Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.31737/2221-2264-2022-57-5-12
Горячая тема, Журнал Нэа
The article deals with the concept of the failures of society. First of all, attention is drawn to the value nature of this concept. What, from the point of view of an external observer, can be interpreted as a failure, for an insider will be a normal state. Moreover, the latter, perhaps, will not want to change life in the traditional environment familiar to him, which constitutes his social identity, for something else, which seems preferable for an external observer. The failures of society are described as far from reality lexicographical preferences. The most typical example is religious fundamentalism. With its dominance, the failures of society are inevitable. However, modern social dogmas, which have become widespread and strongly influencial in the West in the framework of the so-called new ethics, may well be interpreted as failures of society. As a result, the world has lost its orientation and authoritarian (neo-totalitarian) practices do not experience strong opposition. Assessing global processes, it is quite possible to state the failure of the Earth’s civilization as a whole due to the loss of an ideal image of the future. Constructivist solutions are not able to correct the state of affairs. The world will either heal itself through spontaneous institutional change or prolong its state of decline.
{"title":"The failures of society: How to understand them?","authors":"Горячая тема, Журнал Нэа","doi":"10.31737/2221-2264-2022-57-5-12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31737/2221-2264-2022-57-5-12","url":null,"abstract":"The article deals with the concept of the failures of society. First of all, attention is drawn to the value nature of this concept. What, from the point of view of an external observer, can be interpreted as a failure, for an insider will be a normal state. Moreover, the latter, perhaps, will not want to change life in the traditional environment familiar to him, which constitutes his social identity, for something else, which seems preferable for an external observer. The failures of society are described as far from reality lexicographical preferences. The most typical example is religious fundamentalism. With its dominance, the failures of society are inevitable. However, modern social dogmas, which have become widespread and strongly influencial in the West in the framework of the so-called new ethics, may well be interpreted as failures of society. As a result, the world has lost its orientation and authoritarian (neo-totalitarian) practices do not experience strong opposition. Assessing global processes, it is quite possible to state the failure of the Earth’s civilization as a whole due to the loss of an ideal image of the future. Constructivist solutions are not able to correct the state of affairs. The world will either heal itself through spontaneous institutional change or prolong its state of decline.","PeriodicalId":43676,"journal":{"name":"Zhurnal Novaya Ekonomicheskaya Assotsiatsiya-Journal of the New Economic Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69824613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.31737/2221-2264-2022-57-5-3
E. A. Streltsova
Technological knowledge, which is the basis for new technologies and innovation, is an important component of economic success — both on corporate and national levels. Such a role stimulates various actors to participate actively in the global race for talents who have this technological knowledge. The paper discusses if Russia is a successful participant of the race. It analyses the two datasets of patent documents (as for 2010–2019): 1) with Russian inventors and foreign assignees — to study the ‘outflow’ of technological knowledge from the country, and 2) with foreign inventors and Russian assignees — to measure the scope of its inflow. The results of the study demonstrate that Russia is still more a donor for the leading countries, than a recipient of technological knowledge from abroad. Russian inventors are actively involved into collaboration with foreign companies, being in demand in many global corporations, especially in the ICT field. The inflow of technological knowledge is less intense, and its key source is the post-soviet countries, in geographical proximity to Russia. One of the possible reasons for this disproportion is a lack of organizations in the country, capable to compete for talents on the global arena. Due to a specific business climate and a low interest of Russian business in R&D and innovation, an important role in recruitment of high-skilled specialists from abroad is played by the leading universities. Research institutes (including those of Russian Academy of Sciences) seem to be in the least advantaged position.
{"title":"Global flows of technological knowledge: The position of Russia","authors":"E. A. Streltsova","doi":"10.31737/2221-2264-2022-57-5-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31737/2221-2264-2022-57-5-3","url":null,"abstract":"Technological knowledge, which is the basis for new technologies and innovation, is an important component of economic success — both on corporate and national levels. Such a role stimulates various actors to participate actively in the global race for talents who have this technological knowledge. The paper discusses if Russia is a successful participant of the race. It analyses the two datasets of patent documents (as for 2010–2019): 1) with Russian inventors and foreign assignees — to study the ‘outflow’ of technological knowledge from the country, and 2) with foreign inventors and Russian assignees — to measure the scope of its inflow. The results of the study demonstrate that Russia is still more a donor for the leading countries, than a recipient of technological knowledge from abroad. Russian inventors are actively involved into collaboration with foreign companies, being in demand in many global corporations, especially in the ICT field. The inflow of technological knowledge is less intense, and its key source is the post-soviet countries, in geographical proximity to Russia. One of the possible reasons for this disproportion is a lack of organizations in the country, capable to compete for talents on the global arena. Due to a specific business climate and a low interest of Russian business in R&D and innovation, an important role in recruitment of high-skilled specialists from abroad is played by the leading universities. Research institutes (including those of Russian Academy of Sciences) seem to be in the least advantaged position.","PeriodicalId":43676,"journal":{"name":"Zhurnal Novaya Ekonomicheskaya Assotsiatsiya-Journal of the New Economic Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69824781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.31737/2221-2264-2022-56-4-6
S. Nekrasov
Differentiation in (per capita) electricity consumption (PC) between developed and developing countries is decreasing in the world. However, the difference between Russian regions in terms of this indicator in 1990–2020 increased. It is shown that an increase in differentiation in the electric power supply leads to an increase in imbalances in socio-economic development. The relationship between the low profi tability of goods and services in the regions and low EPC was revealed. Unlike developing countries, where electricity consumption is limited by the possibilities of electricity production, in the Russian regions the limiting factor is the underdevelopment of electricity consumers. Under conditions of underdeveloped industry and low power supply, higher losses in power networks are characteristic, which causes a signifi cant increase in electricity prices for local industrial and agricultural consumers. Prerequisites are created for the transfer of industrial and agricultural production to regions with lower electricity supply costs. The mechanism aimed at preventing this negative trend is considered. As a result of its implementation, the modernization of production processes at electricity consumers will be initiated and conditions will be created for the emergence of new points of growth in these currently subsidized regions.
{"title":"Decrease in differentiation of electric power supply in regions and sustainable development of the Russian economy","authors":"S. Nekrasov","doi":"10.31737/2221-2264-2022-56-4-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31737/2221-2264-2022-56-4-6","url":null,"abstract":"Differentiation in (per capita) electricity consumption (PC) between developed and developing countries is decreasing in the world. However, the difference between Russian regions in terms of this indicator in 1990–2020 increased. It is shown that an increase in differentiation in the electric power supply leads to an increase in imbalances in socio-economic development. The relationship between the low profi tability of goods and services in the regions and low EPC was revealed. Unlike developing countries, where electricity consumption is limited by the possibilities of electricity production, in the Russian regions the limiting factor is the underdevelopment of electricity consumers. Under conditions of underdeveloped industry and low power supply, higher losses in power networks are characteristic, which causes a signifi cant increase in electricity prices for local industrial and agricultural consumers. Prerequisites are created for the transfer of industrial and agricultural production to regions with lower electricity supply costs. The mechanism aimed at preventing this negative trend is considered. As a result of its implementation, the modernization of production processes at electricity consumers will be initiated and conditions will be created for the emergence of new points of growth in these currently subsidized regions.","PeriodicalId":43676,"journal":{"name":"Zhurnal Novaya Ekonomicheskaya Assotsiatsiya-Journal of the New Economic Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69824931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.31737/2221-2264-2022-53-1-8
E. A. Zubova
Value of statistical life (VSL) is a widely used instrument for risk monetizing towards public policy planning in many developed countries. In Russia, due to the lack of data required for calculations, there are practically no credible estimates comparable in terms of methodology used, while those that are obtained using a different methodology hereupon differ significantly in magnitude. In our research, the value of statistical life in Russia is estimated using the comparable to foreign studies’ methodology, based on the RLMS-HSE survey microdata, the Russian (Rosstat) data, and the U.S. (BLS CFOI) data on occupational risks for 2018. The basic idea of this approach is to determine the willingness of employees to accept compensation for occupational risk. The resulting estimates of the VSL are in the range from 366,2 to 497,6 million rubles (2018). These values are significantly higher than all available estimates for Russia obtained using a different methodology but comparable to the corresponding values calculated with a similar methodology for the United States, considering the difference in GDP per capita at PPP.
{"title":"Value of statistical life in Russia based on microdata","authors":"E. A. Zubova","doi":"10.31737/2221-2264-2022-53-1-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31737/2221-2264-2022-53-1-8","url":null,"abstract":"Value of statistical life (VSL) is a widely used instrument for risk monetizing towards public policy planning in many developed countries. In Russia, due to the lack of data required for calculations, there are practically no credible estimates comparable in terms of methodology used, while those that are obtained using a different methodology hereupon differ significantly in magnitude. In our research, the value of statistical life in Russia is estimated using the comparable to foreign studies’ methodology, based on the RLMS-HSE survey microdata, the Russian (Rosstat) data, and the U.S. (BLS CFOI) data on occupational risks for 2018. The basic idea of this approach is to determine the willingness of employees to accept compensation for occupational risk. The resulting estimates of the VSL are in the range from 366,2 to 497,6 million rubles (2018). These values are significantly higher than all available estimates for Russia obtained using a different methodology but comparable to the corresponding values calculated with a similar methodology for the United States, considering the difference in GDP per capita at PPP.","PeriodicalId":43676,"journal":{"name":"Zhurnal Novaya Ekonomicheskaya Assotsiatsiya-Journal of the New Economic Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69821668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.31737/2221-2264-2022-53-1-12
N. Smorodinskaya, D. Katukov
The paper attempts to clarify Russia’s possibilities to enter the advanced manufacturing markets (Industry 4.0) through participation in global value chains (GVCs). We analyze transformations in GVCs, generated by the renewal of global business strategies (transition from mass offshoring to smart-sourcing, manufacturing servitization, strengthening of GVCs’ resilience and their digitalization), and how Russia corresponds to them in its accumulated but not yet realized comparative advantages (in the field of science and education, development of digital sectors, transportation of goods between Europe and Asia, etc.). We conclude that in the 2020s, Russia has an objective chance to advance to new export markets by entering into both traditional and new service niches of sophisticated industrial GVCs. But to realize this chance, Russia needs a serious adjustment of its structural policy upon considering not only technological, but also institutional and behavioral shifts in the distributed production.
{"title":"Russia’s opportunities for entering Industry 4.0 markets by improving its position in distributed production","authors":"N. Smorodinskaya, D. Katukov","doi":"10.31737/2221-2264-2022-53-1-12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31737/2221-2264-2022-53-1-12","url":null,"abstract":"The paper attempts to clarify Russia’s possibilities to enter the advanced manufacturing markets (Industry 4.0) through participation in global value chains (GVCs). We analyze transformations in GVCs, generated by the renewal of global business strategies (transition from mass offshoring to smart-sourcing, manufacturing servitization, strengthening of GVCs’ resilience and their digitalization), and how Russia corresponds to them in its accumulated but not yet realized comparative advantages (in the field of science and education, development of digital sectors, transportation of goods between Europe and Asia, etc.). We conclude that in the 2020s, Russia has an objective chance to advance to new export markets by entering into both traditional and new service niches of sophisticated industrial GVCs. But to realize this chance, Russia needs a serious adjustment of its structural policy upon considering not only technological, but also institutional and behavioral shifts in the distributed production.","PeriodicalId":43676,"journal":{"name":"Zhurnal Novaya Ekonomicheskaya Assotsiatsiya-Journal of the New Economic Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69821980","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.31737/2221-2264-2022-54-2-3
A. Golub, V. Potashnikov
Russia still has a large pool of high-quality human capital and, despite certain limitations, access to the advanced technologies needed for transition from a resource-based to a knowledge-based economy. Despite this potential, the gap between Russia and the developed countries was not narrowing for the last ten years. Russian economy falls into a development trap. The paper offers a theoretical analysis of the development trap. It provides solutions that may help to escape the development trap and close the income gap with the developed countries. The Ramsey model with a convex-concave production function is used for the paper. The convexity of the function is the cause of multiple equilibria. Country may move to a higher equilibrium, but under certain conditions a country cannot overcome the “gravity” of a lower equilibrium and remain in development trap. High investment risks, dependence on the export of fossil fuels and excessive investment in resource and energy-intensive industries led the Russian economy into a development trap. Convergence Russia with the most developed countries with high per capita incomes requires a profound diversification of the Russian economy grounded on a massive replacing natural resources and resource-intensive industries with the human capital.
{"title":"Theoretical analysis of development traps: On the example of Russia","authors":"A. Golub, V. Potashnikov","doi":"10.31737/2221-2264-2022-54-2-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31737/2221-2264-2022-54-2-3","url":null,"abstract":"Russia still has a large pool of high-quality human capital and, despite certain limitations, access to the advanced technologies needed for transition from a resource-based to a knowledge-based economy. Despite this potential, the gap between Russia and the developed countries was not narrowing for the last ten years. Russian economy falls into a development trap. The paper offers a theoretical analysis of the development trap. It provides solutions that may help to escape the development trap and close the income gap with the developed countries. The Ramsey model with a convex-concave production function is used for the paper. The convexity of the function is the cause of multiple equilibria. Country may move to a higher equilibrium, but under certain conditions a country cannot overcome the “gravity” of a lower equilibrium and remain in development trap. High investment risks, dependence on the export of fossil fuels and excessive investment in resource and energy-intensive industries led the Russian economy into a development trap. Convergence Russia with the most developed countries with high per capita incomes requires a profound diversification of the Russian economy grounded on a massive replacing natural resources and resource-intensive industries with the human capital.","PeriodicalId":43676,"journal":{"name":"Zhurnal Novaya Ekonomicheskaya Assotsiatsiya-Journal of the New Economic Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69822893","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.31737/2221-2264-2022-54-2-7
O. V. Telegin
This paper investigates the relationship between the volatility of various indicators of the Russia financial markets and the communication policy of the Bank of Russia, namely, regular communications channel – press releases and press conferences following the meetings of the Board of Directors of the Bank of Russia. The use of these two channels of regular verbal interventions aims not only to familiarize market participants with the decision on the key rate adopted during the meeting, but also to describe the reasons for this decision, along with a brief description of the current state of the economy in the way the regulator observes it. The results of econometric analysis using HAR‑models of high-frequency 5-minute volatility, taking into account intraday volatility patterns, show that regular communications of the Bank of Russia (namely, press releases following a meeting of the Bank of Russia Board of directors) really increase volatility in financial markets, while market participants cannot instantly estimate the significance of the new information, while this process takes about 15–20 minutes. However, the effect of increasing volatility is practically insignificant statistically when it comes to press conferences of the Governor Elvira Nabiullina. This result may indicate almost complete absence of new information for the market participants, disclosed during the opening speech at the press conference and the Q&A session. Also, within the framework of the study, recommendations were formulated for the Bank of Russia to change the format of regular communications.
{"title":"Bank of Russia regular communications and volatility short-term effects in financial markets","authors":"O. V. Telegin","doi":"10.31737/2221-2264-2022-54-2-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31737/2221-2264-2022-54-2-7","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the relationship between the volatility of various indicators of the Russia financial markets and the communication policy of the Bank of Russia, namely, regular communications channel – press releases and press conferences following the meetings of the Board of Directors of the Bank of Russia. The use of these two channels of regular verbal interventions aims not only to familiarize market participants with the decision on the key rate adopted during the meeting, but also to describe the reasons for this decision, along with a brief description of the current state of the economy in the way the regulator observes it. The results of econometric analysis using HAR‑models of high-frequency 5-minute volatility, taking into account intraday volatility patterns, show that regular communications of the Bank of Russia (namely, press releases following a meeting of the Bank of Russia Board of directors) really increase volatility in financial markets, while market participants cannot instantly estimate the significance of the new information, while this process takes about 15–20 minutes. However, the effect of increasing volatility is practically insignificant statistically when it comes to press conferences of the Governor Elvira Nabiullina. This result may indicate almost complete absence of new information for the market participants, disclosed during the opening speech at the press conference and the Q&A session. Also, within the framework of the study, recommendations were formulated for the Bank of Russia to change the format of regular communications.","PeriodicalId":43676,"journal":{"name":"Zhurnal Novaya Ekonomicheskaya Assotsiatsiya-Journal of the New Economic Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69822916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.31737/2221-2264-2022-56-4-5
M. Lobanov, J. Zvezdanović Lobanova, M. Zvezdanović
The differences between the countries of Central-Eastern and South-Eastern Europe in terms of socio-economic and, in particular, industrial development suggests the use of complex approach to their study. At the same time, the formation of industrial potential takes place in similar, but not identical institutional conditions, which allows the development of typologies and classifi cations as a result of qualitative and quantitative data generalization. We analyzed intraregional differences in indicators of industrial production dynamics, its role in the economic development, the supply and cost of labor resources, foreign trade diversifi cation and the level of foreign capital penetration, structural rationalization and the effi ciency of enterprises. In addition, on the example of the countries of the region, the relationship between labor productivity and the share of foreign companies in the production structure was studied. The proposed typology of industrial systems in CEE and SEE countries is based on a comparison of two groups of indicators characterizing 1) the main trend in the industrial development and its contribution to economic growth (reindustrialization, recurrent / repeated deindustrialization, persistent deindustrialization, secondary / market industrialization); 2) the effi ciency of factors of production, the extent of involvement in global economic relations, the focus on the products with high added-value (intensive, extensive and transitional industrial development).
{"title":"Typologization of industrial systems in the countries of Central-Eastern and South-Eastern Europe","authors":"M. Lobanov, J. Zvezdanović Lobanova, M. Zvezdanović","doi":"10.31737/2221-2264-2022-56-4-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31737/2221-2264-2022-56-4-5","url":null,"abstract":"The differences between the countries of Central-Eastern and South-Eastern Europe in terms of socio-economic and, in particular, industrial development suggests the use of complex approach to their study. At the same time, the formation of industrial potential takes place in similar, but not identical institutional conditions, which allows the development of typologies and classifi cations as a result of qualitative and quantitative data generalization. We analyzed intraregional differences in indicators of industrial production dynamics, its role in the economic development, the supply and cost of labor resources, foreign trade diversifi cation and the level of foreign capital penetration, structural rationalization and the effi ciency of enterprises. In addition, on the example of the countries of the region, the relationship between labor productivity and the share of foreign companies in the production structure was studied. The proposed typology of industrial systems in CEE and SEE countries is based on a comparison of two groups of indicators characterizing 1) the main trend in the industrial development and its contribution to economic growth (reindustrialization, recurrent / repeated deindustrialization, persistent deindustrialization, secondary / market industrialization); 2) the effi ciency of factors of production, the extent of involvement in global economic relations, the focus on the products with high added-value (intensive, extensive and transitional industrial development).","PeriodicalId":43676,"journal":{"name":"Zhurnal Novaya Ekonomicheskaya Assotsiatsiya-Journal of the New Economic Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69824379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.31737/2221-2264-2022-55-3-11
I. Timofeev
Russia is facing significant rise of economic sanctions since the beginning of the military operation in Ukraine in February 2022. The list of restrictions includes financial, trade, visa, transport and other types of sanctions. There are few precedents of similar scope of sanctions since at least the end of the Cold War. In recent 30 years there has been a transition from “economic carpet bombing” to “smart sanctions”. Sanctions against Russia after February 2022 seem to deviate from this trend. Such a deviation raises research questions about the ways of the “smart” sanctions combination with more comprehensive restrictions and about the evidence of a new paradigm of sanctions policy. Key assumption implies that these are the intensity and the scope of sanctions, rather than the change of the restrictions’ instruments which mark a new paradigm, provided by the Russian case. “Smart sanctions” remain a key instrument, however, their quality and quantity make them similar to the “economic carpet bombing”. The only meaningful obstacle for the initiators to abstain from a wider use of sanctions is a threat of a damage to their own economies. They have to use “smart sanctions” to avoid greater losses for themselves. The article relies on the analysis of key decisions on sanctions as well as their legal substance to test this assumption.
{"title":"Policy of sanctions against Russia: Newest stage","authors":"I. Timofeev","doi":"10.31737/2221-2264-2022-55-3-11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31737/2221-2264-2022-55-3-11","url":null,"abstract":"Russia is facing significant rise of economic sanctions since the beginning of the military operation in Ukraine in February 2022. The list of restrictions includes financial, trade, visa, transport and other types of sanctions. There are few precedents of similar scope of sanctions since at least the end of the Cold War. In recent 30 years there has been a transition from “economic carpet bombing” to “smart sanctions”. Sanctions against Russia after February 2022 seem to deviate from this trend. Such a deviation raises research questions about the ways of the “smart” sanctions combination with more comprehensive restrictions and about the evidence of a new paradigm of sanctions policy. Key assumption implies that these are the intensity and the scope of sanctions, rather than the change of the restrictions’ instruments which mark a new paradigm, provided by the Russian case. “Smart sanctions” remain a key instrument, however, their quality and quantity make them similar to the “economic carpet bombing”. The only meaningful obstacle for the initiators to abstain from a wider use of sanctions is a threat of a damage to their own economies. They have to use “smart sanctions” to avoid greater losses for themselves. The article relies on the analysis of key decisions on sanctions as well as their legal substance to test this assumption.","PeriodicalId":43676,"journal":{"name":"Zhurnal Novaya Ekonomicheskaya Assotsiatsiya-Journal of the New Economic Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69823385","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.31737/2221-2264-2022-55-3-5
I. Kalabikhina, Z. G. Kazbekova
Given the modest growth rates of the Russian economy over the past 10 years and population aging, a careful study of the demographic component of economic growth is of particular interest. This article provides a quantitative assessment of the first demographic dividend in Russia in 1997–2017. Based on Rosstat data for 74 Russian regions, the growth rates of real GRP per capita are modeled depending on the share of the working age population. Additionally, the model includes the possibility of assessing the dynamics of economic growth at the expense of human capital, since its high level can compensate for the negative influence of the demographic factor. According to our calculations, the demographic factor is significant and in the 2000s, it contributed to economic growth; since 2010, Russia has received a negative demographic dividend. Human capital weakly compensates for the negative trends of the demographic factor, which in the coming years will serve as a serious challenge to the growth of the Russian economy. The revealed positive, although still weak, influence of human capital indicates that the development of human capital in the regions of Russia can become a driver of their development.
{"title":"The impact of the first demographic dividend on economic growth considering human capital","authors":"I. Kalabikhina, Z. G. Kazbekova","doi":"10.31737/2221-2264-2022-55-3-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31737/2221-2264-2022-55-3-5","url":null,"abstract":"Given the modest growth rates of the Russian economy over the past 10 years and population aging, a careful study of the demographic component of economic growth is of particular interest. This article provides a quantitative assessment of the first demographic dividend in Russia in 1997–2017. Based on Rosstat data for 74 Russian regions, the growth rates of real GRP per capita are modeled depending on the share of the working age population. Additionally, the model includes the possibility of assessing the dynamics of economic growth at the expense of human capital, since its high level can compensate for the negative influence of the demographic factor. According to our calculations, the demographic factor is significant and in the 2000s, it contributed to economic growth; since 2010, Russia has received a negative demographic dividend. Human capital weakly compensates for the negative trends of the demographic factor, which in the coming years will serve as a serious challenge to the growth of the Russian economy. The revealed positive, although still weak, influence of human capital indicates that the development of human capital in the regions of Russia can become a driver of their development.","PeriodicalId":43676,"journal":{"name":"Zhurnal Novaya Ekonomicheskaya Assotsiatsiya-Journal of the New Economic Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69823750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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