Karras J. Lambert, Christopher J. Coyne, N. Goodman
Abstract The fatal conceit of foreign intervention refers to the limitations faced by governments using discretionary power to address perceived problems in foreign societies. Drawing on evidence from the “Afghanistan Papers”—a collection of internal government documents compiled by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) and released in December 2019—we demonstrate how the failure of the U.S.-led intervention in Afghanistan to meet the stated objectives illustrates the fatal conceit of foreign intervention. We explore the limitations faced by foreign government interveners in three stages, reflecting distinct decision nodes within a means-ends framework in which the policies relating to foreign intervention are formulated and implemented.
{"title":"The Fatal Conceit of Foreign Intervention: Evidence from the Afghanistan Papers","authors":"Karras J. Lambert, Christopher J. Coyne, N. Goodman","doi":"10.1515/peps-2021-0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2021-0001","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The fatal conceit of foreign intervention refers to the limitations faced by governments using discretionary power to address perceived problems in foreign societies. Drawing on evidence from the “Afghanistan Papers”—a collection of internal government documents compiled by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) and released in December 2019—we demonstrate how the failure of the U.S.-led intervention in Afghanistan to meet the stated objectives illustrates the fatal conceit of foreign intervention. We explore the limitations faced by foreign government interveners in three stages, reflecting distinct decision nodes within a means-ends framework in which the policies relating to foreign intervention are formulated and implemented.","PeriodicalId":44635,"journal":{"name":"Peace Economics Peace Science and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/peps-2021-0001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42415733","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Cyber operations targeting government computers and network infrastructure are becoming increasingly common and have the potential to be extremely damaging. Interstate rivalry has been shown to shape a wide range of global patterns. This paper examines the intersection between these two important phenomena. It builds upon previous scholarship by developing a broader and more nuanced theory of the rivalry-cyber operation relationship and testing it empirically with newly developed data on cyber operations from 1990 to 2009. Our results go beyond existing studies to demonstrate that certain types of “cold” rivalries experience elevated numbers of cyber operations, while other “hot” rivalries experience fewer incidents. This finding sheds new light on our general understanding of the volume and location of cyber operations in the international system. It also underscores important distinctions among rivalries that help to explain significant cyber activities and may help to improve our grasp of other emerging threats.
{"title":"Rivalry Type and Cyber Operations: “Hot” Rivalries, “Cold” Rivalries, and Cyber Incidents, 1990–2009","authors":"Jacob A. Mauslein, Jeffrey Pickering","doi":"10.1515/PEPS-2020-0046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/PEPS-2020-0046","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Cyber operations targeting government computers and network infrastructure are becoming increasingly common and have the potential to be extremely damaging. Interstate rivalry has been shown to shape a wide range of global patterns. This paper examines the intersection between these two important phenomena. It builds upon previous scholarship by developing a broader and more nuanced theory of the rivalry-cyber operation relationship and testing it empirically with newly developed data on cyber operations from 1990 to 2009. Our results go beyond existing studies to demonstrate that certain types of “cold” rivalries experience elevated numbers of cyber operations, while other “hot” rivalries experience fewer incidents. This finding sheds new light on our general understanding of the volume and location of cyber operations in the international system. It also underscores important distinctions among rivalries that help to explain significant cyber activities and may help to improve our grasp of other emerging threats.","PeriodicalId":44635,"journal":{"name":"Peace Economics Peace Science and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/PEPS-2020-0046","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48198152","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article examines the causes of the current centrist and secessionist civil conflicts in Yemen. We argue that it is possible to explain the outbreak of the struggle of the Houthis against the central government as well as the acceleration of southern secessionist demands in light of the mismatch theory developed by Herrera, Morelli, and Nunnari (2019). In line with this model, we show that the two conflicts erupted once the relatively low political-economic power of the Houthis and of the southern secessionists was no longer matched by a parallel imbalance in their relative military strength vis-à-vis the central government. To examine the implications of the theory in Yemen, we use qualitative evidence on the two ongoing conflicts. The Yemeni case suggests that conflicts exhibiting a non-parallel asymmetry in relative military strength and political-economic power between the warring actors can be interpreted in light of the mismatch theory, regardless of their direction or the objectives their players pursue.
{"title":"The Yemeni Conflicts: A Mismatch Theory Interpretation","authors":"Rebecca Cambrini, L. Zanotti","doi":"10.1515/peps-2020-0028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2020-0028","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article examines the causes of the current centrist and secessionist civil conflicts in Yemen. We argue that it is possible to explain the outbreak of the struggle of the Houthis against the central government as well as the acceleration of southern secessionist demands in light of the mismatch theory developed by Herrera, Morelli, and Nunnari (2019). In line with this model, we show that the two conflicts erupted once the relatively low political-economic power of the Houthis and of the southern secessionists was no longer matched by a parallel imbalance in their relative military strength vis-à-vis the central government. To examine the implications of the theory in Yemen, we use qualitative evidence on the two ongoing conflicts. The Yemeni case suggests that conflicts exhibiting a non-parallel asymmetry in relative military strength and political-economic power between the warring actors can be interpreted in light of the mismatch theory, regardless of their direction or the objectives their players pursue.","PeriodicalId":44635,"journal":{"name":"Peace Economics Peace Science and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/peps-2020-0028","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48029330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Within the field of peace and conflict studies, data-production on peace agreements has rapidly increased. One complicated task for scholars and practitioners alike is understanding the relationships between peace agreements and the relationships between agreements and processes. For example, discerning when an agreement establishes continuity with previous agreements and, thus, belongs to the same peace process or when an agreement signals the start of a new peace process is not straightforward. In this study, I highlight what appears to be a fuzzy boundary for categorizing some disciplinary core concepts which, in turn, can cause our data to be unreliable. As a point of comparison, I investigate how two major peace agreement datasets – UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset and PA-X Peace Agreement Dataset – associate peace agreements with peace processes and find differences and ambiguities with respect to how they are coded in both databases. As a result of such inconsistencies, analyses drawn from these data can have different outputs and lead to misunderstandings about peace processes. Here, I demonstrate the disciplinary need for clearer principles to effectively associate peace agreements with peace processes and then argue for developing a disciplinary standard for the criteria used to operationalize peace processes. Crucially, a standard method for aggregating agreements into processes will facilitate consistent data production across databases.
{"title":"Conceptual Ambiguity in Coding the Categories of Peace Agreement and Peace Process","authors":"Yoav Kapshuk","doi":"10.1515/peps-2020-0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2020-0003","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Within the field of peace and conflict studies, data-production on peace agreements has rapidly increased. One complicated task for scholars and practitioners alike is understanding the relationships between peace agreements and the relationships between agreements and processes. For example, discerning when an agreement establishes continuity with previous agreements and, thus, belongs to the same peace process or when an agreement signals the start of a new peace process is not straightforward. In this study, I highlight what appears to be a fuzzy boundary for categorizing some disciplinary core concepts which, in turn, can cause our data to be unreliable. As a point of comparison, I investigate how two major peace agreement datasets – UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset and PA-X Peace Agreement Dataset – associate peace agreements with peace processes and find differences and ambiguities with respect to how they are coded in both databases. As a result of such inconsistencies, analyses drawn from these data can have different outputs and lead to misunderstandings about peace processes. Here, I demonstrate the disciplinary need for clearer principles to effectively associate peace agreements with peace processes and then argue for developing a disciplinary standard for the criteria used to operationalize peace processes. Crucially, a standard method for aggregating agreements into processes will facilitate consistent data production across databases.","PeriodicalId":44635,"journal":{"name":"Peace Economics Peace Science and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/peps-2020-0003","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42127101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Faheem Aslam, Hyoung-Goo Kang, K. Mughal, T. Awan, Yasir Tariq Mohmand
Abstract Terrorism in Pakistan poses a significant risk towards the lives of people by violent destruction and physical damage. In addition to human loss, such catastrophic activities also affect the financial markets. The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of terrorism on the volatility of the Pakistan stock market. The financial impact of 339 terrorist attacks for a period of 18 years (2000–2018) is estimated w.r.t. target type, days of the week, and surprise factor. Three important macroeconomic variables namely exchange rate, gold, and oil were also considered. The findings of the EGARCH (1, 1) model revealed that the terrorist attacks targeting the security forces and commercial facilities significantly increased the stock market volatility. The significant impact of terrorist attacks on Monday, Tuesday, and Thursday confirms the overreaction of investors to terrorist news. Furthermore, the results confirmed the negative linkage between the surprise factor and stock market returns. The findings of this study have significant implications for investors and policymakers.
{"title":"Stock Market Volatility and Terrorism: New Evidence from the Markov Switching Model","authors":"Faheem Aslam, Hyoung-Goo Kang, K. Mughal, T. Awan, Yasir Tariq Mohmand","doi":"10.1515/peps-2020-0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2020-0005","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Terrorism in Pakistan poses a significant risk towards the lives of people by violent destruction and physical damage. In addition to human loss, such catastrophic activities also affect the financial markets. The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of terrorism on the volatility of the Pakistan stock market. The financial impact of 339 terrorist attacks for a period of 18 years (2000–2018) is estimated w.r.t. target type, days of the week, and surprise factor. Three important macroeconomic variables namely exchange rate, gold, and oil were also considered. The findings of the EGARCH (1, 1) model revealed that the terrorist attacks targeting the security forces and commercial facilities significantly increased the stock market volatility. The significant impact of terrorist attacks on Monday, Tuesday, and Thursday confirms the overreaction of investors to terrorist news. Furthermore, the results confirmed the negative linkage between the surprise factor and stock market returns. The findings of this study have significant implications for investors and policymakers.","PeriodicalId":44635,"journal":{"name":"Peace Economics Peace Science and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/peps-2020-0005","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41861439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper estimates the economic impact of terrorism at $US 33 billion in 2018. In the 18 years from 2000 to 2018, terrorism cost the world economy $US 855 billion. This model follows the methodology of the 2019 Global Terrorism Index and uses a bottom-up cost accounting approach to aggregate the cost of four indicators that result from the incidents of terrorism. The four indicators include terrorism-related deaths, injuries, property damage and GDP losses. The findings of this paper show that global terrorism peaked in 2014 with 33,555 deaths globally and a consequential economic impact of $US 111 billion. From 2011 to 2014, terrorism-related deaths increased by 353%, and terrorist incidents rose by 190%. The 100 incidents with the highest economic impact from deaths and injuries are included in the analysis. The September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States stands as the incident with the highest economic impact accounting for deaths and injuries only at $US 40.6 billion, this is followed by the Sinjar massacre in Sinjar, Nineveh, Iraq at $US 4.3 billion.
{"title":"The Economic Impact of Terrorism from 2000 to 2018","authors":"H. Bardwell, M. Iqbal","doi":"10.1515/peps-2020-0031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2020-0031","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper estimates the economic impact of terrorism at $US 33 billion in 2018. In the 18 years from 2000 to 2018, terrorism cost the world economy $US 855 billion. This model follows the methodology of the 2019 Global Terrorism Index and uses a bottom-up cost accounting approach to aggregate the cost of four indicators that result from the incidents of terrorism. The four indicators include terrorism-related deaths, injuries, property damage and GDP losses. The findings of this paper show that global terrorism peaked in 2014 with 33,555 deaths globally and a consequential economic impact of $US 111 billion. From 2011 to 2014, terrorism-related deaths increased by 353%, and terrorist incidents rose by 190%. The 100 incidents with the highest economic impact from deaths and injuries are included in the analysis. The September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States stands as the incident with the highest economic impact accounting for deaths and injuries only at $US 40.6 billion, this is followed by the Sinjar massacre in Sinjar, Nineveh, Iraq at $US 4.3 billion.","PeriodicalId":44635,"journal":{"name":"Peace Economics Peace Science and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/peps-2020-0031","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45850282","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Territorial power-sharing arrangements in civil wars face trade-offs between broadening inclusions and dangers of secession. This article argues that in civil wars over a government, the commitment problem is overcome as secession is not in its political agenda, however, the central concern pertains to the issues that arise in policymaking. Granting autonomy at the subnational level leads to peace without weakening the central authority. In addition, in bargaining over policies with multiple conflict parties, a government strategically makes concessions of territorial power-sharing to retain the status quo of national policy and positions in the government in a situation where dominance by one party is not attainable. It signals a government’s less resolute attitude in accommodating additional rebel groups. Hence, territorial power-sharing entails positive externality. This article finds that in civil wars over a government, at a dyad level, the positive effects of territorial power-sharing in peace decreases over time. Instead, the likelihood of a peace agreement with another rebel group increases. The results imply that the effectiveness of the autonomy arrangement depends on strategic concessions and broader future inclusions.
{"title":"Strategic Territorial Power-Sharing and Multi-Party Bargaining in Civil Wars","authors":"Wakako Maekawa","doi":"10.1515/peps-2020-0020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2020-0020","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Territorial power-sharing arrangements in civil wars face trade-offs between broadening inclusions and dangers of secession. This article argues that in civil wars over a government, the commitment problem is overcome as secession is not in its political agenda, however, the central concern pertains to the issues that arise in policymaking. Granting autonomy at the subnational level leads to peace without weakening the central authority. In addition, in bargaining over policies with multiple conflict parties, a government strategically makes concessions of territorial power-sharing to retain the status quo of national policy and positions in the government in a situation where dominance by one party is not attainable. It signals a government’s less resolute attitude in accommodating additional rebel groups. Hence, territorial power-sharing entails positive externality. This article finds that in civil wars over a government, at a dyad level, the positive effects of territorial power-sharing in peace decreases over time. Instead, the likelihood of a peace agreement with another rebel group increases. The results imply that the effectiveness of the autonomy arrangement depends on strategic concessions and broader future inclusions.","PeriodicalId":44635,"journal":{"name":"Peace Economics Peace Science and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/peps-2020-0020","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46580170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract One of the main ways we try to understand the COVID-19 pandemic is through time series cross section counts of cases and deaths. Observational studies based on these kinds of data have concrete and well known methodological issues that suggest significant caution for both consumers and produces of COVID-19 knowledge. We briefly enumerate some of these issues in the areas of measurement, inference, and interpretation.
{"title":"The Data Science of COVID-19 Spread: Some Troubling Current and Future Trends","authors":"Rex W. Douglass, T. Scherer, E. Gartzke","doi":"10.1515/peps-2020-0053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2020-0053","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract One of the main ways we try to understand the COVID-19 pandemic is through time series cross section counts of cases and deaths. Observational studies based on these kinds of data have concrete and well known methodological issues that suggest significant caution for both consumers and produces of COVID-19 knowledge. We briefly enumerate some of these issues in the areas of measurement, inference, and interpretation.","PeriodicalId":44635,"journal":{"name":"Peace Economics Peace Science and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/peps-2020-0053","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41965409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article examines the impact and repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic on patterns of armed conflict around the world. It argues that there are two main ways in which the pandemic is likely to fuel, rather than mitigate, conflict and engender further violence in conflict-prone countries: (1) the exacerbating effect of COVID-19 on the underlying root causes of conflict and (2) the exploitation of the crisis by governments and non-state actors who have used the coronavirus to gain political advantage and territorial control. The article uses data collected in real-time by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) and the Johns Hopkins University to illustrate the unfolding and spatial distribution of conflict events before and during the pandemic and combine this with three brief case studies of Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Libya. Descriptive evidence shows how levels of violence have remained unabated or even escalated during the first five months of the pandemic and how COVID-19-related social unrest has spread beyond conflict-affected countries.
{"title":"A Pandemic of Violence? The Impact of COVID-19 on Conflict","authors":"Sara M. T. Polo","doi":"10.1515/peps-2020-0050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2020-0050","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article examines the impact and repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic on patterns of armed conflict around the world. It argues that there are two main ways in which the pandemic is likely to fuel, rather than mitigate, conflict and engender further violence in conflict-prone countries: (1) the exacerbating effect of COVID-19 on the underlying root causes of conflict and (2) the exploitation of the crisis by governments and non-state actors who have used the coronavirus to gain political advantage and territorial control. The article uses data collected in real-time by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) and the Johns Hopkins University to illustrate the unfolding and spatial distribution of conflict events before and during the pandemic and combine this with three brief case studies of Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Libya. Descriptive evidence shows how levels of violence have remained unabated or even escalated during the first five months of the pandemic and how COVID-19-related social unrest has spread beyond conflict-affected countries.","PeriodicalId":44635,"journal":{"name":"Peace Economics Peace Science and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/peps-2020-0050","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42234534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
OnDecember 31, 2019, theWuhanMunicipal Health Commission of China reported a cluster of cases of pneumonia in the Hubei province. It was then on January 12, 2020 when the Chinese government publicly shared the genetic sequence of COVID-19 that we first made acquaintance of the microscopic villain of the horror movie that 2020was to become.And just like it usually is in thosemovies, notmany paid attention to this first stage appearance of the villain, which only made things worse, somuch so that onMarch 11, 2020, deeply concerned by the alarming levels of spread and severity, theWorld Health Organization characterized COVID-19 as a pandemic. It has been almost six months since then, half a year in which the coronavirus cost more than 800 thousand people their lives and hundreds of millions their livelihoods. We are now mourning the loss of our loved ones as well as the loss of that certainty that we used to have about the ways of our lives. The pandemic has made it painfully clear that those institutions that we had designated to protect and maintain that certainty were unprepared for the task. Oscillating between too lax or too harsh measures whose footing in scientific information is disputable, and undecided or vague about their priorities, governments and state institutions of even the richest and themost powerful countries have failed to effectivelymanage and curb the pandemic and protect the wellbeing and social welfare of their citizens. Consequently, the pandemic still remains largely unpredictable in terms of spread, life cycle and consequences. Even though it is the one thing that everyone has been talking about in the past six months, we still have a myriad of unanswered questions, and most importantly, we are still very uncertain and apprehensive of the shape of things to come. This special issue has beenmotivated exactly by this state of things which can only be resolved by scientific information that can help us understand and learn fromwhat we have experienced and guide us in developing informed expectations
{"title":"Introduction to the special issue ‘Reflections on the post COVID-19 World’","authors":"Raul Caruso, Arzu Kibris","doi":"10.1515/peps-2020-9014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2020-9014","url":null,"abstract":"OnDecember 31, 2019, theWuhanMunicipal Health Commission of China reported a cluster of cases of pneumonia in the Hubei province. It was then on January 12, 2020 when the Chinese government publicly shared the genetic sequence of COVID-19 that we first made acquaintance of the microscopic villain of the horror movie that 2020was to become.And just like it usually is in thosemovies, notmany paid attention to this first stage appearance of the villain, which only made things worse, somuch so that onMarch 11, 2020, deeply concerned by the alarming levels of spread and severity, theWorld Health Organization characterized COVID-19 as a pandemic. It has been almost six months since then, half a year in which the coronavirus cost more than 800 thousand people their lives and hundreds of millions their livelihoods. We are now mourning the loss of our loved ones as well as the loss of that certainty that we used to have about the ways of our lives. The pandemic has made it painfully clear that those institutions that we had designated to protect and maintain that certainty were unprepared for the task. Oscillating between too lax or too harsh measures whose footing in scientific information is disputable, and undecided or vague about their priorities, governments and state institutions of even the richest and themost powerful countries have failed to effectivelymanage and curb the pandemic and protect the wellbeing and social welfare of their citizens. Consequently, the pandemic still remains largely unpredictable in terms of spread, life cycle and consequences. Even though it is the one thing that everyone has been talking about in the past six months, we still have a myriad of unanswered questions, and most importantly, we are still very uncertain and apprehensive of the shape of things to come. This special issue has beenmotivated exactly by this state of things which can only be resolved by scientific information that can help us understand and learn fromwhat we have experienced and guide us in developing informed expectations","PeriodicalId":44635,"journal":{"name":"Peace Economics Peace Science and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/peps-2020-9014","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43517015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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