Abstract Military expenditures constitute a large chunk of the United States’ annual budget and its macroeconomic implications had been modelled using the Granger causality test, which suffers power loss when variables are subjected to structural breaks. This study explored alternative approaches by applying both traditional VAR-based Granger causality and the time-varying causality test techniques to obtain new evidence on the causality between military spending and selected macroeconomic indicators (economic growth, investment, unemployment and inflation rate) in the United States. Relevant data covering 1972Q1–2021Q2 were analysed. The results of the VAR-based Granger Causality test are dominated by a unidirectional causality that runs from macroeconomic variables to military spending and the result are robust to alternative military spending measures. However, the results of the time-varying causality method show that bidirectional causality dominates the relationship between military spending and some macroeconomic indicators, especially economic growth, investment and unemployment. With the variance observed in the causality between military spending and macroeconomic indicators, policymakers need to moderate military spending to achieve desired economic outcomes.
{"title":"Investigating Time-Varying Causality Between Military Spending and Macroeconomic Indicators in the United States","authors":"Isiaka Akande Raifu, Joshua Adeyemi Afolabi","doi":"10.1515/peps-2023-0044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2023-0044","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Military expenditures constitute a large chunk of the United States’ annual budget and its macroeconomic implications had been modelled using the Granger causality test, which suffers power loss when variables are subjected to structural breaks. This study explored alternative approaches by applying both traditional VAR-based Granger causality and the time-varying causality test techniques to obtain new evidence on the causality between military spending and selected macroeconomic indicators (economic growth, investment, unemployment and inflation rate) in the United States. Relevant data covering 1972Q1–2021Q2 were analysed. The results of the VAR-based Granger Causality test are dominated by a unidirectional causality that runs from macroeconomic variables to military spending and the result are robust to alternative military spending measures. However, the results of the time-varying causality method show that bidirectional causality dominates the relationship between military spending and some macroeconomic indicators, especially economic growth, investment and unemployment. With the variance observed in the causality between military spending and macroeconomic indicators, policymakers need to moderate military spending to achieve desired economic outcomes.","PeriodicalId":44635,"journal":{"name":"Peace Economics Peace Science and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135585272","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Domenico Suppa, Salvatore D’Acunto, Francesco Schettino
Abstract Are differences in per capita income between countries really the main cause of migratory flows? Mainstream economic thinking would give an affirmative answer. In the light of the heterodox literature, in this article, the authors critically evaluate this view and then they conduct an empirical test (applying panel and dynamic panel models) on data relating to the stocks of migrants on 232 countries from 1990 to 2019, trying to explain migration trends based on social-political, cultural, demographic and economic variables (obtained by integrating 4 official datasets). The results reveal a non-unique influence of differences in per capita income on migratory flows: up to a certain threshold (around $27,000) migration appears to be directly related to per capita GDP of migrants’ country of origin. Furthermore, the pre-existing stock of migrants in the country of destination takes on an important role, in line with the findings of the literature on migratory chains. These empirical findings could contribute to improve migration policies.
{"title":"An Empirical Investigation on the Determinants of International Migration","authors":"Domenico Suppa, Salvatore D’Acunto, Francesco Schettino","doi":"10.1515/peps-2023-0038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2023-0038","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Are differences in per capita income between countries really the main cause of migratory flows? Mainstream economic thinking would give an affirmative answer. In the light of the heterodox literature, in this article, the authors critically evaluate this view and then they conduct an empirical test (applying panel and dynamic panel models) on data relating to the stocks of migrants on 232 countries from 1990 to 2019, trying to explain migration trends based on social-political, cultural, demographic and economic variables (obtained by integrating 4 official datasets). The results reveal a non-unique influence of differences in per capita income on migratory flows: up to a certain threshold (around $27,000) migration appears to be directly related to per capita GDP of migrants’ country of origin. Furthermore, the pre-existing stock of migrants in the country of destination takes on an important role, in line with the findings of the literature on migratory chains. These empirical findings could contribute to improve migration policies.","PeriodicalId":44635,"journal":{"name":"Peace Economics Peace Science and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135874275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Arsène Aurelien Njamen Kengdo, Tii N. Nchofoung, Alice Kos A Mougnol
Abstract This paper focuses on the determinants of military spending in Africa by considering the role played by institutions. With data obtained between the years 1996–2019, the Driscoll and Kraay fixed effects, the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM), and the Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) estimators are used. The findings suggest that government size, trade freedom, economic risk, and political risk decrease military spending, whereas government stability and military involvement in politics are found to raise it. Using alternative institutional variables, we find that corruption, government effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, the rule of law, and voice and accountability significantly diminish military spending in Africa. In addition, concerning the economic determinants, the results reveal that trade openness and total natural resource rents reduce military spending, while GDP per capita, inflation, and foreign debt stocks increase it. Looking at strategic determinants, arms imports, urban population, and ethnic tensions positively affect African military expenditures. Robustness checks show that these results change once regional specificities are considered. The study concludes that institutional factors could be an engine for evolution in Africa’s military spending.
{"title":"Determinants of Military Spending in Africa: Do Institutions Matter?","authors":"Arsène Aurelien Njamen Kengdo, Tii N. Nchofoung, Alice Kos A Mougnol","doi":"10.1515/peps-2023-0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2023-0014","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper focuses on the determinants of military spending in Africa by considering the role played by institutions. With data obtained between the years 1996–2019, the Driscoll and Kraay fixed effects, the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM), and the Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) estimators are used. The findings suggest that government size, trade freedom, economic risk, and political risk decrease military spending, whereas government stability and military involvement in politics are found to raise it. Using alternative institutional variables, we find that corruption, government effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, the rule of law, and voice and accountability significantly diminish military spending in Africa. In addition, concerning the economic determinants, the results reveal that trade openness and total natural resource rents reduce military spending, while GDP per capita, inflation, and foreign debt stocks increase it. Looking at strategic determinants, arms imports, urban population, and ethnic tensions positively affect African military expenditures. Robustness checks show that these results change once regional specificities are considered. The study concludes that institutional factors could be an engine for evolution in Africa’s military spending.","PeriodicalId":44635,"journal":{"name":"Peace Economics Peace Science and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136107056","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nikolaos A. Kyriazis, Emmanouil M. L. Economou, Andreas Stergiou
Abstract The article discusses the spillover impacts between geopolitical uncertainty, inflation, exchange rates, and exports worldwide by employing the Time-Varying Parameter Vector Autoregressive (TVP-VAR) methodology. The net directional pairwise and net total directional causality among these variables is examined in major advanced economies (US, UK, Germany, France, Israel, South Korea and Japan) and rising economies (Russia, Türkiye, China, India, Brazil, and South Africa). Normal market conditions (since early 2000) and stressed ones since the latest crises (the Covid-19 disease and the Russia–Ukraine conflict) are covered. It is revealed that the national currency value constitutes the most influential determinant of exports and inflation but also in the system examined. Currency values exert direct impacts on inflation but also indirect, affecting exports and enhancing geopolitical risk as this is found to increase inflationary pressures. Intriguingly, this gives credence to the emergence of a new channel of inflation-creation that works through geopolitical risk. Such linkages are more pronounced in the US, South Korea, and Brazil while Germany and France present the weakest relations. Inflation, the currency value, and exports turned out to be very decisive regarding the geopolitical risk in Russia during the Russia–Ukraine war.
{"title":"Connectedness Among Geopolitical Risk, Inflation, Currency Values, and Exports by TVP-VAR Analysis: A Worldwide Perspective","authors":"Nikolaos A. Kyriazis, Emmanouil M. L. Economou, Andreas Stergiou","doi":"10.1515/peps-2023-0026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2023-0026","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The article discusses the spillover impacts between geopolitical uncertainty, inflation, exchange rates, and exports worldwide by employing the Time-Varying Parameter Vector Autoregressive (TVP-VAR) methodology. The net directional pairwise and net total directional causality among these variables is examined in major advanced economies (US, UK, Germany, France, Israel, South Korea and Japan) and rising economies (Russia, Türkiye, China, India, Brazil, and South Africa). Normal market conditions (since early 2000) and stressed ones since the latest crises (the Covid-19 disease and the Russia–Ukraine conflict) are covered. It is revealed that the national currency value constitutes the most influential determinant of exports and inflation but also in the system examined. Currency values exert direct impacts on inflation but also indirect, affecting exports and enhancing geopolitical risk as this is found to increase inflationary pressures. Intriguingly, this gives credence to the emergence of a new channel of inflation-creation that works through geopolitical risk. Such linkages are more pronounced in the US, South Korea, and Brazil while Germany and France present the weakest relations. Inflation, the currency value, and exports turned out to be very decisive regarding the geopolitical risk in Russia during the Russia–Ukraine war.","PeriodicalId":44635,"journal":{"name":"Peace Economics Peace Science and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135365774","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The war between Ukraine and Russia does not only harm their respective populations: the rest of Europe is heavily affected. While some welfare losses for the EU are salient, the most significant one is not: it is the risk that the war escalates into a major nuclear conflict. A promising policy to minimize those losses exploits the desire of both Ukrainians and Russians to join the EU. I propose that they should if they immediately cease all fighting and subscribe to a distinctive, incentive-compatible, peace agreement brokered by the EU. Such an agreement would come at small costs to the EU, costs that would vanish in comparison to the risk of nuclear holocaust.
{"title":"The European Union and Achieving Peace in Ukraine","authors":"Giacomo Corneo","doi":"10.1515/peps-2023-0055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2023-0055","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The war between Ukraine and Russia does not only harm their respective populations: the rest of Europe is heavily affected. While some welfare losses for the EU are salient, the most significant one is not: it is the risk that the war escalates into a major nuclear conflict. A promising policy to minimize those losses exploits the desire of both Ukrainians and Russians to join the EU. I propose that they should if they immediately cease all fighting and subscribe to a distinctive, incentive-compatible, peace agreement brokered by the EU. Such an agreement would come at small costs to the EU, costs that would vanish in comparison to the risk of nuclear holocaust.","PeriodicalId":44635,"journal":{"name":"Peace Economics Peace Science and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136077615","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Current studies do not conclusively tell us whether there is a causal relationship between remittances and terrorism. Yet, this question is important because the answer has clear implications for the way remittances are monitored and handled. Hence, with this paper, we move a step closer to a definitive answer by studying the impact of remittances on specific terrorist events in 180 countries over the period 1970–2020. We also look in reverse at whether acts of terrorism attract remittances. From event-study analysis and a panel vector autoregression model, Granger causality tests, and a Cholesky decomposition to isolate shocks, we find that we can neither reject the hypothesis that remittances do not Granger-cause terrorism nor reject that terrorism does not Granger-cause remittances. We also find that terrorism response to remittances shock is negative. These findings do not support previous studies that show remittances could be used to fund terrorist attacks. Further, the response of remittance to terrorism shock is null, excepting for Latin America which shows a statistical negative effect. Remittances in Latin America do not appear to respond to conflict. Some of our findings are new, others contradict a large stream of literature (i.e. remittances as a potential source of financing). The insights should be useful to policymakers to facilitate the flow of remittances that result in more disposable income of recipient families and possibly help households to cope with the financial loss of terrorist activity.
{"title":"Do Remittances and Terrorism Impact Each Other?","authors":"H. Kratou, Thierry Yogo","doi":"10.1515/peps-2023-0036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2023-0036","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Current studies do not conclusively tell us whether there is a causal relationship between remittances and terrorism. Yet, this question is important because the answer has clear implications for the way remittances are monitored and handled. Hence, with this paper, we move a step closer to a definitive answer by studying the impact of remittances on specific terrorist events in 180 countries over the period 1970–2020. We also look in reverse at whether acts of terrorism attract remittances. From event-study analysis and a panel vector autoregression model, Granger causality tests, and a Cholesky decomposition to isolate shocks, we find that we can neither reject the hypothesis that remittances do not Granger-cause terrorism nor reject that terrorism does not Granger-cause remittances. We also find that terrorism response to remittances shock is negative. These findings do not support previous studies that show remittances could be used to fund terrorist attacks. Further, the response of remittance to terrorism shock is null, excepting for Latin America which shows a statistical negative effect. Remittances in Latin America do not appear to respond to conflict. Some of our findings are new, others contradict a large stream of literature (i.e. remittances as a potential source of financing). The insights should be useful to policymakers to facilitate the flow of remittances that result in more disposable income of recipient families and possibly help households to cope with the financial loss of terrorist activity.","PeriodicalId":44635,"journal":{"name":"Peace Economics Peace Science and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44041495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-01DOI: 10.1515/peps-2023-frontmatter3
{"title":"Frontmatter","authors":"","doi":"10.1515/peps-2023-frontmatter3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2023-frontmatter3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44635,"journal":{"name":"Peace Economics Peace Science and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134995038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract By offering a comprehensive insight into the burden sharing behavior of states contributing to the MINUSMA peacekeeping mission, this paper contributes to the growing literature on burden sharing during specific crisis response operations. Three fairness principles (i.e. equality, equity and exemption) are applied to present an inclusive view on how burden sharing evolves. We find proximity to serve as a paramount motivation to contribute to the mission. As compared to advanced states, low income developing countries both deployed most troops to MINUSMA and were overrepresented in Mali’s most dangerous areas. The highest troop contributing countries have been compensated financially and advanced economies provided the financial and technical means.
{"title":"Burden Sharing During MINUSMA, Fair Enough? A Preliminary Descriptive Account","authors":"Michiel Wierenga, M. Bogers, R. Beeres, M. Bollen","doi":"10.1515/peps-2023-0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2023-0010","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract By offering a comprehensive insight into the burden sharing behavior of states contributing to the MINUSMA peacekeeping mission, this paper contributes to the growing literature on burden sharing during specific crisis response operations. Three fairness principles (i.e. equality, equity and exemption) are applied to present an inclusive view on how burden sharing evolves. We find proximity to serve as a paramount motivation to contribute to the mission. As compared to advanced states, low income developing countries both deployed most troops to MINUSMA and were overrepresented in Mali’s most dangerous areas. The highest troop contributing countries have been compensated financially and advanced economies provided the financial and technical means.","PeriodicalId":44635,"journal":{"name":"Peace Economics Peace Science and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47708642","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper examines the moderating role of institutions in explaining the effects of population density, income, and high-valued natural resources (oil) on violent conflict events. Panel-Corrected Standard Errors and Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood estimators were applied. Results show that population density beyond 2293 persons per square kilometre increases violent conflict events. Further, institutional quality has a moderating effect on violent conflict events – stronger corruption control reduces the positive effect of significant oil production on violent conflict events and weakens the negative effect of per capita income on such events. The results suggest that reducing violent conflict events requires at least three things; (1) keeping population density below 2293 persons per square kilometre, (2) investing in institutional quality improvements, and (3) raising incomes.
{"title":"Population, Institutions, and Violent Conflicts – How Important is Population Pressure in Violent Resource-Based Conflicts?","authors":"Kwami Adanu","doi":"10.1515/peps-2023-0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2023-0004","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper examines the moderating role of institutions in explaining the effects of population density, income, and high-valued natural resources (oil) on violent conflict events. Panel-Corrected Standard Errors and Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood estimators were applied. Results show that population density beyond 2293 persons per square kilometre increases violent conflict events. Further, institutional quality has a moderating effect on violent conflict events – stronger corruption control reduces the positive effect of significant oil production on violent conflict events and weakens the negative effect of per capita income on such events. The results suggest that reducing violent conflict events requires at least three things; (1) keeping population density below 2293 persons per square kilometre, (2) investing in institutional quality improvements, and (3) raising incomes.","PeriodicalId":44635,"journal":{"name":"Peace Economics Peace Science and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42598688","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Christopher J. Coyne, Michael R. Romero, Virgil Henry Storr
Abstract Violent conflict is a global phenomenon with devastating costs to individuals and their communities. Government experts and policymakers have responded with efforts to reduce violence and make peace. Such efforts are often implemented from the top-down, however, and are consequently limited in their peacemaking capacities. Top-down peacemaking is limited because it is typically done by community outsiders who simply lack the knowledge and capabilities to systematically plan and make peace in diverse societies throughout the world. We discuss a bottom-up alternative to peacemaking grounded in entrepreneurship. We argue that entrepreneurs make peace by (a) offering individuals a peaceful means to acquire the things they desire, (b) establishing commercial links across (social and geographic) distances, and, in so doing, (c) helping to cultivate habits of peacefulness.
{"title":"Entrepreneurial Pathways to Peacemaking","authors":"Christopher J. Coyne, Michael R. Romero, Virgil Henry Storr","doi":"10.1515/peps-2023-0019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2023-0019","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Violent conflict is a global phenomenon with devastating costs to individuals and their communities. Government experts and policymakers have responded with efforts to reduce violence and make peace. Such efforts are often implemented from the top-down, however, and are consequently limited in their peacemaking capacities. Top-down peacemaking is limited because it is typically done by community outsiders who simply lack the knowledge and capabilities to systematically plan and make peace in diverse societies throughout the world. We discuss a bottom-up alternative to peacemaking grounded in entrepreneurship. We argue that entrepreneurs make peace by (a) offering individuals a peaceful means to acquire the things they desire, (b) establishing commercial links across (social and geographic) distances, and, in so doing, (c) helping to cultivate habits of peacefulness.","PeriodicalId":44635,"journal":{"name":"Peace Economics Peace Science and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135215431","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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