Abstract:From the perspective of factional politics, this article sheds light on the functions and operations of the Central Liaison Office and the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office (the "two Hong Kong offices") throughout the history of the Communist Party of China (CPC), focusing on the 2013–22 period. The authors posit that the stronger the factional relationship between the top leader responsible for Hong Kong affairs and the heads of the two Hong Kong offices, the greater the policy consistency between the two offices and the central authorities on Hong Kong issues. This article uses text mining techniques to measure the degree of policy consistency between Chinese President Xi Jinping and the two Hong Kong offices from 2013 to 2022. In 2020, Xi appointed his protégés as directors of the two Hong Kong offices, thus regaining absolute control over Hong Kong affairs. Xi may further tighten his hold on Hong Kong in the future, thereby undermining the region's autonomous status.
{"title":"China's Hong Kong Affairs Bureaucracy: Factional Politics and Policy Consistency","authors":"Wen-hsuan Tsai, Chih-Wei Yu","doi":"10.1353/chn.2023.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/chn.2023.0007","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:From the perspective of factional politics, this article sheds light on the functions and operations of the Central Liaison Office and the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office (the \"two Hong Kong offices\") throughout the history of the Communist Party of China (CPC), focusing on the 2013–22 period. The authors posit that the stronger the factional relationship between the top leader responsible for Hong Kong affairs and the heads of the two Hong Kong offices, the greater the policy consistency between the two offices and the central authorities on Hong Kong issues. This article uses text mining techniques to measure the degree of policy consistency between Chinese President Xi Jinping and the two Hong Kong offices from 2013 to 2022. In 2020, Xi appointed his protégés as directors of the two Hong Kong offices, thus regaining absolute control over Hong Kong affairs. Xi may further tighten his hold on Hong Kong in the future, thereby undermining the region's autonomous status.","PeriodicalId":45391,"journal":{"name":"China-An International Journal","volume":"21 1","pages":"70 - 87"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48119303","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Chronology of Events: October 2022 to December 2022","authors":"Ryan Ho","doi":"10.1353/chn.2023.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/chn.2023.0002","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45391,"journal":{"name":"China-An International Journal","volume":"21 1","pages":"204 - 207"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45648807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:China's bold Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a multilateral framework of international cooperation particularly across developing countries, has captured worldwide attention and seen varied responses from different countries. While developed economies have often critiqued the Initiative and have also endeavoured to encircle and counterbalance China's ambitions through multilateral alliances, most developing countries appear to welcome the Initiative. As recipients of the Initiative, how do Malaysians perceive China, especially since the BRI started in 2013? What are the factors that determine the popular perceptions of China in Malaysia? Comparing public opinion data from the third and fourth waves of the Asian Barometer Survey, the author conducts an intervention analysis, a difference-in-differences (DID) analysis, and a multiple regression analysis to assess the impact. These empirical exercises reveal that the popular perceptions of China in Malaysia significantly improved since the launch of the BRI, as the economic incentives through the BRI loom larger over time. In addition, the author also conducted in-depth interviews and assembled other independent sources of survey data to further corroborate the above findings with more nuances of the attitudinal change.
{"title":"Popular Perceptions of China's Influence in Malaysia since the BRI: An Economic Perspective","authors":"Jinrui Xi","doi":"10.1353/chn.2023.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/chn.2023.0010","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:China's bold Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a multilateral framework of international cooperation particularly across developing countries, has captured worldwide attention and seen varied responses from different countries. While developed economies have often critiqued the Initiative and have also endeavoured to encircle and counterbalance China's ambitions through multilateral alliances, most developing countries appear to welcome the Initiative. As recipients of the Initiative, how do Malaysians perceive China, especially since the BRI started in 2013? What are the factors that determine the popular perceptions of China in Malaysia? Comparing public opinion data from the third and fourth waves of the Asian Barometer Survey, the author conducts an intervention analysis, a difference-in-differences (DID) analysis, and a multiple regression analysis to assess the impact. These empirical exercises reveal that the popular perceptions of China in Malaysia significantly improved since the launch of the BRI, as the economic incentives through the BRI loom larger over time. In addition, the author also conducted in-depth interviews and assembled other independent sources of survey data to further corroborate the above findings with more nuances of the attitudinal change.","PeriodicalId":45391,"journal":{"name":"China-An International Journal","volume":"21 1","pages":"135 - 159"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44701820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Important Documents: October 2022 to December 2022","authors":"Ryan Ho","doi":"10.1353/chn.2023.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/chn.2023.0003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45391,"journal":{"name":"China-An International Journal","volume":"21 1","pages":"208 - 209"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43866856","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:When tensions between rival great powers become less predictable, how do small powers exploit their flexibility to increase their opportunities for survival? As a small power caught between China and the United States, Taiwan has established a unique brand of public diplomacy that seeks to win influence in Washington by influencing elite opinions and further deepening the already intricate social connections within the policy community. Through process tracing, this article uses generic case analyses of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) and the Global Taiwan Institute (GTI) to address one area of apparent continuity and one area of apparent intensification in Taiwan's think tank diplomacy. The article concludes that, as much as funding and democratic values are significant factors, the deepening of intersocietal ties enables Taiwan to punch above its weight in influencing Washington's thinking, while reinforcing and maintaining the connections between them.
{"title":"Taiwan's Think Tank Diplomacy in the Trump–Tsai Era: Leveraging Intersocietal Networks and Increasing Government Support","authors":"Sibei Sun, Xiang-Li Wu","doi":"10.1353/chn.2023.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/chn.2023.0008","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:When tensions between rival great powers become less predictable, how do small powers exploit their flexibility to increase their opportunities for survival? As a small power caught between China and the United States, Taiwan has established a unique brand of public diplomacy that seeks to win influence in Washington by influencing elite opinions and further deepening the already intricate social connections within the policy community. Through process tracing, this article uses generic case analyses of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) and the Global Taiwan Institute (GTI) to address one area of apparent continuity and one area of apparent intensification in Taiwan's think tank diplomacy. The article concludes that, as much as funding and democratic values are significant factors, the deepening of intersocietal ties enables Taiwan to punch above its weight in influencing Washington's thinking, while reinforcing and maintaining the connections between them.","PeriodicalId":45391,"journal":{"name":"China-An International Journal","volume":"21 1","pages":"113 - 88"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44619205","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:How do governmental divisions within an authoritarian state influence protest outcomes? In this article, the authors propose two divergent mechanisms—"co-optation" and "coercion"—to capture the relationships between types of protest target and the violence that results from protest events. The "co-optation" hypothesis proposes that protests against judicial and security branches will be more likely to become violent compared to those against the administrative ones because protesters anticipate no substantial economic return from judicial and security branches that do not have financial resources at hand to distribute. The "coercion" hypothesis proposes that protests targeting judicial and security branches pose a lower risk of mass violence than those targeting administrative ones due to the public's fear of violent crackdowns by judicial or military branches that control the state's coercive means. Analysing a unique data set of protest events in China between 2006 and 2017, the authors find that protests involving administrative divisions are significantly less likely to turn violent when compared to those opposing nongovernmental targets, while protests targeting judicial or security divisions are significantly more likely to involve mass violence. The findings suggest that protest violence in authoritarian regimes is associated with the organisational divisions within an authoritarian government, and the explanation of the relations focuses on whether the branches have the co-optation capacity to allocate substantial economic resources instead of whether the branches control the coercive forces to intimidate the public.
{"title":"Co-optation or Coercion: Protest Targeting and Mass Violence in China","authors":"Wei-Feng Tzeng, Hsin-Hsien Wang","doi":"10.1353/chn.2022.0036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/chn.2022.0036","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:How do governmental divisions within an authoritarian state influence protest outcomes? In this article, the authors propose two divergent mechanisms—\"co-optation\" and \"coercion\"—to capture the relationships between types of protest target and the violence that results from protest events. The \"co-optation\" hypothesis proposes that protests against judicial and security branches will be more likely to become violent compared to those against the administrative ones because protesters anticipate no substantial economic return from judicial and security branches that do not have financial resources at hand to distribute. The \"coercion\" hypothesis proposes that protests targeting judicial and security branches pose a lower risk of mass violence than those targeting administrative ones due to the public's fear of violent crackdowns by judicial or military branches that control the state's coercive means. Analysing a unique data set of protest events in China between 2006 and 2017, the authors find that protests involving administrative divisions are significantly less likely to turn violent when compared to those opposing nongovernmental targets, while protests targeting judicial or security divisions are significantly more likely to involve mass violence. The findings suggest that protest violence in authoritarian regimes is associated with the organisational divisions within an authoritarian government, and the explanation of the relations focuses on whether the branches have the co-optation capacity to allocate substantial economic resources instead of whether the branches control the coercive forces to intimidate the public.","PeriodicalId":45391,"journal":{"name":"China-An International Journal","volume":"20 1","pages":"109 - 86"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42529658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:Most urban community studies in China rely on the state–society framework. However, this structural perspective can hardly explain the diverse modes of community governance and their changes over time. This article outlines Shenzhen's 20-year (1999–2019) history of community reform and constructs a framework based on historical institutionalism to analyse Shenzhen's community governance modes over various periods and their changes. First, diversified governance ideas and power structures constructed various community governance modes over this period. Second, community governance mode changes were embedded in local grassroots governance fields. The original governance arrangements, the policy guidance and the ideas of the dominant agencies (the Ministry of Civil Affairs and the Party) at different stages are critical in explaining the transformation of community governance modes. Third, the dominant subject's institutional bricolage within the constraints and empowerment of the institutional context was the critical mechanism of the governance mode transformation. The historical institutionalism framework for community governance transformation provides a new direction for understanding community reform and evaluating evolving local state–society relations.
{"title":"From Government–Society to Party–Masses: The Community Governance Mode Change in Shenzhen","authors":"Changkun Cai, Weiqi Jiang, Y. Liu","doi":"10.1353/chn.2022.0034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/chn.2022.0034","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Most urban community studies in China rely on the state–society framework. However, this structural perspective can hardly explain the diverse modes of community governance and their changes over time. This article outlines Shenzhen's 20-year (1999–2019) history of community reform and constructs a framework based on historical institutionalism to analyse Shenzhen's community governance modes over various periods and their changes. First, diversified governance ideas and power structures constructed various community governance modes over this period. Second, community governance mode changes were embedded in local grassroots governance fields. The original governance arrangements, the policy guidance and the ideas of the dominant agencies (the Ministry of Civil Affairs and the Party) at different stages are critical in explaining the transformation of community governance modes. Third, the dominant subject's institutional bricolage within the constraints and empowerment of the institutional context was the critical mechanism of the governance mode transformation. The historical institutionalism framework for community governance transformation provides a new direction for understanding community reform and evaluating evolving local state–society relations.","PeriodicalId":45391,"journal":{"name":"China-An International Journal","volume":"20 1","pages":"41 - 65"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48869701","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:While past studies have focused on how China's political elites, such as local "top leaders" or senior cadres, are promoted, there has been relatively little research, largely due to lack of data, into local middle-level cadres. This study collects a data set consisting of 582 local middle-level cadres' professional résumés and analyses the influence of such résumés on promotion. Regression results have shown that educational attainment, particularly "first degree", has the most significant impact on speed of promotion, demonstrating that "educational credentialism" is one-sided. Furthermore, the speed at which one is promoted to deputy chu (处) level greatly influences one's subsequent career acceleration; this indicates that promotion has a strong degree of continuity. The impact of cross-departmental work experience on promotion is also significant but overturns the conventional perception that those who have worked in multiple positions are more likely to be promoted. Overall, the promotion process in China is not unique as it shares several characteristics with major states that have a technocratic tendency.
{"title":"Evaluating the Promotion of China's Local Middle-level Cadres: The Role of Professional Résumés","authors":"Jujun Zhao, Zhiyuan Zhao, Guang Yang","doi":"10.1353/chn.2022.0033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/chn.2022.0033","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:While past studies have focused on how China's political elites, such as local \"top leaders\" or senior cadres, are promoted, there has been relatively little research, largely due to lack of data, into local middle-level cadres. This study collects a data set consisting of 582 local middle-level cadres' professional résumés and analyses the influence of such résumés on promotion. Regression results have shown that educational attainment, particularly \"first degree\", has the most significant impact on speed of promotion, demonstrating that \"educational credentialism\" is one-sided. Furthermore, the speed at which one is promoted to deputy chu (处) level greatly influences one's subsequent career acceleration; this indicates that promotion has a strong degree of continuity. The impact of cross-departmental work experience on promotion is also significant but overturns the conventional perception that those who have worked in multiple positions are more likely to be promoted. Overall, the promotion process in China is not unique as it shares several characteristics with major states that have a technocratic tendency.","PeriodicalId":45391,"journal":{"name":"China-An International Journal","volume":"20 1","pages":"23 - 40"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49344806","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has been active for more than six years since the start of its operations in 2016. The AIIB has developed several dispute settlement mechanisms to deal with disputes in business (with borrowers, the hosting state and debtors), as well as disputes with its employees and third parties. On the one hand, the AIIB has learnt from the experience of other development banks concerning dispute settlement mechanisms. On the other hand, the dispute settlement mechanisms it has adopted have their distinctive characteristics and, about six years in development, they are considered still nascent. This article focuses on these dispute settlement mechanisms and compares them with those of other institutions, particularly the World Bank. The authors recommend that the AIIB should commit greater efforts in building the legal framework, improving the mechanisms, maintaining a balance between institutionalisation and flexibility, and cooperating with other international organisations.
{"title":"Dispute Settlement Mechanisms of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank","authors":"Yen-Chiang Chang, Yue Sun, Xinyi Liu, Shuo Li","doi":"10.1353/chn.2022.0038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/chn.2022.0038","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has been active for more than six years since the start of its operations in 2016. The AIIB has developed several dispute settlement mechanisms to deal with disputes in business (with borrowers, the hosting state and debtors), as well as disputes with its employees and third parties. On the one hand, the AIIB has learnt from the experience of other development banks concerning dispute settlement mechanisms. On the other hand, the dispute settlement mechanisms it has adopted have their distinctive characteristics and, about six years in development, they are considered still nascent. This article focuses on these dispute settlement mechanisms and compares them with those of other institutions, particularly the World Bank. The authors recommend that the AIIB should commit greater efforts in building the legal framework, improving the mechanisms, maintaining a balance between institutionalisation and flexibility, and cooperating with other international organisations.","PeriodicalId":45391,"journal":{"name":"China-An International Journal","volume":"20 1","pages":"134 - 154"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45381968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:Based on questionnaire data of 1,298 grassroots civil servants in China, this study empirically tests the relationship between the risks perceived to be attached to accountability and the blame avoidance tendency to assess the impact of intensive accountability mechanisms adopted in China's early stages of COVID-19 (coronavirus disease 2019) containment. It is found that intensive accountability may increase the blame avoidance tendency of grassroots civil servants and, by inhibiting the public service motivation, have a negative moderating effect. Prudent accountability and positive incentives are recommended for long-term COVID-19 containment in China.
{"title":"Is Intensive Accountability Conducive to the Implementation of COVID-19 Pandemic Containment Policies? An Empirical Study of Accountability, Blame Avoidance and Public Service Motivation","authors":"Hui-lin Li, Xinyuan Wei, Yongchao Wu","doi":"10.1353/chn.2022.0040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/chn.2022.0040","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Based on questionnaire data of 1,298 grassroots civil servants in China, this study empirically tests the relationship between the risks perceived to be attached to accountability and the blame avoidance tendency to assess the impact of intensive accountability mechanisms adopted in China's early stages of COVID-19 (coronavirus disease 2019) containment. It is found that intensive accountability may increase the blame avoidance tendency of grassroots civil servants and, by inhibiting the public service motivation, have a negative moderating effect. Prudent accountability and positive incentives are recommended for long-term COVID-19 containment in China.","PeriodicalId":45391,"journal":{"name":"China-An International Journal","volume":"20 1","pages":"181 - 195"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48919744","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}