, by pointing to the problem of privilege and discrimination in the field of reproduction, the concept inspires us to ask questions about who, why and how creates these social divisions and who benefs from reproductive injustice.","PeriodicalId":43453,"journal":{"name":"Avant","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85622814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.26913/avant.2020.03.42
K. Bielecka
{"title":"Może błądzę, ale jednak myślę. Odpowiedź na uwagi krytyków do książki Błądzę, więc myślę","authors":"K. Bielecka","doi":"10.26913/avant.2020.03.42","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26913/avant.2020.03.42","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43453,"journal":{"name":"Avant","volume":"36 11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90660001","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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