Abstract During the Cold War, international film festivals proliferated on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The United States and the Soviet Union recognized these festivals as important venues for “cinematic diplomacy” and the pursuit of broader foreign policy goals. This article explores how the U.S. government, together with the U.S. motion picture industry, made use of its participation in the Moscow and Karlovy Vary International Film Festivals in the 1950s and 1960s. It confirms many of the findings of earlier studies of Cold War cultural diplomacy but also expands our historical understanding of this phenomenon. Specifically, it reveals the extent of cooperation and conflict—as well as an interchangeability of roles—among public officials in Washington and private citizens in Hollywood, with implications for both the formulation at home and reception abroad of U.S. cinematic diplomacy.
{"title":"Cinema as Cultural Diplomacy and the Cold War: U.S. Participation in International Film Festivals behind the Iron Curtain, 1959–1971","authors":"J. Frost","doi":"10.1162/jcws_a_01122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_01122","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract During the Cold War, international film festivals proliferated on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The United States and the Soviet Union recognized these festivals as important venues for “cinematic diplomacy” and the pursuit of broader foreign policy goals. This article explores how the U.S. government, together with the U.S. motion picture industry, made use of its participation in the Moscow and Karlovy Vary International Film Festivals in the 1950s and 1960s. It confirms many of the findings of earlier studies of Cold War cultural diplomacy but also expands our historical understanding of this phenomenon. Specifically, it reveals the extent of cooperation and conflict—as well as an interchangeability of roles—among public officials in Washington and private citizens in Hollywood, with implications for both the formulation at home and reception abroad of U.S. cinematic diplomacy.","PeriodicalId":45551,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cold War Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46370464","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The term “global Cold War” has become fashionable over the past two decades. Scholars who use the term, including many who submit manuscripts to the Journal of Cold War Studies, evidently believe that inserting the adjective “global” enhances our understanding of what the Cold War was. In reality, the simpler phrase “Cold War” is sufficient. During most of the time the Cold War lasted, it was a global phenomenon and was perceived as such. The notion that scholars in the 1970s and later decades focused exclusively on the United States and the Soviet Union and ignored the rest of the world is absurd. Both before and after 1989, scholarly analyses of the Cold War took ample account of the East-West conflict’s global scope. Hence, the addition of “global” in “global Cold War” is redundant, roughly equivalent to calling water “wet water” or fire “hot fire.” The Cold War began in Europe at the end of World War II with the division of the continent, especially the division of Germany, and it soon spread to Northeast Asia with the division of the Korean peninsula, the Communist victory in the Chinese civil war in 1949, the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, and the deepening of territorial disputes between Japan and the Soviet Union. Cold War tensions also quickly spread into the Middle East, where the formation of Israel in 1948, the rise of Arab nationalist governments in Egypt, Syria, and other countries, and the huge importance of the region for global energy supplies became catalysts for East-West conflict. The impact of key events in the Middle East from the 1950s through the 1970s—the Suez crisis of 1956, the Iraqi revolution of 1958, and Arab-Israeli wars in 1967, 1970–1971, and 1973—was greatly exacerbated by the Cold War. The Islamic revolution in Iran in early 1979, the subsequent wave of Islamic radicalism throughout the region, and the decision by Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein to go to war against Iran in 1980—a war that lasted eight years and killed hundreds of thousands—complicated the situation and necessitated realignments, but the Middle East remained a prime arena of superpower competition for the duration of the Cold War. Elsewhere in the world, the spread of the Cold War was facilitated by the process of decolonization and the breakup of European colonial empires in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Africa. Even though decolonization and the Cold War were separate phenomena, they greatly influenced each other at every stage. Decolonization created opportunities for the Soviet Union and other Communist states, especially the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Cuba, East Germany, and North Korea, to provide weapons, training, and financing to Communist guerrilla forces that were striving to end colonial rule and gain power. The United States, for its part, supported antiCommunist governments in former colonial areas as they waged counterinsurgency campaigns against Soviet-backed guerrillas. These developments, and the seizure of
{"title":"Editor's Note","authors":"E. De Angelis","doi":"10.1162/jcws_e_01138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_e_01138","url":null,"abstract":"The term “global Cold War” has become fashionable over the past two decades. Scholars who use the term, including many who submit manuscripts to the Journal of Cold War Studies, evidently believe that inserting the adjective “global” enhances our understanding of what the Cold War was. In reality, the simpler phrase “Cold War” is sufficient. During most of the time the Cold War lasted, it was a global phenomenon and was perceived as such. The notion that scholars in the 1970s and later decades focused exclusively on the United States and the Soviet Union and ignored the rest of the world is absurd. Both before and after 1989, scholarly analyses of the Cold War took ample account of the East-West conflict’s global scope. Hence, the addition of “global” in “global Cold War” is redundant, roughly equivalent to calling water “wet water” or fire “hot fire.” The Cold War began in Europe at the end of World War II with the division of the continent, especially the division of Germany, and it soon spread to Northeast Asia with the division of the Korean peninsula, the Communist victory in the Chinese civil war in 1949, the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, and the deepening of territorial disputes between Japan and the Soviet Union. Cold War tensions also quickly spread into the Middle East, where the formation of Israel in 1948, the rise of Arab nationalist governments in Egypt, Syria, and other countries, and the huge importance of the region for global energy supplies became catalysts for East-West conflict. The impact of key events in the Middle East from the 1950s through the 1970s—the Suez crisis of 1956, the Iraqi revolution of 1958, and Arab-Israeli wars in 1967, 1970–1971, and 1973—was greatly exacerbated by the Cold War. The Islamic revolution in Iran in early 1979, the subsequent wave of Islamic radicalism throughout the region, and the decision by Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein to go to war against Iran in 1980—a war that lasted eight years and killed hundreds of thousands—complicated the situation and necessitated realignments, but the Middle East remained a prime arena of superpower competition for the duration of the Cold War. Elsewhere in the world, the spread of the Cold War was facilitated by the process of decolonization and the breakup of European colonial empires in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Africa. Even though decolonization and the Cold War were separate phenomena, they greatly influenced each other at every stage. Decolonization created opportunities for the Soviet Union and other Communist states, especially the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Cuba, East Germany, and North Korea, to provide weapons, training, and financing to Communist guerrilla forces that were striving to end colonial rule and gain power. The United States, for its part, supported antiCommunist governments in former colonial areas as they waged counterinsurgency campaigns against Soviet-backed guerrillas. These developments, and the seizure of","PeriodicalId":45551,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cold War Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44532514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
James G. Hershberg, David Greenberg, Barbara A. Perry, Luther Spoehr, Fredrik Logevall
Editor's Introduction: Many thousands of books—more than 40,000 by most estimates—and countless articles have appeared over the past 60 years about the short life and interrupted presidency of John F. Kennedy, the youngest man ever elected as U.S. president. During his presidency he had to contend with two of the most severe Cold War crises—the Berlin crisis of 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, both of which came perilously close to provoking war between the Soviet Union and the United States—and he also significantly escalated U.S. military involvement in Vietnam and tried unsuccessfully to overthrow Fidel Castro's Communist regime in Cuba. Kennedy had an ambitious domestic agenda, but, except for an important tax cut, he accomplished almost none of his domestic priorities, unlike his successor, Lyndon Johnson, who accomplished a great deal, especially on civil rights. Nonetheless, when polling organizations ask the public about their assessments of U.S. presidents, Kennedy invariably is rated well above Johnson. This has less to do with Kennedy's meager achievements as president than with his handsome appearance, his charisma, and the way his life ended. The assassination of Kennedy by Lee Harvey Oswald in Dallas on 22 November 1963 preserved the image of the glamorous young president in public memory, largely omitting his egregious flaws and the paucity of his achievements in office.Fredrik Logevall, a distinguished historian of U.S. foreign policy and long-time member of the JCWS Editorial Board (and a colleague and friend of mine at Harvard), is completing an authoritative, two-volume biography of Kennedy for Random House. Because of the Kennedy administration's crucial role in the Cold War, we are publishing a special forum about the Logevall biography. We have asked four experts to write commentaries on the first volume (they will also write about the second volume once it is out), and we are pleased to include Logevall's reply to the commentaries.In 2013, on the fiftieth anniversary of John F. Kennedy's assassination, Jill Abramson complained in The New York Times Book Review that despite the publication of some 40,000 books (and counting) devoted to the slain president since his death, there were “surprisingly few good ones, and not one really outstanding one.” Unlike Thomas Jefferson (Dumas Malone), Abraham Lincoln (David Herbert Donald, among others), Dwight D. Eisenhower (Stephen Ambrose), Lyndon B. Johnson (Robert Caro), and Richard M. Nixon (Garry Wills et al.), Kennedy the man and his presidency had yet to inspire a truly classic study. She acknowledged that many fine works had appeared, although some were hagiographic, or appeared too soon to exploit vital sources released later, or both (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, and Theodore Sorenson, Kennedy, portraits by White House aides, rushed out less than two years after Dallas, fall into this last category). Conversely, other authors aimed to rip the gauze off
即使关于肯尼迪的文献从来没有达到亚伯拉罕·林肯(亚伯拉罕·林肯在传记研究中的地位仅次于耶稣基督)的惊人数量，也没有人能指望阅读关于这位遇刺总统的全部著作。现在，在未来的一段时间里，由普利策奖得主、哈佛大学历史学家弗雷德里克·罗格瓦尔(Fredrik Logevall)撰写的新书《肯尼迪:美国世纪的成长，1917-1956》将成为研究肯尼迪的权威著作。这本书有两卷，所以第一卷在这位年轻的马萨诸塞州参议员开始竞选白宫之前就结束了。请继续关注这部引人入胜的故事:这位爱尔兰马铃薯饥荒难民的曾孙如何成为首位信奉罗马天主教的美国总统(乔·拜登(Joe Biden)是第二位)，以及他如何在动荡的总统任期内执政，任期仅持续了1000天，但却以悲剧和令人震惊的方式结束，似乎永远烙印在美国人的心中。除了写更多关于肯尼迪的书的情感理由之外，还有什么值得探索的新东西吗?自上一部学术传记(罗伯特·达莱克的《未完成的一生:约翰·f·肯尼迪，1917-1963》)于2003年出版以来的20年里，一个档案宝藏已经曝光，其中包括肯尼迪的父母，老约瑟夫·肯尼迪和罗斯·肯尼迪的大量文件;杰奎琳·肯尼迪引人入胜的八小时口述历史，由小阿瑟·施莱辛格(Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.)在遇刺几个月后主持;米勒中心发布的爱德华·肯尼迪口述历史项目;罗伯特·肯尼迪的部分文件;以及取消对其他家庭成员的采访作者们挖掘了这些资源，对他们的主题进行了初步的介绍，但没有人像罗格瓦尔那样，为了讲述肯尼迪的完整人生故事而重新审视这些资源。此外，以前的机密文件已经公布，并将特别启发第2卷。正如我在米勒中心的同事马克·塞尔弗斯通(Marc Selverstone)所观察到的那样，肯尼迪的文学作品涵盖了一条弧线，始于他去世后不久，是卡米洛特圆桌骑士的回忆录，讲述了一位下台总统的黄金时代，充满了怀旧的故事。施莱辛格、西奥多·索伦森、皮埃尔·塞林格、大卫·鲍尔斯、肯尼斯·奥唐奈、保罗·费伊和本杰明·布拉德利都为他们的英雄献上了赞歌，还有总统的长期秘书伊芙琳·林肯，甚至肯尼迪的英国保姆莫德·肖。不可避免地，修正主义随之而来，从20世纪70年代开始，揭示了“卡梅洛特的阴暗面”。第三波学术研究，包括罗格瓦尔的新书和他2012年获奖的关于越南战争的研究，以一种平衡的方式审视了这位第35任总统——他的成功与失败、胜利与悲剧、英雄特质和深刻的性格缺陷。然而，即使读者熟悉美国历史上最强大的政治王朝流传的丰富信息，他们也会在这本最新的传记中发现很多有启发性的东西。没有任何作者对肯尼迪总统图书馆的文件线索和其他可用资源采取了更深入、更详细或更彻底细致入微的方法。罗格瓦尔对年轻的约翰·肯尼迪的大量信件、学生论文和哈佛大学毕业论文、二战前他在欧洲旅行时的日记、来自南太平洋战区的信件，以及作为退伍军人为赫斯特报纸起草的关于联合国成立会议和英国1945年议会选举的新闻文章进行了细致的分析。肯尼迪的性格、智慧、观察力和世界观的形成，正如罗格瓦尔编织档案材料的线索一样，形成了一幅丰富的挂毯。肯尼迪在哈佛求学期间，在二战前夕游历欧洲，他不像亚历克西斯·德·托克维尔(Alexis de Tocqueville)那样深刻地观察了19世纪30年代的美国民主。然而，罗格瓦尔发现了肯尼迪与他父亲狭隘的个性、孤立主义的世界观和绥和政策截然不同的根本原因——这对儿子成功的政治生涯是绝对必要的。这本书对肯尼迪经典的全面补充来自于一位来自瑞典的著名外交政策历史学家的敏锐眼光，这使得罗格瓦尔避免了以美国为中心的卡米洛特传奇的圣徒化。用“人生与时代”的方法来写传记往往是有启示意义的，但当传记作者的生活与历史上清晰的界限直接对应时，这种方法是最有成效的。
{"title":"The Making of a Cold War President","authors":"James G. Hershberg, David Greenberg, Barbara A. Perry, Luther Spoehr, Fredrik Logevall","doi":"10.1162/jcws_c_01146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_c_01146","url":null,"abstract":"Editor's Introduction: Many thousands of books—more than 40,000 by most estimates—and countless articles have appeared over the past 60 years about the short life and interrupted presidency of John F. Kennedy, the youngest man ever elected as U.S. president. During his presidency he had to contend with two of the most severe Cold War crises—the Berlin crisis of 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, both of which came perilously close to provoking war between the Soviet Union and the United States—and he also significantly escalated U.S. military involvement in Vietnam and tried unsuccessfully to overthrow Fidel Castro's Communist regime in Cuba. Kennedy had an ambitious domestic agenda, but, except for an important tax cut, he accomplished almost none of his domestic priorities, unlike his successor, Lyndon Johnson, who accomplished a great deal, especially on civil rights. Nonetheless, when polling organizations ask the public about their assessments of U.S. presidents, Kennedy invariably is rated well above Johnson. This has less to do with Kennedy's meager achievements as president than with his handsome appearance, his charisma, and the way his life ended. The assassination of Kennedy by Lee Harvey Oswald in Dallas on 22 November 1963 preserved the image of the glamorous young president in public memory, largely omitting his egregious flaws and the paucity of his achievements in office.Fredrik Logevall, a distinguished historian of U.S. foreign policy and long-time member of the JCWS Editorial Board (and a colleague and friend of mine at Harvard), is completing an authoritative, two-volume biography of Kennedy for Random House. Because of the Kennedy administration's crucial role in the Cold War, we are publishing a special forum about the Logevall biography. We have asked four experts to write commentaries on the first volume (they will also write about the second volume once it is out), and we are pleased to include Logevall's reply to the commentaries.In 2013, on the fiftieth anniversary of John F. Kennedy's assassination, Jill Abramson complained in The New York Times Book Review that despite the publication of some 40,000 books (and counting) devoted to the slain president since his death, there were “surprisingly few good ones, and not one really outstanding one.” Unlike Thomas Jefferson (Dumas Malone), Abraham Lincoln (David Herbert Donald, among others), Dwight D. Eisenhower (Stephen Ambrose), Lyndon B. Johnson (Robert Caro), and Richard M. Nixon (Garry Wills et al.), Kennedy the man and his presidency had yet to inspire a truly classic study. She acknowledged that many fine works had appeared, although some were hagiographic, or appeared too soon to exploit vital sources released later, or both (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, and Theodore Sorenson, Kennedy, portraits by White House aides, rushed out less than two years after Dallas, fall into this last category). Conversely, other authors aimed to rip the gauze off","PeriodicalId":45551,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cold War Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135495460","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article focuses on the popular image of the nuclear future of Czechoslovakia in the mid-1950s and analyzes the push for a Czechoslovak-Soviet nuclear utopia. The article describes the foreign orientation of Czechoslovakia's nuclear research through 1955 and the first joint nuclear activities between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. The article also shows how Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship was integrated in practice into the image of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and it analyzes the image of civilian nuclear activities that was presented to Czechs and Slovaks in a campaign of popularization in the mid-1950s. Soviet “nuclear assistance” to Czechoslovakia, announced in January 1955, corresponded with a change in the popular vision of the nuclear age in Czechoslovakia when a remote nuclear future was transformed into a “lived utopia.”
{"title":"Atoms for Socialism: The Birth of a Czechoslovak-Soviet Nuclear Utopia","authors":"Michaela Šmidrkalová","doi":"10.1162/jcws_a_01161","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_01161","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article focuses on the popular image of the nuclear future of Czechoslovakia in the mid-1950s and analyzes the push for a Czechoslovak-Soviet nuclear utopia. The article describes the foreign orientation of Czechoslovakia's nuclear research through 1955 and the first joint nuclear activities between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. The article also shows how Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship was integrated in practice into the image of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and it analyzes the image of civilian nuclear activities that was presented to Czechs and Slovaks in a campaign of popularization in the mid-1950s. Soviet “nuclear assistance” to Czechoslovakia, announced in January 1955, corresponded with a change in the popular vision of the nuclear age in Czechoslovakia when a remote nuclear future was transformed into a “lived utopia.”","PeriodicalId":45551,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cold War Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135495449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
U.S. international broadcasting platforms—Voice of America (VOA) in Washington, DC, and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) in Munich and since 1995 in Prague—have been continually broadcasting to native Russian speakers in their own language from the Second World War through the Cold War into the post-Communist period, especially now with Russia's invasion of Ukraine. As is the case today, the Cold War period was marked by high tensions between Washington and Moscow and creative programming by the VOA and RFE/RL. The two stations transmitted sophisticated, popular broadcasts into the Soviet Union featuring current news, opinion programs, music, and cultural personalities on a daily basis.The two U.S. shortwave radios offered competing programing approaches during the Cold War, a duality that has now been reconstructed and detailed by scholar-practitioner Mark Pomar of the University of Texas in his new book, Cold War Radio: Russian Broadcasts of the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Having worked in high positions in both organizations, he labels VOA's Cold War Russian programing “purist journalism”—straightforward, objective journalism—and Radio Liberty's approach to be strategic, indeed confrontational journalism. Both approaches amounted to “war by non-military means” against Communist ideology and autocratic Soviet governance.Other Western-oriented, anti-Communist radios included the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) from London, Radio France International (RFI) from Paris, West Germany's Deutsche Welle (DW) from Bonn, and Israel's Kol Yisrael (KL) from Tel Aviv. These broadcasters offered similar twin approaches.Individually and in the aggregate, Western broadcasters provided Soviet audiences with news and information they could not otherwise obtain, and they thus helped to erode the Soviet regime's grip on its population. One significant reason for the crumbling of the Berlin Wall and fall of the Iron Curtain was the cumulative impact of international broadcasting.The Russian services of VOA and RL were separate from each other in programing, personnel, funding, and space. Both radios, however, targeted Russian speakers throughout the Soviet Union and successfully attracted large, important, diverse, and loyal audiences despite expensive, systematic jamming by the Soviet state security apparatus and Communist Party. Analytic practitioners L. Eugene Parta and A. Ross Johnson published a book in 2010 discussing the estimated sizes of the broadcasts’ audiences, Cold War Broadcasting: Impact on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Kremlin authorities forbade people to listen, and the regime spent many millions of rubles trying to block listeners from hearing the broadcasts. But behind apartment doors and walls, inside bathrooms, under bed blankets, and in forested dachas, Soviet citizens who wanted accurate information about the world persistently listened to the shortwave radio channels.More than three decades af
美国的国际广播平台——华盛顿的美国之音(VOA)和慕尼黑的自由欧洲电台/自由电台(RFE/RL)，以及1995年在布拉格的自由欧洲电台(RFE/RL)——从第二次世界大战到冷战，再到后共产主义时期，特别是现在俄罗斯入侵乌克兰，一直在用母语向母语为俄语的人广播。就像今天的情况一样，冷战时期的特点是华盛顿和莫斯科之间的高度紧张关系，以及美国之音和自由欧洲电台/自由电台的创造性节目。这两家电台向苏联境内播送复杂而受欢迎的广播节目，每天播放时事新闻、观点节目、音乐和文化名人。这两种美国短波电台在冷战期间提供了相互竞争的节目方式，德克萨斯大学的学者兼从业者马克·波马尔(Mark Pomar)在他的新书《冷战电台:美国之音和自由欧洲电台/自由电台的俄罗斯广播》中对这种二元性进行了重建和详细描述。他曾在这两个机构担任要职，他把美国之音冷战时期的俄罗斯节目称为“纯粹主义新闻”——直截了当、客观的新闻——而自由电台的做法是战略性的，实际上是对抗性的新闻。这两种方法都相当于“非军事手段的战争”，反对共产主义意识形态和苏联的专制统治。其他以西方为导向的反共电台包括伦敦的英国广播公司(BBC)、巴黎的法国国际广播电台(RFI)、西德波恩的德国之声(DW)和特拉维夫的以色列之声(KL)。这些广播公司提供了类似的双重方法。无论是个人还是整体，西方广播公司为苏联观众提供了他们无法从其他渠道获得的新闻和信息，从而帮助削弱了苏联政权对其人民的控制。柏林墙倒塌和铁幕倒塌的一个重要原因是国际广播的累积影响。俄罗斯的VOA和RL在节目、人员、资金和空间上都是分开的。然而，这两种电台都以全苏联的俄语使用者为目标，成功地吸引了大批重要的、多样化的忠实听众，尽管苏联国家安全机构和共产党对其进行了昂贵的系统干扰。分析实践者L. Eugene Parta和a . Ross Johnson在2010年出版了一本书，讨论了广播听众的估计规模，《冷战广播:对苏联和东欧的影响》。克里姆林宫当局禁止人们收听广播，政府花费了数百万卢布试图阻止听众收听广播。但在公寓的门和墙后面，在浴室里，在床上的毯子下，在森林茂密的别墅里，想要准确了解世界信息的苏联公民坚持收听短波广播频道。在苏联帝国崩溃三十多年后，弗拉基米尔·普京(Vladimir Putin)在俄罗斯联邦的独裁统治和对乌克兰的残酷征服战争让这些观众重新振作起来。自2022年2月以来，美国之音和RFE/RL的俄语服务获得了新生。这两种服务再次吸引了大量观众，他们希望了解克里姆林宫政治、军事战略和人员、战场位置以及俄罗斯军队命运的最新报道。如今的社交媒体平台不再由短波或中波服务，而是通过互联网吸引了数百万人;事实上，现在各军种之间的接触比冷战时期要多。例如，RFE/RL的主打俄语节目《Current Times》在Facebook上的收视率增加了两倍多，在YouTube上的收视率增加了四倍多。爱沙尼亚前总统、职业克里姆林宫观察家托马斯·亨德里克·伊尔维斯说，这些庞大的听众对乌克兰的战争努力“至关重要”。波玛尔的历史是帕塔和约翰逊的书的值得续篇。作为这门学科的学生，我发现波马尔对里根政府期间美俄两军种的俄语节目、政策和辩论的内部探索是有见地的，组织连贯，写作严谨，与普京领导下的俄罗斯出现的严重局势相关。自从俄罗斯对乌克兰开战以来，RL的俄罗斯观众急剧增加，尤其是互联网上《当代时报》节目的收视率。另一个得到承认的迹象是，俄罗斯当局关押了数量过多的RL记者。此外，RFE/RL和美国之音的节目在基辅、柏林、巴黎、伦敦和纽约获得了大量值得称道的关注，其中包括哥伦比亚广播公司著名的周日节目《60分钟》的大量观众，该节目用15分钟的片段展示了RL在普京统治下的俄罗斯的受欢迎程度。Pomar拥有特殊的资质。
{"title":"<i>Cold War Radio: The Russian Broadcasts of the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty</i> by Mark G. Pomar","authors":"Thomas A. Dine","doi":"10.1162/jcws_r_01152","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_r_01152","url":null,"abstract":"U.S. international broadcasting platforms—Voice of America (VOA) in Washington, DC, and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) in Munich and since 1995 in Prague—have been continually broadcasting to native Russian speakers in their own language from the Second World War through the Cold War into the post-Communist period, especially now with Russia's invasion of Ukraine. As is the case today, the Cold War period was marked by high tensions between Washington and Moscow and creative programming by the VOA and RFE/RL. The two stations transmitted sophisticated, popular broadcasts into the Soviet Union featuring current news, opinion programs, music, and cultural personalities on a daily basis.The two U.S. shortwave radios offered competing programing approaches during the Cold War, a duality that has now been reconstructed and detailed by scholar-practitioner Mark Pomar of the University of Texas in his new book, Cold War Radio: Russian Broadcasts of the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Having worked in high positions in both organizations, he labels VOA's Cold War Russian programing “purist journalism”—straightforward, objective journalism—and Radio Liberty's approach to be strategic, indeed confrontational journalism. Both approaches amounted to “war by non-military means” against Communist ideology and autocratic Soviet governance.Other Western-oriented, anti-Communist radios included the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) from London, Radio France International (RFI) from Paris, West Germany's Deutsche Welle (DW) from Bonn, and Israel's Kol Yisrael (KL) from Tel Aviv. These broadcasters offered similar twin approaches.Individually and in the aggregate, Western broadcasters provided Soviet audiences with news and information they could not otherwise obtain, and they thus helped to erode the Soviet regime's grip on its population. One significant reason for the crumbling of the Berlin Wall and fall of the Iron Curtain was the cumulative impact of international broadcasting.The Russian services of VOA and RL were separate from each other in programing, personnel, funding, and space. Both radios, however, targeted Russian speakers throughout the Soviet Union and successfully attracted large, important, diverse, and loyal audiences despite expensive, systematic jamming by the Soviet state security apparatus and Communist Party. Analytic practitioners L. Eugene Parta and A. Ross Johnson published a book in 2010 discussing the estimated sizes of the broadcasts’ audiences, Cold War Broadcasting: Impact on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Kremlin authorities forbade people to listen, and the regime spent many millions of rubles trying to block listeners from hearing the broadcasts. But behind apartment doors and walls, inside bathrooms, under bed blankets, and in forested dachas, Soviet citizens who wanted accurate information about the world persistently listened to the shortwave radio channels.More than three decades af","PeriodicalId":45551,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cold War Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135495452","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Over the past decade, scholarship on Xinjiang (or East Turkestan) has undergone remarkable changes. Whereas previous scholars were limited to a source base consisting chiefly of Anglo-American consular archives, published Chinese newspaper accounts, and the memoirs of exiled Turkic refugees, a new generation of historians has been able to make ample use of Chinese and Russian archives, along with rare collections of Uyghur documents preserved abroad. Of these three new source bases, however, the Russian archives clearly still offer the greatest untapped potential. Because the Soviet Union played a pivotal role in political developments within Xinjiang throughout the first half of the twentieth century, this is not a negligible lacuna.In part for this reason, Jamil Hasanli's new study of Soviet influence in Xinjiang has been met with great expectations in the field. Focusing on the period of preeminent Soviet involvement in the politics of Chinese-ruled Xinjiang (1930–1949), Hasanli's book is chock full of statistical data and previously classified top-level reports from the Russian archives. The majority of these highly sensitive archival sources have not yet been consulted by any other scholar. This fact alone is cause for celebration. All future scholarship on Xinjiang must consult this book. Hasanli has uncovered archival gems for nearly every major political development during the turbulent reigns of Chinese warlords Jin Shuren (1928–1933) and Sheng Shicai (1933–1944), along with the short but crucial administration of the Nationalist government (1944–1949). Readers will learn, for instance, new details about the fate of the Hui warlords Ma Zhongying and Ma Hushan, who opposed Sheng Shicai for many years in the 1930s, as well as prominent Uyghur politicians such as Khoja Niyaz Haji, who joined Sheng's government in 1934 and was later executed. Perhaps the most precious new insights relate to the visit of Sheng and his wife to Moscow in 1938 to meet with Joseph Stalin and other top Soviet leaders. Hasanli provides a detailed record of the various meetings in which Sheng took part, including his shocking, repeated requests to join the Communist Party, secede from the Republic of China, and overthrow the government of Chiang Kai-shek. After discussing how Sheng fell from political grace in 1944, Hasanli regales the reader with extraordinary detail on the Kazak rebel Osman Batur's meetings with Mongolian leader Khorloogiin Choibalsan, the political career of the Turkic leader Elihan Tore and Soviet battlefield maneuvers on behalf of the East Turkestan Republic.Despite this rich material, the book has several grave shortcomings. Fascinating as all the new political revelations and narrative details are, Hasanli rarely integrates them into an organized analysis of the bigger picture, nor does he engage seriously with the insights of scholars who have made use of Chinese archives over the past decade. (Most egregious in this regard, especially in li
{"title":"<i>Soviet Policy in Xinjiang: Stalin and the National Movement in Eastern Turkistan</i> by Jamil Hasanli","authors":"Justin M. Jacobs","doi":"10.1162/jcws_r_01166","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_r_01166","url":null,"abstract":"Over the past decade, scholarship on Xinjiang (or East Turkestan) has undergone remarkable changes. Whereas previous scholars were limited to a source base consisting chiefly of Anglo-American consular archives, published Chinese newspaper accounts, and the memoirs of exiled Turkic refugees, a new generation of historians has been able to make ample use of Chinese and Russian archives, along with rare collections of Uyghur documents preserved abroad. Of these three new source bases, however, the Russian archives clearly still offer the greatest untapped potential. Because the Soviet Union played a pivotal role in political developments within Xinjiang throughout the first half of the twentieth century, this is not a negligible lacuna.In part for this reason, Jamil Hasanli's new study of Soviet influence in Xinjiang has been met with great expectations in the field. Focusing on the period of preeminent Soviet involvement in the politics of Chinese-ruled Xinjiang (1930–1949), Hasanli's book is chock full of statistical data and previously classified top-level reports from the Russian archives. The majority of these highly sensitive archival sources have not yet been consulted by any other scholar. This fact alone is cause for celebration. All future scholarship on Xinjiang must consult this book. Hasanli has uncovered archival gems for nearly every major political development during the turbulent reigns of Chinese warlords Jin Shuren (1928–1933) and Sheng Shicai (1933–1944), along with the short but crucial administration of the Nationalist government (1944–1949). Readers will learn, for instance, new details about the fate of the Hui warlords Ma Zhongying and Ma Hushan, who opposed Sheng Shicai for many years in the 1930s, as well as prominent Uyghur politicians such as Khoja Niyaz Haji, who joined Sheng's government in 1934 and was later executed. Perhaps the most precious new insights relate to the visit of Sheng and his wife to Moscow in 1938 to meet with Joseph Stalin and other top Soviet leaders. Hasanli provides a detailed record of the various meetings in which Sheng took part, including his shocking, repeated requests to join the Communist Party, secede from the Republic of China, and overthrow the government of Chiang Kai-shek. After discussing how Sheng fell from political grace in 1944, Hasanli regales the reader with extraordinary detail on the Kazak rebel Osman Batur's meetings with Mongolian leader Khorloogiin Choibalsan, the political career of the Turkic leader Elihan Tore and Soviet battlefield maneuvers on behalf of the East Turkestan Republic.Despite this rich material, the book has several grave shortcomings. Fascinating as all the new political revelations and narrative details are, Hasanli rarely integrates them into an organized analysis of the bigger picture, nor does he engage seriously with the insights of scholars who have made use of Chinese archives over the past decade. (Most egregious in this regard, especially in li","PeriodicalId":45551,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cold War Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135495456","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The vast majority of Americans alive today who have no first-hand memories of the years 1965 to 1980 may nonetheless have some awareness of the U.S. debacle in Vietnam, the opening to China in 1971–1972, the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the related Arab oil embargo, the Watergate scandal and the resignation of Richard Nixon from the presidency in 1974, the Iranian revolution in 1979, and the subsequent taking of U.S. diplomats as hostages by the virulently anti-American leaders of the new Islamic Republic of Iran. Those with a bit more interest in international affairs might also be aware of the easing of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War rivalry in the détente of the early 1970s, a policy that was nearly discredited by the end of the decade. This latter puzzle is the topic of Galen Jackson's deeply researched book, A Lost Peace: Great Power Politics and the Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967–1979.For scholars of this period, the challenge is not the lack of availability of original source material. In fact, a goldmine of formerly classified documents have been released, particularly from U.S. archives, including the tape-recorded conversations of President Lyndon Johnson and his successor, Richard Nixon. Taping may have ended with Nixon's departure, but by now most of the records from the U.S. State Department and National Security Council (NSC), and even many from key intelligence agencies, have been released, and scores of the participants in policymaking have written memoirs, published their diaries, and given extensive interviews. The sources are rich not only from U.S. archives but also, increasingly, from Israel and the former Soviet Union, along with a few accounts from seemingly reliable Egyptian, Syrian, Palestinian, and other Arab sources. In short, researchers have been nearly overwhelmed with the immense abundance of sources.The challenge for scholars has been to master this huge amount of material while finding a distinctive angle to develop. Jackson has done this well in a relatively short but thoroughly footnoted book, the major thesis of which is that the policy of détente espoused by Nixon in the early 1970s fell victim to a stubborn U.S. Cold War mindset, particularly but not exclusively represented by Henry Kissinger during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Kissinger's disinclination to work with the Soviet Union for an overall Arab-Israeli peace was aggravated by well-known features of the U.S. political system, such as the electoral cycle, the influence of pressure groups, and the role of Congress. In Jackson's view, the result was the Carter administration's abandonment of its initial search for a comprehensive peace and its shift to brokering an Egyptian-Israeli agreement as the more realistic, but less consequential, alternative. Jackson claims that the U.S. government's desire to “expel” the Soviet Union from the Middle East, or at least to weaken Moscow's influence there, was more important than Soviet rigidity and unwillingness to cooper
{"title":"<i>A Lost Peace: Great Power Politics and the Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967–1979</i> by Galen Jackson","authors":"William B. Quandt","doi":"10.1162/jcws_r_01165","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_r_01165","url":null,"abstract":"The vast majority of Americans alive today who have no first-hand memories of the years 1965 to 1980 may nonetheless have some awareness of the U.S. debacle in Vietnam, the opening to China in 1971–1972, the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the related Arab oil embargo, the Watergate scandal and the resignation of Richard Nixon from the presidency in 1974, the Iranian revolution in 1979, and the subsequent taking of U.S. diplomats as hostages by the virulently anti-American leaders of the new Islamic Republic of Iran. Those with a bit more interest in international affairs might also be aware of the easing of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War rivalry in the détente of the early 1970s, a policy that was nearly discredited by the end of the decade. This latter puzzle is the topic of Galen Jackson's deeply researched book, A Lost Peace: Great Power Politics and the Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967–1979.For scholars of this period, the challenge is not the lack of availability of original source material. In fact, a goldmine of formerly classified documents have been released, particularly from U.S. archives, including the tape-recorded conversations of President Lyndon Johnson and his successor, Richard Nixon. Taping may have ended with Nixon's departure, but by now most of the records from the U.S. State Department and National Security Council (NSC), and even many from key intelligence agencies, have been released, and scores of the participants in policymaking have written memoirs, published their diaries, and given extensive interviews. The sources are rich not only from U.S. archives but also, increasingly, from Israel and the former Soviet Union, along with a few accounts from seemingly reliable Egyptian, Syrian, Palestinian, and other Arab sources. In short, researchers have been nearly overwhelmed with the immense abundance of sources.The challenge for scholars has been to master this huge amount of material while finding a distinctive angle to develop. Jackson has done this well in a relatively short but thoroughly footnoted book, the major thesis of which is that the policy of détente espoused by Nixon in the early 1970s fell victim to a stubborn U.S. Cold War mindset, particularly but not exclusively represented by Henry Kissinger during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Kissinger's disinclination to work with the Soviet Union for an overall Arab-Israeli peace was aggravated by well-known features of the U.S. political system, such as the electoral cycle, the influence of pressure groups, and the role of Congress. In Jackson's view, the result was the Carter administration's abandonment of its initial search for a comprehensive peace and its shift to brokering an Egyptian-Israeli agreement as the more realistic, but less consequential, alternative. Jackson claims that the U.S. government's desire to “expel” the Soviet Union from the Middle East, or at least to weaken Moscow's influence there, was more important than Soviet rigidity and unwillingness to cooper","PeriodicalId":45551,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cold War Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135495465","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Histories of the end of the Cold War have credited a range of actors, from leaders and diplomats to grassroots activists in peace and human-rights movements, some of whom engaged in collaboration across state borders. Stephanie Freeman's Dreams for a Decade is unusual in its focus on both top political figures and transnational movements. She places them all in the category of “nuclear abolitionists” and argues that their commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons helped bring the Cold War and the U.S.-Soviet arms race to an end and contributed to the emergence (at least temporarily) of a reunified, peaceful, and democratic Europe. Freeman excavates an impressive range of English-language primary and secondary sources, from archives of popular movements to declassified records of U.S. National Security Council deliberations. She relies on copies of materials from the National Security Archive (a private repository in Washington, DC) and the Vitalii Kataev collection at the Hoover Institution Archives for insights into the Soviet side.The book opens by citing The Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race, the document drafted mainly by Randall Forsberg, founder of the Boston-based Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies (IDDS), which launched the campaign for a Nuclear Weapons Freeze. Freeman then introduces a parallel initiative, promoted in England by historian E. P. Thompson and political scientist Mary Kaldor, among others, that led to the formation of the European Nuclear Disarmament (END) movement for a nuclear-free Europe. Freeman has worked in the archives of the Freeze movement at Swarthmore College and of END at the London School of Economics. One of the book's most valuable contributions is her detailed recounting of the internal debates within the movements that produced distinct but complementary policies.Another key contribution is Freeman's focus on the level of national political leadership in the United States and the Soviet Union, where she identifies two leading abolitionist leaders: U.S. President Ronald Reagan and the reformist Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Among their achievements was the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, signed in December 1987, the first agreement that led to the elimination of entire classes of nuclear weapons—intermediate and shorter-range nuclear missiles. Freeman's archival research on the U.S. side is particularly impressive, as she traces the impact of the Freeze and END movements on the internal deliberations of the Reagan administration. Popular pressure spurred the administration to propose arms talks with the USSR much sooner than it would otherwise have done and to introduce numerous initiatives, such as the “zero option” for INF, and, paradoxically, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to create a system of defenses against ballistic missiles. SDI, dubbed “Star Wars” by its critics, nearly derailed the process of nuclear disarmament that both Reagan and Gorbachev endorsed. T
里根的副总统和继任者布什是核裁军的主要反对者。当戈尔巴乔夫接受“终结”运动的目标并推动欧洲全面无核化时，布什和他的国家安全顾问布伦特·斯考克罗夫特(Brent Scowcroft)担心，部署在西德的“长矛”(Lance)短程核导弹现代化的计划会受到破坏。如果说“冻结”、“终结”、戈尔巴乔夫和里根是弗里曼故事中的英雄，那么布什无疑是反派。她认为，他在回应戈尔巴乔夫的“欧洲共同家园”愿景时犹豫不决，赞成按照美国的条件解决问题，这为目前的惨淡局面奠定了基础——欧洲重新分裂的局面再次出现，除了铁幕向东推进，以及俄罗斯和美国新的核部署。弗里曼对1989年12月马耳他峰会的处理有效地揭示了布什缺乏“远见”(他自己用这个词来提醒自己应该展示什么)，特别是与戈尔巴乔夫和欧洲裁军和人权支持者的跨国联盟相比。这本书的一个引人入胜的贡献是它追踪了END活动家与捷克斯洛伐克《77宪章》、波兰运动Wolność i Pokój(自由与和平)和东德女权主义者之间的联系。苏联集团的积极分子批评欧洲的裁军支持者对人权关注不够，以及共产党当局对任何独立活动的镇压——即使是支持政府表面上支持的和平倡议。丹尼尔·托马斯和萨拉·斯奈德的研究引起了人们对“赫尔辛基效应”的关注——Václav哈维尔等人试图利用共产党政府在欧洲安全与合作会议人权协议上的签名来要求他们遵守。但是，对于东方阵营的活动人士如何说服END运动接受他们的目标，以及后者如何影响戈尔巴乔夫关于“欧洲共同家园”的思想，Freeman的书是最详细的描述(尽管在这里，人们希望找到比作者对泰尔·塔伊罗夫、阿列克谢·潘金和尤里·朱可夫的证词更多的证据，他们都没有接触过苏联高层决策)。Freeman将END的策略演变与《冻结》的策略进行了比较，这很有启发意义。“冻结”运动引起了大众的注意，导致地方和州级的公民投票支持该倡议，并于1982年6月在纽约市举行了大规模集会。早在福斯伯格的多年战略设想中，“冻结”就进入了党派政治领域，许多民主党人采用了淡化版，包括里根1984年的总统竞选对手沃尔特·蒙代尔。这场运动的大部分注意力集中在立法上，包括削减特定武器资金的努力(第128-129页)。随着END扩大了视野，Freeze缩小了战略范围。本可以加强这项出色研究的一个因素是讨论常规部队与核裁军之间的关系。欧洲和平研究人员曾试图通过推动所谓的非进攻性或非挑衅性防御来加强他们的核裁军理由，他们的工作最终体现在戈尔巴乔夫1988年12月在联合国发表的演讲中，他宣布单方面裁减50万苏联军队，并对武装力量进行防御性重组。在美国，福斯伯格和其他批评核威慑与军事干预之间存在“致命联系”的人，也在寻求通过降低常规力量的进攻潜力，使核武器变得多余的方法。弗里曼提到，布什总统邀请福斯伯格在马耳他峰会前夕与他会晤，讨论军备控制问题和欧洲安全问题。弗里曼暗示，这次邀请只不过是对一位著名的反核活动家的一种礼貌姿态(第237页)，但事实上，正如福斯伯格的IDDS记录(最近在康奈尔大学图书馆提供)所显示的那样，这次会议是实质性的。福斯伯格利用这个机会试图说服布什，重组和削减常规力量将使欧洲在核裁军方面变得安全，但最终他不愿接受这种说法。冷战结束30多年后，随着俄罗斯野蛮入侵乌克兰，欧洲再次面临核战争的前景。废除核武器的梦想，在这本出色的研究中如此有效地叙述，仍然没有实现。
{"title":"<i>Dreams for a Decade: International Nuclear Abolitionism and the End of the Cold War</i> by Stephanie L. Freeman","authors":"Matthew A. Evangelista","doi":"10.1162/jcws_r_01164","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_r_01164","url":null,"abstract":"Histories of the end of the Cold War have credited a range of actors, from leaders and diplomats to grassroots activists in peace and human-rights movements, some of whom engaged in collaboration across state borders. Stephanie Freeman's Dreams for a Decade is unusual in its focus on both top political figures and transnational movements. She places them all in the category of “nuclear abolitionists” and argues that their commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons helped bring the Cold War and the U.S.-Soviet arms race to an end and contributed to the emergence (at least temporarily) of a reunified, peaceful, and democratic Europe. Freeman excavates an impressive range of English-language primary and secondary sources, from archives of popular movements to declassified records of U.S. National Security Council deliberations. She relies on copies of materials from the National Security Archive (a private repository in Washington, DC) and the Vitalii Kataev collection at the Hoover Institution Archives for insights into the Soviet side.The book opens by citing The Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race, the document drafted mainly by Randall Forsberg, founder of the Boston-based Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies (IDDS), which launched the campaign for a Nuclear Weapons Freeze. Freeman then introduces a parallel initiative, promoted in England by historian E. P. Thompson and political scientist Mary Kaldor, among others, that led to the formation of the European Nuclear Disarmament (END) movement for a nuclear-free Europe. Freeman has worked in the archives of the Freeze movement at Swarthmore College and of END at the London School of Economics. One of the book's most valuable contributions is her detailed recounting of the internal debates within the movements that produced distinct but complementary policies.Another key contribution is Freeman's focus on the level of national political leadership in the United States and the Soviet Union, where she identifies two leading abolitionist leaders: U.S. President Ronald Reagan and the reformist Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Among their achievements was the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, signed in December 1987, the first agreement that led to the elimination of entire classes of nuclear weapons—intermediate and shorter-range nuclear missiles. Freeman's archival research on the U.S. side is particularly impressive, as she traces the impact of the Freeze and END movements on the internal deliberations of the Reagan administration. Popular pressure spurred the administration to propose arms talks with the USSR much sooner than it would otherwise have done and to introduce numerous initiatives, such as the “zero option” for INF, and, paradoxically, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to create a system of defenses against ballistic missiles. SDI, dubbed “Star Wars” by its critics, nearly derailed the process of nuclear disarmament that both Reagan and Gorbachev endorsed. T","PeriodicalId":45551,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cold War Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135495454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Has Russia's invasion of sovereign Ukraine, with its attendant atrocities, relegated the 1975 Helsinki agreement and its advocacy of human rights to the dustbin of history? Two very different books, both by former Moscow correspondents of major Western newspapers, disagree. Peter Osnos, a former correspondent for The Washington Post, wants us “to believe [that] the Helsinki accords changed the world” by advancing both human rights and security. Richard Davy, who was a correspondent for The Times of London, is not so certain.The first book is primarily a memoir highlighting the contributions by the author, his wife, and his father-in-law, U.S. ambassador Albert W. Sherer, to the shaping of the Helsinki process and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in its early stages. It includes little on CSCE that is not already known but sheds light on the trajectory of the Helsinki Watch group, a non-governmental organization (NGO) in which Osnos has been deeply involved and which was instrumental in helping to transform dissent within the Soviet bloc into a political force, thus helping to undermine the Soviet system and facilitating the Cold War's peaceful resolution. The book includes two chapters by Helsinki Watch's former director, Holly Cartner, reminiscing about the NGO's transformation after its “Helsinki connection became less important . . . and the ambitions of the organization became increasingly global” (p. 128), with activists pursuing more self-centered agendas.Rebranded as Human Rights Watch (HRW) and serving as a watchdog of human rights anywhere, the group raised eyebrows when it “aligned itself with the position of far-right politicians” (p. 129) and again when it accepted Saudi money and “crossed . . . the threshold” by naming Israel “an apartheid state” (p. 132). After HRW chose “neutrality” by “not picking sides in [the Russia-Ukraine] war or ascribing blame for starting it” (p. 136), Osnos came to wonder whether “it is possible to denounce violence of all kinds when one side is defending itself and the other is intent on maximum destruction” (p. 135). Yet, he still regards HRW as “far and away the most important global human rights and social justice organization in history,” confident that its “scale . . . and the endowment (rare among NGOs) and a record of sustained achievement, assures that it will remain a pillar of human rights” (pp. 65, 140).Davy's study is refreshingly free of such ruminations. Although the book does not add much to what is already known about the Helsinki process, it provides a reliable overview and adds to a better understanding of it as a unique experiment in multilateral diplomacy. Based on solid command of the voluminous secondary literature and salient primary sources, Davy poses the right questions, without necessarily offering final answers, leaving it up to readers to form their own judgments. In explaining the road to Helsinki, he attributes key importance to the rise of détente
俄罗斯对主权国家乌克兰的入侵，以及随之而来的暴行，是否将1975年的赫尔辛基协议及其对人权的倡导，扔进了历史的垃圾箱?两本截然不同的书，都是前西方主要报纸驻莫斯科记者写的，对此持不同意见。《华盛顿邮报》(The Washington Post)前记者彼得•奥斯诺斯(Peter Osnos)希望我们“相信赫尔辛基协议改变了世界”，因为它促进了人权和安全。理查德·戴维(Richard Davy)是伦敦《泰晤士报》(The Times)的记者，他对此并不确定。第一本书主要是一本回忆录，突出了作者、他的妻子和他的岳父、美国大使阿尔伯特·w·谢勒在赫尔辛基进程和欧洲安全与合作会议(欧安会)的早期阶段对其形成的贡献。它所包括的关于欧安会的情况很少为人所知，但它阐明了赫尔辛基观察小组的发展轨迹。赫尔辛基观察小组是一个非政府组织，阿斯诺斯一直深入参与其中，它在帮助将苏联集团内部的异议转化为一股政治力量方面发挥了重要作用，从而有助于破坏苏联制度，促进冷战的和平解决。书中有两章是赫尔辛基观察前主任霍利·卡特纳(Holly Cartner)写的，他回忆了这个非政府组织在“与赫尔辛基的联系变得不那么重要了……”之后的转型。该组织的野心变得越来越全球化”(第128页)，活动人士追求更多以自我为中心的议程。该组织更名为“人权观察”(HRW)，作为世界各地人权的监督者，当它“与极右翼政客的立场一致”(第129页)，当它再次接受沙特的资金并“越过……”时，令人惊讶。将以色列称为“种族隔离国家”(第132页)。人权观察选择了“中立”，“在[俄乌]战争中不选边站，也不归咎于战争的肇事者”(第136页)，之后，Osnos开始怀疑“当一方在自卫，另一方意图最大限度地破坏时，是否有可能谴责各种暴力行为”(第135页)。然而，他仍然认为人权观察是“历史上最重要的全球人权和社会正义组织”，相信它的“规模……捐款(在非政府组织中是罕见的)和持续成就的记录保证它将继续是人权的支柱”(第65、140页)。戴维的研究没有这样的沉思，令人耳目一新。尽管这本书对赫尔辛基进程的已知内容没有增加太多内容，但它提供了一个可靠的概述，并有助于更好地理解它是多边外交的一次独特实验。基于对大量二手文献和重要第一手资料的扎实掌握，戴维提出了正确的问题，而不必提供最终答案，让读者自己形成自己的判断。在解释通往赫尔辛基的道路时，他将关键的重要性归因于“过渡时期”的兴起。“过渡时期”被定义为20世纪60年代和70年代，当时冷战的对手得出结论，认为缓和紧张局势符合他们的利益，尽管在20世纪80年代初，在僵局达到意想不到的过渡时期之前，就已经陷入了“第二次冷战”。戴维将赫尔辛基进程归功于冷战的“解冻”，但他并没有谈到一个更大的问题，即谈判是否加速或推迟了对抗的圆满结束。《冷战及以后的解冻》一书并没有试图将1975年的赫尔辛基最后文件与苏联集团的解体直接联系起来。戴维认为，赫尔辛基进程“促成了东欧共产主义的终结”，但“没有导致崩溃”(第234-235页)。他认为，这一结果不是由外交、多边或其他方式的作用产生的，而是由该地区人民自下而上和自上而下的及时行动产生的，更重要的是，由于他们的统治者在苏维埃国家权力结构刚开始崩溃时缺乏行动。戴维观察到，当冷战结束时，“欧安会成员国可能会宣布他们的工作已经完成”，然后关门大吉。相反，“赫尔辛基进程进入了一个全新的阶段[并]继续发展”(第173页)。会议不仅将自己重塑为一个机构，尽管没有法人资格——欧洲安全与合作组织(欧安组织)——而且还扩大了自己的范围，包括苏联的中亚继承国，这些国家的欧洲身份受到质疑。到2015年，作为世界上最大的地区安全组织，拥有近60个成员国，本应通过协商一致的方式做出决定，但由于俄罗斯的阻挠，它在很大程度上陷入了瘫痪。尽管如此，戴维仍然对欧安组织的潜力持乐观态度，他特别提到了欧安组织在容易被操纵的国家监督选举的记录。 然而，甚至在俄罗斯侵略乌克兰之前，欧安会/欧安组织就已经被其他国际组织边缘化了——不仅是北大西洋公约组织和欧盟，还有欧洲委员会、联合国和世界最大经济体组成的20国集团。在回答“是否错过了建立一个包括俄罗斯在内的新的泛欧安全体系的机会，使其感到不那么孤立和威胁”(第189页)这个令人厌倦的问题时，戴维检查了各种各样的论点，无论是被误导还是虚伪，然后得出结论“最终[俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京是]做出选择的人”(第202页)。在该书付印后不久，普京决定对俄罗斯的斯拉夫邻国发动一场全面战争，这使得俄罗斯在欧洲安全体系中的成员资格问题在不确定的未来成为问题。关于赫尔辛基模式是否可以应用于世界其他地方的问题，Davy的“简短的回答是否定的，[因为]赫尔辛基是特定于它在冷战欧洲的时间和地点的”(第239页)。因此，它的遗产可以归结为可以从中吸取什么教训，或者考虑到冷战的反常性质，应该避免哪些错误的教训。他考虑了十几个可能的教训，从欧安会的程序革新到运用其软实力以及寻求安全和人权之间的联系。然而，“在从工具箱中进行选择之前”，“我们必须在历史背景下全面看待它”(第247页)。因此，例如，试图在乌克兰战争中采用1998年爱尔兰耶稣受难日协议谈判中奏效的赫尔辛基式“篮子”方法——仿佛冲突各方在任何方面都具有可比性——将是不可能成功的。在撰写本文之时，由于俄罗斯对乌克兰的战争仍在肆虐，其结果也不确定，赫尔辛基进程对欧洲安全困境的相关性也不确定。只要一场真正的战争还在进行，军事力量，而不是软实力或其他任何力量，才是至高无上的。在妥协无望的时候，外交应该暂停。然而，所有的战争最终都会结束，而且，只要俄罗斯被击败，战后可能出现的安全环境可能会使欧安组织复苏，甚至可能通过应用赫尔辛基原则将欧洲及其中亚“近邻”团结起来。如果事实证明是这样的话，戴维的书不仅可以成为学生，也可以成为政策制定者不可或缺的入门读物。
{"title":"<i>Would You Believe . . . the Helsinki Accords Changed the World? Advancing Global Human Rights and, for Decades, Security in Europe</i> by Peter L. W. Osnos with Holly Cartner","authors":"Vojtech Mastny","doi":"10.1162/jcws_r_01163","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_r_01163","url":null,"abstract":"Has Russia's invasion of sovereign Ukraine, with its attendant atrocities, relegated the 1975 Helsinki agreement and its advocacy of human rights to the dustbin of history? Two very different books, both by former Moscow correspondents of major Western newspapers, disagree. Peter Osnos, a former correspondent for The Washington Post, wants us “to believe [that] the Helsinki accords changed the world” by advancing both human rights and security. Richard Davy, who was a correspondent for The Times of London, is not so certain.The first book is primarily a memoir highlighting the contributions by the author, his wife, and his father-in-law, U.S. ambassador Albert W. Sherer, to the shaping of the Helsinki process and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in its early stages. It includes little on CSCE that is not already known but sheds light on the trajectory of the Helsinki Watch group, a non-governmental organization (NGO) in which Osnos has been deeply involved and which was instrumental in helping to transform dissent within the Soviet bloc into a political force, thus helping to undermine the Soviet system and facilitating the Cold War's peaceful resolution. The book includes two chapters by Helsinki Watch's former director, Holly Cartner, reminiscing about the NGO's transformation after its “Helsinki connection became less important . . . and the ambitions of the organization became increasingly global” (p. 128), with activists pursuing more self-centered agendas.Rebranded as Human Rights Watch (HRW) and serving as a watchdog of human rights anywhere, the group raised eyebrows when it “aligned itself with the position of far-right politicians” (p. 129) and again when it accepted Saudi money and “crossed . . . the threshold” by naming Israel “an apartheid state” (p. 132). After HRW chose “neutrality” by “not picking sides in [the Russia-Ukraine] war or ascribing blame for starting it” (p. 136), Osnos came to wonder whether “it is possible to denounce violence of all kinds when one side is defending itself and the other is intent on maximum destruction” (p. 135). Yet, he still regards HRW as “far and away the most important global human rights and social justice organization in history,” confident that its “scale . . . and the endowment (rare among NGOs) and a record of sustained achievement, assures that it will remain a pillar of human rights” (pp. 65, 140).Davy's study is refreshingly free of such ruminations. Although the book does not add much to what is already known about the Helsinki process, it provides a reliable overview and adds to a better understanding of it as a unique experiment in multilateral diplomacy. Based on solid command of the voluminous secondary literature and salient primary sources, Davy poses the right questions, without necessarily offering final answers, leaving it up to readers to form their own judgments. In explaining the road to Helsinki, he attributes key importance to the rise of détente","PeriodicalId":45551,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cold War Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135495457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Editor's Note","authors":"","doi":"10.1162/jcws_e_01155","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_e_01155","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45551,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cold War Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135495464","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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